Inmetalogic andmetamathematics,Frege's theorem is ametatheorem that states that thePeano axioms ofarithmetic can be derived insecond-order logic fromHume's principle. It was first proven, informally, byGottlob Frege in his 1884Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (The Foundations of Arithmetic)[1] and proven more formally in his 1893Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I (Basic Laws of Arithmetic I).[2] The theorem was re-discovered byCrispin Wright in the early 1980s and has since been the focus of significant work. It is at the core of thephilosophy of mathematics known asneo-logicism (at least of theScottish School variety).
InThe Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), and later, inBasic Laws of Arithmetic (vol. 1, 1893; vol. 2, 1903), Frege attempted to derive all of the laws of arithmetic from axioms he asserted as logical (seelogicism). Most of these axioms were carried over from hisBegriffsschrift; the one truly new principle was one he called theBasic Law V[2] (now known as theaxiom schema of unrestricted comprehension):[3] the "value-range" of the functionf(x) is the same as the "value-range" of the functiong(x) if and only if ∀x[f(x) =g(x)]. However, not only did Basic Law V fail to be a logical proposition, but the resulting system proved to be inconsistent, because it was subject toRussell's paradox.[4]
The inconsistency in Frege'sGrundgesetze overshadowed Frege's achievement: according toEdward Zalta, theGrundgesetze "contains all the essential steps of a valid proof (insecond-order logic) of the fundamental propositions of arithmetic from a single consistent principle."[4] This achievement has become known as Frege's theorem.[4][5]
( | P | → | ( | Q | → | R | )) | → | (( | P | → | Q | ) | → | ( | P | → | R | )) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ![]() | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ![]() | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ![]() | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✗ | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ![]() | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ![]() | ![]() | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ![]() | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
Inpropositional logic, Frege's theorem refers to thistautology:
The theorem already holds in one of the weakest logics imaginable, the constructiveimplicational calculus. The proof under theBrouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation reads. In words: "Letf denote a reason thatP implies thatQ impliesR. And letg denote a reason thatP impliesQ. Then given af, then given ag, then given a reasonp forP, we know that bothQ holds byg and thatQ impliesR holds byf. SoR holds."
Thetruth table to the right gives a semantic proof. For all possible assignments offalse (✗) ortrue (✓) toP,Q, andR (columns 1, 3, 5), each subformula is evaluated according to the rules formaterial conditional, the result being shown below its main operator. Column 6 shows that the whole formula evaluates totrue in every case, i.e. that it is a tautology. In fact, itsantecedent (column 2) and itsconsequent (column 10) are even equivalent.
One commonly takes to mean, where denotes a false proposition.With for, the theorem entails thecurried form of thenegation introduction principle,
Frege's startling discovery, of which he may or may not have been fully aware and which has been lost to view since the discovery of Russell's paradox, was thatarithmetic can be derived in a purely logical system like that of hisBegriffsschrift from this consistent principle and from it alone.