| Battle of Chamdo | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theAnnexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China and theCold War | |||||||||
 PLA troops crossing theMekong River prior to the battle. | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Tibet |  China | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (POW)[1]Lhalu Tsewang Dorje[2] | Liu BochengDeng XiaopingZhang GuohuaFan Ming | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Tibetan Army: 8,500[3] | People's Liberation Army: 40,000[4][5] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
180 killed or wounded[6][7][8] 3,341 killed, wounded, surrendered, captured, or defected (Chinese estimate)[2] | 114 killed or wounded[6] | ||||||||
TheBattle of Chamdo (orQamdo;Chinese:昌都战役) occurred from 6 to 24 October 1950.[9][10] It was a military campaign by thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) to take theChamdo Region from ade facto independentTibetan state.[11][12][13][14] The campaign resulted in the capture of Chamdo and theannexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China.
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Kham was a border region of Tibet. The eastern part of Kham had been under the direct control of China during theQing dynasty. Its western half is known as Chamdo.
The Khampa Tibetans and Lhasa Tibetans held each other in mutual contempt and dislike, with the Khampas in some cases hating Lhasa rule even more than Chinese rule, which was why the Khampas did little to resist Chinese forces as they entered eastern Kham and subsequently took over the whole of Tibet.[15] Likewise, the Qinghai (Amdo) Tibetans view the Tibetans of Central Tibet (Tibet proper, ruled by the Dalai Lamas from Lhasa) as different from themselves and even take pride in the fact that they were not ruled by Lhasa ever since the collapse of theTibetan Empire.[16]
Khampas like thePandatsang clan had led rebellions for autonomy from Lhasa. Because of this, the Chinese communists viewed them as potential revolutionary allies. In January 1950, the communists officially proposed to aid the Pandatsang brothers' cause in exchange for them to stay on the sidelines during the "liberation of Tibet", but the Pandatsang brothers decided instead to sendGeorge Patterson to India to seek alternate aid.[17]Pandatsang Rapga, leader of the pro-KuomintangTibet Improvement Party also offered the Lhasa-appointed governor of Chamdo,Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the local independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer.
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On 7 March 1950, a Tibetan government delegation arrived inKalimpong to open a dialogue with the newly declaredPeople's Republic of China and aimed to secure assurances that it would respect Tibet's territorial integrity, among other things. The dialogue was delayed by a debate between the Tibetan, Indian, British and the PRC delegation over the location of the talks.
The Tibetan delegation eventually met with the PRC's ambassador GeneralYuan Zhongxian in Delhi on 16 September 1950. Yuan communicated a three-point claimed proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet's defense, and that China was responsible for Tibet's trade and foreign relations. Refusal would result in conquest by China. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one of preceptor and patron, and their head delegate,Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on 19 September, recommended cooperation (but with some stipulations about implementation). Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet, it was argued, since it was under no threat, and if attacked by India or Nepal could appeal to China for military assistance.
After the defeat of majorKuomintang forces in theChinese Civil War, thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) turned its attention to the Republic of China territories in the hinterland. Eastern Kham was the Chinese-held part ofSikang and the gateway to Tibetan areas. The 18th Army of the PLA formed the leading detachment advancing toward Tibet with the 52nd Division as its main force, and arrived atYa'an on 12 February 1950. In March, the People's Liberation Army arrived inKangding (Tachienlu). By mid-April, the 18th Army had at least 30,000 passing through Kangding, and 10,000 Tibetans helped to build the road from Kangding toGarzê (Kandze), which was completed in August. The 18th Army of the PLA assembled at Garzê on 30 July, headquartered atXinlong, and enteredLitang from the east. The Qinghai Cavalry Detachment enteredGyêgu on 22 July, forming a north–southpincer on Chamdo.[18]
In June 1950, the PLA and the Tibetan army fought for the first time in Dengke (also known as Dengo[14]). Dengke is located beside the main road from Garzê toYushu, about 100 miles northeast of Chamdo. Former Chamdo governorLhalu Tsewang Dorje had set up a radio station there. 50 PLA soldiers captured Dengke and destroyed the radio station.[14] Two weeks later (July), 800 Khampa militia (including 300 monks) raided Dengke, claiming to have killed 600 PLA soldiers.[19] In the end, the PLA succeeded in occupying eastern Kham.[20]
After months of failed negotiations,[14] attempts by Lhasa to secure foreign support and assistance,[21] and the troop buildups by the PRC[22] and Tibet,[23] the PLA crossed theJinsha River on 6 or 7 October 1950 into Lhasa-controlled Chamdo, crossing thede facto border[24] at five places.[25]
Two PLA units quickly captured the bordertown of Chamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA[6] soldiers and 180 Tibetan[6][7][8] soldiers had been killed or wounded. The Chamdo governor and commander of Tibetan forces,Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, surrendered with his 2,700 men. Writing in 1962,Zhang Guohua claimed that 5,738 enemy troops were "liquidated", over 5,700 were "destroyed", and "more than 3,000" peacefully surrendered.[26] Active hostilities were limited to a border area controlled by Lhasa northeast of the riverGyalmo Ngulchu River (upper reaches ofSalween River in Tibet) and east of the 96th meridian.[27]
After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures onsocialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes.[28] According tothe Dalai Lama, the PLA did not attack civilians.[29]
With the capture of Chamdo, the PLA believed the objective to have been reached, unilaterally ceased hostilities,[7][30] and sentNgabo toLhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation, and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates toBeijing.[31]
On 21 October, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the PRC government, and to accept the first provision if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before theSix-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.[32][33][34]
On 24 October, all military operations ended.
After news of the defeat at the Battle of Chamdo reached Lhasa, RegentNgawang Sungrab Thutob stepped down, and the14th Dalai Lama was enthroned ahead of plans. In February 1951, five plenipotentiaries from Tibet were sent to Beijing to negotiate with the PRC government, led by chief representativeNgabo. In late April 1951, the TibetanKashag delegation went to Beijing to conclude peace talks, again led by Ngabo, who would go on to serve in the high ranks of the PLA and PRC government. TheSeventeen Point Agreement was eventually signed between the Chinese and the Tibetans.
After releasing the captured soldiers, Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites would not be denied their positions and power.[35]
Some Khampa fighters continued their opposition. Local warlords later became united under a common objective and hence resulted in the formation ofChushi Gangdruk with assistance from the CIA.[36]
According to contemporary authorMelvyn Goldstein, the campaign aimed to capture the Lhasa army occupying Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and to exert pressure to get Tibetan representatives to agree to negotiations in Beijing and sign terms recognizing China's sovereignty over Tibet.[37]
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