the ‘surrender policies’ that have been applied to Assam have been outrageous both in their conception and their consequences. These "ill-conceived and counter-productive policies," K.P.S. Gill remarks, "…create utterly unrealistic and unjustifiable expectations in the minds of those who surrender, and display a far greater concern among our political establishment for the welfare of the terrorists, than they do for the security and welfare of the common people."⁵ The surrender policies, in fact, have done much worse – they have created a Frankensteinian monster, a gigantic organized crime conglomerate that retains all the instruments and practices of terrorism, though it abandons its political intent, and that operates substantially under the protection of, and in collusion with, the state and its agents.

The enormity of this must be understood against the backdrop of some of Assam’s economic and quality of life indicators. The annual per capita income stood at a mere Rs. 4,281 in 1990-91. Even in 1993-94, 40.9 per cent of the population was below the poverty line. Per capita bank deposits are the lowest in the country, at Rs. 2,715. In other words, in a region where poverty and unemployment were rampant, and resource constraints acute, the government was simply handing out over 90 times and more of the then State annual per capita income to anyone who claimed to be a terrorist, and expressed willingness to surrender.

The very large – and largely unproductive – outlays on these schemes were only the visible costs of the surrender policy. The social and economic costs of the creation of the SULFA were to prove far more devastating. But the proximate logic and consequences need some further elaboration.

Surrenders, Gill pointed out, were also encouraged in Punjab during the later stages of the terrorist movement there, but with critical differences in the terms offered:

D.N. Bezboruah, editor of the influential local daily,The Sentinel, described the surrender package as ‘perverted’, adding, "That is why it failed. There were easy cash and soft loans but none of the projects really got off. Result was a Frankenstein monster."

Mahanta made it a point to declare that, unlike Hiteshwar Saikia’s policy, the surrendered terrorists would not be given soft bank loans to start businesses.¹⁷ The salient features of the scheme were:

Needless to say, since the government was under pressure to demonstrate the ‘success’ of the policy through ‘surrender ceremonies’ involving large numbers of ‘terrorists’, the clause relating to the screening of ‘exceptional and deserving cases’ was entirely ignored. More than 500 militants surrendered in the year 1998, but, according to senior State government officials, they were never produced before the Screening Committee. The scheme also explicitly stated that there would be no amnesty for serious crimes committed in the past by the surrendering militants. However, none of the surrendered militants have been interrogated, nor has any charge sheet been filed against them even for the most serious crimes known to have been committed by many of the prominent SULFA leaders.

but this was also followed more in the breach than in practice. Indeed, till November 1999, the Assam government had not opened even a single rehabilitation centre. A series of programmes were, however, initiated in various centres for surrendered militants on November 27, 1999. These included ‘motivational programmes’, yoga, composite farming, raising of mini tea gardens, poultry, piggery, dairy farming and fishery modules under the Indian Institute of Entrepreneurship (IIE) and the Industrial Training Institutes (ITI). The participation in these programmes was modest, ranging from 22 at Dibrugarh to 132 at Bongaigaon. The duration of the training and vocational programmes varied between as little as one day at Tinsukia to eight days at the 10^th AP Battalion Camp at Khettri. Some permanent camps have, however, been in existence in the Army and Police headquarters and encampments for the protection of SULFA cadres against the wrath of their erstwhile comrades in the ULFA.

Though estimates of the actual costs incurred on running these programmes are not available, the range of training, the resources allocated and the scale of some of the activities suggests figures that are far from modest.

with the State government working as a coordinating and supervising agency. Here, again, the planners’ vision was severely flawed. The SULFA comprised a group of surrendered terrorists, and their linkages with both the underground and the SULFA syndicates that had already established themselves under the 1992 scheme. Legitimate NGOs were hardly in a position to resist any threats from the SULFA themselves; moreover, they ran the twin risk of attracting the ire of the ULFA and other insurgent groups by running the rehabilitation centers intended to wean away cadres from the militancy. "With genuine NGOs likely to stay away, what the rehabilitation scheme may result in is the creation of some fly-by-night organizations out to make a fast buck." What results, consequently, is a combination of scams and complete neglect.

However, some symbolic projects were implemented and projected as the great ‘successes’ of the scheme. Thus 73 surrendered militants, including the former ULFA leader Abinash Bordoloi, were involved in harvesting paddy and mustard flower on a 150-bigha plot of land under the aegis of the ‘Udyan Multipurpose Cooperative Society’ at Bhanbhag Salbari in Nalbari district.

Further confirmation of the sheer extent of the failure comes from an unexpected source, and in an unexpected context. Even as Prafulla Kumar Mahanta boasted of the ‘success’ of his surrender policy, he was, by early 2000, already admitting that there was need to amend the rehabilitation package as the existing package was "not adequate to encourage the insurgents to come to the mainstream. He suggested that to make the package more attractive, a margin money scheme should be added to it and the Centre can also announce a recruitment policy for appointing surrendered militants in the armed forces – CRPF, BSF and the PSUs." In other words, Mahanta was arguing for the restoration of virtually every element of the Hiteshwar Saikia scheme that his government had so strongly criticized barely a year and a half earlier. The consensus at the Centre also endorses the comprehensive failure of the scheme, and the Union Home Ministry’s Annual Report for the year 1999-2000 notes that "The experience of the north-eastern States under this scheme has not been very encouraging. There is a need to review the scheme."

The handful of cases in which the police have been goaded to arrest or act against the culprits gives an indication of the sheer scope and invasive character of these activities. Thus, on February 13, 2000, SULFA activist Jayanta Gogoi was arrested in North Lakhimpur attempting to extort money from a shopkeeper. On February 24, 2000, the Guwahati police arrested SULFA leader Manoj Hazarika for planning to collect ‘regular taxes’ from the Public Call Offices (PCOs) in the city. On February 16, 2000, police in Chandmari arrested three SULFA men on charges of abducting two businessmen of Guwahati. In the same month, recovery of five stolen vehicles in Guwahati led to the discovery of a roaring stolen vehicle business run by SULFA activists Dhekial Phukan and Kajal Khan. SULFA leader Putul Das was arrested on March 23, 2000 in connection with a bomb explosion case inside Itachali police outpost in Nagaon town. On April 15, 2000, police in Panbazar in Guwahati arrested a SULFA activist, Jiten Gogoi, on charges of extortion from a computer firm. According to police sources, the accused demanded Rs. 10,000 monthly in addition to Rs.800 per Internet connection provided by the firm. SULFA activist Krishna Hazarika was arrested for threatening a civilian in the Beltola Tiniali area of Guwahati on May 14, 2000. Two SULFA activists were arrested while demanding Rs. 50,000 in the name of ULFA at Lahdaigarh on June 29, 2000. Four SULFA activists were arrested on charges of demanding Rs.3.2 million from timber traders in Lanka. On October 19, 2000, an illegal checkpoint erected by SULFA activists for collection of money from passing vehicles was dismantled in the Barnihat area. On September 14, police in Basistha arrested a SULFA activist Jitu Goswami for trying to occupy a plot of land belonging to another person. Three SULFA activists were arrested on charges of abducting a businessman in Morigaon in October 2000. On October 16, 2000, "after failing to collect ‘goonda tax’ from the fisher man at Balbala Bazar near Goalpara, armed SULFA activists resorted to indiscriminate firing leading to the death of one and injury to eight other fishermen." Police in Bharalu, on October 26, rescued a girl abducted by a SULFA activist Manoj Hazarika. On November 6, 2000, police in Noonamati arrested SULFA activist Dhruba Talukdar and his accomplice for vandalism in a cinema hall.

Individual instances of extortion, moreover, represent only a fraction of the activities of the SULFA, which now either controls all important business activities in the State, or allows them to function only under its ‘protection’ – obviously for a substantial ‘consideration’. The takeover of legitimate businesses by the ULFA has immensely distorted the legal economy, making it impossible for businesses to operate competitively in the absence of ‘protection’ from SULFA cadres. A large number of traders have consequently been thrown out of business by force, while a ‘goonda tax’ is imposed on others. Indeed, in May 2000, the Director General of Police was compelled to take cognizance of the magnitude of the problem and to direct all District Superintendents of Police in the State to immediately take action against the SULFA and furnish all relevant information about their activities to the State police headquarters. The directive was, at best, symbolic, as the power of the SULFA and its patrons in government prevailed to ensure that no significant damage was done to its basic operations.

A similar racket on rail contracts was also exposed recently in a report that claimed, "Construction work for upgradation of the 198-km-long Silchar–Lumding metre gauge railway track into a broad gauge line has been jeopardised by a syndicate which has links with a section of SULFA activists."

Das also pointed to a number of secondary indicators of dramatic increases in disposable income and conspicuous consumption among a narrow section of the population in the State. Other sources indicate that a number of very prominent businesses, including several new hotels set up in Guwahati and other prominent locations in the State, are owned by the SULFA, which also runs the cable television network in the city.

In actual practice, however, the politics of expediency simply set up a second faction of the SULFA, in this case significantly aligned to the AGP. As for arms, not only did the surrendering cadres fail to surrender all their weapons – they surrendered only a fraction, and most of these were obsolete – they were subsequently provided gun licences and armed guards by the state as well, on grounds of their personal security against retributive attacks by the ULFA. Thus, the possession of arms by the SULFA, often illegal in nature, remains an open secret. In January 2001, a government official conceded that "It is true that there are many illegal weapons in the hands of the surrendered militants." Fitful efforts by the police to disarm the SULFA – hastily abandoned under political and internal pressure on each occasion – have thrown up some evidence of such illegal arms possession. Thus, when two AK-56 rifles and some ammunition were discovered from a garbage dump in Guwahati in the first week of January 2000, the police blamed SULFA activists and claimed that these "were dumped by the SULFA ostensibly to evade police action against illegal weapon-holders among them." The ‘police action’ had been initiated as a result of mounting public pressure to restrain suspected renegades from allegedly persecuting family members of ULFA militants.

There are also instances of wider police complicity in acts of vandalism and intimidation. On May 19, 2000, for instance, "A posse of Assam police personnel and armed surrendered Ulfa men intruded inside Lokon village, some 35 KMs from Mon town and about half a kilometre from the boundary with Assam, on Wednesday, and allegedly assaulted 35 villagers. They also abducted seven gaonburahs (village headmen) who were later released."

The only step the administration could take in January 2001was to ask the PSOs to "wear uniforms and display their identity cards to avoid any kind of ‘misunderstanding’ between the police and the public."

Estimates of actual casualties vary, and, on the higher side, Lachit Bordoloi of the Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS), claimed in 1999 that, "Since 1998, more than 110 people have been victims of these secret killings." The reliability of this claim must, however, be qualified with the understanding that MASS is widely known to be aligned with the ULFA, and a recent Union Ministry of Home Affairs notification identified it as one of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) known to have linkages with militant groups.

In what has been interpreted as a retaliatory measure, SULFA businessman Tapan Dutta was killed by suspected ULFA terrorists on July 26, 1998. This was followed by the killing of Diganta Baruah, a suspect in the Parag Das killing, on December 3, 1998. Another accused in the same case, Dhekial Phukan was never convicted, and reportedly went on to establish a stolen car business in Guwahati.

These killings, however, have also been interpreted as part of the political polarization that precedes elections, and the alleged nexus between political parties and both these armed groups. In this context, there were a number of attacks on relatives of the ULFA terrorists since December 2000. "The ancestral home of ULFA commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah was attacked. Dipak Chowdhury, brother of Sasha Chowdhury, Chief of ULFA’s external wing, was shot dead at his Nalbari residence. The house of Sashi Phukan, another ULFA cadre, was blown up at Baihata in Kamrup district. The house was earlier attacked seven times. ULFA miliant Dhristi Rajkhowa’s house was also attacked in Goalpara." Jyotish Sarma, an employee at the Guwahati University and brother-in-law of ULFA terrorist Subhas Sarma was also killed by suspected SULFA cadres in the first week of January 2001. Violence from one camp also provoked retaliatory violence from the other. A SULFA terrorist Monikut Kolita was killed in Mangaldoi. On the very second day of the year 2001, noted SULFA leader Abinash Bordoloi and two of his accomplices were gunned down by ULFA hitmen at Bongbagh Solmara village in Nalbari district.

Police in the State appear to have conceded SULFA involvement in these incidents, and the Guwahati City Superintendent of Police, G.P. Singh publicly declared that he would take all possible steps to disarm the SULFA members ‘within seven days’. That, of course, was in early January 2001. There is little subsequent evidence of any effective measures to secure this objective having consistently been taken thereafter. At least part of the problem in this context arises from within the police organization itself, and the perceived ‘utility’ of the SULFA among a section of the officials. The Director General of Police, H.K. Deka, was reportedly in favor of taking action against the SULFA, but others are said to have argued that "SULFA members have been helping the police by providing information and other assistance against the ULFA. Besides, there is a question of their security."

Whether the SULFA is regarded by the police as an ‘anti-social force’, however, remains open to interpretation. Unfortunately, from the official perspective, SULFA leaders have tended to undermine the SF’s position. On May 22, 1999, prominent SULFA leader Siddhartha Phukan (now Sunil Nath) thus accused the government of ‘blackmailing’ former terrorists into providing information about the militant outfit. Nath said that he and his comrades committed certain mistakes in the past, of which the government was taking advantage.

Shekatkar added that the "usefulness of a surrendered militant was very restricted in the long run. When a militant who has surrendered recently is of no use to us, how can the SULFA, which came overground seven years ago, have any utility for our information gathering machinery?" What Shekatkar chose to overlook is the continuous addition to SULFA’s number that keep the latter updated with ULFA’s activities, and the continuum of surviving linkages and relationships that create opportunities for information flow. Such an argument, moreover, can only apply to the use of the SULFA as a source of information – to which there can be no very serious objection, unless the arrangement is coercive. The more serious allegations regarding the operational use of the SULFA, including the charges regarding the secret killings, however, are not even addressed in this defense.

Police authorities, of course, immediately denied this allegation. But the fact that a sitting Minister chose to air such serious charge certainly gives rise to strong suspicions.

Here, the rule of law lapses entirely, as the institutions of governance are subverted to serve personal and partisan ends of those who control them – directly, or through such collusive arrangements as may obtain – even while the edifice and processes of governance, including the electoral process and justice administration, remain apparently intact.

For good measure, there were also allegations of an implicit understanding between the Congress-I and ULFA. These allegations are, of course, routinely denied, but the evidence will not go away, and the fact is that each political party in the State does maintain some contact with the SULFA – although this varies in character and intensity from party to party, and from time to time. The larger than life image that the SULFA has acquired over the years makes such an arrangement virtually indispensable, both for the ruling and the opposition parties – and these arrangements, in turn, enormously reinforce SULFA’s power and ‘credibility’.

A few months before the State Assembly elections in 2001 nearly 300 SULFA activists joined the AGP. At least two SULFA leaders, Chakra Gohain, the former ULFA armed wing ‘deputy chief’ and Prafulla Bora alias Dhekial Phukan, former Lakhimpur ‘district commander’ applied for Congress party nominations to contest the elections. The AGP actively considered SULFA leader Lohit Deuri’s request for a party ticket from the Nalbari constituency. Another SULFA leader Jayanta Hazarika alias Kushal Duwari negotiated with both the AGP and the Congress-I for a ticket from a constituency in Sibasagar district. There have also been instances of parties such as the Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) being accused of maintaining links with the SULFA.

In the run-up to the elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which eventually became the AGP’s poll partner, had raised apprehensions regarding the use of SULFA by the AGP.

to put an end to the activities of the various ‘syndicates’ controlled by the SULFA. Worse, there is limited evidence that suggests that what is actually occurring is a violent contest for control of these syndicates between factions of the SULFA aligned to the earlier Mahanta government, and those who have closer links with the Congress-I government now in power. The police raid on the residence of SULFA leaders Jogesh Kishor Mahanta and Bhaskar Sharma, who control the so-called ‘coal syndicate’ at Beltola, is a case in point. Mahanta and Sharma are reported to have been "close to former chief minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta." The police raid, interestingly, is reported to have been organized in response to "a complaint lodged by a section of the SULFA leaders."

but the theory was subsequently questioned by the State Finance, Revenue and Power Minister, Debanand Konwar, who questioned the haste with which the blame was pinned on the ULFA and the NSCN even before the investigation started, and described the police investigation as "nothing but an effort to hoodwink the people, hush up the real truth and shield the real culprits." Subsequent, albeit speculative, media reports suggested that the Moran massacre might have been the result of a factional feud within the SULFA. The truth on this will certainly take time to establish – and may, indeed, never be known – but more specific evidence of the deepening cleavage and competition within the SULFA did come in the form of widely divergent responses to the Moran massacre by two separate groups of SULFA leaders. Thus, at a Press Conference on June 22, 2001, Jayanta Hazarika alias Kushal Duri, Kalpajyoti Neog, and others made a fervent appeal "to all sections concerned to stop this violence." Hazarika went even further, saying that he repented for all the wrongs that he had done "under duress or forced upon him by the administration" and appealed to the ULFA "to condone the boys for their involuntary association with counter-insurgency operations after coming overground." On the other hand, Sunil Nath, Agni Nurjery, Mridul Phukan alias Samar Kakaty and some other leaders, at another meeting on June 23, 2001, took a very hard line against the ULFA, blaming it for the carnage at Moran, and declaring that "they would take revenge". This latter group also controls the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha (AJM), which had been created in a bid to project a ‘saner picture’ of the SULFA in the year 2000. The AJM was described as a non-political organisation. SULFA leader and former publicity secretary of the ULFA, Sunil Nath, had stated, "Most of us are members of the newly formed AJM, and our office bearers are debarred from contesting elections or taking active part in it." Shortly after the June 23 meeting, AJM Chairman Tirtha Bhuyan had also accused ULFA ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah of trying to divide the SULFA cadres.

or the "systematic and premeditated use or threatened use of violence for politically motivated purposes." There is, of course, a wide range of other definitions, and substantial variations of interpretation, but the notion of an integral link between terrorism and its ‘political objectives’ is a consistent feature of the literature. At one level, this is a useful theoretical construct, necessary to distinguish terrorism from other patterns of extreme violence – and especially from organized crime. Unfortunately, reality often fails to conform to useful theoretical constructs, which then become obstacles to a fuller appreciation of the complexities on the ground. Increasingly, terrorism has tended to mix in a multiplicity of motives – political, personal and purely criminal – in varying measure, but along an unbroken continuum, depending on transient and often entirely incidental constellations of events and forces. The result, one observer notes, is that:

Within such a scheme of understanding, SULFA would be clearly identified as a terrorist organization to the extent that armed violence and intimidation remain central to its activities and survival.

The surrender policy in Assam has brought criminals and delinquents to the very center of the powers of the state, and this is intolerable within the context of a constitutional democracy. This situation must be reversed if any measure of democratic governance is to be restored. The present regime has both the power and the opportunity to secure such a restoration. What it will have to demonstrate, however, is whether it has the integrity and the will.