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RHODESIA - MZILIKAZE TO SMITH

(Africa Institute Bulletin, vol. 15, 1977)

The Rhodesian problem is essentially the outcome of white and black settlement in Southern Africa, and the resultant confrontation between two societies - West European and African, and the central issue today revolves round the continued survival of whites, and the contribution they can, or will be allowed to make to Rhodesia's future development.

Modern Rhodesian history dates back to the Matabele migration from the Transvaal in the late 1830'swhen they arrived in the area now known as Bulawayo. The Matabele, a scion of the Zulu nation, under their Chief Mzilikaze, were driven from the Transvaal after attacks on the Voor-trekkers. Their encroachment on the land north of the Limpopo marks that first repercussion white settlement in Southern Africa was to have on the course of Rhodesian history.

The Matabele were a predatory race, and established themselves in their new environment by subjugating the original inhabitants until they were firmly entrenched as rulers of the territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers. Their impis foraged far and wide across the land, looting cattle and capturing women and children. Before the coming of the Matabele, the Bushmen, who left their paintings in remote caves, and the negro-hamitic peoples, who had migrated from the lakes of Central Africa were the occupants of Rhodesia. This migration brought the Mashona to Rhodesia, possibly sometime in the 1500's. There were also the builders of Zimbabwe, and numerous other imposing stone structures, who left no other record of their passing save silent ruins scattered about the land. By the last half of the 19th century, when whites started taking an interest in the land north of the Limpopo, the Matabele and the Mashona were already firmly established in the area.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

The first whites to reach Rhodesia were missionaries, hunters and trekkers who crossed the Limpopo in search of grazing. Missionary-explorerDavid Livingstone was the first white man to reachthe Victoria Falls, doing so in 1855. Four yearslater Robert Moffat established Inyati Mission, thefirst permanent white settlement. In subsequentyears whites arrived in ever-increasing numbers,but were with few exceptions temporary visitorsand not settlers or colonists in the accepted sense.

The first actual white settlers in 1890 took partin what is termed the scramble for Africa, precededand triggered off by the discovery of diamonds andgold in South Africa. During the 1880's Europeanimperial powers like Germany, Portugal andBritain showed a growing interest in land north ofthe Limpopo.

The Portuguese already had colonies on the East and West Coasts of Southern and Central Africa, and British penetration from the south was to prevent them from linking their territories across Africa. Germany found herself in much the same position as Portugal and her interest in the Transvaal Republic was growing steadily. Transvaal too had put out tentative feelers towards the north, which could ultimately have led to the linking of German and Transvaal territory, thereby severing the path of British advancement.

Such was the position in the 1880's when Cecil John Rhodes, politician and mining magnate, who gave his name to Rhodesia decided to act. JohnSmith Moffat, at the instigation of Rhodes per-suaded Lobenguela, who had succeeded Mzilikazein 1868, to sign the Moffat Treaty in 1888. Interms of the treaty the Matabele agreed not toenter into correspondence or treaty with anyforeign power without the sanction of the BritishHigh Commissioner for South Africa.

The Transvaal and Portuguese Governmentsboth objected to the Moffat Treaty, but the BritishGovernment remained adamant.

Later during the same year British advancementinto Central Africa was finally secured whenLobenguela signed the Rudd Concession givingRhodes 'complete and exclusive charge over all metal andmineral rights' in Rhodesia in return for a monthlypayment of £100 to himself and his heirs. Inaddition to this, Lobenguela received 1 000 riflesand 100 000 rounds of ammunition.

THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

Besides mineral rights, the Rudd Concession also conferred sweeping commercial and legal powers on Rhodes. Armed with the Concession, Rhodes used his considerable financial resources, derived from control of De Beers and Gold Fields of South Africa, to form the British South Africa Company (BSAC) that subsequently obtained a charter from Queen Victoria in 1899. The charter granted the BSAC the right to operate in all Southern Africa, north of Bechuanaland (Botswana), north and west of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (Transvaal), and west of the Portuguese possessions. No northern limit was stipulated.

The first pioneer column, 180 men and 500 troops in employ of the BSAC left Kimberley for Rhodesia in May 1890, and established Fort Victoria in August 1890. A party of pioneers, including the famous hunter, Courtney Selous, continued further northwards, and in September 1890 raised the British flag at what is now Salisbury.

The pioneers dispatched a party to Eastern Rhodesia to obtain a concession from Chief Mtasa thereby securing the country's eastern border with Mozambique. Border disputes however persisted, finally leading to an armed confrontation between the BSA Police and the Portuguese in 1891. The Portuguese were defeated, and the boundary dispute was settled at the Anglo-Portuguese Convention in June 1891.

The BSAC then turned its attention to the consolidation of Rhodesia. A railroad had to be constructed from Kimberley to Bulawayo, growing unrest and strife among the Africans quelled if law and order were to be maintained, and the country was to attract colonists and capital.

In 1892 Dr Leander Starr Jameson, close associate of Rhodes, was appointed Chief Magistrate for Mashonaland. Jameson believed the Matabele could be absorbed peacefully into the country's labour force, and attempted to secure a modus vivendi with them, based on segregation by designating a boundary between them and the Mashona. He also tried to prevent the Matabele from entering Mashonaland, except as labourers. The latter were however not to be deprived of their traditional raiding grounds. After numerous incidents, matters finally came to a head in 1893 when a Matabele impi raided the Fort Victoria area to punish local blacks for cattle theft.

After a skirmish between whites and a Matabele impi, Jameson finally decided that the Matabele had to be put down, and plumped for war on 18June, 1893. Although the Matabele enjoyed a vast numerical superiority, the whites defeated them with their sophisticated weapons (The Maxim gun among others), and greater mobility. The Matabele then fled northwards.

During their pursuit of the Matabele, Major Allan Wilson and 31 men were trapped and killed to a man on the banks of the flooding Shangani River following a fierce engagement that put an end to the uprising. Lobengula died somewhere in the Wankie area during the flight of the Matabele, and an era of peace and prosperity followed. Bulawayo boomed during the next years.

The peace did not last long however. A rinder- pest epidemic spread through the country in 1896, decimating cattle herds. White veterinary officers aggravated matters by shooting cattle belonging toblacks in an effort to prevent the disease spreading.Other causes of discontent among the blacks wereBSAC's land and labour policies and a taxationsystem. When Jameson was defeated and capturedduring his abortive raid into the Transvaal inDecember 1895, the blacks decided to put an endto white settlement in Rhodesia. In the absence ofthe troops who had accompanied Jameson, thesecond uprising proved far more serious than 1893rebellion, and the BSAC was forced to summon aidand reinforcements from the Cape. Sir FredrickCarrington set out with a total force of 2 000whites and 600 black soldiers, and finally drove theremaining impis into the Matopos where they wereblockaded.

Rhodes arrived in Rhodesia from London at thistime, and decided to take a hand in matters. InOctober 1896 he went into the Matopos to meetthe Matabele chiefs personally, persuading them torelinquish their arms and to surrender.

By that time however the trouble had spread toMashonaland. The Mashona rebellion was finallyput down by the BSA Police assisted by a force ofMounted Infantry under Command of Col EdwinAlderson (who was to become Inspector-General ofthe Canadian Forces in World War 1). Conditionsin Rhodesia improved considerably in the periodimmediately after the Boer War (1899-1903). Although the discovery of a major gold field stilleluded the BSAC, numerous small mines werebeing opened up, and steady stream of immigrants, keen to escape from the depression following in the wake of the Boer War, were arrivingfrom South Africa.

While the BSAC did not do much to encourageagriculture at first, land was plentiful and handedout freely. After much trial and error, farmingbecame established and within 20 years of the firstpioneers entering Rhodesia the ground roots of asound agricultural industry had been established.

Rhodesia was offered her first opportunity tojoin the Union of South Africa in 1910, andCharles Coghlan, who later became the first PrimeMinister of Southern Rhodesia, attended theNational Convention in Durban in 1908 as unofficial representative from Rhodesia. Ironically enough, Coghlan, who was to lead the anti-Unionistmovement in Rhodesia during the 1922 referendum, felt in 1908 that Rhodesia should join theUnion, but that the time for such a move had notyet arrived.

After 1910 anti-BSAC sentiment mounted inSouthern Rhodesia, and an increasing number ofsettlers felt that the country should be placedunder British rule. Britain however did not see herway clear to taking over the burden from theBSAC at this time.

The BSAC attempted to fuse the two Rhodesias- Northern and Southern - during the yearsimmediately after the World War I, however,Southern Rhodesia was wary of the large blackpopulation she would acquire by this move, andthe scheme was finally rejected in 1917.

BRITAIN STEPS IN

During the following year the Privy Councilhanded down a long-awaited decision. The casehad been put before it in 1914, and concerned theland question in Southern Rhodesia. Electedmembers of the Legislature contended that theBSAC did not own unalienated land in its privatecapacity, and that revenue from unalienated landshould be used for the administration of theterritory instead of being appropriated by theBSAC.

Following the Privy Council's decision in favourof the Legislature the BSAC lost the economicmotivation to govern the territory, and claimed£7 688 000 from the British Government for reimbursement of administrative deficits. It thenseemed that a South African solution was the bestanswer to the Rhodesian dilemma. A referendumwas held in 1922 to determine whether the territoryshould become the fifth province of South Africa,and the anti-Unionist movement carried the voteby a majority of 2 785.

The British Government formally annexedSouthern and Northern Rhodesia in 1923, andpaid the BSAC compensation amounting to£3 750 000. Southern Rhodesia in turn was toreimburse Britain to the extent of £2 000 000. Thefirst general election was held in 1924 and Coghlanbecame the first Prime Minister of SouthernRhodesia after the territory had been grantedself-government. The British Government didhowever retain the right of assent in matterspertaining to black rights.

Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern) becamePrime Minister in 1933, a post he held untilSouthern Rhodesia became part of the ill-fatedCentral African Federation in 1953.

LAND TENURE AND FRANCHISE

A brief look at the franchise and the system ofland tenure during the period 1923-1953 is warranted. With the granting of self-government in1923 Rhodesia retained the Cape Colony systemwhich gave voting rights to blacks and whites whoowned property to the value of £150 or had anannual income of £100. Both means tests wereaccompanied by a simple language test in English.These voring qualifications for a common voters'roll were maintained until 1951, when the financialqualifications were raised.

Blacks had the right under the 1898 Constitution to acquire and dispose of land in the same wayas whites, but few of them ever exercised this right.The Morris Carter Commission was convened tolook into the matter in 1925. Its recommendationswere embodied in the Land Aportionment Act of1930 (amended 1941), which allocated the land(50 percent to whites, 33 percent to blacks and restremaining unallocated).

While the Land Apportionment Act did guarantee the land rights of blacks, thereby protectingthem from exploitation, it engendered much bitterness, and remains a most contentious issue inRhodesia. Recent legislation by Prime MinisterSmith amending the Land Tenure Act to giveblacks access to agricultural industrial and commercial land resulted in the most critical test of hisleadership since UDI when 12 members of the RFparty opposed him in Parliament. (The LandApportionment Act was redrafted, in 1969 andrenamed the Land Tenure Act. In terms of the newAct blacks and whites were allocated an equal areaof 45 million acres (18210 000 ha) each, while theremaining land, about 10 million (4047000 ha)acres was designated national land for use as parks,nature reserves etc.)

FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

The idea of Federation, increasingly bandiedabout in the late l940's, was not new and had beenmooted from time to time. Events after World WarII - the economic boom in Central Africa, and therise of the South African Nationalist Party from1948, regarded as a threat to British interests inSouthern Africa - all helped to crystalise matters.Despite the misgivings of certain black leaders,Huggins and Roy Welensky, from NorthernRhodesia, ardently supported the Federation concept, and relentlessly pressed the British Government to go ahead. The Federation was finallyconstituted, following five conferences heldbetween 1951 and 1953 as well as a referendum inthe territories concerned (Southern Rhodesia,Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). The conferences were initiated by the Labour Government(that had agreed to Federation in principle, butheld certain reservations about black rights), andcompleted by the Conservatives that came topower in November 1951.

The first Federal election, held in 1953, wasbased on universal suffrage, and the same votingqualifications applied to all races. The votersreturned the United Rhodesia Party (later theUnited Federal Party) with 24 seats out of 36.Despite overwhelming support for the Federationin the 1953 referendum, and the sweeping victoryof the UFP, black nationalists were extremelyhostile towards the Federation, and their discontent finally led to a period of traumatic violenceand lawlessness.

When Huggins became Federal Prime Ministerin 1954, he was succeeded in Southern Rhodesia byGarfield Todd, the New Zealand-born missionary.Todd was soon at loggerheads with Federal thinking. He refused to extend power and franchise tothe blacks, and also sought to enforce the AfricanLand and Husbandry Act in all black areas. Hispredecessor, Huggins had applied the Act toselected areas only in an effort to convince theblacks of the advantages of sound animal- andfield-husbandry practices. Todd's efforts led towidespread discontent in black areas.

Todd also turned his attention to miscegnation,and while of minor importance only, this proved tobe a highly contentious and emotional issue. A riftdeveloped between Todd and the UFP, matterscoming to a head when Todd was accused ofabrogating the principles of collective cabinetresponsibility, and his entire cabinet resigned,thereby forcing him from office.

Todd was succeeded by Sir Edgar Whitehead,who remained Prime Minister until the upsetelection in 1962 when the Rhodesian Front cameto power. Whitehead's tenure of office was characterised by escalating violence not only in SouthernRhodesia, but also in other Federal territories.Whitehead's first task in Southern Rhodesia was torevise the 1923 Constitution, which still containedclauses empowering the British Government towithold assent to Bills of the Legislative Assemblyof Southern Rhodesia. (This right had never beenexercised.) His aim was in fact independence. Talksbetween the two governments led to a series ofconstitutional conferences starting in 1960. JoshuaNkomo, leader of the National Democratic Partyat that time, agreed to co-operate with Whiteheadon a new constitution, and denounced violence.The new constitution was finally accepted after areferendum by some 42 000 votes to 22 000.

When the constitution was presented to theHouse of Commons in London certain changeshad however been made to the original proposalswhich had been accepted during the referendum.These changes in fact increased the British Government's power to interfere in the process of government in Southern Rhodesia.

The constitution did have certain merits on theother hand, as provisions had been made for blackadvancement. It contained a Bill of Rights aimedat preventing discriminatory legislation, andproviding a safeguard against laws infringing oncivil liberties. Provision had been made for aConstitutional Council that would act as a watch-dog as regards legislation, ensuring that this wasnot inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.

The bill also opened up the franchise to a greaterextent than ever before, and for the first timepermitted blacks to sit in the Legislative Assembly.They would have become the majority in duecourse. The Constitution required the support ofthe blacks however, and this was not forthcoming. While Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole had agreed to the provisions of the constitution, they subsequently changed their minds and their more extremist followers started a campaign of intimidation to prevent blacks from registering as voters. Their actions amounted to a boycott of the constitution.

BLACK LEADERSHIP IN FEDERATION YEARS

Whitehead's inability to cope effectively with the black extremists is reflected by the cat-and-mouse game they played with him. The African National Congress (ANC) was banned in 1959, and the extremists promptly formed the National Democratic Party which Whitehead banned in December 1960. The leaders were undeterred, and startedyet another organisation, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and acts of terror continued. ZAPU was banned in September 1962, but by then lawlessness was rife and it remained so until the Rhodesian Front Party restored order.

Nkomo set up the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) in 1963, insisting that this was not a political organisation. Sithole broke with Nkomo at this stage, and formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA), was one of the members of ZAPU who broke with Nkomo in 1963 to help Sithole with the formation of ZANU. Nkomo and Mugabe are today again united in the Patriotic Front, a development which took place during the Geneva Conference in 1976.

The power of the black extremists was broken for the time being and peace restored when Ian Smith succeeded to the premiership in 1964. He banned ZANU and the PCC-ZAPU, and imprisoned Nkomo and Sithole along with other leaders. They were released from detention in 1974, at the insistence of international pressure which held that there could not be meaningful talks on resolving the Rhodesian settlement issue while the black leaders were imprisoned.

FEDERATION LIMPS ALONG

By the late 1950s it was becoming increasingly clear that the Federation's days were numbered. The black leaders in Nyasaland, Banda and Chipembere, were willing to use force and violenceto get their way, and were interested in independence, not Federation. The same applied in Northern Rhodesia where Kaunda led the black nationalists.

Banda and other black leaders were in fact jailedin 1958 for plotting against the Governor ofNyasaland. The British Government accepted in1962 Nyasaland's right to secede, and in 1963 theNorthern Rhodesia Legislature passed a motiondemanding secession from the Federation.

Federal Prime Minister Welensky argued vehemently that no provision had been made forsecession from the Federation without the consentof all five parties (the Federal Government, thethree partner countries and Britain) but it wasincreasingly clear that the Federation could notwork if one or more of the states involved wantedout.

The 1959 Devlin Commission Report on thestate of emergency in Nyasaland, and the Monckton Commission charged with preparing materialfor the 1960 Federal Review Conference ultimatelysounded the death knell of the Federation.

Devlin's report was severely critical of Britishpolicy in Nyasaland, and by implication in theFederation, while the Monckton Commissionconcluded that the Federation could not surviveexcept by force, or the introduction of massivechanges in racial legislation.

Before dissolving the Federation, the BritishGovernment promised both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia independence, but refused to giveSouthern Rhodesia a similar commitment.

IAN SMITH AND THE RHODESIAN FRONT

However, before dealing finally with the finaldissolution of the Federation and the events thatculminated in UDI on 11 November 1955, it is aswell to briefly trace the rise of the Rhodesian Frontand Ian Smith, who has played so dramatic anddominant a role in the Rhodesian political sceneover the past 13 years.

Winston Field became leader of the newlyformed right-wing Dominion Party (DP) in 1957,and won a major by-election when he defeatedEvan Campbell, prominent member of the UnitedFederal Party (UFP), for a federal seat. The DPcame close to ousting the UFP in the SouthernRhodesia in the 1958 elections when it won 13 seatsto the UFP's 17.

Continuing unrest, Whitehead's failure to copewith it, public dismay at the 1961 Constitution,and the drift to the left in Rhodesian politics hadall led to increasing disenchantment with the UFP.The Rhodesian Front, formed by the DominionParty and dissenters from the UFP in March 1962,(these included Smith, who had resigned from theUFP over the 1961 Constitution) caused an upsetduring the December elections, coming to powerwith a majority of five seats in the 50-memberLegislature.

Winston Field became Prime Minister, with IanSmith as his deputy. During the whole of 1963,until Smith succeeded him as Prime Minister inApril 1964, Field was engrossed in dismantling theFederation following a vain bid to secure Rhodesian independence.

THE FEDERATION DISINTEGRATES

Acting on the advice of Welensky, Field at firstrefused to attend the Victoria Falls Conferencewhere the Federation was to be finally dismantled,arid demanded that he be given a prior commitment on independence. The British Governmentwas not prepared to give this undertaking, andR.A. Butler, MacMillan's First Secretary of Statein charge of Central African Affairs, managed towriggle out of a tight spot by convincing Field thatSouthern Rhodesia 'like the other territories willproveed through the normal proceed to independence.' He further persuaded Field that SouthernRhodesia could not achieve independence whilestill a member of the non-independent Federation,and that a number of financial, defence, constitutional, and similar matters had to be ironed outbefore self-governing dependencies could becomeindependent.

Field was won over, albeit reluctantly, and heattended the Victoria Falls Conference in June1963. The rest is history. The Federation wasdissolved, Southern Rhodesia inherited massiveFederal debts, and Field came away without hisindependence. Field later claimed that Butler hadgiven him a categorical assurance that Rhodesia'sdemand for independence would be dealt withimmediately, and would present no problems,provided he attended the conference. This assurance was allegedly repeated in the presence ofSmith. Butler however, flatly denied that he hadever made such a commitment.

ROAD TO UDI

Field's failure to resolve the independence issueled to his resignation in April 1964, and he wassucceeded by Ian Smith, then little known beyondthe ranks of the RF. He was considered to be a rawcolonial and a hard right-winger particularly byBritish politicians and civil servants. Within 20months of taking office, Smith had a largerfollowing than any of his predecessors, and wasknown throughout the world, having defiedBritian, the Commonwealth, the UN, in fact theworld, by his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965.

When Smith came to office the general expectation was that he would immediately assume independence, but he first turned his attention togaining support in Rhodesia, and toured thecountry, addressing scores of gatherings. His themewas independence, and the need to explore peaceful avenues open to Rhodesia.

Negotiations between Rhodesia and the BritishGovernment were resumed. Smith visited Londonin September 1964 for talks with Home andSandys, but the matter of testing African opinionproved to be the stumbling block to a concensusbetween the two governments. Smith returned toRhodesia, optimistic that agreement could bereached with Britain. History however intervenedin October 1964 when the Labour Governmentnarrowly defeated the Conservative Party, andHarold Wilson came to power.

Smith and Wilson were totally incompatible -not only politically, but also personally, and thedislike and mistrust between them did nothing toease the situation between Britain and Rhodesia.

Exchanges between the two men were markedby increasing acrimony. When Smith called anelection in May 1965, and the RF won 50 of 65seats in Parliament, the stage was set for UDI, andthe Salisbury Government put in train plans to implement it. These included the identification and isolation of senior civil servants who were opposed to UDI, the development of an effective propaganda arm in the Department of Information, and political control of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation.

SMITH'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Wilson was fully aware of the direction of events in Rhodesia, and did make attempts to forestall UDI. He dispatched two of his ministers to Rhodesia, and invited Smith to visit London in October. When this failed, he visited Rhodesia personally towards the end of October 1965, making an eleventh hour bid to avert UDI. His efforts failed, and Ian Smith announced his country's Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965.

The British Government retaliated swiftly. Rhodesia was removed from the sterling area, British exports of capital goods to Rhodesia were banned, the purchase of Rhodesian tobacco was discontinued, Rhodesia was denied access to the London capital market, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was terminated (insofar it affected Rhodesia), and Rhodesian passports were declared illegal documents. The Southern Rhodesia Act outlawed most trade with Rhodesia on 16 November, and on 5 December the British Government seized Rhodesian assets worth £9 million in the British Reserve Bank.

In spite of these measures, Wilson's predictions that the Rhodesian government would collapse "within a matter of weeks" did not prove true. Britain took the Rhodesian matter to the UN Security Council on 9 April 1966 and obtained the world body's consent to impose the "Beira blockade" to prevent oil destined for Rhodesia from reaching the Mocambique port. The British government expected the oil embargo to bring the Rhodesian government to its knees. At the January 1967 Commonwealth Conference. Wilson again emphasized that the "rebel government" could not survive an oil embargo for long, and that the rebellion would end in weeks rather than months. British warships prevented several tankers from reaching Beira during April 1966 but most of Rhodesia's oil requirements had by then been rerouted through other Southern African ports.

LONG ROAD OF FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS

The British Government announced at the endof April that "informal exploratory talks" with Rhodesia would take place to determine whether abasis for negotiated settlement still existed. Thesetalks continued until August, with Britaindemanding Rhodesian surrender as a prerequisiteto official negotiation. Although Rhodesia didaccept certain British proposals, no major progresswas made. Smith was again invited on 19 Sep-tember for further talks with the British PrimeMinister on board the cruiser HMS Tiger. Thesediscussions took place on 2 December 1966'. Britainnow made an additional demand, that Rhodesiareturn to "legality" by renouncing UDI and accepting a British governor for Rhodesia.

Rhodesia's rejection of these preconditions led toBritain's formally withdrawing all offers of anindependent constitution, and adopting the standpoint that there could be no independence beforemajority rule (NIBMAR). Britain then went to theUN and appealed for selected mandatory sanctionsto include oil. The world body readily agreed tothis, thereby violating its own charter. Britishimports from Rhodesia dropped to 15 percent, andthose to West Germany by 87 percent of theiroriginal level, while German exports to Rhodesiasoon rose to 103 percent of the 1965 figures. AfterUN selective mandatory sanctions had been invoked in 1967, 65 percent of Rhodesia's foreigntrade went through South Africa (as compared to35 percent in the past), and this percentage soonincreased. Sanctions have therefore remained apoorly enforced policy.

Despite several attempts to restart talks during1967 and 1968, relations between London andSalisbury deteriorated considerably after appealsby three convicted terrorists against their deathsentences by the Rhodesian Court of Appeal. Theright of appeal to the Privy Council no longerexisted under the 1965 constitution. Despite alast-minute reprieve granted by the Queen, and asubsequent application to the Appelate Division ofthe High Court, the application was dismissed, andthe three terrorists were executed on 6 March.Rhodesia had again demonstrated the country'ssovereignty. The Appelate Division of the HighCourt of Rhodesia ruled on 18 September 1968that the government was also the de jure government of Rhodesia.

Despite the fact that Rhodesia had increasinglyand convincingly demonstrated her independence,attempts to find a political settlement continued.Talks between Smith and his British colleagueWilson were held aboard HMS Fearless on 10-13October 1968. The Tiger proposals remained basically unaltered, except to omit the interim government Wilson had earlier regarded as a prerequisitefor any just test of black opinion. The proposalswere again rejected, despite the fact that Britainwas now prepared to grant independence on abasis which would leave political power in thehands of the whites. The Salisbury governmentstated that it was unwilling to accept the proposed"mechanisations" for constitutional amendment.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Further talks took place between Thompson and the Rhodesian government before the end of 1968, but nothing came of these. Rhodesia raised her new flag on 11 November, and officially rejected the Fearless proposals a week later. The country turned her attention inwards during 1969, and determined to bring her own house in order. In May Prime Minister Smith made it clear that Britain's "intractable attitude" had ended all hope of a negotiated settlement. He went on to announce a new constitution, to be published in a White Paper on 20 May. The referendum held exactly one month later, resulted in an 81 percent poll in favour of a republic, indicating that 72,5 percent of the voters had accepted the new constitution proposed by the Rhodesian Front Government. The constitutional proposals were published on 11 September 1969, and passed by Parliament on 17 November. Clifford Dupont, the officer administering the government, signed the Bill on 29 November.

Constitutional and administrative ties were not the only links to be severed. In December 1969 for instance, the University of Rhodesia decided not to confer University of London degrees in future, but to award its own. Rhodesia became a republic in March 1970, whereupon the US immediately closed her consulate in Salisbury. In spite of this, the United States and Britain jointly vetoed a United Nations proposal for total mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. Rhodesia's first president, Mr Clifford Dupont, was sworn in on 16 April 1970.

PEARCE COMMISSION

The next major attempt at a solution came more than a year later when Lord Goodman, close confidant of Wilson, arrived in Salisbury on 30June 1971. Various new proposals were discussed, but the initiative came to an abrupt end when the Socialists were ousted by a Conservative Govern- ment in Britain. The new Prime Minister, Edward Heath, sent Home, his Foreign Secretary, to Rhodesia, and this round of talks in November 1971 led to London and Salisbury agreeing on a formula for independence. The Rhodesian Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary agreed on the following five principles:

1) Unimpeded progress towards majority rule;
2) A guarantee against retrogressive amendments to the constitution;
3) Immediate improvement in the political status of the black population;
4) Progress towards ending racial discrimination;
5) Any basis for independence must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

Despite Rhodesia's misgivings on the last point- the acceptability of the settlement to the peopleof Rhodesia as a whole - both parties signed theagreement setting out the proposals in Salisbury on24 November, 1971. The commission assigned totest Rhodesian opinion was led by Lord Pearce,and arrived in Rhodesia on 11 January 1972.Within the week, violence erupted in such centresas Salisbury, Gwelo, and Umtali. The AfricanNational Council (ANC), led by Bishop AbelMuzorewa, came out against the settlement propo-sals, thereby driving many followers of JoshuaNkomo (ZAPU), and Ndabaninge Sithole (ZANU)into the ranks of the ANC as these detained blackleaders also continued to oppose any settlementthat did not promote a rapid transition to blackmajority rule. When the Pearce Commission leftRhodesia on 11 March 1971, it had recorded amassive "no" from the black population, whereas98 percent of the 100 000 whites had said "yes",and 97 percent of the coloureds, and 96 percent ofthe Asians had expressed themselves in favour ofthe new Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals.Home later told the House of Commons: "I wouldask the Africans to look again very carefully atwhat they have rejected ... the proposals are stillavailable because Mr Smith has not withdrawn ormodified them".

As it happened, black rejection of the proposalsfailed to generate any new plans, but resulted in astalemate that was to last until the Kissingerinitiative in 1976.

EMERGING TERRORIST CAMPAIGN

Terrorists attacked a white farm in the Centenary area on 21 December 1972. This incidentmarked the beginning of a guerrilla war thatcontinues with varying intensity until the present.As tension mounted throughout the northern areasof the country, the government in Salisbury decid-ed to close the country's border with Zambia untilsuch time as the Zambian authorities gave theassurance that no anti-Rhodesian terrorists wouldbe harboured in their country. Zambia closed herborder with Rhodesia on 1 February, 1973 and haskept it closed, despite Rhodesia's decision, threedays later, to reopen her side of the border. Theborder area remained tense as more and morelandmine and shooting incidents were reported.The most significant of these encounters occurredin the vicinity of the Victoria Falls on 15 May1973, when two Canadian tourists were killed byrifle fire from Zambian side of the Zambezi River.

On 5 July, a large gang of armed terrorists abducted 295 African pupils and teachers from St Alberts mission in the north-east region of the country. Rhodesian security forces succeeded in rescuing all but eight of those abducted. In August serious unrest erupted on the campus of the University of Rhodesia following initial student protest about low wages paid to African workers at the university. The increased guerrilla activity had also forced the Rhodesian government to extent national service from nine months to one year. InJune, while the Victoria Falls incident was still clear in every mind, several officials from the British Foreign Office arrived in Rhodesia for talks with the Rhodesian government, and leaders of the ANC. During the last months of 1973, further terrorist incursions finally became such a menace that the Rhodesian government started offeringcash rewards for information leading to the capture or death of terrorists.

SOUTHERN AFRICA CALLS THE TUNE

The Portuguese coup on 25 April 1974 had animmediate and wide-ranging effect on the politicallandscape of Southern Africa. By the middle of theyear, a Frelimo-led caretaker government had beeninstalled in Lourengo Marques, which meant thatthe port of Beira, hitherto one of Rhodesia's maintrade outlets, was no longer available. The sameapplied to Lourengo Marques. A new railway linkfrom Rutenga to Beit Bridge was completed inSeptember. This has provided an additional railway line between Rhodesia and South Africa thathas now become Rhodesia's lifeline to the outsideworld. In the general election, held on 31 July, theRhodesia Front Party again won all 50 whiteconstituencies.

South African Prime Minister John Vorsterlaunched his famous detente-with-Africa policyduring a speech to the Senate in Cape Town on 23October 1974. Pres Kenneth Kaunda of Zambiareacted a few days later, welcoming the speech as"the voice of reason for which Africa and the worldhave been waiting". Realising that the Portuguesecoup had drastically changed the situation forwhite Southern Africa, and for Rhodesia in particular, Kaunda now encouraged black Rhodesiannationalists to unite with a view to negotiatingwith the Rhodesian government, a course both heand Vorster openly favoured. Several leaders,including Sithole and Nkomo, were released asresult of Vorster's detente efforts. Black leaders metin Lusaka, and on 9 December 1974 they signed anagreement uniting ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI(Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe), under thebanner of the African National Council of BishopMuzorewa. Two days after the meeting, Smithinformed the country that the government was tohold a constitutional conference with the nationalists, and that nationalist leaders still in detentionwould be released. The Prime Minister indicatedthat he expected terrorist incursions in Rhodesia tocease in reciprocation. South Africa also expectedacts of terrorism to cease, and Vorster confirmedthat South African police units originally sent toRhodesia in 1967/68, would be withdrawn ifterrorists were to discontinue their own activities.Despite a definite lull in terrorist incursions, thesesoon increased again, and on 10 January 1975 theRhodesian government stopped the release ofpolitical detainees. Security measures were againtightened, and military officials later admitted thattheir relaxed vigilance during the initial stages ofdetente had enabled terrorists to step-up activitiesin certain areas of Eastern and North-EasternRhodesia. Sithole was again arrested in March1975 on charges of plotting the assassination ofcertain of his political opponents. This caused animmediate outcry in African circles, and pressurewas brought to bear on South Africa to effect hisrelease. Smith led a high-ranking Rhodesiangovernment delegation to a conference with theSouth African Prime Minister on 15 March.

Herbert Chitepo, leader of the ZANU movement, was assassinated by political rivals in Lusakafour days later, revealing the serious rift within thenationalist movement. The Rhodesian SpecialCourt renewed the detention order on Sithole atthe beginning of April, but he was released on 6April following an appeal by Muzorewa, supported by the South African government. Efforts tobring the Rhodesian government and the variousnationalists together, were intensified during thenext two months, the South African governmentplaying a prominent role in attempts to bring theinterested parties to the conference table. Tensionagain mounted among supporters of the variousblack movements. Thirteen people were killed and28 injured when the police opened fire on a crowdof several thousand blacks on 2 June.

The initial talks held between Smith and theANC leaders on 15 June 1975 ended in a deadlockas the parties were unable to agree on the venue fora constitutional conference. The Rhodesian Minister of Information and several MP's flew to Lusakaten days later for talks with Kaunda, and reachedagreement for a conference to be held on neutralground soon after their arrival. The conference washeld on the bridge near the Victoria Falls inrailway carriages provided by the South AfricanRailways on 25 August. Kaunda and Vorsterattended the meeting which may be regarded asthe climax of the detente exercise, despite the fact,that Smith and the black nationalists failed toreach agreement. The ANC disintegrated after theVictoria Falls meeting with Joshua Nkomo forming his own internal wing, and Muzorewa andSithole leading the external faction. The front-line presidents, notably Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique believed that political settlement was impossible, and this led directly to the establishment of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), a military group consisting of former ZANU and ZAPU cadres. ZIPA forces, led by a Moscow-orientated, 18-man High Command under former ZANU Field Commander Rex Nhongo, launched a new offensive against Rhodesia on 18January 1976. This onslaught was perhaps the single most significant element in the politicalstruggle for Rhodesia, and quickly led to anescalation of the conflict, especially along theMogambique border where incidents have becomeincreasingly common. South African and Cubaninvolvement in the Angolan civil war, and thethreat of Cuban involvement in Rhodesia, oncemore fixed the international spotlight on SouthernAfrica and the Rhodesian issue, and led to theKissinger initiative and the abortive Geneva Conference.

Smith met Kissinger, America's Secretary ofState, for talks in Pretoria, and returned to Rhodesia to announce that he had accepted the Kissingerproposals calling for establishment of an interimgovernment and a handover to black majority rulewithin two years. The proposals includedAmerican-British assurances, and guarantees forthe white minority. The agreement called for a haltto sanctions and the terrorist war. The blacknationalists, notably Robert Mugabe of ZIPA, whoclaims to have assumed command of ZANU'sexternal wing from Sithole, and a number offront-line presidents, all rejected the Kissingerproposals, and intimated that they had never beenparty to them - the impression Kissinger hadgiven according to Smith and Vorster.

The Salisbury Government and the black leaders assembled at Geneva under the chairmanshipof Mr Ivor Richard, a British UN representative in October 1976 to try and see how theproposals could best be implemented. However,the conference was marked by dissent among theblack delegates from the beginning and when itbroke up for Christmas no headway had beenmade. In fact the assembly of the conferenceoriginally scheduled for mid-January 1977 hasbeen indefinitely postponed because of the deadlock.

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