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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It seems that theaccidents do not remain in thissacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything disorderly or deceitful in thissacrament oftruth. But foraccidents to be without a subject is contrary to the order whichGod established innature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, sinceaccidents arenaturally the signs of thenature of the subject. Therefore theaccidents are not without a subject in thissacrament.
Objection 2. Further, not even bymiracle can the definition of a thing be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to it; for instance, that, whileman remains a man, he can be an irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories canexist at the one time: for the "definition of a thing is what its name expresses," as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition of anaccident for it to be in a subject, while the definition ofsubstance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even bymiracle, that theaccidentsexist without a subject in thissacrament.
Objection 3. Further, anaccident is individuated by its subject. If therefore theaccidents remain in thissacrament without a subject, they will not beindividual, but general, which is clearlyfalse, because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible.
Objection 4. Further, theaccidents after theconsecration of thissacrament do not obtain any composition. But before theconsecration they were not composed either ofmatter andform, nor ofexistence [quo est] andessence [quod est]. Therefore, even afterconsecration they are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable, for thus they would be simpler thanangels, whereas at the same time theseaccidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in thissacrament theaccidents do not remain without a subject.
On the contrary,Gregory says in anEaster Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramentalspecies are the names of those things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine." Therefore since thesubstance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems that thesespecies remain without a subject.
I answer that, Thespecies of the bread and wine, which are perceived by our senses to remain in thissacrament afterconsecration, are not subjected in thesubstance of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated above (III:75:2); nor in thesubstantial form, for that does not remain (III:75:6, and if it did remain, "it could not be a subject," asBoethius declares (De Trin. i). Furthermore it is manifest that theseaccidents are not subjected in thesubstance ofChrist's body and blood, because thesubstance of thehuman body cannot in any way be affected by suchaccidents; nor is it possible forChrist'sglorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive thesequalities.
Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because atmosphere is not susceptive of suchaccidents. Secondly, because theseaccidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is displaced by the motion of thesespecies. Thirdly, becauseaccidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identicalaccident which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because anaccident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for anaccident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere is not deprived of its ownaccidents, it would have at the one time its ownaccidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that this is donemiraculously in virtue of theconsecration, because the words ofconsecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they signify.
Therefore it follows that theaccidents continue in thissacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more upon the firstcause than on the second,God Who is the firstcause both ofsubstance andaccident, can by His unlimited power preserve anaccident inexistence when thesubstance is withdrawn whereby it was preserved inexistence as by its propercause, just as withoutnaturalcauses He can produce other effects ofnaturalcauses, even as He formed ahuman body in the Virgin's womb, "without the seed ofman" (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers).
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to hinder the commonlaw of nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privilege ofgrace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus inhuman affairs, to someindividuals some things are granted by special privilege which are outside the commonlaw. And so, even though it be according to the commonlaw of nature for anaccident to be in a subject, still for a special reason, according to the order ofgrace, theaccidentsexist in thissacrament without a subject, on account of the reasons given above (III:75:5.
Reply to Objection 2. Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself theessence of eithersubstance oraccident. Consequently, the definition ofsubstance is not—"a being of itself without a subject," nor is the definition ofaccident—"a being in a subject"; but it belongs to the quiddity oressence ofsubstance "to haveexistence not in a subject"; while it belongs to the quiddity oressence ofaccident "to haveexistence in a subject." But in thissacrament it is not in virtue of theiressence thataccidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to beaccidents, because neither is the definition ofaccident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition ofsubstance apply to them.
Reply to Objection 3. Theseaccidents acquiredindividual being in thesubstance of the bread and wine; and when thissubstance is changed into the body and blood ofChrist, they remain in that individuated being which they possessed before, hence they areindividual and sensible.
Reply to Objection 4. Theseaccidents had no being of their own nor otheraccidents, so long as thesubstance of the bread and wine remained; but their subjects had "such" being through them, just as snow is "white" through whiteness. But after theconsecration theaccidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded ofexistence andessence, as was said of theangels, inI:50:2 ad 3; and besides they have composition ofquantitative parts.
Objection 1. It seems that in thissacrament the dimensivequantity of the bread or wine is not the subject of the otheraccidents. Foraccident is not the subject ofaccident; because no form can be a subject, since to be a subject is a property ofmatter. But dimensivequantity is anaccident. Therefore dimensivequantity cannot be the subject of the otheraccidents.
Objection 2. Further, just asquantity is individuated bysubstance, so also are the otheraccidents. If, then, the dimensivequantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the otheraccidents remain individuated according to theexistence which they had before in thesubstance. Therefore they are not in dimensivequantity as in a subject, since everyaccident is individuated by its own subject.
Objection 3. Further, among the otheraccidents that remain, of the bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which cannot be in dimensivequantityexisting outsidematter; because a thing is rare which has littlematter under great dimensions. while a thing is dense which has muchmatter under small dimensions, as is said in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensivequantity can be the subject of theaccidents which remain in thissacrament.
Objection 4. Further,quantity abstract frommatter seems to be mathematicalquantity, which is not the subject of sensiblequalities. Since, then, the remainingaccidents in thissacrament are sensible, it seems that in thissacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensivequantity of the bread and wine that remains afterconsecration.
On the contrary, Qualities are divisible onlyaccidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But thequalities remaining in thissacrament are divided by the division of dimensivequantity, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensivequantity is the subject of theaccidents which remain in thissacrament.
I answer that, It isnecessary to say that the otheraccidents which remain in thissacrament are subjected in the dimensivequantity of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something havingquantity and color and affected by otheraccidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition ofmatter is dimensivequantity, hencePlato also assigned "great" and "small" as the first differences ofmatter (Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first subject ismatter, the consequence is that all otheraccidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensivequantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are thesubstances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, theaccidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that allaccidents remain founded upon dimensivequantity.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of theaccidents, it isnecessary for what is admitted as the subject of someaccidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of anindividual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is notnatural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are alsoindividuals of themselves. Secondly, because a form, be itsubstantial oraccidental, isnaturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first,matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, arenaturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received inmatter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thusexisting be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensivequantity. For that something isnaturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account ofquantity thatsubstance can be divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensivequantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of thematter. Hence also dimensivequantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we canimagine several lines of the samespecies, differing in position, which is included in the notion of thisquantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensivequantity can be the subject of the otheraccidents, rather than the other way about.
Reply to Objection 1. Oneaccident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does notexist of itself. But inasmuch as anaccident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence whenGod makes anaccident toexist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another.
Reply to Objection 2. The otheraccidents, even as they were in thesubstance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensivequantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensivequantity is the subject of the otheraccidents remaining in thissacrament, rather than conversely.
Reply to Objection 3. Rarity and density are particularqualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or littlematter under dimensions; just as all otheraccidents likewise follow from the principles ofsubstance. And consequently, as theaccidents are preserved by Divine power when thesubstance is withdrawn, so, whenmatter is withdrawn, thequalities which go withmatter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power.
Reply to Objection 4. Mathematicalquantity abstracts not from intelligiblematter, but from sensiblematter, as is said in Metaph. vii. Butmatter is termed sensible because it underlies sensiblequalities. And therefore it is manifest that the dimensivequantity, which remains in thissacrament without a subject, is not mathematicalquantity.
Objection 1. It seems that thespecies which remain in thissacrament cannot affect external objects. For it isproved in Phys. vii, that forms which are inmatter are produced by forms that are inmatter, but not from forms which are withoutmatter, because like makes like. But the sacramentalspecies arespecies withoutmatter, since they remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said above (Article 1). Therefore they cannot affect othermatter by producing any form in it.
Objection 2. Further, when the action of the principal agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But allaccidental forms act instrumentally in virtue of thesubstantial form as the principal agent. Therefore, since thesubstantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in thissacrament, as was shown above (III:75:6), it seems that theaccidental forms which remain cannot act so as to change externalmatter.
Objection 3. Further, nothing acts outside itsspecies, because an effect cannot surpass itscause. But all the sacramentalspecies areaccidents. Therefore they cannot change externalmatter, at least as to asubstantial form.
On the contrary, If they could not change external bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in De Anima ii.
I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was said above (Article 1), it is an effect of the Divine power that the sacramentalspecies continue in the being which they had when thesubstance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which they had while thesubstance of the bread and wine remained, now that thesubstance of the bread and wine has passed into the body and blood ofChrist. Hence there is nodoubt but that they can change external bodies.
Reply to Objection 1. The sacramentalspecies, although they are formsexisting withoutmatter, still retain the same being which they had before inmatter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are inmatter.
Reply to Objection 2. The action of anaccidental form depends upon the action of asubstantial form in the same way as the being ofaccident depends upon the being ofsubstance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power that the sacramentalspeciesexist withoutsubstance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without asubstantial form, because every action of asubstantial oraccidental form depends uponGod as the first agent.
Reply to Objection 3. The change which terminates in asubstantial form is not effected by asubstantial form directly, but by means of the active and passivequalities, which act in virtue of thesubstantial form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramentalspecies, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be directed to asubstantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside itsspecies, not as by its own power, but by the power of the chief agent.
Objection 1. It seems that the sacramentalspecies cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from thematter. But thematter of the bread does not remain in thissacrament, as is clear from what was said above (III:75:2). Therefore thesespecies cannot be corrupted.
Objection 2. Further, no form is corrupted exceptaccidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen inspiritualsubstances. But the sacramentalspecies are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted.
Objection 3. Further, if they be corrupted, it will either benaturally ormiraculously. But they cannot be corruptednaturally, because no subject of corruption can be assigned as remaining after the corruption has taken place. Neither can they be corruptedmiraculously, because themiracles which occur in thissacrament take place in virtue of theconsecration, whereby the sacramentalspecies are preserved: and the same thing is not thecause of preservation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the sacramentalspecies be corrupted.
On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that theconsecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted.
I answer that, Corruption is "movement from being into non-being" (Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been stated (Article 3) that the sacramentalspecies retain the same being as they had before when thesubstance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of thoseaccidents could be corrupted while thesubstance of the bread and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that thesubstance has passed away.
But suchaccidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another way,accidentally. They could be corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of thequalities, and increase or decrease of thequantity, not in the way in which increase or decrease is found only in animated bodies, such as thesubstances of the bread and wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is said in Metaph. iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two dimensions result; while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. And in this way suchaccidents can be corrupted manifestly afterconsecration, because the dimensivequantity which remains can receive division and addition; and since it is the subject of sensiblequalities, as stated above (Article 1), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be altered.
Anaccident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted afterconsecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as thesubstance of the bread or wine was subject to corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding alteration regarding theaccidents.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body and the blood ofChrist succeed in thissacrament to thesubstance of the bread and wine, if there be such change on the part of theaccidents as would not have sufficed for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood ofChrist do not cease to be under thissacrament on account of such change, whether the change be on the part of thequality, as for instance, when the color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of thequantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as to keep in them thenature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that thesubstance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, thenChrist's body and blood do not remain under thissacrament; and this either on the part of thequalities, as when the color, savor, and otherqualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with thenature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of thequantity, as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that thespecies of bread or wine no longer remain.
Reply to Objection 1. Since it belongsessentially to corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is inmatter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from thematter. But if such being were not inmatter, yet like such being as is inmatter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is nomatter; as takes place in thissacrament, as is evident from what was said above.
Reply to Objection 2. Although the sacramentalspecies are forms not inmatter, yet they have the being which they had inmatter.
Reply to Objection 3. This corruption ofspecies is notmiraculous, butnatural; nevertheless, it presupposes themiracle which is wrought in theconsecration, namely, that those sacramentalspecies retain without a subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blindman, to whom sight is givenmiraculously, seesnaturally.
Objection 1. It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramentalspecies: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of somematter: for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by creation something is made out of nothing. But there is nomatter underlying the sacramentalspecies except that ofChrist's body, and that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramentalspecies.
Objection 2. Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot spring from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. Butaccident andsubstance differ generically. Therefore, since the sacramentalspecies areaccidents, it seems that nosubstance can be generated from them.
Objection 3. Further, if any corporealsubstance be generated from them, suchsubstance will not be withoutaccident. Therefore, if any corporealsubstance be generated from the sacramentalspecies, thensubstance andaccident would be generated fromaccident, namely, two things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporealsubstance to be generated out of the sacramentalspecies.
On the contrary, The senses are witness that something is generated out of the sacramentalspecies, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed.
I answer that, Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another" (De Gener. i), something must be generatednecessarily from the sacramentalspecies if they be corrupted, as stated above (Article 4); for they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly succeeds to them.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body and blood ofChrist which aretruly there, because these are incorruptible. But if thesubstance, or even thematter, of the bread and wine were to remain in thissacrament, then, as some have maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them. But that supposition isfalse, as was stated above (III:75:2,4,8).
Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not sprung from the sacramentalspecies, but from the surrounding atmosphere. But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the first place, because when a thing is generated from another, the latter at first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the worms or ashes are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because thenature of the atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being generated by such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for manyconsecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible for an earthen body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere, unless a great and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain entire after the generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion cannot stand, because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses.
And therefore others have said that thesubstance of the bread and wine returns during the corruption of thespecies, and so from the returningsubstance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First of all, because if thesubstance of the bread and wine beconverted into the body and blood ofChrist, as was shown above (III:75:4), thesubstance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood ofChrist be again changed back into thesubstance of bread and wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air cannot return without the fire being again changed into air. But if thesubstance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again, because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same. Unless perchance it be said that the saidsubstance returns, becauseGod creates anew another newsubstance to replace the first. Secondly, this seems to be impossible, because no time can be assigned when thesubstance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above (Article 4;III:76:6 ad 3), it is evident that while thespecies of the bread and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood ofChrist, which are not present together with thesubstance of the bread and wine in thissacrament, according to what was stated above (III:75:2). Hence thesubstance of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramentalspecies remain; nor, again, when thesespecies pass away; because then thesubstance of the bread and wine would be without their properaccidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be said that in the last instant of the corruption of thespecies there returns (not, indeed, thesubstance of bread and wine, because it is in that very instant that they have the being of thesubstance generated from thespecies, but) thematter of the bread and wine; which,matter, properly speaking, would be more correctly described ascreated anew, than as returning. And in this sense the aforesaid position might be held.
However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes placemiraculously in thissacrament, except in virtue of theconsecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return ofmatter, it seems better to say that in the actualconsecration it ismiraculously bestowed on the dimensivequantity of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper tomatter; and therefore as a consequence everything which goes withmatter is bestowed on dimensivequantity; and therefore everything which could be generated from thematter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be generated from the aforesaid dimensivequantity of the bread or wine, not, indeed, by a newmiracle, but by virtue of themiracle which has already taken place.
Reply to Objection 1. Although nomatter is there out of which a thing may be generated, nevertheless dimensivequantity supplies the place ofmatter, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. Those sacramentalspecies are indeedaccidents, yet they have the act and power ofsubstance, as stated above (Article 3).
Reply to Objection 3. The dimensivequantity of the bread and wine retains its ownnature, and receivesmiraculously the power and property ofsubstance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, intosubstance and dimension.
Objection 1. It seems that the sacramentalspecies cannot nourish, because, asAmbrose says (De Sacram. v), "it is not this bread that enters into our body, but the bread of everlasting life, which supports thesubstance of oursoul." But whatever nourishes enters into the body. Therefore this bread does not nourish: and the same reason holds good of the wine.
Objection 2. Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, "We are nourished by the very things of which we are made." But the sacramentalspecies areaccidents, whereasman is not made ofaccidents, becauseaccident is not a part ofsubstance. Therefore it seems that the sacramentalspecies cannot nourish.
Objection 3. Further, thePhilosopher says (De Anima ii) that "food nourishes according as it is asubstance, but it gives increase by reason of itsquantity." But the sacramentalspecies are not asubstance. Consequently they cannot nourish.
On the contrary, TheApostle speaking of thissacrament says (1 Corinthians 11:21): "One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk": upon which thegloss observes that "he alludes to those who after the celebration of the sacredmystery, and after theconsecration of the bread and wine, claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the whole, so as even to become intoxicated thereby." But this could not happen if the sacramentalspecies did not nourish. Therefore the sacramentalspecies do nourish.
I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, now that we have solved the preceding question. Because, as stated in De Anima ii, food nourishes by being converted into thesubstance of theindividual nourished. Now it has been stated (Article 5) that the sacramentalspecies can beconverted into asubstance generated from them. And they can beconverted into thehuman body for the same reason as they can into ashes or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish.
But the senses witness to the untruth of what some maintain; viz. that thespecies do not nourish as though they were changed into thehuman body, but merely refresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a man is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the fumes of wine). Because such refreshment does not suffice long for a man, whose body needs repair owing to constant waste: and yet a man could be supported for long if he were to take hosts andconsecrated wine in greatquantity.
In like manner the statement advanced by others cannot stand, who hold that the sacramentalspecies nourish owing to the remainingsubstantial form of the bread and wine: both because the form does not remain, as stated above (III:75:6): and because to nourish is the act not of a form but rather ofmatter, which takes the form of the one nourished, while the form of the nourishment passes away: hence it is said in De Anima ii that nourishment is at first unlike, but at the end is like.
Reply to Objection 1. After theconsecration bread can be said to be in thissacrament in two ways. First, as to thespecies, which retain the name of the previoussubstance, asGregory says in anEaster Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly,Christ's very body can be called bread, since it is the mystical bread "coming down fromheaven." Consequently,Ambrose uses the word "bread" in this second meaning, when he says that "this bread does not pass into the body," because, to wit,Christ's body is not changed intoman's body, but nourishes hissoul. But he is not speaking of bread taken in the first acceptation.
Reply to Objection 2. Although the sacramentalspecies are not those things out of which thehuman body is made, yet they are changed into those things stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. Although the sacramentalspecies are not asubstance, still they have thevirtue of asubstance, as stated above.
Objection 1. It seems that the sacramentalspecies are not broken in thissacrament, because thePhilosopher says in Meteor. iv that bodies are breakable owing to a certain disposition of the pores; a thing which cannot be attributed to the sacramentalspecies. Therefore the sacramentalspecies cannot be broken.
Objection 2. Further, breaking is followed by sound. But the sacramentalspecies emit no sound: because thePhilosopher says (De Anima ii), that what emits sound is a hard body, having a smooth surface. Therefore the sacramentalspecies are not broken.
Objection 3. Further, breaking and mastication are seemingly of the same object. But it isChrist'strue body that is eaten, according toJohn 6:57: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood." Therefore it isChrist's body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said in the confession of Berengarius: "I agree with the HolyCatholic Church, and with heart and lips I profess, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, are thetrue body and blood ofChrist afterconsecration, and aretruly handled and broken by thepriest's hands, broken and crushed by the teeth of believers." Consequently, the breaking ought not to be ascribed to the sacramentalspecies.
On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of that which hasquantity. But nothing havingquantity except the sacramentalspecies is broken here, because neitherChrist's body is broken, as being incorruptible, nor is thesubstance of the bread, because it no longer remains. Therefore the sacramentalspecies are broken.
I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this matter. Some held that in thissacrament there was no breaking at all in reality, but merely in the eyes of the beholders. But this contention cannot stand, because in thissacrament oftruth the sense is not deceived with regard to its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is breaking, whereby from one thing arise many: and these are common sensibles, as is stated in De Anima ii.
Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a genuine breaking, but without any subject. But this again contradicts our senses; because aquantitative body is seen in thissacrament, which formerly was one, and is now divided into many, and this must be the subject of the breaking.
But it cannot be said thatChrist'strue body is broken. First of all, because it is incorruptible and impassible: secondly, because it is entire under every part, as was shown above (III:76:3), which is contrary to thenature of a thing broken.
It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensivequantity of the bread, as in a subject, just as the otheraccidents. And as the sacramentalspecies are the sacrament ofChrist'strue body, so is the breaking of thesespecies the sacrament ofour Lord'sPassion, which was inChrist'strue body.
Reply to Objection 1. As rarity and density remain under the sacramentalspecies, as stated above (Article 2, Reply to Objection 3), so likewise porousness remains, and in consequence breakableness.
Reply to Objection 2. Hardness results from density; therefore, as density remains under the sacramentalspecies, hardness remains there too, and the capability of sound as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3. What is eaten under its ownspecies, is also broken and masticated under its ownspecies; butChrist's body is eaten not under its proper, but under the sacramentalspecies. Hence in explainingJohn 6:64, "The flesh profiteth nothing,"Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says that this is to be taken as referring to those who understood carnally: "for they understood the flesh, thus, as it is divided piecemeal, in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles." Consequently,Christ's very body is not broken, except according to its sacramentalspecies. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be understood in this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with the teeth is to be referred to the sacramentalspecies, under which the body ofChristtruly is.
Objection 1. It seems that no liquid can be mingled with theconsecrated wine, because everything mingled with another partakes of itsquality. But no liquid can share in thequality of the sacramentalspecies, because thoseaccidents are without a subject, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it seems that no liquid can be mingled with the sacramentalspecies of the wine.
Objection 2. Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed with thosespecies, then some one thing must be the result. But no one thing can result from the liquid, which is asubstance, and the sacramentalspecies, which areaccidents; nor from the liquid andChrist's blood, which owing to its incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor decrease. Therefore no liquid can be mixed with theconsecrated wine.
Objection 3. Further, if any liquid be mixed with theconsecrated wine, then that also would appear to beconsecrated; just as water added to holy-water becomesholy. But theconsecrated wine istrulyChrist's blood. Therefore the liquid added would likewise beChrist's blood otherwise than byconsecration, which is unbecoming. Therefore no liquid can be mingled with theconsecrated wine.
Objection 4. Further, if one of two things be entirely corrupted, there is no mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix any liquid, it seems that the entirespecies of the sacramental wine is corrupted, so that the blood ofChrist ceases to be beneath it; both because great and little are difference ofquantity, and alter it, as white and blackcause a difference of color; and because the liquid mixed, as having no obstacle, seems to permeate the whole, and soChrist's blood ceases to be there, since it is not there with any othersubstance. Consequently, no liquid can be mixed with theconsecrated wine.
On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that another liquid can be mixed with the wine after it isconsecrated, just as before.
I answer that, Thetruth of this question is evident from what has been said already. For it was said above (Article 3;Article 5, Reply to Objection 2) that thespecies remaining in thissacrament, as they acquire the manner of being ofsubstance in virtue of theconsecration, so likewise do they obtain the mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can do or receive whatever theirsubstance could do or receive, were it there present. But it is evident that if thesubstance of wine were there present, then some other liquid could be mingled with it.
Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such mixing both according to the form and according to thequantity of the liquid. For if sufficient liquid were mixed so as to spread itself all through the wine, then the whole would be a mixedsubstance. Now what is made up of things mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a third resulting from both: hence it would result that the former wine would remain no longer. But if the liquid added were of anotherspecies, for instance, if water were mixed, thespecies of the wine would be dissolved, and there would be a liquid of anotherspecies. But if liquid of the samespecies were added, of instance, wine with wine, the samespecies would remain, but the wine would not be the same numerically, as the diversity of theaccidents shows: for instance, if one wine were white and the other red.
But if the liquid added were of such minutequantity that it could not permeate the whole, the entire wine would not be mixed, but only part of it, which would not remain the same numerically owing to the blending of extraneousmatter: still it would remain the same specifically, not only if a little liquid of the samespecies were mixed with it, but even if it were of anotherspecies, since a drop of water blended with much wine passes into thespecies of wine (De Gener. i).
Now it is evident that the body and blood ofChrist abide in thissacrament so long as thespecies remain numerically the same, as stated above (Article 4;III:76:6 ad 3); because it is this bread and this wine which isconsecrated. Hence, if the liquid of any kind whatsoever added be so much inquantity as to permeate the whole of theconsecrated wine, and be mixed with it throughout, the result would be something numerically distinct, and the blood ofChrist will remain there no longer. But if thequantity of the liquid added be so slight as not to permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of thespecies,Christ's blood will cease to be under that part of theconsecrated wine, yet will remain under the rest.
Reply to Objection 1.Pope Innocent III in aDecretal writes thus: "The veryaccidents appear to affect the wine that is added, because, if water is added, it takes the savor of the wine. The result is, then, that theaccidents change the subject, just as subject changesaccidents; fornature yields tomiracle, and power works beyond custom." But this must not be understood as if the same identicalaccident, which was in the wine previous toconsecration, is afterwards in the wine that is added; but such change is the result of action; because the remainingaccidents of the wine retain the action ofsubstance, as stated above, and so they act upon the liquid added, by changing it.
Reply to Objection 2. The liquid added to theconsecrated wine is in no way mixed with thesubstance ofChrist's blood. Nevertheless it is mixed with the sacramentalspecies, yet so that after such mixing the aforesaidspecies are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way mentioned above (Article 5), whereby something can be generated from thosespecies. And if they be entirely corrupted, there remains no further question, because the whole will be uniform. But if they be corrupted in part, there will be one dimension according to the continuity ofquantity, but not one according to the mode of being, because one part thereof will be without a subject while the other is in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two metals, there will be one body quantitatively, but not one as to thespecies of thematter.
Reply to Objection 3. AsPope Innocent says in the aforesaidDecretal, "if after theconsecration other wine be put in thechalice, it is not changed into the blood, nor is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed with theaccidents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the body which underlies them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." Now this is to be understood when there is not sufficient mixing of extraneous liquid tocause the blood ofChrist to cease to be under the whole; because a thing is said to be "diffused throughout," not because it touches the body ofChrist according to its proper dimensions, but according to the sacramental dimensions, under which it is contained. Now it is not the same withholy water, because theblessing works no change in thesubstance of the water, as theconsecration of the wine does.
Reply to Objection 4. Some have held that however slight be the mixing of extraneous liquid, thesubstance ofChrist's blood ceases to be under the whole, and for the reason given above (Objection 4); which, however, is not a cogent one; because "more" or "less" diversify dimensivequantity, not as to itsessence, but as to the determination of its measure. In like manner the liquid added can be so small as on that account to be hindered from permeating the whole, and not simply by the dimensions; which, although they are present without a subject, still they are opposed to another liquid, just assubstance would be if it were present, according to what was said at the beginning of the article.