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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It seems that theexistence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us theknowledge of which isnaturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But asDamascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "theknowledge ofGod isnaturally implanted in all." Therefore theexistence of God is self-evident.
Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which areknown as soon as the terms areknown, which thePhilosopher (1 Poster. iii) says istrue of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when thenature of a whole and of a part isknown, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen thatGodexists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that whichexists actually and mentally is greater than that whichexists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood itexists mentally, it also follows that itexists actually. Therefore the proposition"God exists" is self-evident.
Objection 3. Further, theexistence oftruth is self-evident. For whoever denies theexistence oftruth grants thattruth does notexist: and, iftruth does notexist, then the proposition "Truth does notexist" istrue: and if there is anythingtrue, there must betruth. ButGod istruth itself: "I am the way, thetruth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore"God exists" is self-evident.
On the contrary, No one canmentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as thePhilosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition"God is" can bementally admitted: "The fool said in his heart,There is no God" (Psalm 53:2). Therefore, thatGod exists is not self-evident.
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in theessence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in theessence ofman. If, therefore theessence of the predicate and subject beknown to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one isignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom theessence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do notknow the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, asBoethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are somemental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as thatincorporeal substances are not inspace." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, becauseGod is His ownexistence as will be hereafter shown (I:3:4). Now because we do notknow theessence ofGod, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are moreknown to us, though lessknown in theirnature — namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 1. Toknow thatGod exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us bynature, inasmuch asGod isman's beatitude. Formannaturally desireshappiness, and what isnaturally desired byman must benaturallyknown to him. This, however, is not toknow absolutely thatGod exists; just as toknow that someone is approaching is not the same as toknow that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are whoimagine thatman's perfectgood which ishappiness, consists inriches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believedGod to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifiesexists actually, but only that itexistsmentally. Nor can it be argued that it actuallyexists, unless it be admitted that there actuallyexists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold thatGod does notexist.
Reply to Objection 3. Theexistence oftruth in general is self-evident but theexistence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
Objection 1. It seems that theexistence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is anarticle of faith thatGod exists. But what is offaith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientificknowledge; whereasfaith is of the unseen (Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated thatGod exists.
Objection 2. Further, theessence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannotknow in whatGod'sessence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; asDamascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate thatGod exists.
Objection 3. Further, if theexistence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He isinfinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite andinfinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since acause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that theexistence of God cannot be demonstrated.
On the contrary, TheApostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that aremade" (Romans 1:20). But this would not be unless theexistence of God could be demonstrated through the things that aremade; for the first thing we mustknow of anything is whether itexists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through thecause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is betterknown to us than itscause, from the effect we proceed to theknowledge of thecause. And from every effect theexistence of its propercause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are betterknown to us; because since every effect depends upon itscause, if the effectexists, thecause must pre-exist. Hence theexistence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which areknown to us.
Reply to Objection 1. Theexistence of God and other liketruths aboutGod, which can beknown bynaturalreason, are notarticles of faith, but are preambles to thearticles; forfaith presupposesnaturalknowledge, even asgrace presupposesnature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent aman, who cannot grasp aproof, accepting, as a matter offaith, something which in itself is capable of being scientificallyknown and demonstrated.
Reply to Objection 2. When theexistence of acause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of thecause inproof of thecause'sexistence. This is especially the case in regard toGod, because, in order toprove theexistence of anything, it isnecessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not itsessence, for the question of itsessence follows on the question of itsexistence. Now the names given toGod are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating theexistence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".
Reply to Objection 3. From effects not proportionate to thecause no perfectknowledge of thatcause can be obtained. Yet from every effect theexistence of thecause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate theexistence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectlyknowGod as He is in Hisessence.
Objection 1. It seems thatGod does notexist; because if one of two contraries beinfinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He isinfinitegoodness. If, therefore,God existed, there would be noevil discoverable; but there isevil in the world. ThereforeGod does notexist.
Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposingGod did notexist. For allnatural things can be reduced to one principle which isnature; and allvoluntary things can be reduced to one principle which ishumanreason, orwill. Therefore there is no need to supposeGod's existence.
On the contrary, It is said in the person ofGod: "I am Who am." (Exodus 3:14)
I answer that, Theexistence of God can beproved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It iscertain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is inpotentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is inact. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something frompotentiality toactuality. But nothing can be reduced frompotentiality toactuality, except by something in a state ofactuality. Thus that which isactually hot, as fire, makes wood, which ispotentially hot, to beactually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once inactuality andpotentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what isactually hot cannot simultaneously bepotentially hot; but it is simultaneouslypotentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on toinfinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it isnecessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to beGod.
The second way is from thenature of the efficientcause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficientcauses. There is no caseknown (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficientcause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficientcauses it is not possible to go on toinfinity, because in all efficientcauses following in order, the first is thecause of the intermediatecause, and the intermediate is thecause of the ultimatecause, whether the intermediatecause be several, or only one. Now to take away thecause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no firstcause among efficientcauses, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediatecause. But if in efficientcauses it is possible to go on toinfinity, there will be no first efficientcause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficientcauses; all of which is plainlyfalse. Therefore it isnecessary to admit a first efficientcause, to which everyone gives the name ofGod.
The third way is taken from possibility andnecessity, and runs thus. We find innature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing inexistence. Now if this weretrue, even now there would be nothing inexistence, because that which does notexist only begins toexist by something alreadyexisting. Therefore, if at one time nothing was inexistence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun toexist; and thus even now nothing would be inexistence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there mustexist something theexistence of which isnecessary. But everynecessary thing either has itsnecessitycaused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on toinfinity innecessary things which have theirnecessitycaused by another, as has been alreadyproved in regard to efficientcauses. Therefore we cannot but postulate theexistence of some being having of itself its ownnecessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others theirnecessity. This allmen speak of asGod.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some lessgood,true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest intruth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is thecause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is thecause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings thecause of their being,goodness, and every other perfection; and this we callGod.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lackintelligence, such asnatural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacksintelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed withknowledge andintelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore someintelligent beingexists by whom allnatural things are directed to their end; and this being we callGod.
Reply to Objection 1. AsAugustine says (Enchiridion xi): "SinceGod is thehighest good, He would not allow anyevil toexist in His works, unless Hisomnipotence andgoodness were such as to bringgood even out ofevil." This is part of theinfinitegoodness ofGod, that He should allowevil toexist, and out of it producegood.
Reply to Objection 2. Sincenature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done bynature must needs be traced back toGod, as to its firstcause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some highercause other thanhumanreason orwill, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.