Certitude

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The wordcertitude indicates both a state of mind and a quality of a proposition, according as we say, "I am certain", or, "It is certain". This distinction is expressed in the technical language ofphilosophy by saying that there issubjective certitude andobjective certitude. It is worthy of notice, as regards the use of English terms, thatNewman reserves the termcertitude for the state of mind, and employs the wordcertainty to describe the condition of the evidence of a proposition.

Certitude is correlative totruth, fortruth is the object of theintellect. Knowledge meansknowledge oftruth; and hence we are in the habit of saying simply of a proposition that "it is certain", to express that it istrue, and that itstruth is so evident as legitimately to produce certitude. Certitude is contrasted with other states of mind in reference to a proposition: the state ofignorance, the state ofdoubt, and the state of opinion. The last-named signifies, in the strict use of the term, the holding of a proposition as probable, although in common parlance it is loosely used in a wider sense, as in speaking of a man's religious opinions, meaning not his speculations or theories about religious questions, but his dogmatic convictions. Certitude is such assent to thetruth of a proposition as excludes all realdoubt. Here it is proper to observe a distinction between merely undoubting assent, i.e. the mere absence ofdoubt, and an assent that positively excludesdoubt, an assent with whichdoubt is incompatible. Thus one may give to a statement in the morning newspaper an undoubting assent and credence, yet readily withdraw that assent if the statement be contradicted in the afternoon papers. Such assent, though undoubting, is not certitude. But there is a kind of assent from whichdoubt is not only in fact absent but absent of necessity, because such assent anddoubt are incompatible. Such is the assent which one gives to thetruth that he really exists, and that he feels well or ill, or to thetruth of the proposition that it is impossible for a thing in the same respect both to be and not to be, or to the moral law, theexistence of God, and theimmortality of thesoul. Of thesetruths we arecertain, and such assent is properly called certitude. Certitude differs from opinion in kind, not in degree only; for opinion, that is assent to the probability of a proposition, regards the opposite proposition as not more than improbable; and therefore opinion is always accompanied by the consciousness that further evidence may cause a change of mind in favour of the opposite opinion. Opinion, therefore, does not excludedoubt; certitude does. It has been disputed amongphilosophers whether certitude is susceptible of degrees, whether we may rightly say that our certitude of onetruth is greater than our certitude of anothertruth. In Zigliara's judgment, this question may easily be solved if a distinction is made between the exclusion ofdoubt (in which our various certitudes of differenttruths are all equal, and by which they are all equally marked off in kind from opinion) and the positive firmness of assent, which may be more intense in one case than in another, though in both it be equallytrue that we are certain. And, in fact, if we examine experience on this point, it is clear that our certitude of a self-evidenttruth, e.g. of the axioms of geometry, is greater than our certitude of a proposition demonstrated by a long and complex series ofproofs, and that our certitude of such a fact as our own existence or our own state of feeling (gladness or health) is greater than our certitude of the existence, for instance, of a republican form of government in this country, though we are certain in both cases. We are more certain when we assent to atruth as certain which falls in with our inclination than when we are forced to a conviction. It should be noted, too, that in the common opinion oftheologians there is a greater certitude in divinefaith than in any humanscience.

There are several kinds of certitude. In the first place, it is divided into metaphysical, physical, and moral certitude.

Metaphysical certitude is that with which self-evidentlynecessarytruth is known, ornecessarytruth demonstrated from self-evidenttruth. The demonstrativesciences, such as geometry, possess metaphysical certitude. The contingent fact of one's own existence, or of one's present state of feeling, is known with metaphysical certitude.

Physical certitude is that which rests upon thelaws of nature. Theselaws are not absolutely unchangeable, but subject to the will of the Creator; they are not self-evident nor demonstrable from self-evidenttruth; but they are constant, and discoverable aslaws by experience, so that the future may be inferred from the past, or the distant from the present. It is with physical certitude that a man knows that he shall die, that food will sustain life, that electricity will furnish motive power.Astronomersknow beforehand with physical certitude thedate of an eclipse or of a transit of Venus.

Moral certitude is that with which judgments are formed concerning human character and conduct; for thelaws ofhumannature are not quite universal, but subject to occasional exceptions. It is moral certitude which we generally attain in the conduct of life, concerning, for example, the friendship of others, the fidelity of a wife or a husband, the form of government under which we live, or the occurrence of certain historical events, such as theProtestant Reformation or theFrench Revolution. Though almost any detail in these events may be made a subject of dispute, especially when we enter the region of motives and try to tracecause and effect, and though almost any one of the witnesses may be shown to have made some mistake or misrepresentation, yet the occurrence of the events, taken in the mass, is certain.

Father John Rickaby (First Principles of Knowledge) observes that certitude is not necessarily exclusive of all misgiving whatsoever (such as the thought of the bare possibility that we may be mistaken, for we are notinfallible), but of all solid, reasonable misgivings. The termmoral certitude is used by somephilosophers in a wider sense, to include an assent in matters of conduct, given not on purelyintellectual grounds of evidence, but through the virtue ofprudence and the influence of the will over theintellect, because we judge thatdoubt would not be wise. In such a case, weknow that an opinion or a course of action would be right as a rule, let us say, in nine cases out of ten, though we cannot shut our eyes to the possibility that the particular case which we are considering may be the exceptional case in which such a judgment would be wrong. Otherphilosophers say that in such a case we are not certain, but only judge it wise to act as if we were certain, and putdoubts aside because useless. But it seems clear that in such a case we are certain of something, whether that something be described as thetruth of a proposition or the wisdom of a course of action. This certitude might perhaps better be called Practical certitude, since it mainly concerns action. Hence, it is said that in cases in which it isnecessary to act, in which great issues are involved, and yet the evidence, whenlogically set forth, would seem to amount to no more than a higher probability for one course than for another, the standard of judgment, or criterion, is thejudicium prudentis viri, the judgment of a wise man, whose mind is unclouded by passion or prejudice, and who has someknowledge derived from experience of similar cases. Such a judgment is totally different from the spirit of the gambler's throw, which is reckless not only of certainty but even of probability.

Certitude is likewise divided into natural certitude (termed also direct, or spontaneous) andphilosophical. Natural certitude is that which belongs to "common sense", or the spontaneous working of the judgment, which is common to all men not idiots or insane. This certitude belongs chiefly to self-evidenttruth and to thetruthsnecessary for the conduct of life, e.g. the existent of other beings besides ourselves, theduties existing between husband and wife,parents and children, the existence of a Supreme Being deserving of reverence. To these and similartruths the mind comes with certitude, without any specialeducation, in the ordinary course of life in humansociety. Philosophical (or scientific) certitude is that which results from a process of reflection, upon an analysis of the evidence for and against our convictions, a perception of the reasons which support them and of the objections which may be urged against them, together with an examination of the powers and the limits of the human intelligence. The term natural certitude is sometimes used in another sense, in contradistinction from the certitude of Divinefaith, which issupernatural certitude, and which, according totheologians generally, is greater than any degree of certitude to be had inscience, because it rests not uponhumanreason, which is liable to be mistaken, but upon the authority ofGod, who cannoterr. (St. Thomas, Summa, I, Q. i, a. 5.)

A great part ofphilosophy is taken up with the questions whether certitude is possible, what is the extent of the sphere of certainknowledge, and by what tests or criteriatruth may be certainly distinguished from falsehood, so that we mayknow when we have aright to be certain. A fewphilosophers in ancient and modern times have, seriously or not, denied the possibility of attaining certitude on any subject whatsoever, and professed universal scepticism. Such areNicholas of Cusa, Montaigne, Charron, and Bayle, the last of whom aimed at producing the impression that everything is disputable by showing that everything is disputed. Literally universal scepticism is impossible, for it is a profession ofknowledge to assert that nothing can be known, and to believe that there can be nobelief. It is thus a contradiction in terms. A sceptic should in consistency be sceptical as to his own scepticism; but no attention would be given to such a sceptic unless as one attends, for amusement, to a jester. Nevertheless, universal scepticism may practically produce pernicious consequences, because its universality is overlooked, and its arguments are viewed as if they applied only to some particular sphere in which the reader (if it so be) is tempted todoubt. Thus, sceptical objections against the principle ofcausation may be employed against theproofs for theexistence of God, while the reader is not warned, and does not remember, that they would equally avail against taking food and sleep for the restoration of strength, or against the anticipation that the sun will rise to-morrow. It should be added that someChristian apologists, in endeavouring to prove the necessity ofDivine revelation, have used language differing but little from that of scepticism, to the disparagement ofhumanreason. A noted example is Huet, "Traité de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain" (Paris, 1723).

What is more common than a profession of universal scepticism is a scepticism as to the possibility of philosophic certitude. Many who have nodoubt as to natural certitude, or the certitude acquirable by "common sense", the natural, spontaneous action of the unsophisticated mind, regard philosophy as more apt to open questions than to settle them, and to raise objections than to solve them. This seems to have been the position ofPascal, who says: "Reason confounds dogmatists, and nature confoundssceptics"; and, "The heart has reasons of its own which the understanding does notknow". This seems to have been the position also of a very different man, David Hume, who says: "Fortunately since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices for that purpose and cures me of thisphilosophical delirium" (Treatise of Human Nature, I, 297). He said to a friend who spoke to him concerning the future life and theexistence of God: "Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world, as you imagine." And he gives hisidea of scepticism in a remark upon Berkeley's arguments against the real externality of the sensible world: "That these arguments are in reality merely sceptical appears from this, that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction; their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of Skepticism." (Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ch. xii, note 4.)Kant's system, which denies that the speculative reason can attain to realknowledge, and admits only Practical certitude, and consequently denies the possibility of any system of metaphysical philosophy, is virtually the same view. It is needless to say that, in aphilosopher, such a view is self-contradictory.Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", as well as his other works, was an exercise of the speculative reason. If certitude ofknowledge is not obtainable on any subject by the speculative reason, how could he indulge in such positive and dogmatic propositions? If we consider this view ofphilosophy, as it is held by some men of sense and virtue, who point to the disputations and wranglings ofphilosophers, the variety of opinions, the number of infidelphilosophers, and the general suspicion felt by earnestly religious people, the answer to it is, that this view has some measure oftruth, but is a great exaggeration. It is quitetrue thatphilosophical inquiries concerningmorals and religion, if not conducted with propermoral dispositions, are likely to terminate indoubt. If there be any bias, whether conscious or unconscious, against theobligations of morality and religion, there can of course be only one issue. If the understanding seeks toknow everything; if it rejects facts, however well attested, because it does not seehow they can be so; if it will accept notruth, however firmly demonstrated, unless the harmony with every other part of a system can be made clear; if the mind makes itself the measure of possibility; if it claims to see through and through theuniverse, and its origin, and its end; if it refuses to submit to mystery, or to acknowledge that it is limited; and if, because it cannotknow everything, it will proudly not consent toknow anything, of course with such a disposition philosophizing cannot issue in philosophic certitude. But that is not the fault ofphilosophy, nor of reason; and the abuse cannot take away the use, but only be a warning against the misuse ofphilosophy.

"Methodic doubt", that is, provisionaldoubt of everytruth, was put forward byDescartes as the proper course for the discovery oftruth. Thisphilosopher teaches that in order to be certain of thetruth of our convictions we should begin by doubting everything, except one thing: "I think, and therefore I am." He professes to hold that every othertruth may bedoubted and needsproof. He suggests that we maydoubt whether we can discover thetruth on any other point whatsoever, for it may appear possibly that we have been created by a malign or mischievous beings who so constituted our mind that we must invariably be mistaken. TheCartesian method is self-contradictory. To make the supposition that possibly the humanintellect cannotknow thetruth, on any point whatsoever, is to assume that this supposition may betrue, and that there is such a thing astruth, and that it can beknown. To attempt to disprove the supposition, to undertake to show theveracity of thecognitive faculties, presupposes theirveracity or power of knowing thetruth on some points at least. In fact,Descartesproved theveracity of thecognitive faculties from theveracity ofGod. Theveracity ofGod, however, is known as the result of a demonstration of some length and complexity; and the undertaking of such demonstration shows a previousbelief in the power of the mind to discover thetruth. In fact, the verydoubt on such a subject is a self-contradiction; fordoubt as well as certitude is correlated totruth. Todoubt whether a particular view may not befalse is to suspect that the opposite may betrue. Todoubt that theintellect canknow anytruth is to question whether it may not betrue that we areignorant. But this implies that there is such a thing astruth, and that thetruth at least about our own power of knowing, can be discovered. Without such a presupposition, thought cannot be carried on at all. Nor is it a blind presupposition or animalinstinct. For in the perception of first principles, ortruths evident by their own light, there is implicit the perception that there is such a thing astruth and knowledge. Theerror inDescartes' method is its exaggeration. It is wise to be on our guard against the prejudices, or opinions, peculiar to a particular time and place, the place of birth oreducation, the class or party to which our early associations have attached us; but the principles which are self-evident, or which are accepted by thehuman race, should be exempted fromdoubt. It must be remembered, too, that theChurch teaches that aCatholic cannot withoutsin entertaindoubts against the Faith; though, of course, he may lawfullydoubt whether it istrue that a particulardoctrine is taught by theChurch, or whether he has correctly apprehended what theChurch intends to teach, and whether a particular teacher expounds it correctly; or, again, he may investigate the evidences ofChristianity and ofCatholicism, and maydoubt whether a particular argument is validproof. But the method ofdoubt, taken as a whole, has been condemned by theChurch.

Since, then, some things can be known with certitude, some things can be seen to be probable, and some things must remain forever a matter ofdoubt; and since thehumanreason is liable toerror, the need has been felt for some criterion or criteria by which we mayknow that we reallyknow, and by which genuine certitude concerning thetruth may be distinguished from the spurious certitude of delusion.

The proper test oftruth is evidence, whether the evidence of atruth in itself or by participation in the evidence of some othertruth from which it isproved. Manytruths, indeed, have to be accepted on authority; but then it has to be made evident that such authority is legitimate, is capable of knowing thetruth, and is qualified to teach in the particular department in which it is accepted. Manytruths which are at first accepted on authority may afterwards be made evident to the reason of the disciple. Such in fact is the ordinary way in which learning andscience are acquired. Theerror of Bonald's system ofTraditionalism (which was condemned by theChurch) consists in its exaggeration, in its maintaining that thetruths of natural religion are known solely on authority, that each generation simply inherits them from the preceding, and that unless they had been revealed to the firstparents of the racehumanreason never could have discovered them.

If we take thecognitive faculties, one by one, the senses are not in themselves deceived concerning their proportionate object, but owing to circumstances they are so liable to deception that they need the vigilant supervision of the reason. The nature of sensible phenomena is not their object, but that of the reason. It should be remembered, however, that the scientific theories concerning the nature of sound, of colour and light, and of heat, have been thought out by the aid of data furnished by the senses, and therefore confirm the trustworthiness of the senses within certain limits. That men ofscience have nodoubt as to the reality of extension, figure, movement, and space, any more than of force, is shown by their discussions concerning atoms, electrons, and ions. Consciousness isinfallible as to the fact of its present states, e.g. that I am feeling warm, or well, or that I am thinking. The memory often errs, but often is trusted with certitude. Reason within a narrow sphere, isinfallible, viz. in the perception of self-evidenttruth, e.g. that whatever isis, that every movement or change must have a cause, that things equal to the same are equal to each other. Truths which are clearly and easily deducible from self-evidenttruth share in their certitude. Next to such certitude, we may place the certainty oftruths affirmed by the wholehuman race, especially as regards practical principles. "That which seems to all men, this we sayis; and he who rejects this ground ofbelief will not easily assign a more solid one" (Aristotle, Ethics, X, ii). Universal consent is not, however, the sole criterion. To make it such was theerror ofLamennais. Besides thetruths resting on self-evidence (or easy deduction from it) and those resting on the authority of thehuman race, there is a considerable body oftruth which each man of average intelligence comes toknow with certitude in the course of his life. Most of thesetruths are first learned upon authority and afterwards verified by one's own reflection or experience. It may even be said that a practicalChristian in the course of his life has by experiential verification an additional moral certitude of thetruth of revelation, since he has experience of the power of theChristian religion to sustain thesoul against temptation and to strengthen every virtuous and noble aspiration.

The teaching of the Church concerning certitude

TheChurch pronounces judgment concerning the sphere of certitude, not so much for the sake of speculativeknowledge, as in the interest of religion and morality. The mind of theChurch upon this subject is manifested

(1) by placing books dealing with the question upon the Index, or byobligingecclesiastics, or teachers inCatholic institutions, or editors ofCatholic periodicals to subscribe some proposition;

(2) by "condemning" a proposition extracted from some work, in the sense in which it is found in that work;

(3) dogmatically, by a solemn affirmation of sometruth or theanathematization of a falsehood. When a proposition is "condemned" oranathematized, the contradictory (not the contrary) proposition is asserted astrue.

Concerning the sphere of certitude in religion, "Holy MotherChurch holds and teaches thatGod, the first cause(principium) and last end of all things, may be known with certainty, by the natural light of thehumanreason, through the medium of thingscreated" (Vatican Council, Constitut. de Fide Cath., cap. ii); and this affirmation is supported by ananathema of the contradictory proposition (ibid., can. I). The condemnation of theAgnostic position concerningGod may be studied in theEncyclical "Pascendi gregis dominici", in which the subject is admirably treated.

That "the freedom of the human will and the spirituality of the soul may be known with certainty, by the natural light of the reason", is atruth which thepope, approving of adecree of the Sacred Congregation of the Index,obligedBonnetty, editor of the "Annales de philosophie chrétienne", in 1855, to subscribe (Denzinger, "Enchiridion", n. 1506). It would seem that thesetruths concerning the humansoul are also in some measure implied in the definition andanathema cited above, concerning ourknowledge ofGod; for theattributes of God are known by the natural reason only, through the things that are made; and therefore freedom and morality must be known to be attributes of some creature before they can be attributed toGod.

The limitation of naturalknowledge and certitude has been repeatedly asserted by the process of placing books upon the Index, by the "condemnation" of propositions, bypapal Briefs, and finally by a dogmaticdecree, which alone is sufficient, viz: that of theVatican Council (De Fide, cap. iv) which declares that

there are two orders ofknowledge, distinct both in their source and their object; distinct in their source, for thetruths of one order are known by natural reason, and those of the other byfaith in divine revelation; and distinct in their object, because, over and above thetruths naturally attainable, there are proposed to ourbelief mysteries hidden inGod, which can be known through divine revelation alone.

This solemn affirmation is supported by ananathema against any one who shall deny that there is an order ofknowledge higher than the natural, or who shall say that man can naturally by progress attain at length to theknowledge of alltruth (De Revelat., can. iii). Moreover, even as regards the naturalknowledge ofGod, theVatican Council teaches that

truths not unattainable by the natural light of thehumanreason have, by divine mercy, been revealed in order that they may be known by all easily, andwith certainty and without any admixture oferror (De Fide, cap. ii).

As regards certitude concerning the fact ofDivine revelation, theVatican Council teaches that theproofs are not, indeed, such as to make assent intellectuallynecessary (De Fide, cap. iii and can. v), but that they are sufficient to make thebelief "agreeable to reason"(rationi consentaneum), being "most certain and accommodated to the intelligence of all" (De Fide, cap. iii).Anathema is pronounced against any one who shall say thatDivine revelation cannot be made credible by "external signs" but only by "inner experience or personal inspiration" (De Fide, can. iii), and against any one who shall say that "miracles are not possible", or that "miracles can never in any case be certainly known" to be such, or that "bymiracles the divine origin of theChristian religion cannot be properlyproved" (rite probari; De Fide, can. iv). It is, then, moral certitude that is attainable by the reason as to the fact ofDivine revelation. The certitude offaith issupernatural, being due toDivine grace, and is superior not merely to moral certitude, but to the certitude of physicalscience, and to that of the demonstrativesciences. When it is a question whether any particulartruth is contained within the deposit of revelation, the certainty offaith can be obtained only from the authority of the "teaching Church", but a human certitude may be obtained by arguments drawn from the inferior and subordinate authorities such as the Fathers and the "Schola Theologica".

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