Moral Theology

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Moraltheology is a branch oftheology, thescience ofGod and Divine things. The distinction between natural andsupernaturaltheology rests on a solid foundation. Naturaltheology is thescience ofGod Himself, in as far as thehumanmind can by its own efforts reach a definite conclusion aboutGod and His nature: it is always designated by the adjective natural. Theology, without any further modification, is invariably understood to meansupernaturaltheology, that is, thescience ofGod and Divine things, in as far as it is based onsupernatural Revelation. Its subject-matter embraces not onlyGod and His essence, but also His actions and His works ofsalvation and the guidance by which we are led toGod, oursupernatural end. Consequently, it extends much farther than naturaltheology; for, though the latter informs us ofGod's essence and attributes, yet it can tell us nothing about His free works ofsalvation. Theknowledge of all thesetruths isnecessary for every man, at least in its broad outlines, and is acquired byChristianfaith. But this is not yet ascience. Thescience oftheology demands that theknowledge won throughfaith, be deepened, expanded, and strengthened, so that thearticles of faith be understood and defended by their reasons and be, together with their conclusions, arranged systematically.

The entire field oftheology proper is divided into dogmatic and moral theology, which differ in subject-matter and in method.Dogmatic theology has as its end the scientific discussion and establishment of the doctrines offaith, moral theology of the moralprecepts. Theprecepts ofChristianmorals are also part of the doctrines offaith, for they were announced or confirmed by Divine Revelation. The subject-matter ofdogmatic theology is those doctrines which serve to enrich theknowledgenecessary or convenient for man, whose destination issupernatural. Moraltheology, on the other hand, is limited to those doctrines which discuss the relations of man and his free actions toGod and hissupernatural end, and propose the means instituted byGod for the attainment of that end. Consequently, dogmatic and moral theology are two closely related parts of universaltheology. Inasmuch as a considerable number of individual doctrines may be claimed by either discipline, no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between the subject-matter ofdogma andmorals. In actual practice, however, a division and limitation must be made in accordance with practical needs. Of a similar nature is the relation between moral theology and ethics. The subject-matter of naturalmorals or ethics, as contained in theDecalogue, has been included in positive, Divine Revelation, and hence has passed into moral theology. Nevertheless, the argumentative processes differ in the twosciences, and for this reason a large portion of the matter is disregarded in moral theology and referred to ethics. For instance, the refutation of thefalse systems of the modern ethicists is generally treated under ethics, especially because these systems are refuted by arguments drawn not so much fromfaith, as from reason. Only in as far as moral theology requires a defence of revealed doctrines, does it concern itself withfalse systems. However, it must discuss the various requirements of thenatural law, not only because thislaw has been confirmed and defined by positive revelation, but also because every violation of it entails a disturbance of thesupernatural moral order, the treatment of which is an essential part of moral theology.

The field of moral theology, its contents, and the boundaries which separate it from kindred subjects, may be briefly indicated as follows: moral theology includes everything relating to man's free actions and the last, or supreme, end to be attained through them, as far as weknow the same by Divine Revelation; in other words, it includes thesupernatural end, the rule, or norm, of the moral order, human actions as such, their harmony or disharmony with thelaws of the moral order, their consequences, the Divine aids for their right performance. A detailed treatment of these subjects may be found in the second part ofSt. Thomas's"Summa theologica", a work still unrivalled as a treatise of moral theology.

The position of moral theology in universaltheology is briefly sketched bySt. Thomas in the "Summa theol.", I, Q. i, a. 7 and Q. ii in the proemium and in the prologus of I-II; likewise byFr. Suárez in the proemium of his commentaries on the I-II of St. Thomas. The subject-matter of the entire second part of the "Summa theol." is, man as a free agent. "Man was made after the image ofGod, by hisintellect, hisfree will, and a certain power to act of his own accord. Hence, after we have spoken of the pattern, viz. ofGod, and of those things which proceeded from His Divine power according to His will, we must now turn our attention to His image, that is, man, inasmuch as he also is the principle or his actions in virtue of hisfree will and his power over his own actions." He includes all this intheology, not only because it is viewed as the object of positive Divine Revelation (I, Q. i, a. 3), but also becauseGod always is the principal object, for "theology treats all things in their relation toGod, either in as far as they areGod Himself or are directed towardsGod as their origin or last end" (I, Q. i, a. 7). "Since it is the chief aim of theology to communicate the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself but also as the beginning and end of all things and particularly of rational creatures . . ., we shall speak first ofGod, secondly of the tendency of the rational creature towardsGod", etc. (I, Q. ii, proem.). These words point out the scope and the subject-matter of the moral part oftheology. Francisco Suárez, who pregnantly calls this tendency of the creatures towardsGod "the return of the creatures toGod", shows that there is no contradiction in designating man created after the image ofGod, endowed with reason andfree will and exercising these faculties, as the object of moral theology, andGod as the object of entiretheology. "If we are asked to name the proximate object of moral theology, we shall undoubtedly say that it is man as a free agent, who seeks hishappiness by his free actions; but if we are asked in what respect this object must be treated chiefly, we shall answer that this must be done with respect toGod as his last end."

A detailed account of the wide range of moral theology may be found in the analytical index of Pars Secunda of St. Thomas's "Summa theologica". We must confine ourselves to a brief summary. The first question treats of man's last end, eternalhappiness, Its nature and possession. Then follows an examination ofhuman acts in themselves and their various subdivisions, ofvoluntary and involuntary acts, of the moral uprightness or malice of both interior and exterior acts and their consequences; the passions in general and in particular; the habits or permanent qualities of the humansoul, and the general questions about virtues, vices, andsins. Under this last title, while enquiring into the causes ofsin, the author embodies thedoctrine onoriginal sin and its consequences. This portion might, however, be with equal right assigned todogmatic theology in the stricter meaning of the word. AlthoughSt. Thomas regardssin chiefly as a transgression of thelaw, and in particular of the "lex æterna" (Q. ii, a. 6), still he places the chapters on thelaws after the section onsin; becausesin, a freehuman act like any otherhuman act, is first discussed from the standpoint of its subjective principles, viz.knowledge, will, and the tendency of the will; only after this are the human actions viewed with regard to their objective or exterior principles, and the exterior principle, by which human actions are judged not merely as human, but as moral actions, either morally good or morally bad, is thelaw. Since morality is conceived by him assupernatural morality, which exceeds the nature and the faculties of man,Divine grace, the other exterior principle of man's morally good actions, is discussed after thelaw. In the exordium to Q. xc, St. Thomas states his division briefly as follows: "The exterior principle which moves us to good actions isGod; He instructs us by His law and aids us with His grace. Hence we shall speak first of thelaw, secondly of grace. "

The following volume is wholly devoted to the special questions, in the order given bySt. Thomas in the prologue: "After a cursory glance at the virtues, vices, and the moral principles in general, it is incumbent on us to consider the various points in detail. Moral discussions, if satisfied with generalities, are of little value, because actions touch particular, individual things. When there is question ofmorals, we may consider individual actions in two ways: one, by examining the matter, i.e., by discussing the different virtues and vices; another, by inquiring into the various avocations ofindividuals and their states of life." St. Thomas then goes on to discuss the whole range of moral theology from both these standpoints. First, he closely scrutinizes the various virtues, keeping in view the Divine aids, and thesins and vices opposed to the respective virtues. He examines first the three Divine virtues which are whollysupernatural and embrace the vast field of charity and its actual practice; then he passes to the cardinal virtues with their auxiliary and allied virtues. The volume concludes with a discussion of the particular states of life in theChurch of God, including those which suppose an extraordinary, Divine guidance. This last part, therefore, discusses subjects which specifically belong to mystical orascetical theology, such as prophecy and extraordinary modes ofprayer, but above all the active and the contemplative life,Christian perfection, and the religious state in theChurch. The contents of a modern work on moral theology, as, for instance, that of Slater (London, 1909), are: Human acts,conscience,law,sin, the virtues offaith, hope, charity; theprecepts of theDecalogue, including a special treatise onjustice; the commandments of theChurch;duties attached to particular states or offices; thesacraments, in so far as their administration and reception are a means of moral reform and rectitude; ecclesiastical laws and penalties, only in so far as they affectconscience; theselaws forming properly the subject-matter of canon law, in so far as they govern and regulate theChurch as an organization, Its membership, ministry, the relations betweenhierarchy,clergy,religious orders,laity, or of spiritual and temporal authority.

One circumstance must not be overlooked. Moraltheology considers free human actions only in their relation to the supreme order, and to the last and highest end, not in their relation to the proximate ends which man may and must pursue, as for instance political, social, economical. Economics, politics, socialscience are separate fields ofscience, not subdivisions of moralscience. Nevertheless, these specialsciences must also be guided bymorals, and must subordinate their specific principles to those of moral theology, at least so far as not to clash with the latter. Man is one being, and all his actions must finally lead him to his last and highest end. Therefore, various proximate ends must not turn him from this end, but must be made subservient to it and its attainment. Hence moral theology surveys all the individual relations of man and passes judgment on political, economical, social questions, not with regard to their bearings on politics and economy, but with regard to their influence upon a moral life. This is also the reason why there is hardly anotherscience that touches other spheres so closely as does moral theology, and why its sphere is more extensive than that of any other. This istrue inasmuch as moral theology has the eminently practical scope of instructing and forming spiritual directors and confessors, who must be familiar with human conditions in their relation to the moral law, and advisepersons in every state and situation.

The manner in which moral theology treats its subject-matter, must be, as intheology generally, chiefly positive, that is, drawing from Revelation andtheological sources. Starting from this positive foundation, reason also comes into play quite extensively, especially since the whole subject-matter of natural ethics has been raised to the level ofsupernaturalmorals. It istrue reason must be illumined bysupernaturalfaith, but when illumined itsduty is to explain, prove, and defend most of the principles of moral theology.

From what has been said it is manifest that the chief source of moral theology isSacred Scripture and Tradition together with the teachings of theChurch. however, the following points must be observed regarding theOld Testament. Not allprecepts contained in it are universally valid, as many belong to the ritual and speciallaw of theJews. Thesestatutes neverobliged the non-Jewish world and have simply been abrogated by the New Covenant, so that now the ritual observances proper are illicit. TheDecalogue, however, with the sole change in thelaw enjoining the celebration of theSabbath, has passed Into the New Covenant a positive Divine confirmation of thenatural law, and now constitutes the principal subject matter ofChristian morality. Moreover, we must remember that the Old Covenant did not stand on the high moral level to which Christ elevated the New Covenant.Jesus Himself mentions things which were permitted to theJews "on account of the hardness of their hearts", but against which He applied again thelaw at first imposed byGod. Hence, not everything that was tolerated in theOld Testament and its writings, is tolerated now; on the contrary, many of the usages approved and established there would be counter toChristian perfection as counselled byChrist. With these limitations the writings of theOld Testament are sources of moral theology, containing examples of and exhortations toheroic virtues, from which theChristian moralist, following in the footsteps of Christ and HisApostles, may well draw superb models ofsanctity.

Apart fromSacred Scripture, theChurch recognizes also Tradition as a source ofrevealedtruths, and hence ofChristianmorals. It has assumed a concrete shape chiefly in the writings of the Fathers. Furthermore, the decisions of theChurch must be regarded as a source, since they are based on theBible and Tradition, they are the proximate source of moral theology, because they contain the final judgment about the meaning ofSacred Scripture as well as the teachings of the Fathers. These include the long list of condemned propositions, which must be considered as danger signals along the boundary between lawful and illicit, not only when the condemnation has been pronounced by virtue of the highest Apostolic authority, but also when the congregation instituted by thepope has issued a general,doctrinal decision in questions bearing onmorals. WhatPius IX wrote concerning the meetings of scholars inMunich in the year 1863 may also be applied here: "Since there is question of that subjection which binds allCatholics inconscience who desire to advance the interests of theChurch by devoting themselves to the speculativesciences; let the members of this assembly recall that it is not sufficient forCatholic scholars to accept and esteem the above-mentioneddogmas, but that they are alsoobliged to submit to the decisions of thepapal congregations as well as to those teachings which are, by the constant and universal consent ofCatholics, so held astheologicaltruths and certain conclusions that the opposite opinion even when notheretical, still deserves sometheological censure." If this istrue of the dogmatic doctrines in the strict sense of the word, we might say that it is still moretrue of moral questions, because for them not only absolute andinfallibility certain, but also morally certain decisions must be accounted asobligatory norms.

The words ofPius IX just quoted, point to another source oftheological doctrines, and hence ofmorals, viz., the universal teachings of theCatholicschools. For these are the channels by which theCatholic doctrines onfaith andmorals must be transmitted withouterror, and which have consequently the nature of a source. From the unanimousdoctrine of theCatholicschools follows naturally the conviction of the universal Church. But since it is a dogmatic principle that the whole Church cannoterr in matters offaith andmorals, the consent of the variousCatholicschools must offer the guarantee ofinfallibility in these questions.

Moraltheology, to be complete in every respect, must accomplish in moral questions whatdogmatic theology does in questions pertaining todogma. The latter has to explain clearly thetruths offaith and prove them to be such; it must also, as far as possible, show their accordance with reason, defend them against objections, trace their connection with othertruths, and, by means oftheological argumentation, deduce furthertruths. Moraltheology must follow the same processive questions ofmorals. — It is evident that this cannot be done in all branches of moral theology in such a way as to exhaust the subject, except by a series of monographs. It would take volumes to sketch but the beauty and the harmony ofGod's dispositions, which transcend thenatural law, but whichGod enacted in order to elevate man to a higher plane and to lead him to hissupernatural end in a future life — and yet all this is embraced in the subject ofsupernaturalmorals. Nor is moral theology confined to the exposition of thoseduties and virtues which cannot be shirked if man wishes to attain his last end; it includes all virtues, even those which mark the height ofChristian perfection, and their practice, not only in the ordinary degree, but also in the ascetical and mystical life. Hence, it is entirely correct to designate asceticism andmysticism as parts of Christian moral theology, though ordinarily they are treated as distinctsciences.

The task of the moral theologian is by no means completed when he has explained the questions indicated. Moraltheology, in more than one respect, is essentially a practicalscience. Its instructions must extend to moral character, moral behaviour, the completion and issue of moral aspirations, so that it can offer a definite norm for the complex situations ofhumanlife. For this purpose, it must examine the individual cases which arise and determine the limits and the gravity of theobligation in each. Particularly those whose office and position in theChurch demand the cultivation oftheological science, and who are called to be the teachers and counsellors, must find in it a practical guide. Asjurisprudence must enable the future judge and lawyer to administerjustice in individual cases, so must moral theology enable thespiritual director or confessor to decide matters ofconscience in varied cases of everyday life; to weigh the violations of thenatural law in the balance of Divinejustice; it must enable the spiritual guide to distinguish correctly and to advise others as to what issin and what is not, what is counselled and what not, what is good and what is better; it must provide a scientific training for the shepherd of the flock, so that he can direct all to a life ofduty and virtue, warn them againstsin and danger, lead from good to better those who are endowed withnecessary light and moral power, raise up and strengthen those who have fallen from the moral level. Many of these tasks are assigned to the collateralscience of pastoral theology; but this also treats a special part of theduties of moral theology, and falls, therefore, within the scope of moral theology in its widest sense. The purely theoretical and speculative treatment of the moral questions must be supplemented by casuistry. Whether this should be done separately, that is, whether the subject matter should be taken casuistically before or after its theoretical treatment, or whether the method should be at the same time both theoretical and casuistical, is unimportant for the matter itself; the practical feasibility will decide this point, while for written works on moral theology the special aim of the author will determine it. However, he who teaches or writes moral theology for the training ofCatholicpriests, would not do fulljustice to the end at which he must aim, if he did not unite the casuistical with the theoretical and speculative element.

What has been said so far, sufficiently outlines the concept of moral theology in its widest sense. Our next task is to follow up its actual formation and development.

Moraltheology, correctly understood, means thescience of supernaturally revealedmorals. Hence, they cannot speak of moral theology who rejectsupernatural Revelation; the most they can do is to discourse on natural ethics. But to distinguish between moral theology and ethics is sooner or later to admit ascience of ethics withoutGod and religion. That this contains an essential contradiction, is plain to everyone who analyzes theideas of moral rectitude and moral perversion, or the concept of an absoluteduty which forces itself with unrelenting persistency on all who have attained the use of reason. WithoutGod, an absoluteduty is inconceivable, because there is nobody to imposeobligation. I cannotoblige myself, because I cannot be my own superior; still less can Ioblige the wholehuman race, and yet I feel myselfobliged to many things, and cannot but feel myself absolutelyobliged as man, and hence cannot but regard all those who sharehumannature with me asobliged likewise. It is plain then that thisobligation must proceed from a higher being who is superior to all men, not only to those who live at present, but to all who have been and will be, nay, in a certain sense even to those who are merely possible, This superior being is the Lord of all,God. It is also plain that although this Supreme lawgiver can be known by natural reason, neither He nor His law can be sufficiently known without a revelation on His part. Hence if is that moral theology, the study of thisDivine law is actually cultivated only by those who faithfully cling to a Divine Revelation, and by thesects which sever their connection with theChurch, only as long as they retain thebelief in asupernatural Revelation throughJesus Christ.

WhereverProtestantism has thrown thisbelief overboard, there the study of moral theology as ascience has suffered shipwreck. Today it would be merely lost labour to look for an advancement of it on the part of a non-Catholic denomination. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were still men to be found who made an attempt at it. J. A. Dorner states in Herzog, "Real-Encyklopädie", IV, 364 sqq. (s.v. "Ethik"), that prominentProtestant writers upholding "theologicalmorals" have grown very scarce since the eighteenth century. However, this is not quite correct. Of those who still cling to a positiveProtestantism, we may name Martensen, who recently entered the lists with deep conviction for "Christian Ethics"; the same, though in his own peculiar manner, is done by Lemme in his "Christliche Ethik" (1905); both attribute to it a scope wider and objectively other than that of natural ethics. A few names from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may here suffice: Hugo Grotius (d. 1645), Pufendorf (d. 1694) and Christian Thomasius (d. 1728), all see the difference betweentheological and naturalmorals in that the former is also positive, i.e. Divinely revealed, but with the same subject matter as the latter. This last assertion could spring only from theProtestant view which has staked its all on the "fides fiducialis"; but it can hardly acknowledge a range ofduties widened byChrist andChristianity. Other writers of a "theologia moralis" based on this "fides fiducialis", are Buddeus, Chr. A. Crusius, and Jerem. Fr. Reuss. Alogical result ofKantianism was the denial of the very possibility of moral theology, sinceKant had made autonomous reason the only source ofobligation. On this point Dorner says (loc. cit.): "It istrue that the autonomy and the autocracy of the moral being separatesmorals and religion"; he would have been nearer the mark, had he said: "they destroy allmorals". Generally speaking the modern LiberalProtestants hardlyknow any other than autonomousmorals; even when they do speak of "religious"morals, they find its last explanation in man, religion, andGod or Divine Revelation being taken in theirModernistic sense, that is subjective notions of whose objective value we have noknowledge and nocertainty.

This being the case, there remains only one question to be discussed: What has been the actual development and method of moral theology in theChurch? and here we must first of all remember that theChurch is not aneducational institution or aschool for the advancement of thesciences. True, she esteems and promotes thesciences, especiallytheology, and scientificschools are founded by her; but this is not her only, or even her chief task. She is the authoritative institution, founded by Christ for thesalvation ofmankind; she speaks with power and authority to the wholehuman race, to all nations, to all classes ofsociety, to every age, communicates to them thedoctrine ofsalvation unadulterated and. offers them her aids. It is her mission to urge uponeducated and uneducatedpersons alike the acceptance oftruth, without regard to its scientific study and establishment. After this has been accepted onfaith, she also promotes and urges, according to times and circumstances, the scientific investigation of thetruth, but she retains supervision over it and stands above all scientific aspirations and labours. As a result, we see the subject matter of moral theology, though laid down and positively communicated by theChurch, treated differently byecclesiastical writers according to the requirements of times and circumstances.

In the first years of the early Church, when the Divine seed, nourished by the blood of themartyrs, was seen to sprout in spite of the chilling frosts ofpersecution, when, to the amazement of the hostile world, it grew into a mighty tree of heavenly plantation, there was hardly leisure for the scientific study ofChristian doctrine. Hencemorals were at first treated in a popular, parenetic form. Throughout the Patristic period, hardly any other method for moral questions was in vogue, though this method might consist now in a concise exposition, now in a more detailed discussion of individual virtues andduties. One of the earliest works ofChristian tradition, if not the earliest after theSacred Scripture, the "Didache" or "Teaching of the Apostles", is chiefly of a moral-theological nature. It Is hardly more than a code oflaws an enlargeddecalogue, to which are added the principalduties arising from the Divine institution of the means ofsalvation and from the Apostolic institutions of a common worship — in this respect valuable fordogmatic theology in its narrow sense. The "Pastor" of Hermas, composed a little later, is of a moral character, that is, it contains an ascetical exhortation toChristian morality and to serious penance if one should have relapsed intosin.

There exists a long series of occasional writings bearing on moral theology, from the first period of the Christian era; their purpose was either to recommend a certain virtue, or to exhort the faithful in general for certain times and circumstances. Thus, fromTertullian (d. about 240) we have: "De spectaculis", "De idololatria", "De corona militis", "De patientia", "De oratione","De poenitentia", "Ad uxorem", not to take into consideration the works which he wrote after his defection toMontanism and which are indeed of interest for the history ofChristianmorals, but cannot serve as guides in it. OfOrigen (d. 254) we still possess two minor works which bear on our question, viz., "Demartyrio", parenetic in character, and "De oratione", moral and dogmatic in content; the latter meets the objections which are advanced or rather reiterated even today against the efficacy ofprayer. Occasional writings and monographs are offered to us in the precious works ofSt. Cyprian (d. 258); among the former must be numbered: "De mortalitate" and "De martyrio", in a certain sense also"De lapsis", though it bears rather a disciplinary and judicial character; to the latter class belong: "De habitu virginum", "De oratione", "De opere et eleemosynis", "De bono patientiæ", and "De zelo et livore". A clearer title to be classed among moral-theological books seems to belong to an earlier work, the "Pædagogus" ofClement of Alexandria (d. about 217). It is a detailed account of a genuineChristian's daily life, in which ordinary and everyday actions are measured by the standard ofsupernatural morality. The same author touches uponChristianmorals also in his other works, particularly in the"Stromata"; but this work is principally written from the apologetic standpoint, since it was intended to vindicate the entireChristian doctrine, bothfaith andmorals, againstpagan and Jewishphilosophies.

In subsequent years, when the persecutions ceased, and patristic literature began to flourish, we find not onlyexegetical writings and apologies written to defendChristian doctrine against variousheresies, but also numerous moral-theological works, principally sermons,homilies, and monographs. First of these are the orations ofSt. Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 391), ofSt. Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395), ofSt. John Chrysostom (d. 406), ofSt. Augustine (d. 430), and above all the "Catecheses" ofSt. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386). OfSt. John Chrysostom we have "De sacerdotio"; ofSt. Augustine, "Confessiones", "Soliloquia", "De cathechizandis rudibus", "De patientia", "De continentia", "De bono coniugali", "De adulterinis coniugiis", "De sancta virginitate", "De bono viduitatis", "De mendacio", "De cura pro mortuis gerenda", so that the titles alone suffice to give an intimation of the wealth of subjects discussed with no less unction than originality and depth of thought. A separate treatment of thesupernatural morality ofChristians was attempted bySt. Ambrose (d. 397) in his books "De officiis", a work which, imitating Cicero's "De officiis", forms aChristian counterpart of thepagan's purely natural discussions. A work of an entirely different stamp and of larger proportions is the "Expositio in Job, seu moralium lib. XXV", ofGregory the Great (d. 604). It is not a systematic arrangement of the variousChristianduties, but a collection of moral instructions and exhortations based on the Book of Job;Alzog (Handbuch der Patrologie, 92) calls it a "fairly complete repertory ofmorals". More systematic is his work "De cura pastorali" which was intended primarily for thepastor and which is considered even today a classical work in pastoral theology.

Having broadly outlined the general progress of moral theology during the Patristic era proper, we must supplement it by detailing the development of a very special branch of moral theology and its practical application. For moral theology must necessarily assume a peculiar form when its purpose is restricted to the administration of theSacrament of Penance. The chief result to be attained was a clear notion of the varioussins and their species, of their relative grievousness and importance, and of the penance to be imposed for them. In order to ensure uniform procedure, it wasnecessary forecclesiastical superiors to lay down more detailed directions; this they did either of their own accord or in answer to inquiries. Writings of this kind are the pastoral or canonical letters ofSt. Cyprian,St. Peter of Alexandria,St. Basil of Cappadocia, andSt. Gregory of Nyssa; thedecretals and synodal letters of a number ofpopes, asSiricius,Innocent,Celestine,Leo I, etc.; canons of severaloecumenical councils. These decrees were collected at an earlydate and used by thebishops andpriests as a norm in distinguishingsins and in imposingecclesiastical penance for them.

The ascendancy of the so-called "penitential books" dated from the seventh century, when a change took place in the practice ofecclesiastical penance. Till then it had been a time-honoured law in theChurch that the three capital crimes: apostasy,murder, andadultery, were to be atoned for by an accurately determined penance, which was public at least for publicsins. This atonement, which consisted chiefly in severefasts and public, humiliating practices, was accompanied by various religious ceremonies under the strict supervision of theChurch; it included four distinct stations or classes of penitents and at times lasted from fifteen to twenty years. At an early period, however, the capitalsins mentioned above were divided into sections, according as the circumstances were either aggravating or attenuating;, and a correspondingly longer or shorter period of penance was set down for them. When in the course of centuries, entire nations, uncivilized and dominated by fierce passions, were received into the bosom of theChurch, and when, as a result, heinous crimes began to multiply, many offences, akin to those mentioned above, were included amongsins which were subject to canonical penances, while for others, especially for secretsins, thepriest determined the penance, its duration and mode, by the canons. The seventh century brought with It a relaxation, not indeed in canonical penance, but in theecclesiastical control; on the other hand, there was an increase in the number of crimes which demanded a fixed penance if discipline was to be maintained; besides, many hereditaryrights of a particular nature, which had led to a certain mitigation of the universal norm of penance, had to be taken into consideration; substitutes and so-calledredemptiones, which consisted in pecuniary donations to the poor or to public utilities, gradually gained entrance and vogue; all this necessitated the drawing up of comprehensive lists of the various crimes and of the penances to be imposed for them, so that a certain uniformity among confessors might be reached as to the treatment of penitents and the administration of thesacraments.

There appeared a number of "penitential books" Some of them, bearing the sanction of theChurch, closely followed the ancient canonical decrees of thepopes and the councils, and the approvedstatutes of St. Basil,St. Gregory of Nyssa, and others; others were merely private works, which, recommended by the renown of their authors, found a wide circulation, others again went too far in their decisions and hence constrainedecclesiastical superiors either to reprehend or condemn them. A more detailed account of these works will be found in another article.

These books were not written for a scientific, but for a practical juridical purpose. Nor do they mark an advance in thescience of moral theology, but rather a standing-still, nay, even a decadence. Those centuries of migrations, of social and political upheavals, offered a soil little adapted for a successful cultivation of thesciences, and though in the ninth century a fresh attempt was made to raisescientific studies to a higher level, still the work of the subsequent centuries consisted rather in collecting and renewing treasures of former centuries than in adding to them. This istrue of moral-theological questions, no less than of other scientific branches. From this stagnationtheology in general and moral theology in particular rose again to new life towards the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century. A new current of healthy development was noticeable in moral theology and that in two directions: one in the new strength infused into the practice of the confessors, the other in renewed vigour given to the speculative portion.

With the gradual dying out of the public penances, the "penitential books" lost their importance more and more. The confessors grew less concerned about the exact measure of penances than about the essential object of the sacrament, which is the reconciliation of the sinner withGod. Besides, the "penitential books" were by far too defective for teaching confessors how to judge about the varioussins, their consequences and remedies. In order to meet this need, St. Raymond of Peñafort wrote towards the year 1235 the "Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio". Like his famous collection ofdecretals, it is a repertory of canons on various matters, i.e. important passages from the Fathers, councils, andpapal decisions. More immediately adapted for actual use was the "Summa de casibus conscientiæ", which was written about 1317 by an unknown member of the Order of St. Francis atAsti in UpperItaly, and which is, therefore, known as "Summa Astensana" or "Summa Astensis". Its eight books cover the whole subject matter of moral theology and the canonical decrees, both indispensable for thepastor and confessor: Book I, the Divine commandments; II, virtues and vices; III, contracts and wills; IV-VI,sacraments, except matrimony; VII,ecclesiastical censures; VIII, matrimony. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries produced a number of similarsummoe for confessors; all of them, however, discarded the arrangement in books and chapters, and adopted the alphabetical order. Their value is, of course, widely different. The following are the most important and most popular among them: The "Summa confessorum" of theDominican Johannes ofFreiburg (d. 1314) which was published a few years previous to the "Summa Astensis"; its high reputation and wide circulation was due to its revision by another member of theDominican Order, Bartholomæus ofPisa (d. 1347) who arranged it alphabetically and supplemented its canonical parts; it is commonly known as the "Summa Pisana". This work served as the foundation for the "Summa. angelica", a clear and concise treatise, composed about 1476 by theFranciscan Angelus Cerletus, called "Angelus a Clavasio" after his native city, Chiavasso. Its great popularity is attested by the fact that it went through at least thirty-one editions from 1476 to 1520. A like popularity was enjoyed by the "Summa casuum" of theFranciscan, J. B. Trovamala, which appeared a few years later (1484) and, after being revised by the author himself, in 1495, bore the title of "Summa rosella". One of the last and most renowned of thesesummoe was probably the "Summa Silvestrina" of theDominican Silvester Prierias (d. 1523), after which moral theology began to be treated in a different manner. Thesummoe here mentioned, being exclusively written for the practical use of confessors, did not spurn the more elementary form; but they represented the results of a thorough, scientific study, which produced not only writings of this kind, but also other systematic works of a profound scholarship.

The twelfth century witnessed a busy activity in speculativetheology, which centered about thecathedral andmonasticschools. These produced men like Hugh andRichard of St. Victor, and especially Hugh's pupil,Peter the Lombard, called the Master of the Sentences, who flourished in thecathedralschool ofParis towards the middle of the century, and whose "Libri sententiarum" served for several centuries as the standard text-book intheological lecture-halls. In those days, however, when dangerousheresies against the fundamentaldogmas andmysteries of theChristian faith began to appear, the moral part of theChristian doctrine received scant treatment;Peter the Lombard incidentally discusses a few moral questions, as e.g., aboutsin, while speaking of creation and the original state of man, or more in particular, while treating oforiginal sin. Other questions, e.g., about the freedom of our actions and the nature of human actions in general, are answered in thedoctrine on Christ, where he discusses theknowledge and the will ofChrist. Even the renowned commentator of the "Sentences",Alexander of Hales, O. Min., does not yet seriously enter intoChristianmorals. The work of constructing moral theology as a speculativescience was at last undertaken and completed by that great luminary oftheology,St. Thomas of Aquin, to whose"Summa theologica" we referred above. Aside from this masterpiece, of which the second part and portions of the third pertain tomorals, there are several minor works extant which bear a moral and ascetical character; the last-named branch was cultivated with extraordinary skill bySt. Bonaventure of theFranciscan Order, though he did not equal the systematic genius of St. Thomas.

This and the subsequent centuries produced a number of prominenttheologians, some of whom contested various doctrines of Aquinas, asDuns Scotus and his adherents, while others followed in his footsteps and wrote commentaries on his works, as Ægidius Romanus and Capreolus. Nevertheless, purely moral-theological questions were rarely made the subject of controversy during this time; a new epoch in the method of moral theology did not dawn until after theCouncil of Trent. However, there are two extremely fertile writers of the fifteenth century who not only exerted a powerful influence on the advancement oftheology but raised the standard of practical life. They areDionysius the Carthusian andSt. Antoninus,Bishop ofFlorence. The former is well known for hisascetical works, while the latter devoted himself to the practice of the confessional and the ordinary work of thepastor. His"Summa theologica" belongs specially to our subject. It went through several editions, andA. Ballerini's revision of it, which appeared in 1740 atFlorence, contains four folios. The third volume treats chiefly of ecclesiastical law; it discusses at great length the legal position of theChurch and its penal code. A few chapters of the first volume are devoted to thepsychological side of man and his actions. The remainder of the whole work is a commentary, from the purely moral standpoint, on the second part of St. Thomas's "Summa theologica", to which it constantly refers. It is not a mere theoretical explanation, but is so replete with juridical and casuistical details that it may be called an inexhaustible fountain for manuals of casuistry. How highly the practical wisdom of Antoninus was esteemed even during his lifetime is attested by the surname "Antoninus consiliorum", Antoninus of good counsel, given to him in theRoman Breviary.

A new life was breathed into theCatholicChurch by theCouncil of Trent. Reformation ofmorals gave a fresh impetus totheological science. These had gradually fallen from the high level to which they had risen at the time ofSt. Thomas; the desire of solid advancement had frequently given place to seeking after clever argumentations on unimportant questions. The sixteenth century witnessed a complete change. Even before the council convened, there were eminent scholars of a serious turn of mind as Thomas of Vio (usually called Cajetanus),Victoria, and the two Sotos, all men whose solidknowledge oftheologyproved of immense benefit to the Council itself. Their example was followed by a long series of excellent scholars, especiallyDominicans and members of the newly-foundedSociety of Jesus. It was above all the systematic side of moral theology which was now taken up with renewedzeal. In former centuries,Peter the Lombard's "Sentences" had been the universal text-book, and more prominenttheological works of subsequent ages professed to be nothing else than commentaries upon them; henceforth, however, the "Summa theologica" of St. Thomas was followed as guide intheology and a large number of the besttheological works, written after theCouncil of Trent, were entitled "Commentarii in Summam Sti. Thomæ''. The natural result was a more extensive treatment of moral questions, since these constituted by far the largest portion of St. Thomas's "Summa". Among the earliest classical works of this kind is the "Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quattuor" ofGregory of Valentia. It is well thought out and shows great accuracy; vols. III and IV contain the explanation of the "Prima Secundæ" and the "Secunda Secundæ" of St. Thomas. This work was succeeded, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, by a number of similar commentaries; among them stand out most prominently those of Gabriel Vásquez",Lessius, Francisco Suárez, Becanus, and the works of Thomas Sanchez "In decalogum" as well as "Consilia moralia", which are more casuistical in their method; the commentaries of Dominic Bánez, which had appeared some time before; and those of Medina (see MEDINA,BARTHOLOMEW,PROBABILISM).

Prominent among all those mentioned is Francis Francisco Suárez, S.J., in whose voluminous works the principle questions of the"Secunda" ofSt. Thomas are developed with great accuracy and a wealth of positiveknowledge. Almost every question is searchingly examined, and brought nearer its final solution; the most varied opinions of formertheologians are extensively discussed, subjected to a close scrutiny, and the final decision is given with great circumspection, moderation, and modesty. A large folio treats the fundamental questions of moral theology in general:

Another volume treats of "Laws": several folio volumes are devoted to treatises which do indeed belong tomorals, but which are inseparably connected with other strictly dogmatic questions aboutGod and His attributes, viz., "De gratia divina"; they are today assigned everywhere todogma proper; a third series gives the entiredoctrine of thesacraments (with the exception of matrimony) from their dogmatic and moral side. Not all of the various virtues were examined by Francisco Suárez; besides the treatise on thetheological virtues, we possess only that on the virtue of religion. But if any of Francisco Suárez's works may be called classical it is the last-named, which discusses in four volumes the whole subject "De religione" Within the whole range of "religio", including its notion and relative position, its various acts and practices, asprayers,vows,oaths, etc., thesins against it, there can hardly be found a dogmatic or casuistic question that has not been either solved or whose solution has not at least been attempted. Of the last two volumes one treats ofreligious orders in general, the other of the "Institute" of theSociety of Jesus.

In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, there appeared a number of similar, though conciser, works which treat moral-theological questions as a part of universaltheology with the genuine spirit ofScholasticscience. There are those of Tanner,Coninck, Platel,Gotti,Billuart, and many others, the mere enumeration of whom would lead us too far afield. We must, however, mention one to whom nobody can deny thehonour of having advanced both speculative and practicaltheology, and especially practicalmorals, John de Lugo. Endowed with uncommon, speculative genius and clear, practical judgment, he in many instances pointed out entirely new paths towards the solution of moral questions. Speaking of his moral theology,St. Alphonsus styles him "by all odds leader afterSt. Thomas". The works that have come down to us are: "De fide", "De Incarnatione", "De justitia et jure", "De sacramentis", viz., "De sacramentis in genere", "De baptismo et eucharistia", and "De poenitentia". It is above all the volume "De poenitentia" which, through its sixteenth disputation, has become the classical handbook for casuistical moral theology and particularly for the specific distinction ofsins; to the same subject belong the posthumous "Responsa moralia", a collection of answers given by de Lugo in complicated cases ofconscience. This is not the place to point out his eminence as a dogmatist; suffice it to say that many far-reaching questions receive original solutions, which, though not universally accepted, have yet shed considerable light on these subjects.

The method which Lugo applies to moraltheological questions, may well be called mixed, that is, it is both speculative and casuistical. Such works of a mixed character now grow common, they treat the whole subject-matter of moral theology, in as far as it is serviceable for the confessor and thepastor, in this mixed manner, though they insist more on casuistry than did Lugo. A type of this kind is the "Theologia moralis" of Paul Laymann (d. 1635); in this category may also be numbered the "Theologia decalogalis" and "Theologia sacramentalis" ofSporer (d. 1683), the "Conferentiæ" ofElbel (d. 1756), and the "Theologia moralis" of Reuter* (d. 1762). Almost numberless are the manuals for confessors, written in a simple casuistical form, though even these justify their conclusions by internal reasons after legitimatizing them by an appeal to external authority. They are not unfrequently the fruit of thorough, speculativeknowledge and extensive reading. One of the most solid is probably the "Manuale confessariorum et poenitentium" of Azpilcueta (1494-1586), the great canonist, commonly known as "Doctor Navarrus"; furthermore, the "Instructio sacerdotum" or "Summa casuum conscientiæ" of Cardinal Tolet (d. 1596), which was highly recommended by St. Francis of Sales. One other work must also be mentioned, viz., the so-called "Medulla theologiæ moralis" ofHermann Busenbaum (d. 1688), which has become famous on account of its very extensive use (forty editions in less than twenty years during the lifetime of the author) and the number of its commentators. Among these are included Claude Lacroix, whose moral theology is considered as one of the most valuable of the eighteenth century, andSt. Alphonsus Liguori, with whom, however, an entirely new epoch of moral theology commences.

Before entering upon this new phase, let us glance at the development of the so-called systems ofmorals and the controversies which sprang up amongCatholic scholars, as well as at the casuistical method of treating moral theology in general. For it is precisely the casuistry of moral theology around which these controversies centre, and which has experienced severe attacks in our own day. These attacks were for the most part confined toGermany. The champions of the adversaries are J. B. Hirscher (d. 1865),Döllinger, Reusch, and a group ofCatholic scholars who, in the years 1901 and 1902, demanded a "reform of Catholic moral theology", though all were not moved by the same spirit. In Hirscher it was thezeal for a supposedly good cause, though he was implicated intheologicalerrors;Döllinger and Reusch attempted to cover their defection from theChurch and their refusal to acknowledge thepapal infallibility by holding up to the ridicule of the worldecclesiastical conditions and affairs which they thought militated against thatinfallibility; the latest phase of this opposition is mainly the result of misunderstandings. In order to elucidate the accusations brought against casuistry, we use the wholly unjustifiable criticism which Hirscher launched againstScholastic theology in general in his work of 1832, "On the Relation between the Gospel and Theological Scholasticism"; it is quoted approvingly byDöllinger and Reusch (Moralstreitigkeiten, 13 sqq.):

(1) "Instead of penetrating into the spirit which makes virtue what it is and underlies everything that is good in this world, in other words, instead of beginning with the one indivisible nature of allgoodness, they begin with the material of the various moralprecepts and prohibitions without adverting to where these originate, on what foundation they rest, and what is their life-giving principle." This means thatScholastics and casuistsknow only individual things, see nothing universal and uniform in the virtues andduties.

(2) "Instead of deriving theseprecepts and prohibitions from the one, individual essence of allgoodness and thereby creatingcertainty in the moral judgments of their audience, they, rejecting principles, string 'shalt' to 'shalt', provide them with innumerablestatutes and clauses, confuse and oppress the hearer by the overflowing measure ofduties, half-duties, non-duties." In other words, theScholastics oppress and confuse by an unnecessary multiplication ofduties and non-duties.

(3) "It is more in accordance with the spirit of Mosaism than with that ofChristianity whenChristian morality is treated less as adoctrine of virtues than oflaws andduties, and when by adding commandment to commandment, prohibition to prohibition, it gives us a full and shaken measure of moral rules instead of building up on theChristian spirit, deriving everything from it and pointing out all particular virtues in its light." Or briefly, casuistry promotes exterior sanctimoniousness without the interior spirit.

(4) "Those who treatmorals from the standpoint of casuistry, assign an important part to the distinction between grave and lightlaws grave and lightduties, serious and slight transgressions, mortal and venialsins. . . . Now, the distinction between grievous and venialsins is not without a solid foundation, and if it is chiefly based on the different qualities of the will, and if, besides, the various degrees ofgoodness and malice are measured by the presence, e.g., of a purely good and strong will, of one less pure and less strong, of a weak, inert, impure, malicious, perverted will, then nobody will raise his voice against it. But it is wholly different when the distinction between mortal and venialsins is taken objectively, and based on the gravity and lightness of the commandments. . . . Such a distinction between mortal and venialsins, founded on the material differences of the commandments and the prohibitions, is a source of torment and anxiety for many. . . . True morality cannot be advanced through such an anxiety. . . . The mass of the people will derive only this one profit from such a method: many will refrain from what is forbidden under pain of mortalsin and will do what is commanded under the same penalty, but they will care little for what is commanded or forbidden under pain of venialsin only; on the contrary they will seek a compensation in the latter for what they sacrificed to the grave commandments. But can we call the lives of such menChristian?" In other words, casuistry falsifies theconsciences by distinguishing objectively between mortal and venialsins, leads to a contempt of the latter, and renders a genuinelyChristian life impossible.

It is not difficult to refute all these accusations. One glance at the"Summa theologica" ofSt. Thomas will prove how incorrect is the first charge thatScholasticism and casuistryknow only individual good acts and individual virtues, without inquiring into the foundation common to all virtues. Before treating the individual virtues and the individualduties, St. Thomas gives us a whole volume of discussions of a general nature, of which we may note the profound speculations on the last end, thegoodness and malice of human actions, the eternal law.

The second accusation, that theScholastic casuistry confuses the mind by its mass ofduties and non-duties, can only mean that theScholastic casuistry sets these up arbitrarily and contrary totruth. The complaint can only refer to those works and lectures which aim at the instruction of theclergy,pastors, and confessors. The reader or hearer who is confused or oppressed by this "mass ofduties etc." shows by this very fact that he has not the talentnecessary for the office of confessor or spiritual guide, that he should therefore choose another vocation.

The third charge, directed against Judaicalhypocrisy which neglects the fostering of the interior life, is refuted by every work on casuistry, however meagre, for every one of them states most emphatically that, without the state of grace and a good intention, all external works, no matter how difficult and heroic, are valueless in the sight ofGod. Can the necessity of the internal spirit be brought out more clearly? And even if, in some cases, the external fulfilment of a certain work is laid down as the minimum demanded byGod or theChurch, without which theChristian would incureternal damnation, yet this is not banishing the internal spirit, but designating the external fulfilment as the low-water mark of morality.

Lastly, the fourth charge springs from a very gravetheologicalerror. There can be nodoubt that, in judging the heinousness ofsin and in distinguishing between mortal and venialsins, the subjective element must be taken into consideration, However, every compendium of moral theology, no matter how casuistical, meets this requirement. Every manual distinguishessins which arise fromignorance, weakness, malice, without, however, labelling allsins of weakness as venialsins, or allsins of malice as mortalsins; for there are surely minor acts of malice which cannot be said to cause the death of thesoul. Every manual also takes cognizance ofsins which are committed without sufficient deliberation,knowledge, or freedom: all these, even though the matter be grave, are counted as venialsins. On the other hand, every manual recognizes venial and grievoussins which are such by the gravity of the matter alone. Or who would, abstracting from everything else, put a jocose lie on a par with the denial offaith? But even in thesesins, mortal or venial according to their object, the casuists lay stress on the personal dispositions in which thesin was actually committed. Hence, their universal principle: the result of a subjectivelyerroneousconscience may be that an action which is in itself only venial, becomes a mortalsin, and vice versa, that an action which is in itself mortallysinful, that is, constitutes a grave violation of the moral law, may be only a venialsin. Nevertheless, alltheologians, also casuists, consider a correctconscience a great boon and hence endeavour, by their casuistic discussions, to contribute towards the formation of correct consciences, so that the subjective estimate of the morality of certain actions may coincide, as far as possible, with the objective norm of morality.

When, lastly, various opponents of the casuistical method object that the moralist occupies himself exclusively withsins and their analysis, with the "dark side" ofhumanlife, let them remember that it is physically impossible to say everything in one breath, that, just as in many other arts andsciences, a division of labour may also be advantageous for thescience of moral theology, that the particular purpose of manuals and lectures may be limited to theeducation of skilled confessors and that this purpose may very well be fulfilled by centering attention on the dark side ofhumanlife. Nevertheless, it must be granted that this cannot be the only purpose of moral theology: a thorough discussion of allChristian virtues and the means of acquiring them is Indispensable. If at any time this part of moral theology should be pushed to the background, moral theology would become one-sided and would need a revision, not by cutting down casuistry, but by devoting more time and energy to thedoctrine of virtues in their scientific, parenetical, and ascetical aspect.

In all these branches of moral theology, a great advance was noticeable at the time of theCouncil of Trent. That more stress was laid on casuistry in particular, finds its explanation in the growing frequency of sacramental confession. This is freely conceded by our adversaries.Döllinger and Reusch say (op. cit., 19 sqq.): "The fact that casuistry underwent a further development after the sixteenth century, is connected with further changes in the penitential discipline. From that time on the custom prevailed of approaching the confessional more frequently, regularly before Communion, of confessing not only grievous, but also venialsins, and of asking the confessor's advice for all troubles of the spiritual life, so that the confessor became more and more a spiritual father and guide." The confessor needed this schooling and scientific training, which alone could enable him to give correct decisions in complex cases ofhumanlife, to form a correct estimate of moralgoodness or defect,duty or violation ofduty, virtue or vice. Now, it was inevitable that the confessor should meet cases where the existence or exact measure of theobligation remained obscure even after careful examination, where the moralist was therefore confronted by the question what the final decision in these cases should be: whether one wasobliged to consider oneself bound when theduty was obscure anddoubtful, or how one could remove thisdoubt and arrive at the definite conclusion that there was no strictobligation. That the former could not be the case, but that anobligation, to exist, must first beproved, had always been known and had been variously expressed in practical rules: "In dubiis benigniora sequenda", "odiosa sunt restringenda", etc. The basic principle, however, for solving such dubious cases and attaining the certitudenecessary for the morality of an action was not always kept clearly in view. To establish this universal principle, was equivalent to establishing a moral system; and the various systems were distinguished by the principle to which each adhered.

The history ofProbabilism is given under this title, suffice it to say here that from the middle of the seventeenth century when the violent discussion of this question begins, the development of moral theology coincides with that ofProbabilism and of other Probabilistic systems; although these systems touch only a small portion ofmorals and of moraltruths and nothing is farther from thetruth than the opinion, so wide-spread among the adversaries ofCatholicmorals, thatProbabilism gave a new shape and a new spirit to the whole of moral theology.Probabilism and the other systems ofmorals are concerned only about cases which are objectivelydoubtful; hence they abstract entirely from the wide sphere of certain, establishedtruths. Now, the latter class is by far the larger in moral theology also; were it not so,humanreason would be in a sorry plight, andDivine providence would have bestowed little care on the noblest of its visible creatures and on their highest goods, even in thesupernatural order, in which a full measure of gifts andgraces was showered upon those ransomed inChrist. The certain and undoubted portion includes all the fundamental questions ofChristianmorals; it comprises those principles of the moral order by which the relations of man to himself, toGod, to his neighbour, and to the various communities are regulated; it embraces thedoctrine of the last end of man and of thesupernatural means of attaining this end. There is only a comparatively small number of objectively obscure anddoubtfullaws orduties that appeal toProbabilism or Antiprobabilism for a decision. However, as has been said, since the middle of the seventeenth century, the interest of moraltheologians centered in the question aboutProbabilism or Antiprobabilism.

Just as far from thetruth is the second opinion of the adversaries ofProbabilism, viz., that this system induces people to evade thelaws and hardens them into callousness. On the contrary, to moot the question ofProbabilism at all, was the sign of a severely conscientioussoul. He who proposes the question at all knows and confesses by that very fact: first, that it is not lawful to act with adoubtfulconscience, that he who performs an action without being firmly convinced of its being allowed, commitssin in the sight ofGod; secondly, that a law, above all theDivine law, obliges us to take cognizance of it and that, therefore, wheneverdoubts arise about the probable existence of anobligation we must apply sufficient care in order to arrive atcertainty, so that a frivolous disregard of reasonabledoubts is in itself asin against the submission due toGod. In spite of all this, it may happen that all our pains and inquiries do not lead us tocertainty, that solid reasons are found both for and against the existence of anobligation: under these circumstances, a conscientious man will naturally ask whether he must consider himself bound by thelaw or whether he can, by further reflections — reflex principles, as they are called — come to the plain conclusion that there is noobligation either to do or to omit the act in question. Were weobliged to consider ourselves bound in everydoubt, the result, obviously, would be an intolerable severity. But since before performing an action the final verdict of ourconscience must be free fromdoubt, the necessity of removing in one way or another suchdoubts as may have arisen, is self-evident.

At first there was a lack of clearness with regard toProbabilism and the questions connected with it. Conflicting definitions of opinion, probability, and certitude, could not but cause confusion. When works on moral theology and practical manuals began to multiply, it was inevitable that someindividuals should take the word "probable" in too wide or in too lax a sense, although there can be nodoubt that in itself it means "something acceptable to reason", in other words, since reason can accept nothing unless it has the appearance oftruth, "something based on reasons which generally lead to thetruth". Hence it is that opinions were actually advanced and spread as practicable which were little in accord with the demands of theChristian Faith, and which brought down upon them the censure of theHoly See. We refer particularly to the theses condemned byAlexander VII on 24 Sept., 1665, and on 18 March, 1666, and byInnocent XI on 2 March, 1679. It is notProbabilism that must be made responsible for them, but the vagaries of a few Probabilists.

As a result of these condemnations, sometheologians thought themselvesobliged to oppose the system itself and to side with Probabiliorism. Previous to this turn of affairs, theJansenists had been the most pronounced adversaries ofProbabilism. But they, too, had received a setback whenInnocent X condemned (31 May, 1653) in the "Augustinus" ofJansenius, then recently deceased, the proposition: "Just men, with the strength now at their disposal, cannot keep certain commandments of God even if they wish and endeavour to do so; besides, they are without the help of grace which might make it possible for them", was taken from the work and rejected asheretical and blasphemous. NowProbabilism was least reconcilable with thisJansenistic thesis, which could be maintained the easier, the stricter the moralobligations laid upon man'sconscience were and the severer the system proclaimed as solely justified was. Consequently, the adherents of theJansenisticdoctrine endeavoured to attackProbabilism, to throw suspicion on it as an innovation, to represent it even as leading tosin. The exaggerations of a few Probabilists who went too far in their laxity, gave an opportunity to theJansenists to attack the system, and soon a number of scholars, notably among theDominicans abandonedProbabilism, which they had defended till then, attacked it and stood up for Probabiliorism; someJesuits also opposedProbabilism. But by far, the majority of theJesuit writers as well as a vast number of other orders and of thesecular clergy, adhered toProbabilism. An entire century was taken up with this controversy, which probably has not its equal in the history ofCatholictheology.

Fortunately, the works on either side of this controversy were not popular writings. Nevertheless, exaggerated theories caused a glaring inequality and much confusion in the administration of theSacrament of Penance and in the guidance ofsouls. This seems to have been the case particularly inFrance andItaly;Germany probably suffered less from Rigorism. Hence it was a blessing ofDivine Providence that there arose a man in the middle of the eighteenth century, who again insisted on a gentler and milder practice, and who, owing to the eminentsanctity which he combined with solid learning, and which raised him soon after his death to thehonour of the altar, received theecclesiasticalapprobation of hisdoctrine, thereby definitively establishing the milder practice in moral theology.

This man is Alphonsus Maria Liguori, who died in 1787 at the age of 91, wasbeatified in 1816,canonized in 1839, and declared Doctor Ecclesiæ in 1871. In his youth Liguori had been imbued with the stricter principles of moral theology; but, as he himself confesses, the experience which a missionary life extending over fifteen years gave him, and careful study, brought him to a realization of theirfalseness andevil consequences. Chiefly for the younger members of the religious congregation which owed its existence to his ferventzeal, he worked out a manual of moral theology, basing it on the widely used "Medulla" of theJesuitHermann Busenbaum, whose theses he subjected to a thorough examination, confirmed by internal reasons and external authority, illustrated by adverse opinions, and here and there modified. The work, entirely Probabilistic in its principles, was first published in 1748. Received with universal applause and lauded even bypopes, it went through its second edition in 1753; edition after edition then followed, nearly every one showing the revising hand of the author; the last, ninth, edition, published during the lifetime of thesaint, appeared in 1785. After hisbeatification and canonization his "Theologia moralis" found an even wider circulation. Not only were various editions arranged, but it almost seemed as though the further growth of moral theology would be restricted to a reiteration and to compendious revisions of the works of St. Alphonsus. An excellent critical edition of the "Theologia moralis Sti. Alphonsi" is that of Léonard Gaudé, C.SS.R. (Rome, 1905), who has verified all the quotations in the work and illustrated it with scholarly annotations.

No future work on practical moral theology can pass without ample references to the writings of St. Alphonsus. Hence it would be impossible to gain a clear insight into the present state of moral theology and its development without being more or less conversant with the system of thesaint, as narrated in the articlePROBABILISM. The controversy, which is still being waged aboutProbabilism and Æquiprobabilism, has no significance unless the latter oversteps the limits set to it by St. Alphonsus and merges into Probabiliorism. However, though the controversy has not yet been abandoned theoretically, still in everyday practice it isdoubtful if there is any one who follows other rules in decidingdoubtful cases than those ofProbabilism. This ascendancy of the milderschool in moral theology over the more rigorous gained new impetus when Alphonsus wascanonized and when theChurch pointed out in particular thatDivine Providence had raised him up as a bulwark against theerrors ofJansenism, and that by his numerous writings he had blazed a more reliable path which the guides ofsouls might safely follow amid the conflicting opinions either too lax or too strict. During his lifetime thesaint was forced to enter several literary disputes on account of his works on moral theology; his chief adversaries wereConcina and Patuzzi, both of theDominican Order, and champions of Probabiliorism.

The last decades of the eighteenth century may well be called a period of general decadence as far as thesacred sciences, moral theology included, are concerned. The frivolous spirit of theFrench Encyclopedists had infected, as it were, the whole ofEurope. TheRevolution, which was its offspring, choked all scientific life. A few words about the state of moral theology during this period may suffice.Italy was torn asunder by the dispute about Rigorism and a milder practice; inFrance, Rigorism had received the fullrights of citizenship through theJansenistic movement and held its own till late in the nineteenth century;Germany was swayed by a spirit of shallowness which threatened to dislodgeChristianmorals byrationalistic and natural principles. The "generalseminaries" whichJoseph II established in the Austrian states, engaged professors who did not blush to advanceheretical doctrines and to excludeChristian self-restraint from the catalogue of moralobligations. Other German institutions, too, offered their chairs oftheology to professors who had imbibed theideas of "enlightenment", neglected to insist onCatholic doctrines offaith and putting aside thesupernatural life, sought the end and aim ofeducation in a merely natural morality. But in the second decade of the nineteenth century theFrench Revolution had spent itself, quiet had again followed the turmoil, the political restoration ofEurope had been begun. A restoration also of theecclesiastical spirit and learning was also inaugurated and the gradual rise of moral theology became noticeable. Apart from the purely ascetical side there are three divisions in which this new life was plainly visible:catechism, popular instruction, pastoral work.

Though it is the purpose ofcatechetical teaching to instruct the faithful in the entire range ofChristian religion, in the doctrines offaith no less than in those ofmorals, yet the former may also be conceived and discussed with respect to theduties and the way by which man is destined to obtain his last end. Hence, thecatechetical treatment of religious questions may be regarded as a portion of moral theology. During the period of "enlightenment", this branch had been degraded to a shallow moralizing along natural lines. But that it rose again in the course of the past century to a lucid explanation of the sum-total of theChristian doctrine, is attested by numerous excellent works, both catechisms and extensive discussions. To these may be added the more thorough manuals ofChristian doctrine intended for higherschools, in which the apologetical and moral portions of religious instruction are treated scientifically and adapted to the needs of the time. There is nothing, however, which prevents us from placing these writings in the second of the above-mentioned classes, since their aim is the instruction of theChristian people, though principally theeducatedlaymen. It istrue these works belong exclusively, even less than thecatechetical, to moral theology, since their subject-matter embraces the whole of theChristian doctrine, yet the morally destructive tendencies ofAtheism and the new moral questions brought forward by the conditions of our times, impressed upon writers the importance of moral instruction in manuals ofCatholicfaith. The last decades in particular prove that this side oftheology has been well taken care of. Various questions bearing onChristianmorals were extensively treated in monographs, as e.g., the social question, the significance of money, theChurch'sdoctrine onusury, thewoman question, etc. To quote single works or to enter on the different subjects in detail would exceed the limits of this article.

The third line along which we noted an advance was called the pastoral, that is, instruction which has as its special aim theeducation and aid ofpastors and confessors. That this instruction is necessarily, though not exclusively, casuistic, was mentioned above. The scarcity ofpriests, which was keenly felt in many places, occasioned a lack of timenecessary for an all-round scientificeducation of the candidates for thepriesthood. This circumstance explains why scientific manuals of moral theology, for decades, were merely casuistic compendia, containing indeed the gist of scientific investigations, but lacking in scientific argumentation. The correctness ofecclesiasticaldoctrine had been insured and facilitated by theapprobation with which theChurch distinguished the works of St. Alphonsus. Hence, many of these compendia are nothing else than recapitulations of St. Alphonsus's "Theologia moralis", or, if following a plan of their own, betray on every page that their authors had it always ready at hand. Two works may here find mention which enjoyed a wider circulation than any other book on moral theology and which are frequently used even today: the Scavini's "Theologia moralis universa", and the shorter "Compendium theologiæ moralis" byJean-Pierre Gury, together with the numerous revisions which appeared inFrance,Germany,Italy,Spain, and North America.

We must not, however, deceive ourselves by concluding that, owing to theecclesiasticalapprobation of St. Alphonsus and his moral writings, moral theology is now settled forever and, so to speak, crystallized. Nor does thisapprobation assure us that all individual questions have been solved correctly, and therefore the discussion of certain moral questions remains still open. TheApostolic See itself, or rather the Sacred Penitentiary, when asked, "Whether a professor of moral theology may quietly follow and teach the opinions which St. Alphonsus Liguori teaches in his Moral Theology", gave indeed an affirmative answer on 5 July, 1831; it added, however, "but those must not be reprehended who defend other opinions supported by the authority of reliabledoctors". He who would conclude the guarantee of absolute correctness from theecclesiasticalapprobation of thesaint's works, would make theChurch contradict herself.St. Thomas of Aquin was at least as solemnly approved for the whole field oftheology as St. Alphonsus for moral theology. Yet, e. g, on the subject of the efficacy of grace, which enters deeply intomorals, St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus defend wholly contradictory opinions; both cannot be right, and so may be freely discussed. The same may be said of other questions. In our own days,Antonio Ballerini above all made a simple use of this freedom of discussion, first in his annotations toGury's "Compendium", then in his "Opus theologicum morale", which was recast and edited after his death by Dominic Palmieri. It rendered an eminent service to casuistry; for though we cannot approve of everything, yet the authority of various opinions has been carefully sifted and fully discussed.

Lately, attempts have been made to develop moral theology along other lines. The reformers assert that the casuistical method has choked every other and that it must give place to a more scientific, systematic treatment. It is evident that a merely casuistical treatment does not come up to the demands of moral theology, and as a matter of fact, during the last decades, the speculative element was more and more insisted on even in works chiefly casuistic. Whether the one or the other element should prevail, must be determined according to the proximate aim which the work intends to satisfy. If there is question of a purely scientific explanation of moral theology which does not intend to exceed the limits of speculation, then the casuistical element is withoutdoubt speculative, systematic discussion of the questions belonging to moral theology; casuistry then serves only to illustrate the theoretical explanations. But if there is question of a manual which is intended for the practical needs of apastor and confessor and for theireducation, then the solid, scientific portion of general moral-theological questions must be supplemented by an extensive casuistry. Nay, when time and leisure are wanting to add ample theoretical explanations to an extensive casuistical drill, we should not criticize him who would under these circumstances insist on the latter at the expense of the former; it is the morenecessary in actual practice.

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