Hope

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Hope, in its widest acceptation, is described as the desire of something together with the expectation of obtaining it. TheScholastics say that it is a movement of theappetite towards a future good, which though hard to attain is possible of attainment. Consideration of this state ofsoul is limited in this article to its aspect as a factor in thesupernatural order. Looked at in this way it is defined to be a Divine virtue by which we confidently expect, withGod's help, to reacheternal felicity as well as to have at our disposal the means of securing it. It is said to be Divine not merely because its immediate object isGod, but also because of the special manner of its origin. Hope, such as we are here contemplating, is an infused virtue; ie., it is not, like good habits in general, the outcome of repeated acts or the product of our own industry. Likesupernaturalfaith and charity it is directly implanted in thesoul byAlmighty God. Both in itself and in the scope of its operation it outstrips the limits of the created order, and is to be had if at all only through the direct largess of the Creator. The capacity which it confers is not only the strengthening of an existing power, but rather the elevation, the transforming of a faculty for the performance of functions essentially outside its natural sphere of activity. All of this is intelligible only on the basis, which we take for granted, that there is such a thing as thesupernatural order, and that the only realizable ultimate destiny of man in the presentprovidence of God lies in that order.

Hope is termed atheological virtue because its immediate object isGod, as istrue of the other two essentially infused virtues,faith and charity.St. Thomas acutely says that thetheological virtues are so called "because they haveGod for their object, both in so far as by them we are properly directed to Him, and because they are infused into oursouls byGod alone, as also, finally, because we come toknow of them only byDivine revelation in theSacred Scriptures".Theologians enlarge upon thisidea by saying thatAlmighty God is both the material and the formal object of hope. He is the material object because He is that which is chiefly, though not solely, aimed at when we elicit acts of this virtue- ie., whatever else is looked for is only desired in so far as it bears a relation to Him. Hence according to the generally followed teaching, not onlysupernatural helps, particularly such as arenecessary for oursalvation, but also things in the temporal order, inasmuch as they can be means to reach the supreme end ofhumanlife, may be the material objects ofsupernatural hope. It is worthwhile noting here that in a strict construction of the term we cannot properly hope for eternal life for someone other than ourselves. The reason is that it is of the nature of hope to desire and expect something apprehended precisely as the good orhappiness of the one who hopes (bonum proprium). In a qualified sense, however, that is so far aslove may have united us with others, we may hope for others as well as for ourselves.

By the formal object of hope we understand the motive or motives which lead us to entertain a confident expectation of ahappy issue to our efforts in the matter ofeternalsalvation notwithstanding the difficulties which beset our path.Theologians are not of one mind in determining what is to be assigned as the sufficient reason ofsupernatural hope. Mazzella (De Virtutibus Infusis, disp. v, art. 2), whose judgment has the merit of simplicity as well as that of adequate analysis, finds the foundation of our hope in two things. It is based, according to him, on our apprehension ofGod as our supremesupernatural good Whose communication in thebeatific vision is to make ushappy for alleternity, and also on thoseDivine attributes such asomnipotence, mercy and fidelity, which unite to exhibitGod as our unfailing helper. These considerations, he thinks, motive our wills or furnish the answer to the question why we hope. Of course it is taken for granted that the yearning forGod, not simply because of His owninfinite perfections but explicitly because He is to be our reward, is a righteous temper ofsoul, otherwise the spiritual attitude of hope in which such a longing is included would not be a virtue at all.Luther andCalvin were at one in insisting that only the product of the perfectlove ofGod, ie. thelove ofGod for His own sake, was to be regarded as morally good. Consequently they rejected assinful whatever was done only through consideration of eternal reward or, in other words, through thatlove ofGod which theScholastics call "amor concupiscentiae". TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. vi, can. 31) stigmatized theseerrors asheresy: "If anyone says that a justifiedpersonsins when such a one does what is right through hope of eternal reward, let him beanathema". In spite of this unequivocal pronouncement of the council,Baius, the celebratedLouvaintheologian, substantially reiterated thefalse doctrine of theReformers on this point. His teaching on the matter was formulated in the thirty-eighth proposition extracted from his works, and was condemned bySt. Pius V. According to him there is notrue act of virtue except what is elicited by charity, and as alllove is either ofGod or His creatures, alllove which is not thelove ofGod for His own sake, ie. for His owninfinite perfections, is depraved cupidity and asin. Of course in such a theory there could not properly speaking be any place for the virtue of hope as we understand it. It is easy also to see how it fits in with the initialProtestant position of identifyingfaith and confidence and thus making hope rather an act of theintellect than of the will. For if we may not hope, in theCatholic sense, for blessedness, the only substitute available seems to bebelief in the Divine mercy and promises.

It is atruth constantly acted upon inCatholic life and no less explicitly taught, that hope isnecessary tosalvation. It isnecessary first of all as an indispensible means (necessitate medii) of attainingsalvation, so that no one can enter uponeternal bliss without it. Hence even infants, though they cannot have elicited the act, must have had the habit of hope infused in Baptism.Faith is said to be "the substance of things hoped for" (Hebrews 11:1), and without it "it is impossible to pleaseGod" (Hebrews 11:6). Obviously, therefore, hope is required forsalvation with the same absolute necessity asfaith. Moreover, hope isnecessary because it is prescribed by law, thenatural law which, in the hypothesis that we are destined for asupernatural end, obliges us to use the means suited to that end. Further, it is prescribed by the positiveDivine law, as, for instance, in the first Epistle of St. Peter, i, 13: "Trust perfectly in the grace which is offered you in the revelation ofJesus Christ".

There is both a negative and a positive precept of hope. Thenegative precept is in force ever and always. Hence there can never be a contingency in which one may lawfully despair or presume. Thepositive precept enjoining the exercise of the virtue of hope demands fulfilment sometimes, because one has to discharge certainChristianduties which involve an act of thissupernatural confidence, such asprayer, penance, and the like. Itsobligation is then said, in the language of theschools, to beper accidens. On the other hand, there are times when it is binding without any such spur, because of its own intrinsic importance, orper se. How often this is so in the lifetime of aChristian, is not susceptible of exact determination, but that it is so is quite clear from the tenor of a proposition condemned byAlexander VII: "Man is at no time during his life bound to elicit an act offaith, hope and charity as a consequence of Divineprecepts appertaining to these virtues". It is, however, perhaps not superfluous to note that the explicit act of hope is not exacted. The average goodChristian, who is solicitous about living up to hisbeliefs, implicitly satisfies theduty imposed by the precept of hope.

Thedoctrine herein set forth as to the necessity of Christian hope was impugned in the seventeenth century by the curious mixture of fanaticalmysticism andfalse spirituality calledQuietism. This singular array oferrors was given to the world by aSpanishpriest named Miguel Molinos. He taught that to arrive at the state of perfection it was essential to lay aside all self-love to such an extent that one became indifferent as to one's own progress,salvation, or damnation. The condition ofsoul to be aimed at was one of absolute quiet brought about by the absence of every sort of desire or anything that could be construed as such. Hence, to quote the words of the seventh of the condemned propositions taken from Molinos'sSpiritual Guide, "thesoul must not occupy itself with any thought whether of reward or punishment,heaven orhell, death oreternity". As a result one ought not to entertain any hope as to one'ssalvation; for that, as a manifestation of selfwill, implies imperfection. For the same reason petitions toAlmighty God about anything whatever are quite out of place. No resistance, except of a purely negative sort, should be offered totemptations, and an entirely passive attitude should be fostered in every respect. In the year 1687Innocent XII condemned sixty-eight propositions embodying this extraordinarydoctrine asheretical, blasphemous,scandalous, etc. He likewise consigned the author to perpetual confinement in amonastery, where, having previouslyabjured hiserrors, he died in the year 1696. About the same time a species of pseudomysticism, largely identical with that of Molinos, but omitting the objectionable conclusions, was defended byMadame Guyon. It even found an advocate inFénelon who engaged in a controversy withBossuet on the subject. Ultimately twenty-three propositions drawn fromFénelon'sExplanation of the maxims of the Saints on the interior life were proscribed byInnocent XII. The gist of the teaching, so far as we are concerned, was that there is in this life a state of perfection with which it is impossible to reconcile anylove ofGod except that which is absolutely disinterested, which therefore does not contemplate possession ofGod as our reward. It would follow that the act of hope is incompatible with such a state, since it postulates precisely a desire forGod, not only because He is good in Himself, but also and formally because He is our adequate and final good. Hope is less perfect than charity, but that admission does not involve a moral deformity of any kind, still less is ittrue that we can or ought to pass our lives in a quasi uninterrupted act of purelove ofGod. As a matter of fact, there is no such state anywhere identifiable, and if there were it would not be inconsistent with Christian hope.

The question as to the necessity of hope is followed with some natural sequence by the inquiry as to its certitude. Manifestly, if hope be absolutely required as a means tosalvation, there is an antecedent presumption that its use must in some sense be accompanied bycertainty. It is clear that, as certitude is properly speaking a predicate of theintellect, it is only in a derived sense, or asSt. Thomas saysparticipative, that we can speak of hope, which is largely a matter of the will, as being certain. In other words, hope, whose office is to elevate and strengthen our wills, is said to share the certitude offaith, whose abiding place is our intellects. For our purpose it is of importance to recall what it is that, being apprehended by ourintellect, is said to do service as the foundation of Christian hope. This has already been determined to be the concept ofGod as our helper gathered from reflecting on Hisgoodness, mercy,omnipotence, and fidelity to His promises. In a subordinate sense our hope is built upon our own merits, as the eternal reward is not forthcoming except to those who shall have employed theirfree will to co-operate with the aids afforded byGod's bounty. Now there is a threefold certitude discernible.

Thisdoctrine is in direct antagonism to the initialProtestant contention that we can and must be altogether certain of oursalvation. The only thing required for this end, according to the teaching of theReformers, was the specialfaith or confidence in the promises which alone, withoutgoodworks, justified a man. Hence, even though there were nogoodworks distinguishable in aperson's earthly career, such a one might and ought, notwithstanding, cherish a firm hope, provided only that he did not cease to believe.

Assuming that the seat of hope is our will, we may ask whether, having been once infused, it can ever be lost. The answer is that it can be destroyed, both by the perpetration of thesin of despair, which is its formal opposite, and by the subtraction of the habit offaith, which assigns the motives for it. It is not so clear that thesin of presumption expels thesupernatural virtue of hope, although of course it cannot coexist with the act. We need not be detained with the inquiry whether a man could continue to hope if hiseternal damnation had been revealed to him.Theologians are agreed in regarding such a revelation as practically, if not absolutely, impossible. If, by an all but clearly absurd hypothesis, we supposeAlmighty God to have revealed to anyone in advance that he was surely to be lost, such aperson obviously could no longer hope. Do thesouls inPurgatory hope? It is the commonly held opinion that, as they have not yet been admitted to theintuitive vision of God, and as there is nothing otherwise in their condition which is at variance with the concept of this virtue, they have the habit and elicit the act of hope. As to the damned, the concordant judgment is that, as they have been deprived of every othersupernatural gift, so also knowing well the perpetuity of their reprobation, they can no longer hope. With reference to the blessed inheaven,St. Thomas holds that, possessing what they have striven for, they can no longer be said to have thetheological virtue of hope. The words ofSt. Paul (Romans 8:24) are to the point: "For we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen, is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" They can still desire the glory which is to be proper to their risen bodies and also by reason of the bonds of charity, they can wish for thesalvation of others, but this is not, properly speaking, hope. The human Soul of Christ furnishes an example. Because of thehypostatic union It was already enjoying thebeatific vision. At the same time, because of the passible nature with which He had clothed Himself, He was in the state ofpilgrimage (in statu viatoris), and hence He could look forward with longing to His assumption of the qualities of the glorified body. This however was not hope, because hope has as its main object union withGod inheaven.

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