Duty

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The definition of the termduty given by lexicographers is: "something that is due", "obligatory service"; "something that one is bound to perform or to avoid". In this sense we speak of a duty, duties; and, in general, the sum total of these duties is denoted by the abstract term in the singular. The word is also used to signify that unique factor of consciousness which is expressed in the foregoing definitions by "obligatory", "bound", "ought" by and "moralobligation". Let us analyse this datum of consciousness. When, concerning a contemplated acts one forms the decision "I ought to do it", the words express anintellectual judgment. But unlike speculative judgments, this one is felt to be not merely declaratory. Nor is it merely preferential; it asserts itself as imperative and magisterial. It is accompanied by a feeling impelling one, sometimes effectively, sometimes ineffectively to square his conduct with it. It presumes that there is a right way and a wrong way open, and that the right is better or more worthy than the wrong. All moral judgments of this kind are particular applications of a universal judgment which is postulated in each one of them: right is to be done; wrong is to be avoided. Another phenomenon of our moral consciousness is that we are tuted a hierarchical order among our feelings,appetites, and desires. We instinctively feel, for example, that the emotion of reverence is higher and nobler than the sense of humour; that it is more worthy of us as rational beings to find satisfaction in a noble drama than in watching a dog-fight; that the sentiment of benevolence is superior to that of selfishness. Furthermore we are conscious that, unless it has been weakened or atrophied by neglect, the sentiment attending moral judgments asserts itself as the highest of all; awakens in us the feeling of reverence; and demands that all other sentiments and desires, as motives of action, shall be reduced to subordination to the moral judgment. When action is conformed to this demand, there arises a feeling of self-approbation while an opposite course is followed by a feeling of self-reproach. Starting from this analysis we may expose the theory of duty according toCatholic ethics.

Duty in Catholic ethics

The path of activity proper and congenial to every being is fixed and dictated by the nature which the being possesses. The cosmic order which pervades all the non-humanuniverse is predetermined in the natures of the innumerable variety of things which make up theuniverse. For man, too, the course of action proper to him is indicated by the constitution of his nature. A great part of his activity is like the entire movements of the non-human world, under the iron grip of determinism; there are large classes of vital functions, over which he has no volitional control; and his body is subject to the physicallaws of matter. But, unlike all the lower world, he is himself the master of his action over a wide range of life which weknow as conduct. He is free to choose between two opposite courses; he can elect, in circumstances inumerable, to do or not to do; to do this action, or to do that other which is incompatible with it. Does then, his nature furnish no index for conduct? Is every form of conduct equally congenial and equally indifferent tohumannature? By no means. His nature indicates the line of action which is proper, and the line which is abhorrent to it. This demand of nature is delivered partly in that hierarchical order which exists in our feelings and desires as motives of action partly through the reflective reason which decides what form of action is consonant with the dignity of a rational being, comprehensively, and with immediate practical application to actions in those moral judgments involving the "ought". This function of reason, aided thus by good will and practical experience, we callconscience.

We have now reached the first strand of the bond which weknow as moralobligation, or duty. Duty is adebt owed to the rational nature of which the spokesman and representative isconscience, which imperatively calls for the satisfaction of the claim. But is this the be-all and the end-all of duty? Theidea of duty, ofindebtedness, involves another self orperson to whom thedebt is due. Conscience is not another self, it is an element of one's ownpersonality. How can one be said, except through a figure of speech, to be indebted to oneself? Here we must take into consideration another characteristic ofconscience. It is thatconscience in a dim, undefinable, but very real way, seems to set itself over against the rest of ourpersonality. Its intimations awake, as no other exercise of our reason does, feelings of awe, reverence,love, fear, shame, such as are called forth in us by otherpersons, and bypersons only. The universality of this experience is testified to by the expressions men commonly employ when speaking ofconscience; they call it a voice, a judge, they say that they must answer toconscience for their conduct. Their attitude towards it is as to something not completely identical with themselves; its whole genesis is not to be accounted for by describing it as one function of life. It is the effect ofeducation and training, some say. Certainlyeducation and training may do a great deal to develop this impression that inconscience there is another self implicated beyond ourselves. But the quickness with which the child responds to its instructor or educator on this point proves that he feels within himself something which confirms his teacher's lesson. Ethicalphilosophers and conspicuously among themNewman, have argued that to him who listens reverently and obediently to the dictates ofconscience, they inevitably reveal themselves as emanating, originally, from "a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive". If, however, we acceptNewman's view as universallytrue, we cannot easily admit that, as is generally asserted and believed, many men obeyconscience andlove righteousness who nevertheless, do notbelieve in a personal, moral ruler of theuniverse. Why may not the most uncomprimising theist admit that the moral guide which the Creator has implanted in our nature is powerful enough successfully to discharge its function at least in occasional cases, without fully unfolding its implications? One of the leadingUnitarianmoralists has eloquently expressed this opinion.

The profound sense of the authority and even sacredness of the moral law is often conspicuous among men whose thoughts apparently never turn to superhuman things, but who are penetrated by a secret worship ofhonour,truth and right. Were this noble state of mind brought out of its impulsive state and made to unfold its implicit contents, it would indeed reveal a source higher thanhumannature for the august authority of righteousness. But it is undeniable that that authority may be felt where it is not seen--felt as if it were the mandate of a Perfect Will, while yet there is no overt recognition of such a Will: i.e.,conscience may act as human, before it is discovered to be divine. To the agent himself its whole history may seem to lie in his ownpersonality and his visible social relations; and it shall nevertheless serve as hisoracle, though it be hid from him Who it is that utters it. (Martineau, A Study of Religion, Introduc., p. 21.)

Nevertheless it must be admitted that suchpersons are comparatively few; and they, too, testify to the implication of another self in the intimations of consciousness; for they, as Ladd says

personify the conception of the sum-total ofethicalobligations, they are fain to spell the words with capitals and swear allegiance to this purely abstract conception. They hypostatize and deify an abstraction as though it were itself existent and divine. (Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, p. 385.)

Thedoctrine thatconscience is autonomous, independent, sovereign, a law-giver deriving its authority from no higher source, will neither,logically speaking, satisfy theidea of duty, nor sufficiently safeguard morality. One cannot, after all, owe adebt to himself, he cannot lay a command on himself. If moral judgments can claim no higher origin than one's own reason, then under close, severe inspection they must be considered as merely preferential. The portentous magisterial tone in whichconscience speaks is a mere delusion; it can show no warrant or title to the authority which it pretends to exercise when, under stress of temptation, a man who believes in no higher legislator thanconscience, finds arising in his mind the inevitable question, Why am I bound to obey myconscience when my desires run in another direction? he is perilously tempted to adjust hismoral code to his inclinations; and the device of spelling duty with a capital will prove but a slender support to it against the attack of passion.

Reason solves the problem of duty, and vindicates thesanctity of thelaw of righteousness by tracing them to their source inGod. As the cosmic order is a product and expression of the Divine Will so, likewise, the moral law which is expressed on the rational nature.God wills that we shape our free action or conduct to that norm. Reason recognizing our dependence on the Creator, and acknowledging His ineffable majesty, power,goodness, andsanctity, teaches us that we owe Himlove, reverence, obedience, service, and, consequently, we owe it to Him to observe that law which He has implanted within us as the ideal of conduct. This is our first and all-comprehensive duty in which all other duties have their root. In the light of thistruthconscience explains itself, and is transfigured. It is the accredited representative of the Eternal; He is the original Imponent of moralobligation; and disobedience toconscience is disobedience to Him. Infraction of the moral law is not merely aviolence done to our rational nature; it is also an offence toGod, and this aspect of its malice is designated by calling itsin. The sanctions ofconscience, self-approbation, and self-reproach, are reinforced by the supreme sanction, which, if one may use the expression, acts automatically. It consists in this, that by obedience to thelaw we reach our perfection, and compass our supreme good; while, on the other hand the transgressor condemns himself to miss that good in the attainment of which alone lies thehappiness that is incorruptible. To obviate a possible misapprehension it may be remarked here that the distinction between right and wrong hangs not upon any arbitrarydecree of the Divine Will. Right is right and wrong is wrong because the prototype of the created order, of which the moral law forms a part, is the Divine Nature itself the ultimate ground of alltruthintellectual and moral.

Erroneous ethics

We have already touched upon the main weakness of theKantian theory, which is to treatconscience as autonomous. Another mistake ofKant is that in his system duty and right are made coterminous. A moment's reflection is sufficient to perceive that this is anerror. There are many conceivable good actions which one can do, and which it would be highly praiseworthy to perform, yet which no reasonableperson, however rigorous his ideal of conduct might be would say one is bound to perform. Duty and right are two concentric circles. The inner one, duty, embraces all that is to be observed under penalty of failing to live rationally. The outer contains the inner, but, stretching far beyond, permits an indefinite extension to the paths of virtue that lead to consummate righteousness andsanctity. Every philosophic system which embraces as one of its tenets thedoctrine of determinism thereby commits itself to the denial of the existence of moralobligation. Duty implies that the subject of it possesses the power to observe thelaw, or to disobey, and the power to choose between these alternatives what reproach can a determinist mentorlogically address to one who has committed a wrong action? "You ought not to have done so"? The culprit can reply: "But you have taught me thatfree will is a delusion; that no one can act otherwise than he does. So, under the circumstances in which I found myself, it was impossible for me to refrain from the notion which you condemn. What, then, can you mean by saying that I ought not to have meted as I did? You reproach me; as well reproach a tiger for having eaten his man or a volcano for having ruined a village."

With regard to the existence of duty every form ofpantheism, or monism,logically finds itself in the camp of determinism. When man is looked upon as one with the Infinite his actions are not really his own, but belong properly to the Universal Being. The part assigned to him in his activities, is similar to that played by a carbon burner in relation to the electric current generated by a dynamo. The Divine power passing through him clothes itself with only a seeming individuality, while the whole course of action, the direction which it takes, and the results in which it culminates, belong to the Supreme Being. If this weretrue, then lying, debauchery, theft,murder were equally as worthy as truthfulness chastity, honesty, benevolence; for all would be equally manifestations of the one universal Divinity. Then a classification of conduct into two opposite categories might still be made from the standpoint of results; but theidea of moral worth, which is the very core of the moral life and the first postulate of duty, would have vanished.Hedonism of every shade--epicurean,utilitarian, egoistic, altruistic, evolutionary--which builds on one or another form of the "greatesthappiness" principle and makes pleasure and pain in discriminating norm of right and wrong, is unable to vindicate any authority for duty, or even to acknowledge the existence of moralobligation. No combination of impulses, if they are estimated from the merely biological or purely empirical standpoint, can, by any juggling of words, be converted into a moralhierarchy. Thehedonist is doomed to find all his endeavour to establish the basis of the moral order terminate in "is", but never in "ought", in a fact, but never in an ideal. Lecky has neatly summed up thehedonist solution of the problem of duty: "All that is meant by saying we ought to do an action is that if we do not do it we shall suffer."

Pleasure, say the epicurean and the egoist, is the only motive of action; and actions are good or bad accordingly as they produce a surplus of pleasure over the pain, or contribute to or diminish welfare. Then, we ask, must I always pursue what seems to me the most pleasurable or the most remunerative? If the answer is yes, we are again landed in determinism. If the reply is that I can choose, but that I ought to choose what produces the mosthappiness, then I ask, why ought I to choose the course which produces mosthappiness or pleasure if I prefer to do otherwise? To this question the epicurean and the egoist have no answer. Besides, the most pleasurable conduct may be one that all reasonable men condemn as wrong, because it is injurious to some one else. Here the egoist is compelled to hand the difficulty over to the altruist. The latter endeavours to dispose of it by pointing out that the object of good conduct is not merely the agent's ownhappiness, but that of everybody concerned. But again, why am I bound to take into account the welfare of others? and the altruist is silent. The evolutionist of the Spencerian type intervenes with a ponderous theory that in gauging the measure in which actions produce welfare or diminish it not merely the immediate, but also and more especially, the remote results must be considered. He then proceeds to show that, as an hereditary consequence of our ancestors' experience that remote results are more important than immediate, we have come to fancy that remote results have a certain authoritativeness. Also, from unpleasant experiences of our ancestors, we inherit a tendency, when thinking of injurious actions, to think too of the external penalties which were attached to such actions. These two elements blending into one, give rise, we are told, to the feeling of moralobligation. So the common conviction that moralobligation has really any binding authority is a mere delusion. Spencer is honest enough to draw the inevitable corollary of thedoctrine which is that our sense of duty and moralobligation is transitory and defined to disappear. Ethical writers of the "independent morality"schools have devised a beautifully simple way of escaping from the embarrassment of accounting for the validity of moralobligation. They ignore the subject altogether and refer the disappointed inquirer to the metaphysician. Ethics, they blandly declare, is a descriptive, not a normativescience; hence that imposing array of works professing to treat scientifically ofmorals, yet calmly ignoring the pivotal factor of the moral life.

Historic development of the idea of duty

To trace the development of the concept of duty would be to review the history of thehuman race. Even in the lowest races there is to be found somemoral code, however, crude anderroneous. Another universal fact is that the race has, everywhere and always, placedmorals under a religious or quasi-religious, sanction. The savage, in a measure corresponding to his crude moral andintellectual development, witnesses to this universal impulse by observing inumerable customs because he believes them to have some sanction higher than that of his fellow tribesmen or their chief. The great nations of antiquity,Chinese, Chaldean, Babylonlan,Egyptian, saw in theirdeities the source or sanction of their moral codes--at least until the religious and the moral ideal became simultaneously corrupted. In Greece andRome, likewise religion andmorals were intimately associated, until religionprovedfalse to its trust. The same phenomenon is found in the Aryan race ofIndia andPersia, while theSemitic peoples, especially theJews, always continued to look to religion for the reason of their moral codes. When classicpaganism had introduced among the gods the vices of men, the ancient tradition continued to be vindicated by the poets, and by some of thephilosophers. The magnificent testimonies of the Greek tragic poets, ofPlato,Aristotle, and Cicero to the superhuman origin of the moral law and duty need not be quoted here. But when religious tradition lost its force and philosophy became the guardian of morality a conflict of rivalschools, none of which possessed sufficient authority to make its tenets prevail with the mass of the people, was the inevitable result; and as religiousfaith declined, the tendency to find a non-religious basis for duty became more pronounced. The consequence was that theidea of duty faded, and systems arose, which, like our present day "independent morality", had no place for moralobligation.

The unity of the moral andreligious ideal was restored and rendered perfect byChristianity. The Gospel vindicated the Divine origin of duty, and declared that its fulfilment constituted the very essence of religion. Thisidea has been the chief motor force to raise the Western world out of the moral chaos into which denyingpaganism had dragged it. Thedoctrine that every man is animmortal being created byGod to be united with Himself in an endless existence, provided that he observe thelaw of righteousness, in whichGod's will is expressed, sets forth the dignity of man and the sacredness of duty in their full nobility. The wickedness of moral delinquency reveals itself in this, that it is asin against the Most High--anidea scarcely known to antiquity outside the Hebrew people. TheChristian religion brought out more clearly and taught with the authority ofGod, the code of thenatural law, much of which unaided reason developed only in hesitating accents and without the authoritynecessary to impose it effectively asobligatory on all. TheChristian was taught that the fulfilment of duty is the one supreme concern of life to which all other interests must be made to bow and that its fulfilment is enforced by the most tremendous sanctions conceivable. The Gospel gave a satisfactory solution to the anomaly which had perplexedphilosophers and misled them toerroneous doctrines concerning the meaning of the moral life. How can virtue be man's perfection, good, and end, when the fulfilment of duty means in many cases, the frustration of many natural desires and wants? The history of duty, replies theChristian, lies not all within the confines of earthly life; its ultimate goal is beyond the grave. TheChristian doctrine of the Fatherhood ofGod and the sonship of man leads to a clearer perception of the chief duties and of their importance. Human life is seen to be a sacred, inviolable thing in ourselves and in others;woman the equal, not the slave of man; thefamily isordained ofGod, and its cornerstone is monogamous marriage. The State, too, is placed on a firmer basis, sinceChristian doctrine teaches that it draws the warrant of its existence not from force, or a more consensus of human wills, but fromGod. Finally, theChristian law oflove correlates the outer circle of righteousness with the inner one of strict duty. Love ofGod becomes the adequate motive for striving after the highest personalsanctity;love of our neighbour for the widest exercise of benevolence far beyond the limits of strict duty. In theperson of the Master,Christianity offers to us the lawless Exemplar of the moral ideal, the perfect conformity of will and action to the Divine Will. His example hasproved potent enough to inspire with heroic loyalty to duty "the millions who countless and nameless, the stern hard path have trod". The moral standards of our civilization have been developed and maintained by the efficiency of theChristianidea of duty. Contemporary conditions furnish unmistakable indications that these standard become debased and discredited when they are torn from the ground whence they sprang.

Duties

Theobligation of living according to our rational nature is the parent of all particular duties. These are generally divided into three groups: (1) duties toGod, (2) duties towards ourselves, and (3) duties to others.

(1) ToGod, the Supreme Master of theuniverse, our Creator, the All Holy, All Good, we owehonour, service, obedience, andlove. These duties are comprehended under the general termreligion. Since He is Truth itself, we owe it to Him to believe whatever He has revealed to us in asupernatural manner; to worship Him in the way which in revelation, He has taught us is most pleasing to Him; and to obey the authority which He has constituted (seeCHURCH). Reverence due to Him forbids all profanity andblasphemy of Him or whatever is sacred to Him. Lying is an offence against His Divine nature, which is Truth itself. These generic duties cover all the specific duties that we owe toGod, and embrace, besides, those duties which devolve upon us as members of theCatholicChurch.

(2) Our duties towards ourselves may all be included under one principle: life, the goods ofperson,mental and physical, have been given to us in trust, with theobligation of using them to obtain our supreme good and end. Hence we may not destroy them, or abuse them as if we were independent master of them. Thereforesuicide, abuse of our faculties,mental or physical, exposing our life or health to danger without a reasonable motive, are prohibited; as also are all actions incompatible with the reverence that we owe to our moral nature. We are bound to strive for the development of ourintellect and for temporal goods as far as these arenecessary to the fulfilment of the moral law. As duty is adebt to some one other than ourselves, we cannot, strictly speaking, use the term dutiesto ourselves. They are due toGod; they regard ourselves.

(3) All our duties towards others are implicitly contained inChristian precept: "Thou shaltlove thy neighbour as thyself".God wills the welfare of all men; hence theobligation of making His will the rule of mine binds me to will their welfare, and to order my conduct towards them with a due respect to the rational nature which they possess, and to theobligations which that nature imposes on them. The application of this principle gives birth to duties towards the minds and wills of others (prohibition ofscandal and lying); to the lives of others (prohibition ofmurder, etc.); to their good reputation (prohibition of insult,detraction, or defamation of character).

As material goods arenecessary to us in order to live according to the rational law, evidentlyGod in imposing moralobligation wills also that we have at our disposal the meansnecessary to fulfil our duty. Hence arises that moral control over things which is called aright. The needs of a moral life requite that some things should be permanently under our control; hence therights of ownership. Now a right in oneperson is nugatory unless others are bound to respect it. So to every right there is a corresponding duty.

Thus far we have sketched the line of duty incumbent on each one towards others asindividuals. Besides these there are social duties. The primarysociety, thefamily, which is the unit of civilsociety, has its foundation in our nature; and the relations which constitute it give rise to two groups ofrights and correlative duties--conjugal andparental. Besides thefamily, a wider, broader, association of man with his fellows is needed, generally speaking, in order that he may develop his life with all its needs and potencies, in accordance with the dictates of reason.God has intended man to live in civilsociety, and man becomes the subject of duties andrights with regard to thesociety of which he is a member. Thesociety, too, acquires a moral unity orpersonality which is also the by thesociety to imposelaws which constitute a bindingobligation. This right, called authority, is derived from thenatural law, ultimately fromGod. For, since He wills civilsociety as a means for the due development ofhumannature, He wills that authority without which it cannot exist. As the lower and animals cannot be the subject ofrights we do not owe them any duties; but we owe duties toGod in their regard. (seeETHICS;LAW; OBLIGATIONS).

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