Doubt

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(Latindubium, Greekaporí,Frenchdoute,GermanZweifel).

A state in which the mind is suspended between two contradictory propositions and unable to assent to either of them. Any number of alternative propositions on the same subject may be in doubt at the same time; but, strictly speaking, the doubt is attached separately to each one, as between the proposition and its contradictory, i.e. each proposition may or may not betrue. Doubt is opposed tocertitude, or the adhesion of the mind to a proposition without misgiving as to itstruth; and again toopinion, or amental adhesion to a proposition together with such a misgiving. Doubt is eitherpositive ornegative. In the former case, the evidence for and against is so equally balanced as to render decision impossible; in the latter, the doubt arises from the absence of sufficient evidence on either side. It is thus possible that a doubt may be positive on the one side and negative on the other (positivo-negative or negativo-positive), i.e. in cases where evidence on one side only is attainable and does not, of itself, amount to absolute demonstration, as, for instance, in circumstantial evidence. Again, doubt may be eithertheoretical orpractical. The former is concerned with abstracttruth anderror; the latter with questions ofduty, or of the licitness of actions, or of mere expediency. A further distinction is made between doubt concerning the existence of a particular fact(dubium facti) and doubt in regard to a precept of law(dubium juris). Prudent doubts are distinguished fromimprudent, according to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the considerations on which the doubt is based. It should be observed that doubt is a purely subjective condition; i.e. it belongs only to the mind which has to judge of facts, and has no application to the facts themselves. A proposition or theory which is commonly called doubtful is, therefore, one as to which sufficient evidence to determine assent is not forthcoming; in itself it must be eithertrue orfalse. Theories which have at one time been regarded as doubtful for want of sufficient evidence, frequently become certainlytrue orfalse by reason of the discovery of fresh evidence.

As certitude may be produced either by reason (which deals with evidence) or byfaith (which rests on authority), it follows that theoretical doubt may be in like manner concerned with the subject-matter of either reason orfaith, that is to say, with philosophy or with religion. Practical doubt is concerned with conduct; and since conduct must be guided by principles afforded by reason or byfaith, or by both conjointly, doubt concerning it regards the application of principles already accepted under one or other of the foregoing heads. The resolution of doubt of this kind is the province ofmoral theology, in regard to questions of right and wrong and in regard to those of mere practical expediency, recourse must be had to the scientific or other principles which properly belong to the subject-matter of the doubt. Thus, for example, doubt as to the actual occurrence of an historical event can only be resolved by consideration of the evidence; doubt as to thedoctrine of thesacraments, by ascertaining what is offaith on the subject; doubt as to the morality of a commercial transaction, by the application of the authoritative decisions ofmoral theology; while the question of the wisdom or the reverse of the transaction in regard to profit and loss must be determined by commercialknowledge and experience. The legitimacy, or the reverse, of doubt in regard to matters of fact is made evident by the forms oflogic (induction anddeduction), which, whatever may be the extent of their function as a means of acquiringknowledge, are indispensablynecessary as a test of the correctness of conclusions or hypotheses already formed.

Doubt in philosophy

The validity of human perception and reasoning in general as guides to objectivetruth has been frequently called in question. The doubt thus raised has been sometimes of the character calledmethodic, fictitious, or provisional, and sometimes real, or sceptical, as embodying the conclusion that objectivetruth cannot beknown. Doubt of the former kind is thenecessary preliminary to all inquiry, and in this sense philosophy is said byAristotle (Metaph., III, i) to be "the art of doubting well". Sir W. Hamilton points out (Lect. on Metaphysics, v) that doubt, as a preliminary tophilosophical inquiry is the only means by which thenecessary removal of prejudice may be effected; as theBaconian method insisted on the primary necessity of putting aside the "idols", or prejudices, by which men's minds are naturally influenced. Thus theScholasticproof of a proposition or thesis begins by the statement of "doubts", or contrary arguments; after which the evidence for the thesis is given, and finally the doubts are resolved. This, it need hardly be said, is the method pursued in the "Summa" ofSaint Thomas Aquinas and still in use in the formal disputations oftheological students. An instance of this kind of doubt is theSic et Non (Yes and No) ofAbelard, which consists of a long series of propositions ontheological, Scriptural, andphilosophical subjects, with a counter-proposition attached to each. The solution of the doubts in the sense of theorthodox thesis, which was clearly intended to follow, was never written; or if so, has not been preserved. (See Victor Cousin's "Fragments Philosophiques".) Thephilosophical system ofDescartes begins with a universal methodic doubt; the famouscogito, ergo sum, on which the whole system is based, is the solution of thephilosopher's fundamental doubt of his own existence. This solution had been anticipated bySt. Augustine; who took the subjectivecertainty of one's own existence as the ground of allcertainty, e.g.,

Tu, qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? Scio. Unde scis? Nescio. Cogitare te scis? Scio. (Sol., II, i);

Utrum aëris sit vis vivendi, an ignis, dubitaverunt homines; vivere se tamen et meminisse et intelligere et velle et cogitare et scire et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitet vivit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit, etc. (De Trin., X, xiv).

In general it may be said that doubt, either expressed or implied, is involved in allintellectual research.

Among the systems in which doubt as to the trustworthiness of human faculties is not merely provisionally assumed, but is genuine and final, those which find in asupernatural revelation the guide totruth which natural reason fails to provide must be distinguished from those which hold doubt to be the final conclusion of all inquiry intotruth. The former depreciate reason in the interests offaith; the latter take reason as the only possible guide, but find no ground for confidence in it. To the former class belongsNicholas of Cusa (1440), who was the author of two sceptical treatises onhumanknowledge;certainty is to be found, according to his view, only through the mysticalknowledge ofGod. The scepticism of Montaigne made a reservation (whether sincerely or not is uncertain) in favour ofrevealedtruth; and the same principle was advocated by Charron, Sanchez, and Le Vayer. Hume, in his sceptical essays onmiracles andimmortality, also attributed a final authority to revelation; but with obvious insincerity. The sceptical views of Hobbes, combined with his peculiar theory of government, made all conviction, including that of religioustruth, dependent on thecivil authority. Glanvill's "The Vanity of Dogmatizing", or "Scepsis Scientifica", grounded a serious defense ofrevealedreligion on the uncertainty of naturalknowledge. Balfour's "Defense of Philosophic Doubt", based on the indemonstrability of ultimatetruths, is an attempt in the same direction. (SeeFIDEISM.)

In the second class are to be reckoned the various systems of genuine skepticism. This appeared in Greek philosophy at a very earlydate. Heraclitus held the senses to be untrustworthy(kakoí mártures) and misleading, though he also conceived a supersensuousknowledge of the universal reason, immanent in the cosmos, to be attainable.Zeno of Elea defended thedoctrine of the unity and permanence of being by propounding a series of "hypotheses", each of which resulted in a contradiction, and by means of them sought to demonstrate the unreality of the manifold and changing. The subjective principle of theSophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, and others of less note) that "man is the measure of all things" implies doubt, or skepticism, as to all objective reality. Knowledge is resolved by Protagoras into mere variable opinion; and Gorgias asserts that nothing really exists, that if anything existed, it could not be known, and that if suchknowledge were possible it would be incommunicable. ThePyrrhonists, or Sceptics, held everything in doubt, even the fact of doubting. The Middle Academics, whose chief representatives were Arcesilaus and Carneades, while doubting allknowledge, held, nevertheless, that probability could be recognized in varying degrees. The "Encyclopedia" of Diderot and d'Alembert comments on the odd self-contradiction of Montaigne, who claimed a higher degree of probability for thePyrrhonist than for the Academic opinion. Sextus Empiricus advanced the theory, often since maintained, that the syllogism is really apetitio principii, and that demonstration is therefore impossible. Bayle, in his celebrated "Dictionary", subjected the philosophy of his time to severe destructive criticism, but was confessedly unable to supply its deficiencies. Hume's position was purely negative for him, neither the existence of the external world nor that of the mind by which it is known was capable of demonstration; and the conclusion ofKant's "Critique of Pure Reason", that the "thing in itself"(Ding an sich) is unknowable though certainly existing, is evidently sceptical (though the author himself rejected the title), since it embodies a purely negative doubt as to the nature of "transcendent" reality.Kant's argument for theexistence of God, as rationally indemonstrable, but postulated by the practical reason, necessarily results in a very limited conception of the Divine nature.Lamennais made general consent, or the common sense ofmankind, the only ground of certitude; the individual reason he held to be incapable of attaining it. "Nothing is so evident to us today that we can be sure we shall not find it either doubtful orerroneous to-morrow" (Essai sur l'indifférence, II, xiii).

It may be observed that theories which deny the validity of simple experience as a guide totruth are really instances of doubt, because, though they assert dogmatically the inadequacy of widely accepted evidence, they are nevertheless in that state of suspense by which doubt is properly characterized in regard to the reality commonly held to be made known by experience. Thus themental attitude which received from Professor Huxley the name ofAgnosticism is a strictly doubtful one towards all that lies beyond sense-experience. The doubt is purely negative in this view; whatever is not cognizable by the aid of the senses is held to be unknowable;God may exist, or He may not, but we can neither affirm His existence nor deny it. Again, the system or method known as Pragmatism regards all reality as doubtful;truth is the correspondence ofideas with one another, and cannot be regarded as anything final, but must perpetually change with the progress of human thought;knowledge must be taken at its "face value" from moment to moment, as a practical guide to well-being, and must not be regarded as having anynecessary correspondence with definite and permanent reality.

Doubt in regard to religion

In regard to relgion, doubt has at different times assumed a variety of forms. It is perhaps uncertain how far the ancient mythologies received or even demanded exactbelief; it is at any rate certain that they were, as a rule, not considered worthy of serious attention by thephilosophers of anyschool. Theatheism which formed part of the charge on whichSocrates was condemned was an offense against the State rather than against religion in itself (see Lecky, Hist. ofEuropean Morals, ii). Thefaith demanded by theChristian Revelation stands on a different footing from thebelief claimed by any other religion. Since it rests on divine authority, it implies anobligation to believe on the part of all to whom it is proposed; andfaith being an act of the will as well as of theintellect, its refusal involves not merelyintellectualerror, but also some degree of moral perversity. It follows that doubt in regard to theChristian religion is equivalent to its total rejection, the ground of its acceptance being necessarily in every case the authority on which it is proposed, and not, as withphilosophical or scientific doctrines, its intrinsic demonstrability in detail. Thus, whereas aphilosophical or scientific opinion may be held provisionally and subject to an unresolved doubt, no such position can be held towards the doctrines ofChristianity; their authority must be either accepted or rejected. The unconditional, interior assent which theChurch demands to the Divine authority of revelation is incompatible with any doubt as to its validity.Gregory XVI, by theBrief "Dum acerbissimas", 26 Sept., 1835, condemned the teaching ofHermes that alltheological inquiry should be based on positive doubt (Denzinger, 10th ed., no. 1619); and theVatican Council declared (Sess. II, ch. sxxi):

"revelata vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest", i.e. we believe the things that are revealed to betrue, not because of an intrinsictruth which reason perceives, but because of the authority ofGod Who is the Author of Revelation, and Who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

Heresies have, however, generally had the character rather of dogmatic assertion than of mere doubt, though they arose from a more or less prevalent state of doubt as to doctrines imperfectly understood or not yet authoritatively defined. The devotion to classical studies which followed upon the fall ofConstantinople in 1463 and the dispersion of its literary treasures gave rise to thehumanism, or literary revival, of theRenaissance, and in many cases resulted in a skeptical attitude towards religion. This skepticism, however, was by no means universal among the Humanists, and was due rather to lack of interest intheological as compared with literary andphilosophical, study, than to any reasoned criticism of religiousdoctrine. (See Pastor, "History of the Popes", chapters on the Renaissance.) It helped to prepare the way however, for theReformation which, beginning with a revolt againstecclesiastical authority, called all the doctrines ofChristianity in question, rejecting those which failed to gain the approval of the different leaders of the movement. Thus amongProtestants in general there is great variety of opinion on religious doctrines, those which are firmly held by some being considered doubtful by others, and by others again, rejected asfalse.Anglicanism, especially, leaves open many of the tenets which theCatholicChurch holds as offaith, and thus endeavours to comprehend within its boundariespersons who differ widely from one another on important subjects. TheCatholicChurch, on the other hand, pronounces authoritatively as to thetruth or falsehood of opinions, by means ofgeneral councils, professions offaith,infallible decisions of thesupreme pontiff, and the ordinary teaching of her Doctors. AsSt. Avitus, in the sixth century, declared, "it is thelaw of the councils that if any doubt have arisen in matters which regard the state of theChurch, we are to have recourse to the chiefpriest of theRoman Church" (Ep. xxxvi in P.L., LIX, 253). Doubt as to the Faith is thus impossible in theCatholicChurch without infringing the principle of authority on which theChurch itself depends. The field, however, which is open to a variety of opinions on questions not directly involving the essential doctrines of the Faith is still a very wide one; and though its extent may be further limited by future dogmatic decisions, it is probable on the other hand that it will be increased in the future, as in the past, by the emergence of doubtful questions as to the exact bearing of dogmatictruth upon fresh discoveries or theories of all kinds.

It will be evident from what has been said that doubt cannot coexist either withfaith orknowledge in regard to any given subject;faith and doubt are mutually exclusive, andknowledge which is limited by a doubt, becomes, in regard to the subject or part of a subject to which the doubt applies, no longerknowledge but opinion. A moralcertainty--that is, one which is founded on the normal course of human action--does not strictly exclude doubt, but, as excludingprudent doubt, must be considered a sufficient practical guide (cf. Butler, "Analogy of Religion", introduction, and pt. II, ch. vi). Thus doubt is sometimes said to implybelief; though suchbelief or practicalcertainty cannot properly be held to rise above the most probable kind of opinion. The rhetorical conception of thefaith that "lives in honest doubt" (Tennyson, In Memoriam) must be taken to signify that truthful and serious habit of mind which refuses to submit to deception on motives furnished byintellectualsloth or the desire of worldly advantage.Catholic philosophy is entirely opposed both to thePyrrhonist doubt of external reality and to that form ofIdealism which is closely connected with theKantian method on its sceptical side, and which seeks to reduce alldogma to the mere expression of subjective religious conceptions, relegating the objective facts with whichdogma is concerned to the domain of symbol andparable. In the view of theScholastic system human experience is atrue perception of external reality through the senses and theintellect; phenomena being the object both of the senses, which they directly affect, and, after a different manner, of theintellect, which apprehends through sensible impressions thetrue nature and principles of the reality which causes those impressions. The facts of revelation to which theChurch bears witness are in this sense real and objective, and may neither be explained away nor set aside by any system of historical or scientific criticism. Such is the purport of theEncyclical "Pascendi Dominici gregis" (1907), which both controverts and condemns the attempt to evacuatedogma of itstrue significance made by the method of religious speculation known asModernism.

Practical doubt

Practical doubt, or doubt as to the lawfulness of an action is, according to the teaching ofmoral theology, incompatible with right action; since to act with a doubtfulconscience is obviously to act in disregard of the moral law. To act with a doubtfulconscience is therefore,sinful; and the doubt must be removed before any action can be justified. It frequently happens, however, that the solution of a practical doubt is not attainable, while some decision isnecessary. In such cases theconscience may obtain a "reflexive"certainty by adopting an approved opinion as to the lawfulness of the action contemplated, apart from the intrinsic merits of the question. The question has been much discussed among differentschools oftheologians whether the opinion so followed must be of greatly preponderating authority in favour of liberty in order to justify an action the lawfulness of which appears intrinsically doubtful, whether it must be merely more probable than the contrary one, or equally probable, or merely probable in itself, even though less so than its contrary. (SeeMORAL THEOLOGY;PROBABILISM.) The fast, however, is the theory now generally accepted for all practical purposes; and the principle thatlex dubia non obligat--i.e. that a law which is doubtful in its application to the case in hand does not bind--is universally admitted. It must be observed, however, that where the question is one not merely of positive law but of securing a certain practical result, only the "safer" course may be followed. No opinion however probable, is allowed to take precedence of the most certain means of securing such ends; e.g. in providing for the validity of thesacraments, in dischargingobligations ofjustice, or in avoiding injury to others. Thus doubtfulbaptisms and ordinations must be repeated conditionally. (SeeAGNOSTICISM;CERTITUDE;EPISTEMOLOGY;FAITH;HERESY;INFALLIBILITY;SCEPTICISM.)

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