(CHARLES I, KING OF SPAIN).
Born atGhent, 1500; died at Yuste, inSpain, 1558; was a descendant of the house of Hapsburg, and to this descent owed his sovereignty over so many lands that it was said of him that the sun never set on his dominions. Charles was the son of Philip, Duke ofBurgundy, by Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, andBurgundy was the first heritage to which he at his led, on his fathers death in 1506. As he was a minor at that time, his aunt, Margaret ofAustria, undertook the regency for him. William of Chièvres, hisfather's chief counsellor, had charge of the prince's household; Adrian ofUtrecht, the Humanist and professor oftheology atLouvain, who undertook hiseducation, appears to have exercised a deep and lasting influence on the opinions and convictions of his pupil.
Like many princes of his house, the boy developed slowly, showing no signs of a strong will. In January, 1515, he was declared to be of age, through the influence of Chièvres, who sought to destroy the power by which Margaret was forcing theBurgundian nobility into a too dynastic policy regardless of the country's need of peace. The peace of the country demanded an alliance withFrance, even thoughFrance should thus gain considerable influence in the internal affairs ofBurgundy. Charles at once acceded to the wishes of the nobility (Treaties ofParis, 24 March, 1515, and Noyon, 13 August, 1516). Upon the death of Ferdinand ofAragon in January, 1516, Charles was named as his successor; but as the Duchess Joanna was still living, and Charles' brother Ferdinand,educated inSpain, was popular in that country, the realization of this arrangement was still indoubt. Of his own motion Charles immediately assumed the title of King of Castile, and announced his intention of going toSpain as soon as possible. It was not till the autumn of 1517 that he effected this purpose, and the Spanish opposition had mean while been silenced. But the power left in the hands of Chièvres, and theBurgundians provoked the uprising in Castile known as the War of the Communidad. It was a movement of the cities. In Castile the discontentment of the ruling classes was joined to that of the handicraftsmen and labourers, in Valencia the movement was exclusively one of mechanics and the proletariat. The rebellion failed because the commercial cities of Southern Castile took no part in it, and because Charles, acting upon his own judgment, placedSpaniards, instead of foreigners, in positions of authority.
In 1520 Charles leftSpain to take possession of theGerman Empire to which he had been elected. The French king,Francis I, had been his rival for the dignity;Leo X thought that his interests inItaly were endangered by Charles' election. The Kingdom of Navarre was already a matter of contention betweenFrance andSpain, whileFrance and theNetherlands wrangled over the original Dukedom ofBurgundy as well as Tournai,Flanders, Artois, and some lesser territories. War had not broken out over these questions, and nothing indicated that Charles would be a warlike prince; but he had broken the alliance withFrance made under Chièvres. TheHoly See opposed the election of Charles even more vigorously thanFrance. As King ofAragon, Charles was heir to theKingdom of Naples, apapal fief; the investiture had not yet taken place, but it could not be withheld. If he should also become emperor, and thus obtain a title toMilan as well, there would result a political condition against which thepopes sinceInnocent III had constantly fought the union ofMilan andNaples in one hand.
In spite of the opposition ofRome andFrance, Charles was elected (28 June, 1519), and everywhere received the title of "Emperor Elect".Leo X put no difficulties in Charles' way atNaples. The foundation had been laid for his universal empire. Not yet twenty years of age at the time of his election, he had shown a marked precocity of development. During a stay in theNetherlands of several months, after his return fromSpain, and on his arrival inGermany, it became apparent that he had taken the reins of government into his own hands. His chief counsellor, Chièvres, died in May, 1521, and thenceforward Charles was practically free in all his decisions.
His first important service to the empire was to affect the successful issue of the Diet of Worms, exhibiting his entire independence andintellectual maturity. TheLutheran movement had extended so widely overGermany, that Aleander, thepapal representative at the imperial Court, strenuously urged its suppression. Charles had already told him, in theNetherlands, that the affair seemed to him to be settled by thepapal Bull of 15 June, 1520. But inGermany he was convinced that the opposition to theRoman Curia was widespread and that this opposition helped themonk, even among those who did not holdheretical doctrines. Still, as he told Aleander, Charles did not think it right to mix up his affairs with those of thepope. He promised the constituent estates of the empire a hearing for themonk before the imperial diet and in return received their promise that ifLuther persisted in hisheresy they would abandon him. Thus he gained time to turn his attention to temporal politics. He meant to bring to a successful conclusion the efforts which for a generation had been making to give the empire a better constitution, and increase its financial and military strength. An agreement was reached as to how the estates of the realm should share in its government, according to a scheme called theReichsregiment—how the expenses of the imperial chamber etc. were to be met and how the estates were to furnish the emperor military assistance inwar. In April, 1521,Luther appeared before the diet, but did not retract. Next day Charles in person appeared against him before the estates, and expressed his own views with an emphasis not expected from so taciturn a youth. On the 8th of May he prepared the ban againstLuther, but it was not published until the 26th. In accordance with the promise given by the estates in February, he spoke for them all.
Had Charles had his way, he would have devoted himself for some time to the pressing internal needs of his country. The constitution especially needed improvement; the finances were so disordered, and thedebt so large, that the monarch was hampered in whatever he did, and could provide for the foreign interests of the empire only by very careful management. Owing to the primitive development of means of communication, he could not keep watch over the whole empire, which he therefore decided to divide into districts. Already convinced that he must makeSpain the centre of his dominions and the mainstay of his politics, he for that reason determined to make it his personal charge, and went thither in the summer of 1522. Once inSpain, remote fromGermany and his hereditary Hapsburg estates, he at first purposed to make them almost entirely independent of him, although he was more dissatisfied with the conditions there than with those of any other part of his empire. Reserving to himself only the general policy of the empire as a whole, he gave his Austrian possessions to his brother Ferdinand, in 1522, making him, at the same time, his representative at the head of the imperial government. TheReichsregiment having been abrogated in 1525, he had Ferdinand chosen King ofRome at the next opportunity (1530). He kept a firmer hold on the government of theNetherlands, but established a permanent regency for them also (1522), selecting for this function two able and thoroughly loyalwomen: first (till 1530), the faithful Margaret, and next his sister Maria ofHungary, who held the regency till Charles himself abdicated.Naples had been ruled by viceroys under his grandfather, and he continued this policy.
While Charles was completing these dispositions, he became involved in a greatwar. On the 8th of May, 1521, thedate of the edict againstLuther, an offensive alliance againstFrance was signed by representatives of thepope and the emperor. Charles had desired only a defensive alliance, butLeo X, long an ally ofFrancis I, was now bent uponwar against him, because Francis had prevented an extension of thepapal territory which Leo desired. War would assuredly have broken out between Francis and Charles on the score ofNavarre andBurgundy, even if Leo had not hastened the conflict; though it probably would not have attained such dimensions, nor would have lasted so long as it actually did; forFrancis I was an irritable and fickle prince, not a man of strong will, and cared more for pleasure than forwar. But, as a matter of fact, the main issue to be decided in the ensuing struggle (1521-29) was the extent of thepapal power inItaly — the question, that is, whether thepapacy or some foreign dynasty should be the dominant political power in the Peninsula. In the first year of thiswar Charles' generals won only a few minor victories inSpain and theNetherlands. In 1522 they tookMilan from the French. To complete their victory they invadedFrance, in alliance with the Constable of Bourbon. But the army had been weakened by the siege ofMilan, and the French succeeded in again invadingLombardy. MeanwhileClement VII, who had succeededLeo X, after the short pontificate ofAdrian VI, feared that Charles might become too powerful inItaly, and, when the French returned, prepared to transfer his friendship to them. But before he came to a decision, theSpaniards completely defeated Francis at Pavia (24 February, 1525) and took himprisoner. Francis was carried toSpain and, to obtain his freedom, was forced to sign the Peace ofMadrid (44 January, 1526), the terms of which greatly weakened the power ofFrance and gave Charles a free hand inItaly. Charles believed that this peace would be lasting. ButClement VII exerted every effort to at once form a coalition against Charles, and to induce Francis to recommence thewar. Under these circumstances Charles directed his army againstRome. The result of this action was the frightful sack ofRome by the imperial troops in 1527, which the emperor had never intended, but his generals were powerless to prevent, since discipline had vanished in presence of constant privations. After the sack, Charles' army was placed in a dangerous position, as the French advanced to relieveRome and then besiegeNaples. By superior generalship, however, the imperialists once more triumphed. The smaller Italian States, recognizing the hopelessness of opposing the imperial power, made an alliance with Charles. Clement also concluded a treaty of peace atBarcelona, 29 June, 1529;France atCambrai, 5 August. The Peace ofCambrai settled the political situation of WesternEurope for a long time, especially that ofItaly.
Meantime Charles regulated the affairs ofSpain and theNetherlands. These countries resembled each other in having been originally composed of many independent parts, gradually united under one sovereign. In both cases, too, the previously independent states had obstinately clung to their ancient interests,laws and customs, and were moreover powerful against the Crown. By centralizing the general administration, and assimilating thelaws and legal procedures, he sought to counteract the force of these nationalist tendencies. To this end, he perceived, the king, or (in theNetherlands) the regent, must be the centre of activity. In reorganizing the central bureaus inSpain (1523) and theNetherlands (1531), his main object was to entirely subordinate them to the royal power, and employ in them trained men who should consider themselves servants of the king. In theNetherlands, moreover, he brought about the dependence of the judicial and fiscal officials on the central administration. Through these new and efficient agencies he created an excellent police system as well as a body oflaws which fostered the social and industrial life of the people, besides promoting agriculture as no other prince ever had. His commercial legislation was restrictive only when capitalistic excesses or the growth of the proletariat demanded restraint. The edict of 1531 for theNetherlands (promulgated 1540) and the state organization for the care of the poor illustrate this. The creation of these authorities and this system oflaws at the same time had the effect of limiting the power of the Cortes and the States General, both of which bodies thereafter retained only the right of taxation, in the exercise of which, moreover, Charles succeeded in accustoming them to regular annual budgets, by explaining to them his own policy and enlightening them as to the needs of the country, and thus showing them why they should contribute revenue.
Withindividuals Charles dealt still more effectively—inSpain chiefly with the burghers, in theNetherlands with the higher nobility. The latter he won to his support by bestowing on them the most important offices and holding out hopes of the Golden Fleece; the former he hoped to win by leaving them the control of taxation, so that they might regulate it uniformly, and therefore less oppressively. He controlled theclergy by transferring to them an almost general right to the disposal ofbenefices, which had been granted by thepopes either to his predecessors or to himself. He strove especially to foster the progressive industrial elements of the middle class. At the beginning of the century the old cloth industries ofFlanders had been seriously threatened by English competition; under Charles the industries of theNetherlands were effectually protected by an entire change in system which may be regarded as a first step towards capitalistic industry. Antwerp became the world's great centre of commerce and finance. The cloth industry was strengthened by the introduction of factory methods, the linen industry fully developed. While furthering this progress, Charles used it to give political influence in the cities of the Low Countries to the progressive classes who were loyal to himself. Judged by its results, Charles'economic policy was successful in theNetherlands, but it succeeded only indifferently inSpain, where industrial progress, though much greater during this reign than it had been, was generally slow and never so marked as to produce great political changes. InSpain the opposition to Charles' policies was found in the Cortes and in the city governments, but still more among the lesser nobility, theHidalgueria, who resisted all agricultural progress as well as the emperor's external policy. Most of the Castilians remained under Charles' rule the same frugal, contented, rustic people as before, in marked contrast to the people of theNetherlands. Yet by industrial improvement and political training, Charles was able to make ofSpain the instrument by which his son Philip, in the time of the counter-Reformation, brought effective aid to theCatholics ofEurope, and under the unfavourable circumstances this result is as remarkable as the prosperity which theNetherlands attained under his rule.
No less noteworthy were his services to the great empire rapidly springing up in America. Economical considerations being, in the early period of colonization, the most important, the management of American affairs was confided to a bureau of commerce (casa de contratacion) in Seville; but at the same time he established inSpain a special political "Council of the Indies". In the colonies two viceroyalties and twenty-nine governments, four archbishoprics, and twenty-fourbishoprics were gradually organized. Already of all those great problems had arisen which still vex colonial politics—the question, how far the mother country should monopolize the products of the colonies; the question colonization; the question of the treatment of the natives, doubly difficult because on the one hand their labour was indispensable and on the other it was most unwilling; the question, howChristianity and civilization might best be established; finally the question, howscience might be systematically promoted by the government that opened up these new countries. On account of the great distance separatingSpain and her colonies, the unsatisfactory means of communication, and his lack of funds, Charles was unable to carry out the principles laid down by his government. But be made the first, perhaps the only, attempt on a large scale to deal with colonial politics, in practical effect, from the double standpoint of political and economical interests and with the realization of aduty to promoteChristian civilization.
When Charles received news of the Peace ofCambrai, he determined to go toItaly and settle Italian affairs by a personal interview with thepope. This difficult question, which had occupied him for almost a decade, was, as he thought, settled definitively. At Bologna he discussed with thepope principally two questions affecting allChristendom: theTurkish and theLutheran. In 1521 theTurks had taken possession ofBelgrade, the key toHungary; in 1522, ofRhodes, the bulwark which had hitherto barred their way westward of the Ægean Sea. In the following year the daring pirate, Chaireddin Barbarossa, an ally of the sultan, placing himself at the head of the North African corsairs who were continually harassing the Italian and Spanish coasts, had built up a formidable power in the smallMohammedan States of the North African coast. On land theTurks had defeated the Hungarians at Mohács, and taken possession of almost the entire kingdom. Their way was thus opened toVienna, which they entered in 1529. Equally great was the danger threateningChristianity from within.Lutheranism had boldly advanced when the edict againstLuther remained unenforced, and it had been greatly stimulated by the social-revolutionary movements inGermany from 1522 to 1525. Since 1526 an independent State Church had been organized by theProtestants in several provinces with the aid of their sovereigns, and in 1529 these sovereigns declared at the Diet of Spires that they would allow no attacks on these organizations, nor tolerate anyCatholic worship in their states.
As early as 1526 Charles was aware of these two growing dangers. He had thought that by the Peace ofMadrid he would obtain freedom to carry on awar against theTurks, as well as to assume the regulation of religious affairs inGermany. But the new outbreak ofwar inItaly prevented him from giving attention to this work till 1529. On 24 February, 1530, he received the imperial crown fromClement VII at Bologna. On 1 February he had concluded a general peace with thepope and most of theChristian states. The retreat of theTurks fromVienna enabled Charles, before beginningwar against them, to make an effort towards religious unity inGermany. In the summer he appeared at the Diet of Augsburg, accompanied by apapal legate, to hear theProtestants. The adherents of the new creed were disposed to approach him in a submissive temper, though on German soil Charles did not possess all the power they ascribed to him. He had disbanded his troops, and the purely political resources at his command were not great. Holding the Duchy of Wurtemburg, he could thence exert pressure on several neighbouring princes, but his title to that duchy was not clear.
Having convinced himself thatCatholics as well asLutherans were irritated againstRome, Charles informed thepope that only the immediate summoning of ageneral council could bring about peace. He had always desired this; henceforth it became one of his principal aims, of which he never lost sight. At Home he urged it with all his energy, using every effort to remove political obstacles. At the same time he was preparing to meet the next attack of theTurks. This came in 1532, on land. Charles was successful in forcing them back, and in recovering a large part ofHungary, but without inflicting any decisive defeat on theTurks. He transferred thewar to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1530, by the advice of thepope, he had given to the KnightsHospitallers, the defenders ofRhodes, the island of Malta, which barred the approach of theTurkish fleet to theTuscan Sea. In 1531 and 1532 Andrea Doria had sought theTurks in their own waters, but theTurkish fleet avoided a battle. The sultan now sought to prevent the return of Doria by giving the chief command of his navy to Chairaddin, thus making the cause of the pirates his own. Charles thereupon decided to clear the Mediterranean Sea of piracy. In 1555 he personally took part in the campaign againstTunis under the leadership of Doria. He had the largest share in the victory, and urged an immediate advance on Algiers to complete his success. His commanders, however, opposed this plan, as the season was far advanced. This campaign established Charles' reputation throughoutEurope.
While Charles delivered the first serious blow againstIslam on the Mediterranean,Paul III, the successor ofClement VII, had summoned ageneral council. But new difficulties prevented both the assembling of the council and the continuation of thewar against theTurks. When Charles returned home fromAfrica it was evident that he must again go towar withFrance.Francis I opposed the meeting of the council and, moreover, entered into relations both with theTurks and with theSmalkaldic League of GermanProtestant princes formed against Charles soon after the Diet of Augsburg, while, upon the death of the last Sforza Duke ofMilan, he renewed his claim to that fief. Charles, eager to push thewar against theTurks, as well as to restore theunity of Christendom, was ready to partly forego his strictrights both in theMilanese andBurgundy, and to consider the question of the balance of power between his house and that of Valois. Family alliances were proposed with this end in view. Awar whichFrance nevertheless beganproved abortive, and in 1539 the rivals met atNice, and peace seemed likely. Visiting theNetherlands andGermany, Charles soon found that new troubles awaited him, once more fomented byFrance. In 1538 the line of the Counts of Guelders had become extinct; but the last of that line had provided that, after his death, the countship should pass to the Dukes of Cleves-Julich, the strongest temporal principality on the Lower Rhine. Guelders, accordingly, resisted annexation byBurgundy, and Charles would not consent to its annexation to the Duchy of Cleves-Julich, which was favoured byFrancis I and the Smalkaldic League. Moreover,Henry VIII of England, having married Anne, daughter of the Duke of Cleves, threatened to join this coalition.
InHungary, meanwhile, theTurks were again active, and preparations were being made to unite the French andTurkish fleets in the Mediterranean. Francis sought the aid of the Danes and Scandinavians. Charles thought it best to avoid hostilities until he could break up the too formidable coalition of his enemies. He succeeded in detaching Henry ofEngland from the alliance, and during the Diet and religious conference atRatisbon, in 1541, where he was present in person, he brought Philip ofHesse, the leading spirit of the Smalkaldic League, under his control. He turned then upon theTurks. He intended that the imperial army should operate inHungary while he attacked Algiers; but both plans failed. The year 1542 was an unfortunate one for him; the French entered theNetherlands, and the Smalkaldic League, withHesse, attacked Henry of Brunswick, Charles' only ally in NorthGermany, and occupied his territories. The patriotism of theNetherlands held the French in check. Charles returned fromSpain and, in 1543, attacked Cleves. A few days sufficed to make Guelders a part ofBurgundy, which was thus protected on the side ofGermany, though still exposed on itsFrench frontier. It was to remedy this weakness that Charles established a line of fortresses which for centuries barred the way against French invasion. In 1544 he invadedFrance. The strength of Francis was exhausted, and, as Charles, too, was weary ofwar, a peace was concluded at Crespy (17 September, 1544).
Charles had now to consider whether he would allow liberty of action to theProtestant princes ofGermany, to whom, under pressure ofwar, he had made concessions, especially at the Diet of Spires in 1544. Up to this time he had let affairs take their own course inGermany, and his brother Ferdinand had been unable to exert effectual pressure. The power of the feudatory princes, steadily increasing since 1521, was now established on a solid basis. In the emperor's absence they had, on their own initiative, found means to suppress several disturbances which might otherwise have plungedGermany into the horrors of civilwar — first the League of the Knights, then thePeasants' War, then the disorders of the turbulentclergy who had embracedLutheranism and led the masses astray, and lastly the rebellion of theAnabaptists. By supportingLuther against Charles, the princes secured the means of maintaining the power which they had acquired by their resistance to the emperor. Charles perceived the gravity of the situation at least sufficiently to lead him to resolve upon openwar against the princes. To deprive them of their religious leverage, he awaited the opening of theCouncil of Trent (1545). In the summer of 1546 he opened hostilities. He began by conquering SouthGermany, then pushed forward intoSaxony, and defeated and captured the Elector at Muhlberg, 24 April, 1547. Soon after this heimprisoned Philip ofHesse. (The charges of treachery brought against Charles on this account, are not well sustained.) Charles now believed the princes to be sufficiently humbled to permit him to reorganize the empire with their help at a Diet atAugsburg, as he had previously reorganizedSpain and theNetherlands. The settlement of religious difficulties was to be the basis of this reconstruction. He insisted that the council was to have the final decision in matters ofdoctrine; but until this decision was pronounced he wished for peace and was willing to make certain concessions to theProtestants (theInterim). His sense ofjustice, however, reserved from these concessions both the retention of theecclesiastical property seized by theReformers and the temporary abrogation of episcopal authority in the reformed districts. In consequence of this resolution the Interim lost all its attraction for the Evangelical princes. In dealing with the political reconstruction of the empire, Charles was ready to recognize the condition ofGermany so far as it was the result of historical development. He required the feudatories to promise obedience to the imperial power only in specific cases affecting the general welfare, to bind themselves by certain recognized formulae, and not to seek individual profit under pretext of the welfare of the empire. He therefore made here concessions like those already made to his Spanish subjects—namely, a certain degree of autonomy to the several States, in return for their aid in the unquestioned necessities of the empire. No open opposition was made at the Diet, but nothing was done. TheCatholics demanded that the Interim should apply to them also; that instrument now no longer made for harmony, and theProtestants resisted it more strenuously than before. On the other band, the German princes were as selfish and provincial as the hidalgos ofCastile, and less patriotic. They procrastinated until affairs took an unfavourable turn for the emperor.
But Charles was now ready to dispose of his earthly possessions. His recent campaigns had so undermined his strength as to render it advisable for him to make his will. Warned by the grasping policy ofFrancis I, he determined to keep the possessions of hisfamily together. He would not, however, leave them all to one heir, knowing how impossible it had been for even him to govern all to his own satisfaction. What his plans were is unknown, but while he was considering them theTurks and the French king (now Henry II) once more began hostilities against him (1551). In the following year some of the GermanProtestant princes, led by Maurice of Saxony, unexpectedly attacked the imperial forces, while Charles lay sick atInnsbruck, and Henry II occupied theBishoprics ofMetz, Tool, andVerdun. Charles escaped, but abandoned his plan for the reorganization of the imperial government. He empowered Ferdinand to conclude the Treaty of Passau with the insurgents in April, 1552, which finally gave the ascendency in theGerman Empire to the princes. His attempt to retake Metz, in the autumn of 1552, failed, and thewar was transferred to theNetherlands, where it was waged without decisive result. In North Africa, also, and inItaly, where theTurks, the French, and some Italian States were attacking the emperor, matters became critical. Still the emperor hoped to win a final victory. For in 1553 the accession ofMary Tudor to the throne ofEngland suddenly excited his hope that he might extend his influence in that kingdom.Mary Tudor was ready to marry his son Philip, and in 1554 this alliance became a fact. When their marriageproved childless, the emperor gave up the fight and decided to turn over the conclusion of peace to Philip and Ferdinand. Ferdinand insisted that the authority of princes in the empire, as settled be the agreement of Passan, should be legally recognized by adecree of the Diet, and the equality of theCatholic andLutheranreligions accepted. This was done atAugsburg in 1555. Charles then requested the electors to accept his abdication and to elect Ferdinand his successor. This was done on 28 February, 1558. Shortly after the finaldecree of the Diet of Augsburg, in 1555, Charles convened the Estates of theNetherlands, and in their presence transferred the government to Philip. Three months later (16 January, 1556) he transferred the Spanish Crown to his son. In spite of this he could not free himself from political cares. It was September, 1556, before he could leave for his long-chosen place of retirement inSpain, accompanied by his two sisters, thewidow of the French king, and Maria ofHungary. But he did not live a monastic life even at Yuste. Messengers with political despatches came to him every day. However, he took no active part in affairs. He lived his few remaining months on earth amid works of art, of which he had a keen appreciation (Titian was his favouritepainter), amid the books which, as a cultured man, he studied and took pleasure in, and enjoying the music which heloved, while he prepared himself for the life to come.
APA citation.Spahn, M.(1908).Emperor Charles V. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03625a.htm
MLA citation.Spahn, Martin."Emperor Charles V."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 3.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1908.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03625a.htm>.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. November 1, 1908. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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