 |
|
| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
(Latinomnipotentia, fromomnia andpotens, able to do all things).
Omnipotence is the power ofGod to effect whatever is not intrinsically impossible. These last words of the definition do not imply any imperfection, since a power that extends to every possibility must be perfect. The universality of the object of the Divine power is not merely relative but absolute, so that thetrue nature of omnipotence is not clearly expressed by saying thatGod can do all things that are possible to Him; it requires the further statement that all things are possible toGod. The intrinsically impossible is the self-contradictory, and its mutually exclusive elements could result only in nothingness. "Hence," says Thomas (Summa I, Q. xxv, a. 3), "it is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say thatGod cannot produce it." To include the contradictory within the range of omnipotence, as does theCalvinist Vorstius, is to acknowledge the absurd as an object of the Divineintellect, and nothingness as an object of the Divine will and power. "God can do all things the accomplishment of which is a manifestation of power," saysHugh of St. Victor, "and He is almighty because He cannot be powerless" (De sacram., I, ii, 22).
As intrinsically impossible must be classed:
(a) It is impossible for God to sin
Man's power of preferringevil to good is a sign not of strength, but of infirmity, since it involves the liability to be overcome by unworthy motives; not the exercise but the restraint of that power adds to the freedom and vigour of the will. "Tosin," saysSt. Thomas, "is to be capable of failure in one's actions, which is incompatible with omnipotence" (Summa, I, Q, xxv, a. 3).
(b) The decrees of God cannot be reversed
Frometernity the production of creatures, their successive changes, and the manner in which these would occur were determined byGod'sfree will. If these decrees were not irrevocable, it would follow either thatGod's wisdom was variable or that His decisions sprang from caprice. Hencetheologians distinguish between theabsolute and theordinary, orregulated, power ofGod (potentia absoluta; potentia ordinaria). The absolute power ofGod extends to all that is not intrinsically impossible, while the ordinary power is regulated by the Divine decrees. Thus by His absolute powerGod could preserve man from death; but in the present order this is impossible, since He has decreed otherwise.
(c) The creation of an absolutely best creature or of an absolutely greatest number of creatures is impossible, because the Divine power is inexhaustible
It is sometimes objected that this aspect of omnipotence involves the contradiction thatGod cannot do all that He can do; but the argument is sophistical; it is no contradiction to assert thatGod can realize whatever is possible, but that no number of actualized possibilities exhausts His power.
Another class of intrinsic impossibilities includes all that would simultaneously connote mutually repellent elements, e.g. a square circle, aninfinite creature, etc.God cannot effect the non-existence of actual events of the past, for it contradictory that the same thing that has happened should also not have happened.
Omnipotence is perfect power, free from all mere potentiality. Hence, althoughGod does not bring into external being all that He is able to accomplish, His power must not be understood as passing through successive stages before its effect is accomplished. The activity ofGod is simple and eternal, without evolution or change. The transition from possibility to actuality or from act to potentiality, occurs only in creatures. When it is said thatGod can or could do a thing, the terms are not to be understood in the sense in which they are applied to created causes, but as conveying theidea of a Being possessed ofinfinite unchangeable power, the range of Whose activity is limited only by His sovereign Will. "Power," saysSt. Thomas, "is not attributed toGod as a thing really different from His Knowledge and Will, but as something expressed by a different concept, since power means that which executes the command of the will and the advice of theintellect. These three (viz.,intellect, will, power), coincide with one another inGod" (Summa, I, Q. xxv, a. 1, ad 4). Omnipotence is all-sufficient power. The adaptation of means to ends in theuniverse does not argue, as J.S. Mill would have it, that the power of the designer is limited, but only thatGod has willed to manifest His glory by a world so constituted rather than by another. Indeed the production of secondary causes, capable of accomplishing certain effects, requires greater power than the direct accomplishment of these same effects. On the other hand even though no creature existed,God's power not be barren, for creatures are not an end toGod.
The omnipotence of God is adogma ofCatholicfaith, contained in all the creeds and defined by various councils (cf.Denzinger-Bannwart. "Enchiridion", 428, 1790). In theOld Testament there are more than seventy passages I whichGod is calledShaddai, i.e. omnipotent. The Scriptures represent this attribute asinfinite power (Job 42:2;Mark 10:27;Luke 1:37);Matthew 19:26, etc.) whichGod alone possesses (Tobit 13:4; Ecclus. I, 8; etc.). The Greek andLatinFathers unanimously teach thedoctrine of Divine omnipotence.Origen testifies to thisbelief when he infers the amplitude ofDivine providence from God's omnipotence: "Just as we hold thatGod is incorporeal andomnipotent and invisible, so likewise do we confess as a certain and immovabledogma that His providence extends to all things" (Genesis, Hom. 3).St. Augustine defends omnipotence against theManichæans, who taught thatGod is unable to overcomeevil (Haeres, xlvi and Enchir., c. 100); and he speaks of thisdogma as atruth recognized even bypagans, and which no reasonableperson can question (Serm. 240, de temp., c. ii). Reason itself proves the omnipotence of God. "Since every agent produces an effect similar to itself," saysSt. Thomas (Summa, I, Q. xxv, a. 3), "to every active power there must correspond as proper object, a category of possibilities proportioned to the cause possessing that power, e.g. the power of heating has for its proper object that which can be heated. Now Divine Being, which is the basis of Divine power, isinfinite, not being limited to any category of being but containing within itself the perfection of all being. Consequently all that can be considered as being is contained among the absolute possibilities with respect to whichGod is omnipotent." (SeeCREATION;GOD; INFINITE;MIRACLES.)
The question of omnipotence is discussed by philosophers in works on natural theology and by theologians in the treatise on One God (De Deo Uno). Se especially ST. THOMAS, Summa, I, Q. xxv; IDEM, Contra Gentes, II, vii sq.; SUAREZ, De Deo, III, ix; HURTER, Compendium theologiae dogmaticae, II (Innsbruck, 1885), 79 sq.; POHLE, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, I (Paderborn, 1908), 143. sq.
APA citation.McHugh, J.(1911).Omnipotence. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11251c.htm
MLA citation.McHugh, John."Omnipotence."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 11.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1911.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11251c.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Veronica Jarski.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
Contact information. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is webmasterat newadvent.org. Regrettably, I can't reply to every letter, but I greatly appreciate your feedback — especially notifications about typographical errors and inappropriate ads.