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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thewill does not depend on the object. For thewill cannot be directed otherwise than to what isgood: since "evil is outside the scope of thewill," asDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore thegoodness of thewill depended on the object, it would follow that every act of thewill isgood, and none bad.
Objection 2. Further,good is first of all in the end: wherefore thegoodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, according to thePhilosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, butgoodness of making is never the end": because the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore thegoodness of the act of thewill does not depend on any object.
Objection 3. Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of thewill isgood, by reason of thegoodness ofnature. Therefore it cannot give moralgoodness to thewill. Therefore the moralgoodness of thewill does not depend on the object.
On the contrary, thePhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) thatjustice is thathabit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly,virtue is ahabit from which men wish forgood things. But agoodwill is one which is in accordance withvirtue. Therefore thegoodness of thewill is from the fact that a man wills that which isgood.
I answer that, Good andevil areessential differences of the act of thewill. Becausegood andevil of themselves regard thewill; just astruth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is dividedessentially by the difference oftruth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said to betrue orfalse. Consequentlygood andevil will are acts differing inspecies. Now the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (I-II:18:5). Thereforegood andevil in the acts of thewill is derived properly from the objects.
Reply to Objection 1. Thewill is not always directed to what istrulygood, but sometimes to the apparentgood; which has indeed some measure ofgood, but not of agood that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of thewill is not alwaysgood, but sometimesevil.
Reply to Objection 2. Although an action can, in a certain way, beman's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of thewill, as stated above (I-II:1:1 ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3. Good is presented to thewill as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral order, andcauses moralgoodness in the act of thewill: because the reason is the principle ofhuman and moral acts, as stated above (I-II:18:5).
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thewill does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to thewill than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derivegoodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we have shown above (I-II:18:4). Therefore the act also of thewill derivesgoodness not only from the object but also from the end.
Objection 2. Further, thegoodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (I-II:18:3). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity ofgoodness andmalice in the act of thewill: for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore thegoodness of thewill depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.
Objection 3. Further,ignorance of circumstances excusesmalice of thewill, as stated above (I-II:6:8). But it would not be so, unless thegoodness ormalice of thewill depended on the circumstances. Therefore thegoodness andmalice of thewill depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
On the contrary, An action does not take itsspecies from the circumstances as such, as stated above (I-II:18:10 ad 2). Butgood andevil are specific differences of the act of thewill, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore thegoodness andmalice of thewill depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the principle of thegoodness andmalice ofhuman actions is taken from the act of thewill. Consequently thegoodness andmalice of the act of thewill depend on some one thing; while thegoodness andmalice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not somethingaccidental to that genus, but somethingessential thereto: because whatever isaccidental is reduced to somethingessential, as to its principle. Therefore thegoodness of thewill's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itselfcausesgoodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which areaccidents, as it were, of the act.
Reply to Objection 1. The end is the object of thewill, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of thewill, thegoodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhapsaccidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of thewill on another.
Reply to Objection 2. Given that the act of thewill is fixed on somegood, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said that a man wills agood when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of thewill is not fixed on somethinggood: since to will to do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will somethinggood. Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will somethinggood when one ought not to, because one ought always to will what isgood: except, perhaps,accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particulargood, is prevented from willing at the same time anothergood which he ought to will at that time. And thenevil results, not from his willing that particulargood, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other circumstances.
Reply to Objection 3.Ignorance of circumstances excusesmalice of thewill, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thewill does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows. But thegood belongs to thewill before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (I-II:9:1). Therefore thegoodness of thewill does not depend on reason.
Objection 2. Further, thePhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that thegoodness of the practicalintellect is "atruth that is in conformity with right desire." But right desire is agoodwill. Therefore thegoodness of the practical reason depends on thegoodness of thewill, rather than conversely.
Objection 3. Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But thewill moves the reason and the other powers, as stated above (I-II:9:1). Therefore thegoodness of thewill does not depend on reason.
On the contrary,Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition toreason." But thegoodness of thewill consists in not being unruly. Therefore thegoodness of thewill depends on its being subject toreason.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles1 and2), thegoodness of thewill depends properly on the object. Now thewill's object is proposed to it by reason. Because thegood understood is the proportionate object of thewill; while sensitive orimaginarygood is proportionate not to thewill but to the sensitiveappetite: since thewill can tend to the universalgood, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitiveappetite tends only to the particulargood, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore thegoodness of thewill depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.
Reply to Objection 1. Thegood considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to thewill before pertaining to the reason. But considered astrue it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect ofgoodness, pertaining to thewill: because thewill cannot desire agood that is not previously apprehended by reason.
Reply to Objection 2. ThePhilosopher speaks here of the practicalintellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this respect it is perfected byprudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves thewill in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above (I-II:9:01).
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thehuman will does not depend on theeternallaw. Because to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the rule of thehuman will, on which itsgoodness depends, is right reason. Therefore thegoodness of thewill does not depend on theeternallaw.
Objection 2. Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But theeternallaw is not homogeneous with thehuman will. Therefore theeternallaw cannot be the measure on which thegoodness of thehuman will depends.
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most certain. But theeternallaw is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which thegoodness of our will depends.
On the contrary,Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is adeed, word or desire against theeternallaw." Butmalice of thewill is the root ofsin. Therefore, sincemalice is contrary togoodness, thegoodness of thewill depends on theeternallaw.
I answer that, Wherever a number ofcauses are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the secondcause: since the secondcause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from theeternallaw, which is the DivineReason, thathumanreason is the rule of thehuman will, from which thehuman derives itsgoodness. Hence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7): "Many say: Who showeth usgood things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able to show usgood things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident that thegoodness of thehuman will depends on theeternallaw much more than onhumanreason: and whenhumanreason fails we must have recourse to theEternalReason.
Reply to Objection 1. To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
Reply to Objection 2. A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.
Reply to Objection 3. Although theeternallaw is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomesknown to us somewhat, either bynaturalreason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additionalrevelation.
Objection 1. It would seem that thewill is notevil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of thehuman will, in so far as it is derived from theeternallaw, as stated above (Article 4). But erring reason is not derived from theeternallaw. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of thehuman will. Therefore thewill is notevil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
Objection 2. Further, according toAugustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely,God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently thewill is notevil if it be at variance with erring reason.
Objection 3. Further, everyevilwill is reducible to somespecies ofmalice. But thewill that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to somespecies ofmalice. For instance, if a man's reasonerr in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to anyspecies ofmalice. Therefore thewill is notevil when it is at variance with erring reason.
On the contrary, As stated in theI:79:13,conscience is nothing else than the application ofknowledge to some action. Nowknowledge is in the reason. Therefore when thewill is at variance with erring reason, it is againstconscience. But every suchwill isevil; for it is written (Romans 14:23): "All that is not offaith"—i.e. all that is againstconscience—"issin." Therefore thewill isevil when it is at variance with erring reason.
I answer that, Sinceconscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application ofknowledge to action, as was stated in theI:19:13), to inquire whether thewill isevil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an erringconscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some aregood generically; some are indifferent; some areevil generically. And they say that if reason orconscience tell us to do something which isgood generically, there is noerror: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which isevil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what isgood and forbids what isevil. On the other hand if a man's reason orconscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what isevil in itself; or that what isgood in itself, is forbidden, then hisreason orconscienceerrs. In like manner if a man's reason orconscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, hisreason orconscienceerrs. They say, therefore, that reason orconscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that thewill which is at variance with that erring reason isevil andsinful. But they say that when reason orconscienceerrs in commanding what isevil in itself, or in forbidding what isgood in itself andnecessary forsalvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases thewill which is at variance with erring reason orconscience is notevil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, thewill that is at variance with erring reason orconscience, isevil in some way on account of the object, on which thegoodness ormalice of thewill depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its ownnature; but according as it isaccidentally apprehended by reason as somethingevil to do or to avoid. And since the object of thewill is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as beingevil, thewill by tending thereto becomesevil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that aregood orevil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character ofgoodness ormaliceaccidentally; but also that which isgood, can receive the character ofevil, or that which isevil, can receive the character ofgoodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication isgood: yet thewill does not tend to thisgood except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as anevil, thewill tends to it as to somethingevil. Consequently thewill isevil, because it willsevil, not indeed that which isevil in itself, but that which isevilaccidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, tobelieve inChrist isgood in itself, andnecessary forsalvation: but thewill does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as somethingevil, thewill tends to it as to somethingevil: not as if it wereevil in itself, but because it isevilaccidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence thePhilosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinentman is one who does not follow right reason; butaccidentally, he is also one who does not followfalse reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is alwaysevil.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived fromGod, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as beingtrue, and consequently as being derived fromGod, from Whom is alltruth.
Reply to Objection 2. The saying ofAugustine holds good when it isknown that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority. But if a man were tobelieve the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were toknow thathumanreason was dictating something contrary toGod's commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirelyerroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being commanded byGod, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment ofGod.
Reply to Objection 3. Whenever reason apprehends something asevil, it apprehends it under somespecies ofevil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine precept, or as givingscandal, or for some such like reason. And then thatevil is reduced to thatspecies ofmalice.
Objection 1. It would seem that thewill isgood when it abides by erring reason. For just as thewill, when at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason judges to beevil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to begood. But thewill isevil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, thewill isgood.
Objection 2. Further, thewill is alwaysgood, when it abides by the commandment ofGod and theeternallaw. But theeternallaw andGod's commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when iterrs. Therefore thewill isgood, even when it abides by erring reason.
Objection 3. Further, thewill isevil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, thewill isevil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that thewill is alwaysevil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, ofnecessity, wouldsin: which is unreasonable. Therefore thewill isgood when it abides by erring reason.
On the contrary, The will of those who slew theapostles wasevil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according toJohn 16:2: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service toGod." Therefore thewill can beevil, when it abides by erring reason.
I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erringconscience binds"; so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erringconscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above aboutignorance. For it was said (I-II:6:8) thatignorance sometimescauses an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moralgood andevil consist in action in so far as it isvoluntary, as was stated above (Article 2); it is evident that whenignorancecauses an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moralgood andevil; but not, when it does notcause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (I-II:6:8) that whenignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does notcause the act to be involuntary. And I call thatignorance "directly"voluntary, to which the act of thewill tends: and that, "indirectly"voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing toknow what he ought toknow, as stated above (I-II:6:8).
If then reason orconscienceerr with anerror that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that oneerrs about what one ought toknow; then such anerror of reason orconscience does not excuse thewill, that abides by that erring reason orconscience, from beingevil. But if theerror arise fromignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that itcause the act to be involuntary, then thaterror of reason orconscience excuses thewill, that abides by that erring reason, from beingevil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to anotherman's wife, thewill that abides by that erring reason isevil; since thiserror arises fromignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound toknow. But if a man's reason,errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, hiswill is excused from beingevil: because thiserror arises fromignorance of a circumstance, whichignorance excuses, andcauses the act to be involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1. AsDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entirecause,evil from each particular defect." Consequently in order that the thing to which thewill tends be calledevil, it suffices, either that it beevil in itself, or that it be apprehended asevil. But in order for it to begood, it must begood in both ways.
Reply to Objection 2. Theeternallaw cannoterr, buthumanreason can. Consequently thewill that abides byhumanreason, is not always right, nor is it always in accord with theeternallaw.
Reply to Objection 3. Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he willsin, whether he does hisduty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about thematter: because he can put aside hisevilintention. In like manner, suppose a man's reason orconscience toerr through inexcusableignorance, thenevil must needs result in thewill. Nor is thisman in a dilemma: because he can lay aside hiserror, since hisignorance is vincible andvoluntary.
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thewill does not depend on theintention of the end. For it has been stated above (Article 2) that thegoodness of thewill depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of thewill is one thing, and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters thegoodness of thewill does not depend on theintention of the end.
Objection 2. Further, to wish to keepGod's commandment, belongs to agoodwill. But this can be referred to anevil end, for instance, to vainglory orcovetousness, by willing to obeyGod for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore thegoodness of thewill does not depend on theintention of the end.
Objection 3. Further, just asgood andevil diversify thewill, so do they diversify the end. Butmalice of thewill does not depend on themalice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to givealms, has anevil will, although he intends agood end. Therefore neither does thegoodness of thewill depend on thegoodness of the end intended.
On the contrary,Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) thatGod rewards theintention. ButGod rewards a thing because it isgood. Therefore thegoodness of thewill depends on theintention of the end.
I answer that, Theintention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of thewill; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [Leonine edn.: 'accompanying'] it. Theintention precedes the act of thewillcausally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of thegoodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast forGod's sake; because the act offasting is specificallygood from the very fact that it is done forGod's sake. Wherefore, since thegoodness of thewill depends on thegoodness of the thing willed, as stated above (Articles1 and2), it must, ofnecessity, depend on theintention of the end.
On the other hand,intention follows the act of thewill, when it is added to a preceding act of thewill; for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it toGod. And then thegoodness of the previous act of thewill does not depend on the subsequentintention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequentintention.
Reply to Objection 1. When theintention is thecause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of thegoodness of the object, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. The act of thewill cannot be said to begood, if anevilintention is thecause of willing. For when a man wills to give analms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which isgood in itself, under aspecies ofevil; and therefore, as willed by him, it isevil. Wherefore hiswill isevil. If, however, theintention is subsequent to the act of thewill, then the latter may begood: and theintention does not spoil that act of thewill which preceded, but that which is repeated.
Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated (Article 6, Reply to Objection 1), "evil results from each particular defect, butgood from the whole and entirecause." Hence, whether thewill tend to what isevil in itself, even under thespecies ofgood; or to thegood under thespecies ofevil, it will beevil in either case. But in order for thewill to begood, it must tend to thegood under thespecies ofgood; in other words, it must will thegood for the sake of thegood.
Objection 1. It would seem that the degree ofgoodness in thewill depends on the degree ofgood in the intention. Because onMatthew 12:35, "Agoodman out of thegood treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which isgood," agloss says: "Aman does as muchgood as he intends." But theintention givesgoodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of thewill, as stated above (Article 7). Therefore thegoodness of a man'swill is according to thegoodness of hisintention.
Objection 2. Further, if you add to thecause, you add to the effect. But thegoodness of theintention is thecause of thegoodwill. Therefore a man'swill isgood, according as hisintention isgood.
Objection 3. Further, inevil actions, a mansins in proportion to hisintention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderousintention, he would be guilty ofmurder. Therefore, for the same reason, ingood actions, thewill isgood in proportion to thegood intended.
On the contrary, Theintention can begood, while thewill isevil. Therefore, for the same reason, theintention can be better, and thewill lessgood.
I answer that, In regard to both the act, and theintention of the end, we may consider a twofoldquantity: one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man willing or doing agood that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that thequantity in the act does not depend on thequantity in theintention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize hisintention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior act of thewill, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of thewill are in our power, whereas the external actions are not. But thewill can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus thewill that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not sogood as theintention. Yet because theintention also belongs, in a way, to the act of thewill, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that thequantity ofgoodness in theintention redounds upon the act of thewill; that is to say, in so far as thewill wills some greatgood for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great agood, is not proportionate to thatgood.
But if we consider thequantity in theintention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of theintention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of thewill: since theintention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (I-II:12:4;I-II:18:6). And yet considered materially, while theintention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to theintention as its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because thequantity ofgoodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on thequantity of thegood intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that a man does notmerit as much as he intends tomerit: because thequantity ofmerit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (I-II:20:4;I-II:114:4).
Reply to Objection 1. Thisgloss speaks ofgood as in the estimation ofGod, Who considers principally theintention of the end. Wherefore anothergloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is theintention, according to whichGod judges our works." For thegoodness of theintention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon thegoodness of thewill, which makes even the external act to bemeritorious inGod's sight.
Reply to Objection 2. Thegoodness of theintention is not the wholecause of agoodwill. Hence the argument does notprove.
Reply to Objection 3. The meremalice of theintention suffices to make thewillevil: and therefore too, thewill is asevil as theintention isevil. But the same reasoning does not apply togoodness, as stated above (Reply to Objection 2).
Objection 1. It would seem that thegoodness of thehuman will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible forman's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word ofIsaiah 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts." If thereforegoodness of thewill depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible forman's will to begood. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 2. Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does ourknowledge flow from the Divineknowledge. But ourknowledge does not require to be conformed toGod'sknowledge; sinceGodknows many things that weknow not. Therefore there is no need for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
Objection 3. Further, thewill is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed toGod's. Therefore neither can our will be conformed to His.
On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishesman to be upright and to tend toGod," asAugustine expounds in the Enchiridion [Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of thewill is itsgoodness. Therefore thegoodness of thewill depends on its conformity to the Divine will.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 7), thegoodness of thewill depends on theintention of the end. Now the last end of thehumanwill is the Sovereign Good, namely,God, as stated above (I-II:1:8;I-II:3:1). Therefore thegoodness of thehuman will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, toGod.
Now this Good is primarily andessentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude andgoodness, in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order thatman's will begood it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 1. Thehuman will cannot be conformed to thewill ofGod so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like mannerhumanknowledge is conformed to the Divineknowledge, in so far as itknowstruth: andhuman action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.
Objection 1. It would seem that thehuman will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what weknow not: since the apprehendedgood is the object of thewill. But in many things weknow not whatGod wills. Therefore thehuman will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
Objection 2. Further,God wills to damn theman whom He foresees about to die in mortalsin. If thereforeman were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Objection 3. Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But ifman were to will whatGod wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for instance, whenGod wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. Thereforeman is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.
On the contrary, (1) OnPsalm 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," agloss says: "Thatman has an upright heart, who wills whatGod wills." But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will whatGod wills.
(2) Moreover, thewill takes itsform from the object, as does every act. If thereforeman is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has anevil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has anevil will.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above (Articles3 and5), thewill tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appeargood from one point of view, and notgood from another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to begood, hiswill isgood: and thewill of anotherman, who wills that thing not to be, according as it appearsevil, is alsogood. Thus a judge has agood will, in willing athief to be put to death, because this is just: while thewill of another—e.g. thethief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is anaturalevil, is alsogood.
Now since thewill follows the apprehension of the reason orintellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehendedgood, the more universal thegood to which thewill tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has care of the commongood, which isjustice, and therefore he wishes thethief's death, which has the aspect ofgood in relation to the common estate; whereas thethief's wife has to consider the private, thegood of thefamily, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, thethief, not to be put to death. Now thegood of the wholeuniverse is that which is apprehended byGod, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the commongood; this is His own Goodness, which is thegood of the wholeuniverse. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to itsnature, is of some particulargood, proportionate to thatnature. Now a thing may happen to begood under a particular aspect, and yet notgood under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certainwill isgood from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thingGod wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can begood in respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
But a man'swill is not right in willing a particulargood, unless he refer it to the commongood as an end: since even thenaturalappetite of each part is ordained to the commongood of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particulargood with a rightwill, he must will that particulargood materially, and the Divine and universalgood, formally. Therefore thehumanwill is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universalgood; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, thehumanwill is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficientcause; since the proper inclination consequent tonature, or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing fromGod as its efficientcause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills whatGod wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of theformalcause, consisting inman's willing something fromcharity, asGod wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper object ofcharity.
Reply to Objection 1. We canknow in a general way whatGod wills. For weknow that whateverGod wills, He wills it under the aspect ofgood. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect ofgood, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But weknow not whatGod wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state ofglory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to whatGod wills in that particularmatter. Consequently he will conform his will toGod in all things not only formally, but also materially.
Reply to Objection 2.God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death, because, "He wills allmen to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect ofjustice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices forman to will the upholding ofGod'sjustice and of thenatural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will toGod's, in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills whatGod wills, more than theman, who conforms his will toGod's, in the point of the very thing willed; because thewill tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
To the second, it must be replied that thespecies and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, oneman wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question of this here.