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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem that everyhuman action isgood, and that none isevil. ForDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) thatevil acts not, save in virtue of thegood. But noevil is done in virtue of thegood. Therefore no action isevil.
Objection 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing isevil, not according as it is in act, but according as itspotentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as itspotentiality is perfected by act, it isgood, as stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it isevil, but only according as it isgood. Therefore every action isgood, and none isevil.
Objection 3. Further,evil cannot be acause, saveaccidentally, asDionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action isevil, but every action isgood.
On the contrary,Our Lord said (John 3:20): "Every one that dothevil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions ofman areevil.
I answer that, We must speak ofgood andevil in actions as ofgood andevil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so muchgood as it has being: sincegood and being are convertible, as was stated in theI:5:1;I:5:3. ButGod alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the fulness ofhuman being requires a compound ofsoul and body, having all the powers and instruments ofknowledge and movement: wherefore if anyman be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he ofgoodness: while so far as he is lacking ingoodness, and is said to beevil: thus a blindman is possessed ofgoodness inasmuch as he lives; and ofevil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being orgoodness, could not be said to be eitherevil orgood. But since this same fulness of being is of the veryessence ofgood, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to begood simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated inI:5:1 (Reply to Objection 1). We must therefore say that every action hasgoodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking ingoodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to beevil: for instance if it lacks thequantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
Reply to Objection 1.Evil acts in virtue of deficientgoodness. For it there were nothing ofgood there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand ifgood were not deficient, there would be noevil. Consequently the action done is a deficientgood, which isgood in a certain respect, but simplyevil.
Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as tocause a deficient act. Thus a blindman has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Reply to Objection 3. Anevil action can have a proper effect, according to thegoodness and being that it has. Thusadultery is thecause ofhuman generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
Objection 1. It would seem that thegood orevil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," asAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore thegood orevil of ahuman action is not derived from their object.
Objection 2. Further, the object is compared to the action as itsmatter. But thegoodness of a thing is not from itsmatter, but rather from the form, which is an act. Thereforegood andevil in actions is not derived from their object.
Objection 3. Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect tocause. But thegoodness of acause does not depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Thereforegood orevil in actions is not derived from their object.
On the contrary, It is written (Hosea 9:10): "They became abominable as those things which they loved." Nowman becomes abominable toGod on account of themalice of his action. Therefore themalice of his action is according to theevil objects thatman loves. And the same applies to thegoodness of his action.
I answer that, as stated above (Article 1) thegood orevil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing itsspecies. And just as anatural thing has itsspecies from itsform, so an action has itsspecies from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as the primarygoodness of anatural thing is derived from itsform, which gives it itsspecies, so the primarygoodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as, innatural things, the primaryevil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primaryevil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing forspecies, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the wholehumanspecies.
Reply to Objection 1. Although external things aregood in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not thequality ofgoodness.
Reply to Objection 2. The object is not thematter "of which" (a thing is made), but thematter "about which" (something is done); and stands in relation to the act as itsform, as it were, through giving it itsspecies.
Reply to Objection 3. The object of thehuman action is not always the object of an active power. For theappetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle ofhuman actions. Nor again have the objects of the active powers always thenature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power as thematter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it itsform andspecies, since movement derives itsspecies from its term. Moreover, although thegoodness of an action is notcaused by thegoodness of its effect, yet an action is said to begood from the fact that it can produce agood effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of itsgoodness.
Objection 1. It would seem that an action is notgood orevil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as stated above (I-II:7:1). But "good andevil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derivegoodness ormalice from a circumstance.
Objection 2. Further, thegoodness ormalice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances areaccidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because "no art takes notice of what isaccidental" (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore thegoodness ormalice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
Objection 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of itssubstance, is not ascribed to it in respect of anaccident. Butgood andevil belong to an action in respect of itssubstance; because an action can begood orevil in its genus as stated above (Article 2). Therefore an action is notgood or bad from a circumstance.
On the contrary, thePhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that avirtuousman acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, theviciousman, in thematter of eachvice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Thereforehuman actions aregood orevil according to circumstances.
I answer that, Innatural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the meresubstantial form, that gives it itsspecies; since a thing derives much from superveningaccidents, asman does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of theseaccidents be out of due proportion,evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of itsgoodness does not consist wholly in itsspecies, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certainaccidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will beevil.
Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of itsessence; but they are in an action asaccidents thereof. Thus, too,accidents innaturalsubstances are outside theessence.
Reply to Objection 2. Everyaccident is notaccidentally in its subject; for some are properaccidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
Reply to Objection 3. Sincegood and being are convertible; according as being is predicated ofsubstance and ofaccident, so isgood predicated of a thing both in respect of itsessential being, and in respect of itsaccidental being; and this, both innatural things and in moral actions.
Objection 1. It would seem that thegood andevil inhuman actions are not from the end. ForDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts with a view toevil." If therefore an action weregood orevil from its end, no action would beevil. Which is clearlyfalse.
Objection 2. Further, thegoodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsiccause. Therefore an action is not said to begood or bad according to its end.
Objection 3. Further, agood action may happen to be ordained to anevil end, as when a man gives analms from vainglory; and conversely, anevil action may happen to be ordained to agood end, as atheft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is notgood orevil from its end.
On the contrary,Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end isgood, the thing isgood, and if the end beevil, the thing also isevil."
I answer that, The disposition of things as togoodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to thecause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so thegoodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whosegoodness does not depend on another, the measure ofgoodness is not taken from the end. Whereashuman actions, and other things, thegoodness of which depends on something else, have a measure ofgoodness from the end on which they depend, besides thatgoodness which is in them absolutely.
Accordingly a fourfoldgoodness may be considered in ahuman action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it ofgoodness, as stated above (Article 1). Secondly, it hasgoodness according to itsspecies; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it hasgoodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of itsaccidents. Fourthly, it hasgoodness from its end, to which it is compared as to thecause of itsgoodness.
Reply to Objection 1. Thegood in view of which one acts is not always atruegood; but sometimes it is atruegood, sometimes an apparentgood. And in the latter event, anevil action results from the end in view.
Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is an extrinsiccause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to the action.
Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders an action that isgood in one of the way mentioned above, from lackinggoodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which isgood in itsspecies or in its circumstances is ordained to anevil end, or vice versa. However, an action is notgood simply, unless it isgood in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, butgood from the completecause," asDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Objection 1. It would seem thatgood andevil in moral actions do not make a difference ofspecies. For theexistence ofgood andevil in actions is in conformity with theirexistence in things, as stated above (Article 1). Butgood andevil do not make a specific difference in things; for agoodman is specifically the same as a badman. Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Objection 2. Further, sinceevil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to thePhilosopher (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes thespecies, it seems that an action is not constituted in aspecies through beingevil. Consequentlygood andevil do not diversify thespecies ofhuman actions.
Objection 3. Further, acts that differ inspecies produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from agood and from anevil action: thus a man is born ofadulterous or of lawful wedlock. Thereforegood andevil actions do not differ inspecies.
Objection 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to begood or bad from a circumstance, as stated above (Article 3). But since a circumstance is anaccident, it does not give an action itsspecies. Thereforehuman actions do not differ inspecies on account of theirgoodness ormalice.
On the contrary, According to thePhilosopher (Ethic. ii. 1) "likehabits produce like actions." But agood and a badhabit differ inspecies, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore alsogood and bad actions differ inspecies.
I answer that, Every action derives itsspecies from its object, as stated above (Article 2). Hence it follows that a difference of objectcauses a difference ofspecies in actions. Now, it must be observed that a difference of objectscauses a difference ofspecies in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which does notcause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because nothingaccidental constitutes aspecies, but only that which isessential; and a difference of object may beessential in reference to one active principle, andaccidental in reference to another. Thus toknow color and toknow sound, differessentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to theintellect.
Now inhuman actions,good andevil are predicated in reference to the reason; because asDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "thegood ofman is to be in accordance with reason," andevil is "to be againstreason." For that isgood for a thing which suits it in regard to itsform; andevil, that which is against the order of itsform. It is therefore evident that the difference ofgood andevil considered in reference to the object is anessential difference in relation to reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable toreason. Now certain actions are calledhuman or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident thatgood andevil diversify thespecies inhuman actions; sinceessential differencescause a difference ofspecies.
Reply to Objection 1. Even innatural things,good andevil, inasmuch as something is according tonature, and something againstnature, diversify thenaturalspecies; for a dead body and a living body are not of the samespecies. In like manner,good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, andevil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moralspecies.
Reply to Objection 2.Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting somepotentiality. For an action is said to beevil in itsspecies, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute thespecies of anevil act.
Reply to Objection 3. The conjugal act andadultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ inspecies; and thus they have one specific effect.
Reply to Objection 4. A circumstance is sometimes taken as theessential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action fromgood toevil; for a circumstance would not make an actionevil, except through being repugnant toreason.
Objection 1. It would seem that thegood andevil which are from the end do not diversify thespecies of actions. For actions derive theirspecies from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore thegood andevil which are from the end do not diversify thespecies of an action.
Objection 2. Further, that which isaccidental does not constitute thespecies, as stated above (Article 5). But it isaccidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to givealms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as tospecies, according to thegood andevil which are from the end.
Objection 3. Further, acts that differ inspecies, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of variousvirtues andvices can be ordained. Therefore thegood andevil which are taken from the end, do not diversify thespecies of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above (I-II:1:3) thathuman actions derive theirspecies from the end. Thereforegood andevil in respect of the end diversify thespecies of actions.
I answer that, Certain actions are calledhuman, inasmuch as they arevoluntary, as stated above (I-II:1:1). Now, in avoluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of thewill, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of thewill: while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes itsspecies from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of thewill takes itsspecies from the end, as from its own proper object.
Now that which is on the part of thewill is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because thewill uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure ofmorality, save in so far as they arevoluntary. Consequently thespecies of ahuman act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence thePhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commitadultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer thanthief."
Reply to Objection 1. The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. Although it isaccidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is notaccidental to the interior act of thewill, which act is compared to the external act, as form tomatter.
Reply to Objection 3. When many actions, differing inspecies, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity ofspecies on the part of the external actions; but unity ofspecies on the part of the internal action.
Objection 1. It would seem that thespecies ofgoodness derived from the end is contained under thespecies ofgoodness derived from the object, as aspecies is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits atheft in order to givealms. For an action takes itsspecies from its object, as stated above (Articles2 and6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under anotherspecies, if thisspecies be not contained under the properspecies of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in differentspecies that are not subordinate to one another. Therefore thespecies which is taken from the end, is contained under thespecies which is taken from the object.
Objection 2. Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specificspecies. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore thespecies derived from the end, is contained under thespecies derived from the object, as its most specificspecies.
Objection 3. Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form tomatter. But thespecies derived from the end, is more formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above (Article 6). Therefore thespecies derived from the end is contained under thespecies derived from the object, as the most specificspecies is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one samespecies on the part of its object, can be ordained to aninfinite number of ends: for instance,theft can be ordained to aninfinite number ofgood and bad ends. Therefore thespecies derived from the end is not contained under thespecies derived from the object, as under its genus.
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of thewill: first, as being of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained theretoaccidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is ordainedaccidentally to the giving ofalms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute thespecies of that genus, must, as thePhilosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that genusessentially: and if they divide itaccidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are notessential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter division is anessential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the object is not anessential determination of thespecies derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of thesespecies is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under twospecies that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commitstheft for the sake ofadultery, is guilty of a twofoldmalice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is anessential determination of the other. Wherefore one of thesespecies will be contained under the other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does itcause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For thewill, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of thesoul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Reply to Objection 1. One and the same thing, considered in itssubstance, cannot be in twospecies, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to thesubstance, one thing can be contained under differentspecies. Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under onespecies, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under thespecies of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to itssubstance, is in onenaturalspecies, considered in respect to the moralconditions that are added to it, can belong to twospecies, as stated above (I-II:1:3 ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2. The end is last in execution; but first in theintention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive theirspecies.
Reply to Objection 3. Difference is compared to genus as form tomatter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more formal than thespecies, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus offormalcause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is theformalcause of thespecies; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
Objection 1. It would seem that no action is indifferent in itsspecies. Forevil is the privation ofgood, according toAugustine (Enchiridion xi). But privation andhabit are immediate contraries, according to thePhilosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as an action that is indifferent in itsspecies, as though it were betweengood andevil.
Objection 2. Further,human actions derive theirspecies from their end or object, as stated above (Article 6;I-II:1:3). But every end and every object is eithergood or bad. Therefore everyhuman action isgood orevil according to itsspecies. None, therefore, is indifferent in itsspecies.
Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Article 1), an action is said to begood, when it has its due complement ofgoodness; andevil, when it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the entire plenitude of itsgoodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must needs be eithergood or bad in itsspecies, and none is indifferent.
On the contrary,Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certaindeeds of a middle kind, which can be done with agood orevil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to theirspecies.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles2 and5), every action takes itsspecies from its object; whilehuman action, which is called moral, takes itsspecies from the object, in relation to the principle ofhuman actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order ofreason, it will be agood action according to itsspecies; for instance, to givealms to aperson in want. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order ofreason, it will be anevil act according to itsspecies; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to theirspecies.
Reply to Objection 1. Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contraryhabit, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the oppositehabit. In this wayevil is a privation ofgood, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does not take away allgood, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something betweengood andevil.
Reply to Objection 2. Every object or end has somegoodness ormalice, at leastnatural to it: but this does not imply moralgoodness ormalice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply to Objection 3. Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to itsspecies. Wherefore although an action's specificnature may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of itsgoodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specificallygood. Thus a man in regard to hisspecies is neithervirtuous norwicked.
Objection 1. It would seem that anindividual action can be indifferent. For there is nospecies that does not, cannot, contain anindividual. But an action can be indifferent in itsspecies, as stated above (Article 8). Therefore anindividual action can be indifferent.
Objection 2. Further,individual actionscause likehabits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But ahabit can be indifferent: for thePhilosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are notevil; and yet it is evident that they are notgood, since they depart fromvirtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of ahabit. Therefore someindividual actions are indifferent.
Objection 3. Further, moralgood belongs tovirtue, while moralevil belongs tovice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to avicious orvirtuous end. Therefore anindividual action may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary,Gregory says in ahomily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of justnecessity or pious utility." But an idle word is anevil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in theday of judgment" (Matthew 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of justnecessity or pious utility, it isgood. Therefore every word is eithergood or bad. For the same reason every other action is eithergood or bad. Therefore noindividual action is indifferent.
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in itsspecies, but considered in theindividual it isgood orevil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (Article 3), derives itsgoodness not only from its object, whence it takes itsspecies; but also from the circumstances, which are itsaccidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of hisindividualaccidents, which does not belong to him by reason of hisspecies. And everyindividual action must needs have some circumstance that makes itgood or bad, at least in respect of theintention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character ofevil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character ofgood. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently everyhuman action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in theindividual, must begood or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of theimagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral orhuman; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply to Objection 1. For an action to be indifferent in itsspecies can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that itsspecies demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no object ofhuman action is such that it cannot be directed togood orevil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far as itsspecies is concerned, it is neithergood nor bad. Wherefore it can be madegood or bad by something else. Thusman, as far as hisspecies is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it acondition of hisspecies that he should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded toman by other principles than those of hisspecies.
Reply to Objection 2. ThePhilosopher states that a man isevil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here thatevil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense everyindividual action is eithergood or bad, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to thegood of somevirtue, or to theevil of somevice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to thegood ofvirtue, provided he direct his body itself to thegood ofvirtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in thespecies ofgood orevil. For thespecies of an action is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action itsspecies.
Objection 2. Further, circumstances are asaccidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (I-II:7:1). But anaccident does not constitute thespecies. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute aspecies ofgood orevil.
Objection 3. Further, one thing is not in severalspecies. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a moral action in aspecies ofgood orevil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certainspecies ofevil; fortheft of a thing from aholy place is asacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specificallygood or bad.
I answer that, Just as thespecies ofnatural things are constituted by theirnatural forms, so thespecies of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above (Article 5). But sincenature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process ofnature go on toinfinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that innatural things, that which isaccidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting thespecies. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principalcondition of the object that determines the action'sspecies. Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in thespecies oftheft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that thecondition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to aholy place. Consequently to steal from aholy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principalcondition of the object, and as itself repugnant toreason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whethergood or bad.
Reply to Objection 1. A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as acondition of the object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mereaccident: but when it becomes a principalcondition of the object, then it does specify the action.
Reply to Objection 3. It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in thespecies ofgood orevil; since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in manyspecies. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moralspecies, as said above (Article 7, Reply to Objection 1;I-II:1:3 ad 3).
Objection 1. It would seem that every circumstance relating togood orevil, specifies an action. Forgood andevil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore that whichcauses a difference in thegoodness ormalice of a moral action,causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ inspecies. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ ingoodness andmalice. Therefore itcauses it to differ inspecies. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes aspecies.
Objection 2. Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character ofgoodness ormalice, or it has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse; because what is notgood, cannot make a greatergood; and what is notevil, cannot make a greaterevil. But if it has in itself the character ofgood orevil, for this very reason it has a certainspecies ofgood orevil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a newspecies ofgood orevil.
Objection 3. Further, according toDionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil iscaused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increasesmalice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a newspecies ofsin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increasesgoodness, seems to add a newspecies ofgoodness: just as every unity added to a number makes a newspecies of number; since thegood consists in "number, weight, and measure" (I:5:5).
On the contrary, More and less do not change aspecies. But more and less is a circumstance of additionalgoodness ormalice. Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in aspecies ofgood orevil.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 10), a circumstance gives thespecies ofgood orevil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect ofgood orevil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes itsspecies ofgood orevil. Thus to take something in a large or smallquantity, does not regard the order of reason in respect ofgood orevil, except a certain othercondition be presupposed, from which the action takes itsmalice orgoodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or smallquantity, does not change thespecies of thesin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish thesin. The same applies to otherevil orgood actions. Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes itsspecies.
Reply to Objection 1. In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change thespecies: thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to itsspecies of color. In like manner that which makes an action to be more or lessgood orevil, does not make the action differ inspecies.
Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance that aggravates asin, or adds to thegoodness of an action, sometimes has nogoodness ormalice in itself, but in regard to some othercondition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a newspecies, but adds to thegoodness ormalice derived from this othercondition of the action.
Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes itcauses a defect in reference to something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it may add to thegoodness ormalice, it does not always change thespecies ofgood orevil.