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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
A vow is defined as a promise made toGod. The promise is binding, and so differs from a simple resolution which is a present purpose to do or omit certain things in the future.
As between man and man, a promise pledges thefaith of the man who makes it; he promises, wishing some otherperson to trust him, and depend upon him. By his fidelity he shows himself worthy of trust; if he breaks his word, he loses credit, by causing the other a disappointment which is destructive of mutual confidence — and, likefaith, mutual confidence is important tosociety, for thenatural law condemns all conduct which shakes this confidence. These statements do not apply to a promise made toGod; it is impossible for me to deceiveGod as to my present intention, and He knows whether I shall be constant in the future:God, then, is protected against that disappointment on account of which the failure to fulfil a promise to a fellow-man is considered disgraceful. But, just as one can offer toGod an existing thing, or a present action, so also one can offer Him a future action, and perseverance in the purpose of fulfilling it. That offering of perseverance is characteristic of avow. A subsequent change in one's purpose is a want of respect toGod: it is like taking away something that has been dedicated to Him, and committing sacrilege in the widest sense of the word. Unlike the simple breach of a promise made to a man, a failure to give toGod what has been promised Him is a matter of importance, a very serious offence.
This explanation shows us also how a vow is an act of religion, just as any offering made toGod. It is a profession that toGod is due the dedication of our actions, and an acknowledgment of the order which makes Him our last end. By adding to ourobligations, we declare thatGod deserves more than He demands. Lastly we see why a vow is always made toGod — for, as all our actions ought to be ultimately directed to Him, we cannot make a final promise of those actions to anyone butGod. Promises made to thesaints cannot be lightly neglected without detracting from thehonour we owe them; but a failure in this respect, though grave in itself, is vastly less serious than breaking a vow, to which it bears some resemblance. These promises occasionally imply a vow.God is well pleased with thehonour paid to Hissaints, and they rejoice at the glory given toGod. We may then confirm by a vow the promise made to asaint, and likewise we mayhonour a saint by a vow made toGod, as for instance, to erect in memory of some saint a temple for Divine worship.
The vow, moreover, is approved byGod, because it is useful to man; it strengthens his will to do what is right. TheProtestants of the sixteenth century, followingWyclif, declared themselves opposed to vows; butLuther andCalvin condemned only vows relating to acts which were not ofobligation, the latter because he considered all good actions asobligatory, the former because the vow of a free action was contradictory to the spirit of the new law. Both denied that the vow was an act of religion and justified it by the simplehumanreason of strengthening the will. Certain recent tendencies have minimized the importance at least of vows made by members ofreligious communities. Errors of this kind are due to overemphasis of the fact that vows, and especially the perpetual vow of chastity, ofreligious life, or of missionary labour, do not imply any special instability in theperson who makes them, but only the fickleness natural to the human will; and that instead of denoting the grudging service of a slave, they imply rather the enthusiasm of a generous will, eager to give and sacrifice beyond what isnecessary, and at the same time so sincere in self-knowledge as to imitate warriors who burned their ships to cut off the possibility and even the temptation to flight. In the case of a will incapable of change, a vow would have no meaning; it were useless to offer a perseverance that could never be found wanting; for this reason it is not suitable to Christ, or theangels, or to the blessed inheaven.
A vow, even in an unimportant matter, presupposes the full consent of the will; it is an act of generosity towardsGod. One does not give unless one knows fully what one is doing. Every substantialerror, or indeed everyerror which is really the cause of making a vow, renders the vow null and void. This condition must be properly understood; to judge of the effect of theerror, it isnecessary toknow the will of theperson making the vow at the moment of making it. One who can say sincerely, "if I had known this or that, I would not have made the vow", is not bound by the vow. If, however, one who is aware of someignorance on the matter of a vow, but, in spite of that, generously decides to make it, knowing its general import and that it is in itself proper and commendable, such as the vow of chastity, for instance, is bound by it, as it is entirely valid. Lastly, the vows which accompany the entrance into a state, such as the vows of religion, can only be rendered void by some really substantialerror. The good of the community requires this stability. For every vow whatsoever suchknowledge and liberty are required as render aperson capable of committing serioussin; though it does not follow that at the age when one is capable of committing mortalsin, one is capable of understanding the importance of a perpetual engagement. The object of a vow, according to the classical formula, must be not merely something good, but something better; whence it follows that no vow must be made toGod of any unlawful or indifferent matter. The reason is simple:God is all holy and cannot accept the offering of anything which is bad or less good in its nature. Again, the object of the vow must be something that is humanly possible, for no one can be bound to do what is impossible. No man can make a vow to avoid all manner ofsin, even the slightest, because this is morally impossible. The vow to avoid deliberatesin is valid, at least inpersons who have made some progress invirtue. A vow may apply to aduty already existing or to acts which are not commanded by any law. A vow, being a personal act, binds only theperson who makes it; but a superior, who makes a vow in the name of his community, may, within the limits of his authority, command the fulfilment of the vow. (As to theobligation of heirs, see section III of this article.) A vow binds according to the intention of theperson who makes it; and this intention must be reasonable: in an unimportant matter, one cannot bind oneself under pain of grievoussin. In order to estimate the gravity of the matter, we distinguish between vows which affect isolated acts, and vows which relate to a series of acts. To an isolated act the well-known rule applies: The matter is grave if, in the hypothesis of anecclesiastical command, it wouldoblige under mortalsin; but if the vow relates to a series of acts, then we must see what is truly important in regard to the end pursued. Thus every grave offence against the virtue of chastity, as it should be observed outside the married state, is a serious matter for the vow of chastity. The omission of one or two Masses or one or twoRosaries is not a grave matter in the case of a vow to be present at Mass or to say theRosary every day. Every mortalsin is a grave offence against a vow to do what is most perfect; it is not the same with venialsin, even when deliberate; there must be a habit of committing acts which are certainly imperfect, in order to constitute a gravesin against this vow.
A vow is fulfilled by doing what has been promised, even without a positive intention of fulfilling the vow. One should personally fulfil the vow of some act or omission, promised as such as, for instance, the vow of apilgrimage, but may fulfil through another such a vow as that ofalmsgiving, or donation or restitution ofproperty. Allobligation ceases when the fulfilment of the vow becomes impossible or harmful, or if the reason for the vow ceases to exist. (As todispensation from vows, see section III.) A vow is a good action, but should be made withprudence and discretion; in theChristian life,love is better than bonds. We should avoid vows which are embarrassing, either because they are too numerous or because we may be unable to fulfil them (for failure to fulfil a vow is sure to be followed by sorrow which may endure for a long time); besides such vows as are not helpful to sanctification or charity. The more important theobligation the more careful reflection and preparation it requires. No objection can be made to reasonable vows made in order to increase the efficacy ofprayer; but the vows to be commended above all are those which give us strength against some weakness, help us to cure some fault, or, best of all, contain the germ of some great spiritual fruit. Such are the vows of religion or missionary work.
The vow properly so called is made toGod alone, but promises made to thesaints have a certain resemblance to vows and are often accompanied by a vow, as we have already seen. A vow may be the act of a privateperson, or the act of a superior representing a community. In the latter case the community is only indirectly bound by the vow. The sentiment which leads aperson to take a vow marks the distinction between absolute and conditional vows. The condition may be suspensive, that is to say, it may make the commencement of theobligation depend on the happening or the not happening of some future uncertain event; for instance, the words, "If I recover my health", make theobligation commence upon the recovery; or it may be resolutory, that is, it may have the effect of rescinding the vow, as if theperson adds to the vow the words, "Unless I lose my fortune", in which case the vow ceases to bind if the fortune is lost. The same sentiment distinguishes between simple, or pure, vows, by which aperson promises simply to do an act which is pleasing toGod, and vows having some special end in view, such as another's conversion.
According to their object, vows may be personal, as a promise to do a certain act; or real, as a promise of a certain thing; or mixed, as a promise to nurse a sickperson with one's own hands. They may also have reference to a single definite object, or leave the choice among two or three objects (disjunctive vows). According to the manner of their utterances, there are vows interior and exterior; vows express, and vows tacit or implied (as for instance, that of thesubdeacon at hisordination); vows secret, and vows made in public. According to their juridical form, they may be private or made with theChurch's recognition; and these last are divided into simple and solemn vows. Lastly, from the point of view of thedispensation required, vows are either reserved to theHoly See or not reserved. In itself the vow is a promise, and does not imply any surrender or transfer ofrights; certain vows, however, according to ecclesiastical law, modify therights ofpersons; such are the vows taken inreligious orders.
Under we have seen how the distinction arose historically between simple and solemn vows, the names of which appear in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Various opinions have been expressed as to the matter of this distinction, and the question has not yet been decided. Somepersons make the essential solemnity consist in the surrender of oneself which accompanies certain vows; this is the opinion ofGregory of Valentia (Comment. theol., III, D. 6, Q. vi, punct. 5) and many recentThomists. But the surrender is found in vows which are not solemn, such as the vows of scholastics of theSociety of Jesus, who would not be religious properly so-called, if their surrender differed essentially from that of the professed fathers. Moreover, the surrender really accompanies only a vow of obedience accepted in areligious order, while other vows are solemn, even without any question of obedience, such as the vow of chastity made bysubdeacons.
In the opinion of Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor., I, nn. 64750) the solemnity of the vow consists in a spiritualconsecration, the effect of which is that, after such a vow, aperson is irrevocably set apart and appointed by theChurch to serveGod by the offering of that vow. This opinion has its attractive side, but does it agree with history? The vow ofpilgrimage to the Holy Land was temporary and solemn. Or does it agree with the definition of law?Boniface VIII declares those vows to be solemn which are accompanied either by aconsecration or by areligious profession. And lastly, does not theconsecrationlogically follow the solemnity, rather than precede or cause it?
In spite of its complication and the forced explanations to which recourse is had, in order to escape from the difficulty, the opinion of Francisco Suárez (De religione tr. VII, c. ii, c.x, n.l; c.xii, nn.7-9; c.xiii, nn. 3, 8-13; c.xiv, n. 10) still finds distinguished defenders, especially Wernz (Jus Decretalium, III, n. 572). This opinion places the essence of the solemnity in the absolute surrender of himself by the religious, and the acceptance of that surrender by thereligious order, which is accomplished by solemn profession, and also in the incapacity of aperson who is bound by solemn vows to perform validly acts that are contrary to those vows; such as the incapacity to possessproperty, or to contract marriage. But historically this incapacity was not and is not always attached to solemn vows; the solemn vow of obedience does not as such involve any particular incapacity; and often solemn vows do not produce this effect. Will they be called solemn as being attached to the vow of obedience, and solemnized by the surrender of oneself?
But, apart from the arbitrary nature of these explanations, the vow of theCrusader was solemn without being attached to any more general vow of obedience; and we have seen that the surrender does not constitute the solemnity. For this reason we prefer a simple opinion, which, in accord with Vasquez (In I-II, Q. xcvi, d. clxv, especially n. 83) and Sanchez (In decalogum, 1, 5, c. 1, n. 11-13), places the material solemnity of vows of religion in the surrender followed by irrevocable acceptance; and with Laymann (De statu religioso, c. i, n. 4), Pellizarius (Manuale regularium, tr. IV, c. i. nn. 10-18). Medina (De sacrorum hominum continentia, l. 4, controv. 7, c. xxxviii),V. De Buck (De solemnitate votorum epistola),Nilles (De juridica votorum solemnitate), and Palmieri (Opus theol., II, pp. 445, 446) respects the ordinary juridical signification of the solemn act. The juridical solemnities are formalities to be observed in order to give to the act either its legal value or at least the more or less valuable guarantee of perfect authenticity. This very simple explanation accounts for the historical changes, both those which have reference to the number and conditions of vows, and those which concern their effects. It is natural that there should be greater difficulty in obtaining adispensation from a solemn vow, and also that theChurch should attach certain disabilities to such a vow. But these effects of solemn vows cannot constitute the essence of such vows. However this may be, canon law at the present day does not recognize any vow as solemn except the vow of chastity, solemnized byreligious profession in an order strictly so called. The vows taken in religious congregations, like the simple vows which inreligious orders precede the solemn profession, and also the complementary simple vows which follow the profession in some institutes, and lastly the final simple vows taken in certainreligious orders in place of solemn profession, are, strictly speaking, private; but they derive a certain authenticity from the approval of theChurch and the circumstances in which they are taken.
In itself the vow creates a personalobligation, which does not arise from the virtue ofjustice and which would seem to cease at the death of theperson taking the vow. It is admitted, nevertheless, that heirs are bound to fulfil the vows called real, because they imply a promise to make over certainproperty or money; the origin of thisobligation is theRoman law "De pollicitionibus", accepted as canon law. As to its nature, it is anobligation of religion, if theperson making the vow has not made a bequest of theproperty by will. In this supposition theobligation would be ofjustice; but in the other cases, seeing that thelaw mentions no specific title, but simply declares that theobligation of the vow devolves on the heirs, we infer it devolvestalis qualis, that is as a religiousobligation.
Theobligation of the vow is cancelled not only by the performance of the work promised, but also by the effective substitution of a better work, and by any circumstance which would have prevented theobligation from arising; as, for instance, if the work became useless, or unnecessary, or impossible. Theobligation of the vow may also be annulled by lawful authority. We shall first sum up the generally accepteddoctrine, and then endeavour to explain it briefly.
We must distinguish between the power to annul a vow and the power to dispense from theobligation to fulfil it. A vow may be annulled directly or indirectly. No vow can be made to the prejudice of anobligation already existing. If aperson entitled to benefit under a previousobligation asserts a claim which is incompatible with the fulfilment of a vow, the fulfilment is prevented, and theobligation isipso facto at least temporarily removed. Thus, a master may require the performance of services promised by the contract of hiring, without reference to any vow subsequently made; a husband may also require his wife to fulfil a conjugalduty. This is indirect annulment, which presents no difficulty. But besides this, certainpersons, in virtue of a general power over the acts of others, may directly and finally annul all vows made by their subjects, or may prevent them generally from taking vows in the future. This power belongs to the father or guardian in the case of a minor, to the regularprelate, and even to the superior of religious congregations, in the case of professed religious; and, according to many authorities, to the husband, in the case of the marriedwoman; and theperson exercising this power of annulment is not required to prove the existence of just cause.
The power of dispensing, on the contrary, requires a just cause, less, however, than that which would suffice by itself to exempt from a vow. A still less reason is enough to commute the vow into another good work, especially if the latter is almost equivalent to the work promised. According to canon law, all vows made before solemn profession cease to bind by the fact of that profession, due regard being shown to therights of thirdpersons; and it is always permissible for aperson to commute vows previously made into those of his or herreligious profession, even when this is not solemn. When a vow is commuted byecclesiastical authority, although theperson who has taken the vow may always fulfil hisobligation by doing the work originally promised, he is not in any case bound to do so, even if the substituted work becomes impossible. The power of dispensing and commuting belongs to those who have ordinaryjurisdiction (besides thepope, thebishop and the regularprelate) over all vows not reserved to thepope and vows thedispensation from which does not prejudice therights of thirdpersons. Without the consent of the latter theserights cannot be prejudiced by adispensation from the vow, except by the exercise of a supreme power over thoserights, such as is possessed by thepope over therights of religious congregations. Moreover, the power ofdispensation may be delegated either in special cases or even generally: thus the confessors of the regular orders may grantdispensation from vows to their penitents-that is topersons whose confessions they are authorized to receive.
Dispensation from a vow is ordinarily justified by great difficulty in its fulfilment or by the fact that it was taken without due deliberation, or by the probability of some greater good either to theperson taking it or to others, as, for instance, to afamily, the State, or theChurch. In dispensing from vows, theecclesiastical superior does not dispense from anyDivine law, but he exercises thepower of the keys, the power of binding and loosing, in order to remit thedebt contracted toGod: and this power appears so useful tosociety, that, even if it had not been formally conferred by Christ, we might contend that it would always have belonged to the authority responsible for the public interests of religion. (See Francisco Suárez, "De religione", VI, Q. xviii.) The direct annulment of vows is more difficult of explanation; for no one can have a power extending so far as to interfere with the interior acts of anotherperson. A son not yet arrived at the age of puberty may, even without the consent of hisparents, make a promise of marriage; why does he appear to be unable, by reason of his tender age, to bind himself by any vow toGod? We may observe that the distinction between direct and indirect annulment is not found inSt. Thomas, or in Cajetan, but dates from a later period. With Lehmkuhl, we cannot explain this power without the intervention ofecclesiastical authority: in our opinion, theChurch, in consideration of the weakness of minors and the condition of religious and marriedwomen, gives them a general conditionaldispensation that is to say adispensation at the discretion of the father, the superior, or the husband. The power to commute vows does not give the power to dispense from them; but the power over vows may, according to a probable opinion, extend also tooaths, and even to vows confirmed byoaths.
Noperson may, in virtue of ordinary powers, dispense from vows which thesovereign pontiff has reserved to himself. These vows are, first, all such as form part of areligious profession, at least in an institute approved byRome, and this reservation applies also to vows taken bywomen belonging to orders, entitled to make solemn vows, but who in some countries take only simple vows. Besides these, five vows are reserved to theHoly See: the vow of perpetual chastity, the vow to enter the religious state (that is in an institution with solemn vows), a vow of apilgrimage to thetombs of the Apostles, to St. James ofCompostela, or to the Holy Land. However, these vows are only reserved if they are made under graveobligation, with full liberty and unconditionally, and if they include the whole object of the vow. The reservation does not extend to accidental circumstances, for instance, to enter one order in preference to another, or to make apilgrimage in this or that manner. In urgent cases, when there would be great peril in delay, the ordinaries may, ifnecessary, dispense even from reserved vows.
The vow of chastity forbids allvoluntary sexual pleasure, whether interior or exterior: thus its object is identical with theobligations which the virtue of chastity imposes outside the marriage state. Strictly speaking, it differs (though in ordinary language the expressions may be synonymous) from the vow ofcelibacy (or abstinence from marriage), the vow of virginity (which becomes impossible of fulfilment after complete transgression), or the vow not to use therights of marriage. The violation of the vow of chastity is always asin against religion; it constitutes also asacrilege in aperson who has receivedHoly orders, or in a religious, because each of thesepersons has beenconsecrated toGod by his vow: his vow forms part of the public worship of theChurch. Some authors consider that this sacrilege is committed by the violation of even a private vow of chastity. Although asin against the virtue of chastity is committed, there is no violation of the vow when aperson without experiencing any sexual pleasure personally becomes an accomplice (as for instance by counsel) in thesin of anotherperson not bound by a vow. Unless theperson concerned is able honestly to abstain from all use of therights of marriage, every simple vow of chastity constitutes a prohibitive impediment to marriage; sometimes, as is the case in theSociety of Jesus, it becomes by privilege a diriment impediment; when joined to religious solemn profession, it has the effect even of annulling a previous marriage not consummated. Sometheologians have expressed the opinion that thereligious profession produced this effect byDivine law; but it is more usual at the present day, and it seems to us more correct, to see in this a point ofecclesiastical discipline. Aperson who, in defiance of his solemn vow, attempts to contract marriage, incurs theexcommunication reserved to thebishop by the Constitution"Apostolicae Sedis". Marriage following after the simple vow of perpetual chastity has the effect of making the perfect fulfilment of the vow impossible, as long as the married state continues — therefore the observance of the vow is suspended, and thebishop or the regular confessor may give permission for the use of marriage. If the marriage is dissolved, the vow recovers its full force. We have already seen that the vow of the wife, taken at marriage, can be directly annulled by the husband, and that of the husband indirectly by the wife.
The Sovereign Pontiff may dispense from the vow, even the solemn vow, of chastity. History contains well-known examples of suchdispensations; thus,Julius III permittedCardinal Pole to dispense evenpriests who, at the time of theAnglican schism, had contracted marriage;Pius VII dispensedpriests who were civilly married under theFrench Revolution. But suchdispensations are only granted for exceptionally grave reasons; and even when a case is one of a simple vow of perpetual chastity freely and deliberately taken, theHoly See ordinarily grants adispensation only in view of marriage, and imposes a perpetual commutation, such as the condition of approaching thesacraments once a month.
Historically there are frequent instances of special vows in theOld Testament, generally under the form of offerings conditionally made toGod — offerings of things, of animals, even ofpersons, which might, however, be redeemed; offerings of worship, of abstinence, of personalsacrifices. See for example the vow of Jacob (Gen., xxviu, 2022), ofJephte (Judges 11:30, 31), of Anna the mother of Samuel (1 Samuel 1:11), in which we find an example of Nazaritism, and the imprecatory vow of Saul (1 Samuel 14:24). In Deuteronomy, xxiii, 21-23, it is laid down that there is nosin in not making a promise toGod, but that there issin in delaying to pay the vow. TheNew Testament contains no express commendation of vows; but two instances of special vows are specially recorded in theActs of the Apostles (xviii, 18, and xxi, 23). In both these passages, the vows are of the same nature as those of the Nazarenes. These particular vows were not unknown to theFathers of the Church, especially toSt. Ambrose, "De officiis ministrorum", III, xii (P.L., XVI, 168);St. Jerome, Epistle 130 (PL 22:1118 andSt. Augustine, Sermon 148 (P.L., XXXVIII, 799). But theChurch especially recognized the promise to devote one's life to the service ofGod;baptism itself is accompanied by promises which were formerly considered as genuine vows, and which contain in reality aconsecration of oneself toJesus Christ by the renunciation of thedevil andpaganism. At a very early period continence was professed by virgins andwidows — and though this profession appears rather under the form of the choice of a state of life than a formal promise, in the fifth century it was considered strictly irrevocable.
APA citation.Vermeersch, A.(1912).Vows. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15511a.htm
MLA citation.Vermeersch, Arthur."Vows."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 15.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1912.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15511a.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Tomas Hancil and Joseph P. Thomas.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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