Virtue

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The subject will be treated under the following heads:

I. Definitions;
II. Subjects;
III. Divisions;
IV. Causes;
V. Properties.

Definitions

According to its etymology the wordvirtue (Latinvirtus) signifies manliness orcourage. "Appelata est enim a viro virtus: viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo" ("The term virtue is from the word that signifies man; a man's chief quality isfortitude"; Cicero, "Tuscul.", I, xi, 18). Taken in its widest sense virtue means the excellence of perfection of a thing, just as vice, its contrary, denotes a defect or absence of perfection due to a thing. In its strictest meaning, however, as used by moralphilosophers andtheologians, it signifies a habit superadded to a faculty of thesoul, disposing it to elicit with readiness acts conformable to our rational nature. "Virtue", says Augustine, "is a good habit consonant with our nature." From Saint Thomas's entire Question on the essence of virtue may be gathered his brief but complete definition of virtue: "habitus operativus bonus", an operative habit essentially good, as distinguished from vice, an operative habit essentiallyevil. Now a habit is a quality in itself difficult of change, disposing well or ill the subject in which it resides, either directly in itself or in relation to its operation. An operative habit is a quality residing in a power or faculty in itself indifferent to this or that line of action, but determined by the habit to this rather than to that kind of acts. (SeeHABIT.) Virtue then has this in common with vice, that it disposes a potency to a certain determined activity; but it differs specifically from it in that it disposes it to good acts, i.e. acts in consonance with rightreason. Thus, temperance inclines the sensuousappetite to acts of moderation conformably to rightreason just as intemperance impels the sameappetite to acts of excess contrary to the dictates of our rational nature.

Subjects of virtue

Before determining the subjects or potencies in which the different virtues reside, it will benecessary to distinguish two kinds of virtues: those which are virtues absolutely (simpliciter) and those which are virtues only in a restricted sense (secundum quid). The latter confer only a faculty for well-doing, and render the possessor good only in a restricted sense, e.g. a goodlogician. The former, in addition to the facility for well-doing, cause one to use the facility rightly, and render the possessor unqualifiedly good. Now theintellect may be the subject of those habits which are called virtues in a restricted sense, such asscience and art. But the will only, or any other faculty only in so far as it is moved by the will, can be the subject of habits, which are called virtues in the absolute sense. For it is the proper function of the will to move to their respective acts all the other powers which are in any way rational. Thus theintellect and sensuousappetite as moved by the will are the subjects ofprudence and temperance, while the will itself is the subject ofjustice, a virtue in the absolute sense.

Divisions of virtue

Virtues may be divided into intellectual,moral, andtheological.

Intellectual virtues

Intellectual virtue may be defined as a habit perfecting theintellect to elicit with readiness acts that are good in reference to their proper object, namely,truth. As theintellect is called speculative or practical according as it confines itself to the sole contemplation oftruth or considerstruth in reference to action, theintellectual virtues may be classified according to this twofold function of themental faculty. The speculativeintellectual virtues are wisdom,science, and understanding. Wisdom is theknowledge of conclusions through their highest causes. Thus philosophy, and particularlymetaphysics, is properly designated as wisdom, since it considerstruth of the natural order according to its highest principles. Science is theknowledge of conclusions acquired by demonstration through causes or principles which are final in one class or other. Thus there are differentsciences, mathematics, physics, etc., but only one wisdom, the supreme judge of all. Understanding is defined as the habit of first principles; as habit or virtue it is to be distinguished, at leastlogically, from the faculty of intelligence. It is also calledintuition, as it has for its objecttruths that are self-evident, the perception of which requires no discursive process. It is to be observed that these virtues differ from the gifts of the Holy Ghost, designated by the same name, inasmuch as they are qualities of the natural order, while the gifts are intrinsicallysupernatural. The practicalintellectual virtues are two, namely, art andprudence.

Art

Art, according to theSchoolmen, signifies the right method with regard to external productions (recta ratio factibilium). Just asscience perfects and directs theintellect to reason correctly with regard to its proper object in view of the attainment oftruth, so also art perfects and directs theintellect in the application of certain rules in view of the production of external works, whether these be of a useful or æsthetic character. Hence the division into useful andfine arts. Art has this in common with the three speculativeintellectual habits, that they are all virtues only in a restricted sense. Hence they constitute a man good only in a qualified sense, e.g. a good geometrician or a goodsculptor. For the proper function ofscience as art, as such, is not to confer moralgoodness, but to direct theintellect in its scientific or artistic processes.

Prudence

As art is the right method of production, soprudence, as defined bySt. Thomas, is the right method of conduct (recta ratio agibilium). It differs from all the otherintellectual virtues in this, that it is a virtue in the absolute sense, not only conferring a readiness for well-doing, but causing one to use that readiness rightly. Considered more specifically, it is that virtue which directs on in the choice of means most apt, under existing circumstances, for the attainment of a due end. It differs from the moral virtues as it resides not in the appetitive powers but in theintellect, its proper act being, not the choice of apt means, but the direction of that choice. But althoughprudence is essentially anintellectual virtue, nevertheless, under a certain respect (materialiter) it may be considered a moral virtue, since it has as its subject matter the acts of the moral virtues. For if the end be vicious, though a certain astuteness be manifested in the discernment of means, such astuteness is not realprudence, but the semblance ofprudence. (SeePRUDENCE.)

Moral virtues

Moral virtues are those which perfect the appetitive faculties of thesoul, namely, the will and the sensuousappetite. Moral virtue is so called from the wordmos, which signifies a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do a thing. But the inclination to act is properly attributed to the appetitive faculty, whose function it is to move the other powers to action. Consequently that virtue is called moral which perfects the appetitive faculty. For asappetite and reason have distinct activities, it isnecessary that not only reason be well disposed by the habit ofintellectual virtue, but that the appetitive powers also be well disposed by the habit of moral virtue. From this necessity of the moral virtues we see thefalsity of the theory ofSocrates, who held that all virtue wasknowledge, as he held that all vice wasignorance. Moreover, the moral virtues excel theintellectual,prudence excepted, in this, that they give not only the facility, but also the right use of the facility, for well- doing. Hence moral virtues are virtues absolutely; and when we say without qualification that a man is good, we mean morally good. As the proper function of the moral virtues is to rectify the appetitive powers, i.e. to dispose them to act in accordance with rightreason, there are principally three moral virtues:justice, which perfects the rationalappetite or will;fortitude and temperance, which moderate the lower or sensuousappetite. Prudence, as we have observed, is called a moral virtue, not indeed essentially, but by reason of its subject matter, inasmuch as it is directive of the acts of the moral virtues.

Justice

Justice, an essentially moral virtue, regulates man in relations with his fellow-men. It disposes us to respect therights of others, to give each man his due. (SeeJUSTICE.) Among the virtues annexed tojustice are:

All these moral virtues, as well asjustice itself, regulate man in his dealings with others. But besides these there are moral virtues which regulate man with regard to his own inner passions. Now there are passions which impel man to desire that which reason impels him forward; hence there are principally two moral virtues, namely, temperance andfortitude, whose function it is to regulate those lowerappetites.

Temperance

Temperance it is which restrains the undue impulse ofconcupiscence for sensible pleasure, whilefortitude causes man to bebrave when he would otherwise shrink, contrary to reason, from dangers or difficulties. Temperance, then, to consider it more particularly, is that moral virtue which moderates in accordance with reason the desires and pleasures of the sensuousappetite attendant on those acts by whichhumannature is preserved in the individual or propagated in the species. The subordinate species of temperance are:

The virtues annexed to temperance are:

To this virtue may be reduced to whatAristotle designated aseutrapelia, or good cheer, which disposes to moderation in sports, games, and jests, in accordance with the dictates of reason, taking into consideration the circumstance ofperson, season, and place.

Fortitude

As temperance and its annexed virtues remove from the will hindrances to rational good arising from sensuous pleasure, sofortitude removes from the will those obstacles arising from the difficulties of doing what reason requires. Hencefortitude, which implies a certain moral strength andcourage, is the virtue by which one meets and sustains dangers and difficulties, even death itself, and in never through fear of these deterred from the pursuit of good which reason dictates. (SeeFORTITUDE.) The virtues annexed tofortitude are:

(For a more detailed treatment of the four principal moral virtues, seeCARDINAL VIRTUES.)

Theological virtues

All virtues have as their final scope to dispose man to acts conducive to histruehappiness. Thehappiness, however, of which man is capable is twofold, namely, natural, which is attainable by man's natural powers, andsupernatural, which exceeds the capacity of unaidedhumannature. Since, therefore, merely natural principles of human action are inadequate to asupernatural end, it isnecessary that man be endowed withsupernatural powers to enable him to attain his final destiny. Now thesesupernatural principles are nothing else than thetheological virtues. They are calledtheological

Thetheological virtues are three, viz.faith, hope, and charity.

Faith

Faith is an infused virtue, by which theintellect is perfected by asupernatural light, in virtue of which, under asupernatural movement of the will, it assents firmly to thesupernaturaltruths of Revelation, not on the motive of intrinsic evidence, but on the sole ground of theinfallible authority ofGod revealing. For as man is guided in the attainment of naturalhappiness by principles ofknowledge known by the natural light of reason, so also in the attainment of hissupernatural destiny hisintellect must be illumined by certainsupernatural principles, namely, Divinelyrevealedtruths. (SeeFAITH.)

Hope

But not only man'sintellect must be perfected with regard to hissupernatural end, his will also must tend to that end, as a good possible of attainment. Now the virtue, by which the will is so perfected, is thetheological virtue of hope. It is commonly defined as a Divinely infused virtue, by which we trust, with an unshaken confidence grounded on the Divine assistance, to attain life everlasting.

Charity

But the will must not only tend toGod, its ultimate end, it must also be united to Him by a certain conformity. This spiritual union or conformity, by which thesoul is united toGod, the sovereign Good, is effected by charity. Charity, then, is thattheological virtue, by whichGod, our ultimate end, known bysupernatural light, isloved by reason of His own intrinsicgoodness or amiability, and our neighbourloved on account ofGod. It differs fromfaith, as it regardsGod not under the aspect oftruth but of good. It differs from hope inasmuch as it regardsGod not as our good precisely (nobis bonum), but as good in Himself (in se bonum). But thislove ofGod as good in Himself does not, as theQuietists maintained, exclude thelove ofGod as He is our good (seeQUIETISM). With regard to thelove of our neighbor, it falls within thetheological virtue of charity in so far as its motive is thesupernaturallove ofGod, and it is thus distinguished from mere natural affection. Of the threetheological virtues, charity is the most excellent. Faith and hope, involving as they do a certain imperfection, namely, obscurity of light and absence of possession, will cease with this life, but charity involving no essential defect will last forever. Moreover, while charity excludes all mortalsin,faith and hope are compatible with grievoussin; but as such they are only imperfect virtues; it is only when informed and vivified by charity that their acts are meritorious of eternal life (seeTHEOLOGICAL VIRTUE OF LOVE).

Causes of virtue

To the humanintellect the first principles ofknowledge, both speculative and moral, are connatural; to the human will the tendency to rational good is connatural. Now these naturally knowable principles and these natural tendencies to good constitute the seeds or germs whence theintellectual and moral virtues spring. Moreover by reason of individual natural temperament, resulting from physiological conditions, particularindividuals are better disposed than others to particular virtues. Thus certainpersons have a natural aptitude with regard toscience, others to temperance, and others tofortitude. Hence nature itself may be assigned as the radical cause of theintellectual and moral virtues, or the cause of those virtues viewed in their embryonic state. In their perfect and fully developed state, however, the aforesaid virtues are caused or acquired by frequently repeated acts. Thus by multiplied acts the moral virtues are generated in the appetitive faculties in so far as they are acted upon by reason, and the determination of first principles (seeHABIT). Thesupernatural virtues are immediately caused or infused byGod. But a virtue may be called infused in two ways: first, when by its very nature (per se) it can be effectively produced byGod alone; secondly, accidentally (per accidens) when it may be acquired by our own acts, but by a Divinedispensation it is infused, as in the case of Adam and Christ. Now besides thetheological virtues, according to thedoctrine ofSt. Thomas, there are also moral andintellectual virtues of their very nature Divinely infused, asprudence,justice,fortitude, and temperance. These infused virtues differ from the acquired virtues

Properties of virtues

Mean of virtues

One of the properties of virtues is that they consist in the golden mean, that is to say, in what lies between excess and deficit. For as the perfection of things subject to rule consists in conformity with that rule, so alsoevil in those same things results from deviation from that rule either by excess or defect. Hence the perfection of the moral virtues consists in rendering the movements of the appetitive powers conformable to their proper rule, which is reason, neither going beyond nor falling short of it. Thusfortitude, which makes onebrave to meet dangers, avoids on the one hand reckless daring and on the other undue timidity. This golden mean, which consists in conformity with rightreason, sometimes coincides with the mean of the objective thing (medium rei), as in the case of the virtue ofjustice, which renders to every man his due, no more and no less. The golden mean, however, is sometimes taken in reference to ourselves, as in the case of the other moral virtues, viz.fortitude and temperance. For these virtues are concerned with the inner passions, in which the standard of right cannot be fixed invariably, as differentindividuals vary with regard to the passions. Thus what would be moderation in one would be excess in another. Here also it is to be observed that the mean and extremes in actions and passions must be determined according to circumstances, which may vary. Hence with regard to a certain virtue, what may be an extreme according to one circumstance may be a mean according to another. Thus perpetual chastity, which renounces all sexual pleasures, andvoluntary poverty, which renounces all temporal possessions, aretrue virtues, when exercised for the motive of more surely securing life everlasting. With regard to theintellectual virtues, their golden mean istruth or conformity to reality, whilst excess consists infalse affirmation, and defect infalse negation. Theological virtues do not absolutely (per se) consist in a mean, as their object is somethinginfinite. Thus we can neverloveGod excessively. Accidentally (per accidens), however, what is extreme or mean intheological virtues may be considered relatively to ourselves. Thus although we can neverloveGod as much as He deserves, still we canlove Him according to our powers.

Connection of virtues

Anotherproperty of virtues is their connection with one another. This mutual connection exists between the moral virtues in their perfect state. "The virtues", saysSt. Gregory, "if separated, cannot be perfect in the nature of virtue; for that is notrueprudence which is not just and temperate andbrave". The reason of this connection is that no moral virtue can be had withoutprudence; because it is the function of moral virtue, being an elective habit, to make a right choice, which rectitude of choice must be directed byprudence. On the other handprudence cannot exist without the moral virtues; becauseprudence, being a right method of conduct, has as principles whence it proceeds the ends of conduct, to which ends one becomes duly affected through the moral virtues. Imperfect moral virtues, however, that is to say, those inclinations to virtue resulting from natural temperament, are not necessarily connected with one another. Thus we see a man from natural temperament prompt to acts of liberality and not prompt to acts of chastity. Nor are the natural or acquired moral virtues necessarily connected with charity, though they may be so occasionally. But thesupernatural moral virtues are infused simultaneously with charity. For charity is the principle of allgoodworks referable to man'ssupernatural destiny. Hence it isnecessary that there be infused at the same time with charity all the moral virtues by which one performs the different kinds ofgoodworks. Thus the infused moral virtues are not only connected on account ofprudence, but also on account of charity. Hence he who loses charity by mortalsin looses all the infused but not the acquired moral virtues.

From thedoctrine of nature and properties of virtues it is abundantly clear how important a role they play inman'strue and real perfection. In the economy ofDivine Providence all creatures by the exercise of their proper activity must tend to that end destined for them by the wisdom of aninfinite intelligence. But as Divine Wisdom governs creatures conformably to their nature, man must tend to his destined end, not by blind instance, but by the exercise of reason andfree will. But as these faculties, as well as the faculties subject to them, may be exercised for the faculties subject to them, may be exercised forgood orevil, the proper functions of the virtues is to dispose these various psychical activities to acts conductive to man'strue ultimate end, just as the part which vice plays inman's rational life is to make him swerve from his final destiny. If, then, the excellence of a thing is to be measured by the end for which it is destined, withoutdoubt among man's highest principles of action which play so important a part in his rational, spiritual,supernatural life, and which in the truest sense of the word are justly called virtues.

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