Rationalism

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(Latin,ratio — reason, the faculty of the mind which forms the ground of calculation, i.e. discursive reason. SeeAPOLOGETICS;ATHEISM;BIBLE;DEISM;EMPIRICISM;ETHICS;BIBLICAL EXEGESIS;FAITH;MATERIALISM;MIRACLE;REVELATION).

The term is used: (1) in an exact sense, to designate a particular moment in the development ofProtestant thought inGermany; (2) in a broader, and more usual, sense to cover the view (in relation to which manyschools may be classed as rationalistic) that thehumanreason, or understanding, is the sole source and final test of alltruth. It has further: (3) occasionally been applied to the method of treatingrevealedtruth theologically, by casting it into a reasoned form, and employingphilosophical Categories in its elaboration. These three uses of the term will be discussed in the present article.

I

The Germanschool oftheological Rationalism formed a part of the more general movement of the eighteenth-century "Enlightenment". It may be said to owe its immediate origin to thephilosophical system of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), which was a modification, withAristotelean features, of that of Leibniz, especially characterized by its spiritualism, determinism, and dogmatism. This philosophy and its method exerted a profound influence upon contemporaneous Germanreligious thought, providing it with a rationalistic point of view intheology andexegesis. German philosophy in the eighteenth century was, as a whole, tributary to Leibniz, whose "Théodicée" was written principally against the Rationalism of Bayle: it was marked by an infiltration ofEnglishDeism andFrenchMaterialism, to which the Rationalism at present considered had great affinity, and towards which it progressively developed: and it was vulgarized by its union with popular literature. Wolff himself was expelled from his chair at the University of Halle on account of the Rationalistic nature of his teaching, principally owing to the action of Lange (1670-1774; cf. "Causa Dei et religionis naturalis adversus atheismum", and "Modesta Disputatio", Halle, 1723). Retiring to Marburg, he taught there until 1740, when he was recalled to Halle byFrederick II. Wolff's attempt to demonstrate natural religion rationally was in no sense an attack upon revelation. As a "supranaturalist" he admittedtruths above reason, and he attempted to support by reason thesupernaturaltruths contained inHoly Scripture. But his attempt, while it incensed the pietisticschool and was readily welcomed by the more liberal and moderate among theorthodoxLutherans, in reality turned out to be strongly in favour of theNaturalism that he wished to condemn. Natural religion, he asserted, is demonstrable;revealedreligion is to be found in theBible alone. But in his method ofproof of the authority of Scripture recourse was had to reason, and thus thehumanmind became,logically, the ultimate arbiter in the case of both. Supranaturalism intheology, which it was Wolff's intention to uphold,proved incompatible with such aphilosophical position, and Rationalism took its place. This, however, is to be distinguished from pureNaturalism, to which it led, but with which it never became theoretically identified. Revelation was not denied by the Rationalists; though, as a matter of fact, if not of theory, it was quietly suppressed by the claim, with its ever-increasing application, that reason is the competent judge of alltruth. Naturalists, on the other hand, denied the fact of revelation. As withDeism andMaterialism, the German Rationalism invaded the department ofBiblical exegesis. Here a destructive criticism, very similar to that of theDeists, was levelled against themiracles recorded in, and the authenticity of theHoly Scripture. Nevertheless, the distinction between Rationalism andNaturalism still obtained. The great Biblical critic Semler (1725-91), who is one of the principal representatives of theschool, was a strong opponent of the latter; in company with Teller (1734-1804) and others he endeavoured to show that the records of theBible have no more than a local and temporary character, thus attempting to safeguard the deeper revelation, while sacrificing to the critics its superficial vehicle. He makes the distinction betweentheology and religion (by which he signifies ethics).

The distinction made between natural andrevealedreligion necessitated a closer definition of the latter. For Supernaturalists and Rationalists alike religion was held to be "a way of knowing and worshipping the Deity", but consisting chiefly, for the Rationalists, in the observance ofGod's law. This identification of religion withmorals, which at the time wasutilitarian in character (seeUTILITARIANISM), led to further developments in the conceptions of the nature of religion, the meaning of revelation, and the value of theBible as a collection of inspired writings. The earlierorthodoxProtestant view of religion as a body oftruths published and taught byGod to man in revelation was in process of disintegration. In Semler's distinction between religion (ethics) on the one hand andtheology on the other, withHerder's similar separation of religion fromtheological opinions and religious usages, the cause of theChristian religion, as they conceived it, seemed to be put beyond the reach of the shock of criticism, which, by destroying the foundations upon which it claimed to rest, had gone so far to discredit the older form ofLutheranism.Kant's (1724-1804) criticism of the reason, however, formed a turning-point in the development of Rationalism. For a full understanding of his attitude, the reader must be acquainted with the nature of his pietistic upbringing and later scientific andphilosophical formation in the Leibniz-Wolff school of thought (seePHILOSOPHY OF KANT). As far as concerns the point that occupies us at present,Kant was a Rationalist. For him religion was coextensive, with natural, though notutilitarian,morals. When he met with the criticisms of Hume and undertook his famous "Kritik", his preoccupation was to safeguard his religious opinions, his rigorous morality, from the danger of criticism. This he did, not by means of the old Rationalism, but by throwing discredit uponmetaphysics. The acceptedproofs of theexistence of God,immortality, and liberty were thus, in his opinion, overthrown, and the well-known set of postulates of the "categoric imperative" put forward in their place. This, obviously, was the end of Rationalism in its earlier form, in which the fundamentaltruths of religion were set out as demonstrable by reason. But, despite the shifting of the burden of religion from the pure to the practical reason,Kant himself never seems to have reached the view --; to which all his work pointed --; that religion is not mere ethics, "conceiving moral laws as divine commands", no matter how far removed fromUtilitarianism --; not an affair of the mind, but of the heart and will; and that revelation does not reach man by way of an exteriorpromulgation, but consists in a personal adaptation towardsGod. This conception was reached gradually with the advance of the theory that man possesses a religious sense, or faculty, distinct from the rational (Fries, 1773-1843; Jacobi, 1743-1819; Herder, 1744-1803; — all opposed to the Intellectualism ofKant), and ultimately found expression with Schleiermacher (1768-1834), for whom religion is to be found neither inknowledge nor in action, but in a peculiar attitude of mind which consists in the consciousness of absolute dependence uponGod. Here the older distinction between natural andrevealedreligion disappears. All that can be called religion — the consciousness of dependence — is at the same time revelational, and all religion is of the same character. There is no special revelation in the olderProtestant (theCatholic) sense, but merely this attitude of dependence brought into being in the individual by the teaching of various great personalities who, from time to time, have manifested an extraordinary sense of the religious. Schleiermacher was a contemporary of Fichte, Schelling, andHegel, whose philosophical speculations had influence, with his own, in ultimately subverting Rationalism as here dealt with. The movement may be said to have ended with him — in the opinion of Teller "the greatesttheologian that theProtestant Church has had since the period of theReformation". The majority of modernProtestanttheologians accept his views, not, however, to the exclusion ofknowledge as a basis of religion.

Parallel with the development of thephilosophical andtheological views as to the nature of religion and the worth of revelation, which provided it with its critical principles, took place anexegetical evolution. The first phase consisted in replacing theorthodoxProtestantdoctrine (i.e. that theSacred Scriptures are the Word ofGod) by a distinction between the Word ofGod contained in theBible and theBible itself (Töllner,Herder), though the Rationalists still held that the purer source of revelation lies rather in the written than in the traditional word. This distinction led inevitably to the destruction, of the rigid view of inspiration, and prepared the ground for the second phase. The principle of accommodation was now employed to explain the difficulties raised by the Scripture records ofmiraculous events anddemoniacal manifestations (Senf, Vogel), and arbitrary methods ofexegesis were also used to the same end (Paulus, Eichhorn). In the third phase Rationalists had reached the point of allowing the possibility of mistakes having been made byChrist and the Apostles, at any rate with regard to non-essential parts of religion. All the devices ofexegesis were employed vainly; and, in the end, Rationalists found themselves forced to admit that the authors of theNew Testament must have written from a point of view different from that which a moderntheologian would adopt (Henke, Wegseheider). This principle, which is sufficiently elastic to admit of usage by nearly every variety of opinion, was admitted by several of the Supernaturalists (Reinhard, Storr), and is very generally accepted by modernProtestant divines, in the rejection of verbal inspiration.Herder is very clear on the distinction — the truly inspired must be discerned from that which is not; and de Wette lays down as the canon of interpretation "the religious perception of the divine operation, or of the Holy Spirit, in the sacred writers as regards theirbelief and inspiration, but not respecting their faculty of formingideas. . ." In an extreme form it may be seen employed in such works as Strauss's "Leben Jesu", where the hypothesis of the mythical nature ofmiracles is developed to a greater extent than by Schleiermacher or de Wette.

II

Rationalism, in the broader, popular meaning of the term, is used to designate any mode of thought in whichhumanreason holds the place of supreme criterion oftruth; in this sense, it is especially applied to such modes of thought as contrasted withfaith. ThusAtheism,Materialism,Naturalism,Pantheism, Scepticism, etc., fall under the head of rationalistic systems. As such, the rationalistic tendency has always existed inphilosophy, and has generally shown itself powerful in all the criticalschools. As has been noted in the preceding paragraph, German Rationalism had strong affinities withEnglishDeism andFrenchMaterialism, two historic forms in which the tendency has manifested itself. But with the vulgarization of theideas contained in the various systems that composed these movements, Rationalism has degenerated. It has become connected in the popular mind with the shallow and misleading philosophy frequently put forward in the name ofscience, so that a double confusion has arisen, in which;

This Rationalism is now rather a spirit, or attitude, ready to seize upon any arguments, from any source and of any or no value, to urge against the doctrines and practices offaith. Beside this crude and popular form it has taken, for which the publication of cheap reprints and a vigorous propaganda are mainly responsible, there runs the deeper and more thoughtful current of critical-philosophical Rationalism, which either rejects religion and revelation altogether or treats them in much the same manner as did theGermans. Its various manifestations have little in common in method or content, save the general appeal to reason as supreme. No better description of the position can be given than the statements of the objects of the Rationalist Press Association. Among these are: "To stimulate the habits of reflection and inquiry and the free exercise of individualintellect . . . and generally to assert the supremacy of reason as the natural andnecessary means to all suchknowledge and wisdom as man can achieve". A perusal of the publications of the same will show in what sense this representative body interprets the above statement. It may be said finally, that Rationalism is the direct andlogical outcome of the principles ofProtestantism; and that the intermediary form, in which assent is given torevealedtruth as possessing theimprimatur of reason, is only a phase in the evolution ofideas towards general disbelief. Official condemnations of the various forms of Rationalism, absolute and mitigated, are to be found in the Syllabus ofPius IX.

III

The termRationalism is perhaps not usually applied to thetheological method of theCatholicChurch. All forms oftheological statement, however, and pre-eminently thedialectical form ofCatholictheology, are rationalistic in the truest sense. Indeed, the claim of such Rationalism as is dealt with above is directly met by the counter claim of theChurch: that it is at best but a mutilated and unreasonable Rationalism, not worthy of the name, while that of theChurch is rationally complete, and integrated, moreover, with super-rationaltruth. In this senseCatholictheology presupposes the certaintruths of natural reason as thepreambula fidei, philosophy (theancilla theologiæ) is employed in the defence ofrevealedtruth (seeAPOLOGETICS), and the content ofDivine revelation is treated and systematized in the categories of natural thought. This systematization is carried out both in dogmatic andmoral theology. It is a process contemporaneous with the first attempt at a scientific statement of religioustruth, comes to perfection of method in the works of such writers asSt. Thomas Aquinas andSt. Alphonsus, and is consistently employed and developed in the Schools.

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