Morality

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It isnecessary at the outset of this article to distinguish betweenmorality andethics, terms not seldom employed synonymously. Morality is antecedent toethics: it denotes those concrete activities of whichethics is thescience. It may be defined as human conduct in so far as it is freely subordinated to the ideal of what is right and fitting.

This ideal governing our free actions is common to the race. Though there is wide divergence as to theories ofethics, there is a fundamental agreement among men regarding the general lines of conduct desirable in public and private life. Thus Mr. Hobhouse has well said:

"The comparative study of ethics, which is apt in its earlier stages to impress the student with a bewildering sense of the diversity of moral judgments, ends rather by impressing them with a more fundamental and far-reaching uniformity. Through the greatest extent of time and space over which we have records, we find a recurrence of the common features of ordinary morality, which to my mind at least is not less impressive than the variations which also appear" (Morals in Evolution, I, i, n. 11).

Plainly this uniformity regards principles rather than their application. The actual rules of conduct differ widely. While reverence toparents may be universally acknowledged asobligatory, certain savage tribes believe that filialpiety requires them to despatch theirparents when the infirmities of old age appear. Yet making allowance for all such diversities, it may be said that the common voice of the race proclaims it to be right for a man to reverence hisparents; to care and provide for his children; to be master of his lowerappetites; to be honest and just in his dealings, even to his own damage; to show benevolence to his fellows in time of distress; to bear pain and misfortune withfortitude. And only within comparatively recent years has anyone been found to deny that beyond this a man is bound tohonourGod and to prefer his country's interests to his own. Thus, indeed, the advance of morality lies not so much in the discovery of new principles as in the better application of those already accepted, in the recognition of theirtrue basis and their ultimate sanction, in the widening of the area within which they are held to bind, and in the removal of corruptions inconsistent with their observance.

The relation of morality to religion has been a subject of keen debate during the past century. In much recentethical philosophy it is strenuously maintained that right moral action is altogether independent of religion. Such is the teaching alike of the Evolutionary, Positivist, and Idealistschools. And an active propaganda is being carried on with a view to the general substitution of this independent morality for morality based on thebeliefs of Theism. On the other hand, theChurch has ever affirmed that the two are essentially connected, and that apart from religion the observance of the moral law is impossible. This, indeed, follows as anecessary consequence from theChurch's teaching as to the nature of morality. She admits that the moral law is knowable to reason: for the due regulation of our free actions, in which morality consists, is simply their right ordering with a view to the perfecting of our rational nature. But she insists that thelaw has its ultimateobligation in the will of the Creator by whom our nature was fashioned, and who imposes on us its right ordering as aduty; and that its ultimate sanction is the loss ofGod which its violation must entail. Further, among theduties which the moral law prescribes are some which are directly concerned withGod Himself, and as such are of supreme importance. Where morality isdivorced from religion, reason will, it istrue, enable a man to recognize to a large extent the ideal to which his nature points. But much will be wanting. He will disregard some of his most essentialduties. He will, further, be destitute of the strong motives for obedience to thelaw afforded by the sense ofobligation toGod and theknowledge of the tremendous sanction attached to its neglect — motives which experience has proved to benecessary as a safeguard against the influence of the passions. And, finally, his actions even if in accordance with the moral law, will be based not on theobligation imposed by the Divine will, but on considerations of human dignity and on the good of humansociety. Such motives, however, cannot present themselves as, strictly speaking,obligatory. But where the motive ofobligation is wanting, acting lacks an element essential totrue morality. Moreover, in this connection theChurch insists upon thedoctrine oforiginal sin. She teaches that in our present state there is a certain obscurity in reason's vision of the moral law, together with a morbid craving for independence impelling us to transgress it, and a lack of complete control over the passions; and that by reason of this inherited taint, man, unless supported by Divine aid, is unable to observe the moral law for any length of time.Newman has admirably described from thepsychological point of view this weakness in our grasp of the moral law:

"The sense of right and wrong . . . is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressionable byeducation, so biassed bypride and passion, so unsteady in its course, that in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the humanintellect, the sense is at once the highest of all teachers yet the least luminous" (Newman, "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk", in section onconscience).

In dealing with this subject, however, it is furthernecessary to take account of the historical argument. Various facts are adduced, which, it is alleged, show that morality is, in point of fact, capable of dissociation from religion. It is urged (1) that the most primitive peoples do not connect their religiousbeliefs with such moral code as they possess; and (2) that even where the moral consciousness and the religious system have reached a high degree of development, the spheres of religion and morality are sometimes regarded as separate. Thus the Greeks of classical times were in moral questions influenced rather by non-religious conceptions such as that ofaidos (natural shame) than by fear of the gods; while one great religious system, namelyBuddhism, explicitly taught the entire independence of the moral code from anybelief inGod. To these arguments we reply, first: that the savages of today are not primitives, but degenerates. It is the merestsuperstition to suppose that these degraded races can enlighten us as to what were thebeliefs of man in his primitive state. It is among civilized races, where man has developed normally, that we must seek forknowledge as to what is natural to man. The evidence gathered from them is overwhelmingly in favour of the contention thathumanreason proclaims the essential dependence of morality on religiousbelief. In regard to the contrary instances alleged, it must be denied that the morality of the Greeks was unconnected with religion. Though they may not have realized that thelaws prescribed by natural shame were derived from a divine command, they most certainly believed that their violation would be punished by the gods. As toBuddhistbelief, a distinction must be drawn between the metaphysical teaching of theBuddha or of some of his disciples, and the practical interpretation of that teaching as expressed in the lives of the great mass of the adherents of thecreed. It is only theBuddhistmonks who have really followed the speculative teaching of their master on this point and have dissociated the moral law frombelief inGod. The mass of adherents never did so. Yet even themonks, while denying theexistence of a personal God, regarded as aheretic any who disputed the existence ofheaven andhell. Thus they too help to bear witness to the universal consensus that the moral law is based onsupernatural sanctions. We may, however, readily admit that where the religious conceptions and the moral code were alike immature and inadequate, the relation between them was less clearly grasped in thought, and less intimate in practice, than it became when man found himself in possession of a fullertruth regarding them. A Greek or aBuddhist community may have preserved a certain healthiness of moral tone even though the religiousobligation of the moral law was but obscurely felt, while ancestral precept and civicobligation were viewed as the preponderating motives. A broad distinction must be made between such cases and that of those nations which having once accepted theChristian faith with its clear profession of the connection between moralobligation and aDivine law, have subsequently repudiated thisbelief in favour of a purely natural morality. There is no parity between "Fore-Christians" and "After-Christians". The evidence at our command seems to establish as certain that it is impossible for these latter to return to the inadequate grounds ofobligation which may sometimes suffice for nations still in the immaturity of theirknowledge; and that for them the rejection of the religious sanction is invariably followed by a moral decay, leading rapidly to the corruptions of the most degraded periods of our history. We may see this wherever the great revolt fromChristianity, which began in the eighteenth century, and which is so potent a factor today, has spread. It is naturally inFrance, where the revolt began, that the movement has attained its fullest development. There its effects are not disputed. The birth-rate has shrunk until the population, were it not for the immigration of Flemings andItalians, would be a diminishing quantity;Christianfamily life is disappearing; the number ofdivorces and ofsuicides multiplies annually; while one of the most ominous of all symptoms is the alarming increase of juvenile crime. But these effects are not peculiar toFrance. The movement away fromChristianity has spread to certain sections of the population in theUnited States inEngland, inGermany, inAustralia, countries providing in other respects a wide variety of circumstances. Wherever it is found, there in varying degrees the same results have followed, so that the unprejudiced observer can draw but one conclusion, namely: that for a nation which has attained maturity, morality is essentially dependent on the religious sanction, and that when this is rejected, morality will soon decay.

Granting religion to be the essential basis of moral action, we may further inquire what are the chief conditions requisite for the growth and development of morality in the individual and in the community. Three such may be singled out as of primary moment, namely: (1) a righteducation of the young, (2) a healthy public opinion, (3) sound legislation. It will be unnecessary for us to do more than touch in the briefest manner on these points.

(1) Undereducation we include the early training of the home as well as the subsequent years ofschool life. Thefamily is thetrueschool of morality, aschool which nothing can replace. There the child is taught obedience, truthfulness, self-restraint, and the other primary virtues. Theobligation to practise them is impressed upon him by those whose claim on him he at once recognizes, and whose word he does not dream of doubting; while the observance of the precept is made easy by the affection which unites him with those who impose it. It is, therefore, with reason that theChurch has ever declareddivorce to be fatal to the truest interests of a nation. Wheredivorce is frequent,family life in its higher form disappears and with it perishes the foundation of a nation's morality. Similarly theChurch maintains, that during the years ofschool life, the moral and religious atmosphere is of vital importance, and that apart from this the possession ofintellectual culture is a danger rather than a safeguard.

(2) It is hardlynecessary to do more than call attention to the necessity of a sound public opinion. The great mass of men have neither opportunity nor leisure to determine a standard of morals for themselves. They accept that which prevails around them. If it is high, they will not question it. If it is low, they will aim no higher. When the nations wereCatholic, public opinion was predominantly swayed by the teaching of theChurch. In these days it is largely formed by the press; and since the press as a whole views morality apart from religion, the standard proposed is inevitably very different from what theChurch would desiderate. Hence the immense importance of aCatholic press, which even in a non-Catholic environment will keep atrue view before the minds of those who recognize theChurch's authority. But public opinion is also largely influenced byvoluntary associations of one form or another; and of recent years immense work has been done byCatholics in organizing associations with this purpose, the most notable instance being the GermanVolksverein.

(3) It may be said withtruth that the greater part of a nation's legislation affects its morality in some way or other. This is of course manifestly the case with alllaws connected with thefamily or witheducation; and with those, which like thelaws regarding the drink traffic and the restriction of bad literature, have the public morals for their immediate object. But it is alsotrue of all legislation which deals with the circumstances of the lives of the people. Laws, for instance, determining the conditions of labour and protecting the poor from the hands of theusurer, promote morality, for they save men from that degradation and despair in which moral life is practically impossible. It is thus evident hownecessary it is, that in all such questions theChurch should in every country have a definitely formed opinion and should make her voice heard. (SeeETHICS;LAW.)

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