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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
(Latinintendere, to stretch toward, to aim at) is an act of the will by which that faculty efficaciously desires to reach an end by employing the means. It is apparent from this notion that there is a sharply defined difference between intention and volition or even velleity. In the first instance there is a concentration of the will to the point of resolve which is wholly lacking in the others. With the purpose of determining the value of an action, it is customary to distinguish various sorts of intentions which could have prompted it.
First, there is the actual intention, operating, namely, with the advertence of theintellect. Secondly, there is the virtual intention. Its force is borrowed entirely from a prior volition which is accounted as continuing in some result produced by it. In other words, the virtual intention is not a present act of the will. but rather a power(virtus) come about as an effect of a former act, and now at work for the attainment of the end. The thing therefore that is wanting in a virtual, as contrasted with an actual, intention is not of course the element of will, but rather the attention of theintellect, and that particularly of the reflex kind. So, for example, aperson having made up his mind to undertake a journey may during its progress be entirely preoccupied with other thoughts. He will nevertheless be said to have all the while the virtual intention of reaching his destination. Thirdly, an habitual intention is one that once actually existed, but of the present continuance of which there is no positive trace; the most that can be said of it is that it has never been retracted. And fourthly an interpretative intention is one that as a matter of fact has never been really elicited; there has been and is no actual movement of the will; it is simply the purpose which it is assumed a man would have had in a given contingency, had he given thought to the matter.
It is a commonplace amongmoralists that the intention is the chief among the determinants of the concrete morality of ahuman act. Hence when one's motive is grievously bad, or even only slightly so, if it be the exclusive reason for doing something, then an act which is otherwise good is vitiated and reputed to beevil. An end which is only venially bad, and which at the same time does not contain the complete cause for acting, leaves the operation which in other respects was unassailable to be qualified as partly good and partly bad. A good intention can never hallow an action the content of which is wrong. Thus it never can be lawful to steal, even though one's intention be to aid the poor with the proceeds of the theft. The end does not justify the means. It may be noted here in passing, as somewhat cognate to the matter under discussion, that the explicit and frequently renewed reference of one's actions toAlmighty God is not now commonly thought to benecessary in order that they may be said to be morally good. The old-time controversy on this point has practically died out.
Besides affecting thegoodness or badness of acts, intention may have much to do with their validity. Is it required, for instance, for the fulfilment of thelaw? The receiveddoctrine is that, provided the subject is seriously minded to do what is prescribed, he need not have the intention of satisfying hisobligation; and much less is it required that he should be inspired by the same motives as urged the legislator to enact thelaw.Theologians quote in this connection the saying, "Finis præcepti non cadit sub præcepto" (the end of thelaw does not fall under its binding force). What has been said applies with even moretruth to the class ofobligations called real, enjoining for instance the payment ofdebts. For the discharge of these no intention at all is demanded, not even a conscious act. It is enough that the creditor gets his own.
TheChurch teaches very unequivocally that for the valid conferring of thesacraments, the minister must have the intention of doing at least what theChurch does. This is laid down with great emphasis by theCouncil of Trent (sess. VII). The opinion once defended by suchtheologians as Catharinus andSalmeron that there need only be the intention to perform deliberately the external rite proper to each sacrament, and that, as long as this wastrue, the interior dissent of the minister from the mind of theChurch would not invalidate the sacrament, no longer finds adherents. The commondoctrine now is that a real internal intention to act as a minister ofChrist, or to do what Christ instituted thesacraments to effect, in other words, to trulybaptize, absolve, etc., is required. This intention need not necessarily be of the sort called actual. That would often be practically impossible. It is enough that it be virtual. Neither habitual nor interpretative intention in the minister will suffice for the validity of the sacrament. Thetruth is that here and now, when the sacrament is being conferred, neither of these intentions exists, and they can therefore exercise no determining influence upon what is done. To administer thesacraments with a conditional intention, which makes their effect contingent upon a future event, is to confer them invalidly. This holds good for all thesacraments except matrimony, which, being a contract, is susceptible of such a limitation.
As to the recipients of thesacraments, it iscertain that no intention is required in children who have not yet reached the age of reason, or in imbeciles, for the validity of thosesacraments which they are capable of receiving. In the case of adults, on the other hand, some intention is indispensable if the sacrament is not to be invalid. The reason is that our justification is not brought about without our co-operation, and that includes the rational will to profit by the means of sanctification. How much of an intention is enough is not always quite clear. In general, more in the way of intention will be demanded in proportion as the acts of the receiver seem to enter into the making of the sacrament. So for penance and matrimony under ordinary conditions a virtual intention would appear to be required; for the othersacraments an habitual intention is sufficient. For an unconsciousperson in danger of death the habitual intention may be implicit and still suffice for the validity of thesacraments that are thennecessary or highly useful; that is, it may be contained in the more general purpose which a man has at some time during his life, and which he has never retracted, of availing himself of these means ofsalvation at so supreme a moment. For the gaining ofindulgences the most that can probably be exacted is an habitual intention.
APA citation.Delany, J.(1910).Intention. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08069b.htm
MLA citation.Delany, Joseph."Intention."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 8.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1910.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08069b.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Rick McCarty.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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