Sanctifying Grace

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Grace (gratia, Charis), in general, is asupernaturalgift of God tointellectual creatures (men,angels) for theireternalsalvation, whether the latter be furthered and attained through salutary acts or a state ofholiness. Eternalsalvation itself consists in heavenly bliss resulting from theintuitiveknowledge of theTriune God, who to the one not endowed withgrace "inhabiteth light inaccessible" (1 Timothy 6:16).Christian grace is a fundamentalidea of theChristian religion, the pillar on which, by a specialordination ofGod, the majestic edifice ofChristianity rests in its entirety. Among the three fundamentalideas —sin,redemption, andgrace —grace plays the part of the means, indispensable and Divinelyordained, to effect theredemption fromsin through Christ and to lead men to their eternal destiny inheaven.

Before theCouncil of Trent, theSchoolmen seldom used the termgratia actualis, preferringauxilium speciale,motio divina, and similar designations; nor did they formally distinguishactual grace from sanctifying grace. But, in consequence of moderncontroversies regarding grace, it has become usual andnecessary intheology to draw a sharper distinction between the transient help to act (actual grace) and the permanent state of grace (sanctifying grace). For this reason we adopt this distinction as our principle of division in our exposition of theCatholic doctrine. In this article, we shall treat only of sanctifying grace. (See alsoACTUAL GRACE.)

Sanctifying grace

Since the end and aim of all efficacious grace is directed to the production of sanctifying grace where it does not already exist, or to retain and increase it where it is already present, its excellence, dignity, and importance become immediately apparent; forholiness and the sonship ofGod depend solely upon the possession of sanctifying grace, wherefore it is frequently called simplygrace without any qualifying word to accompany it as, for instance, in the phrases "to live in grace" or "to fall from grace".

All pertinent questions group themselves around three points of view from which the subject may be considered:

I. The preparation for sanctifying grace, or the process of justification.
II. The nature of sanctifying grace.
III. The characteristics of sanctifying grace.

Justification: the preparation for sanctifying grace

(For an exhaustive treatment of justification, see the articleJUSTIFICATION).

The wordjustification (justificatio, fromjustum facere) derives its name fromjustice (justitia), by which is not merely meant the cardinal virtue in the sense of a constant purpose to respect therights of others (suum cuique), nor is the term taken in the concept of all those virtues which go to make up the moral law, but connotes, especially, the whole inner relation of man toGod as to hissupernatural end. Every adultsoul stained either withoriginal sin or with actual mortalsin (children are of course excepted) must, in order to arrive at the state of justification, pass through a short or long process of justification, which may be likened to the gradual development of the child in its mother's womb. This development attains its fullness in the birth of the child, accompanied by the anguish and suffering with which this birth is invariably attended; our rebirth inGod is likewise preceded by great spiritual sufferings of fear and contrition.

In the process of justification we must distinguish two periods: first, the preparatory acts or dispositions (faith, fear, hope, etc.); then the last, decisive moment of the transformation of the sinner from the state ofsin to that of justification or sanctifying grace, which may be called the active justification (actus justificationis) with this the real process comes to an end, and the state of habitualholiness and sonship ofGod begins. Touching both of these periods there has existed, and still exists, in part, a great conflict of opinion betweenCatholicism andProtestantism.

This conflict may be reduced to four differences of teaching. By a justifyingfaith theChurch understands qualitatively the theoreticalfaith in thetruths of Revelation, and demands over and above thisfaith other acts of preparation for justification.Protestantism, on the other hand, reduces the process of justification to merely a fiduciaryfaith; and maintains that thisfaith, exclusive even ofgoodworks, is all-sufficient for justification, laying great stress upon the scriptural statementsola fides justificat. TheChurch teaches that justification consists of an actual obliteration ofsin and an interior sanctification.Protestantism, on the other hand, makes of the forgiveness ofsin merely a concealment of it, so to speak; and of the sanctification a forensic declaration of justification, or an external imputation of thejustice ofChrist. In the presentation of the process of justification, we will everywhere note this fourfold confessional conflict.

The fiduciary faith of the Protestants

TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vi, and can. xii) decrees that not the fiduciaryfaith, but a realmental act offaith, consisting of a firmbelief in allrevealedtruths makes up thefaith of justification and the "beginning, foundation, and source" (loc. cit., cap. viii) of justification. What did theReformers withLuther understand by fiduciaryfaith? They understood thereby not the first or fundamental deposition or preparation for the (active) justification, but merely the spiritual grasp (instrumentum) with which we seize and lay hold of the externaljustice of Christ and with it, as with a mantle of grace, cover oursins (which still continue to exist interiorly) in theinfallible, certainbelief (fiducia) thatGod, for the sake ofChrist, will no longer hold oursin against us. Hereby the seat of justifyingfaith is transferred from theintellect to the will; andfaith itself, in as far as it still abides in theintellect, is converted into a certainbelief in one's own justification. The main question is: "Is this conception Biblical?"Murray (De gratia, disp. x, n. 18, Dublin, 1877) states in his statistics that the wordfides (pistis) occurs eighty times in the Epistle to the Romans and in thesynoptic Gospels, and in only six of these can it be construed to meanfiducia. But neither here nor anywhere else does it ever mean the conviction of, orbelief in, one's own justification, or theLutheran fiduciaryfaith. Even in the leading text (Romans 4:5) the justifyingfaith ofSt. Paul is identical with themental act offaith orbelief in Divinetruth; for Abraham was justified not byfaith in his own justification, but byfaith in thetruth of the Divine promise that he would be the "father of many nations" (cf.Romans 4:9 sqq.). In strict accord with this is the Pauline teaching that thefaith of justification, which we must profess "with heart and mouth", is identical with themental act offaith in theResurrection of Christ, the centraldogma ofChristianity (Romans 10:9 sq.) and that the minimum expresslynecessary for justification is contained in the twodogmas: theexistence of God, and thedoctrine of eternal reward (Hebrews 11:6).

The Redeemer Himself madebelief in the teaching of the gospel anecessary condition forsalvation, when he solemnly commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel to the whole world (Mark 16:15).St. John the Evangelist declares his Gospel has been written for the purpose of excitingbelief in the Divine Sonship ofChrist, and links to thisfaith the possession of eternal life (John 20:31). Such was the mind of theChristianChurch from the beginning. To say nothing of the testimony of the Fathers (cf.Bellarmine, De justific., I, 9),Saint Fulgentius, a disciple ofSt. Augustine, in his precious booklet, "De vera fide ad Petrum", does not understand bytruefaith a fiduciaryfaith, but the firmbelief in all thetruths contained in theApostles' Creed, and he calls thisfaith the "Foundation of all good things", and the "Beginning of human salvation" (loc. cit., Prolog.). The practice of theChurch in the earliest ages, as shown by the ancient custom, going back to Apostolic times, of giving thecatechumens (katechoumenoi fromkatechein,viva voce instruere) a verbal instruction in thearticles of faith and of directing them, shortly beforebaptism, to make a public recitation of theApostles' Creed, strengthens this view. After this they were called notfiduciales butfideles, in contra-distinction toinfidels andhaeretici (fromaireisthai, to select, to proceed eclectically) who rejected Revelation as a whole or in part.

In answer to thetheological question: How manytruths offaith must one expressly (fide explicita) believe under command (necessitate praecepti)?theologians say that an ordinaryCatholic must expresslyknow and believe the most importantdogmas and thetruths of the moral law, for instance, theApostles' Creed, theDecalogue, the sixprecepts of theChurch, the Seven Sacraments, theOur Father. Greater things are, of course, expected from theeducated, especially from catechists, confessors, preachers wherefore upon these the study oftheology rests as anobligation. If the question be put: In how manytruths as a means (necessitate medii) must one believe to be saved? many catechists answerSix things:God's existence; an eternal reward; the Trinity; the Incarnation; theimmortality of thesoul; the necessity of Grace. But according toSt. Paul (Hebrews 11:6) we can only be certain of the necessity of the first twodogmas, while thebelief in the Trinity and the Incarnation could not of course be exacted from ante-ChristianJudaism or fromPaganism. Then, too,belief in the Trinity may be implicitly included in thedogma ofGod's existence, andbelief in the Incarnation in thedogma of theDivine providence, just as theimmortality of thesoul is implicitly included in thedogma of an eternal reward. However, there arises for any onebaptized in the name of theHoly Trinity, and entering thus theChurch ofChrist, the necessity of making an act of explicitfaith (fides explicita). This necessity (necessitas medii) arisesper accidens, and is suspended only by a Divine dispensation in cases of extreme necessity, where such an act offaith is either physically or morally impossible, as in the case ofpagans or those dying in a state of unconsciousness. For further matter on this point see Pohle, "Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", 4th ed., II, 488 sqq. (Paderborn, 1909).

The "sola fides" doctrine of the Protestants

TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, can. ix) decrees that over and above thefaith which formally dwells in theintellect, other acts of predisposition, arising from the will, such as fear, hope,love, contrition, and good resolution (loc. cit., cap. vi), arenecessary for the reception of the grace of justification. This definition was made by the council as against the second fundamentalerror ofProtestantism, namely that "faith alone justifies" (sola fides justificat).

Martin Luther stands as the originator of thedoctrine ofjustification byfaith alone, for he hoped that in this way he might be able to calm his ownconscience, which was in a state of great perturbation, and consequently he took refuge behind the assertion that the necessity ofgoodworks over and above merefaith was altogether apharisaical supposition. Manifestly this did not bring him the peace and comfort for which he had hoped, and at least it brought no conviction to his mind; for many times, in a spirit of honesty and sheer good nature, he applaudedgoodworks, but recognized them only asnecessary concomitants, not as efficient dispositions, for justification. This was also the tenor ofCalvin's interpretation (Institute, III, 11, 19).Luther was surprised to find himself by his unprecedenteddoctrine in direct contradiction to theBible, therefore he rejected the Epistle of St. James as "one of straw" and into the text ofSt. Paul to the Romans (3:28) he boldly inserted the wordalone. This falsification of theBible was certainly not done in the spirit of the Apostle's teaching, for nowhere doesSt. Paul teach thatfaith alone (without charity) will bring justification, even though we should accept as also Pauline the text given in a different context, thatsupernaturalfaith alone justifies but the fruitless works of theJewish Law do not.

In this statementSt. Paul emphasizes the fact that grace is purely gratuitous; that no merely naturalgoodworks can merit grace; but he does not state that no other acts in their nature and purport predisposing arenecessary for justification over and above the requisitefaith. Any other construction of the above passage would be violent and incorrect. IfLuther's interpretation were allowed to stand, thenSt. Paul would come into direct contradiction not only with St. James (ii, 24 sqq.), but also with himself; for, except St. John, the favourite Apostle, he is the most outspoken of all Apostles in proclaiming the necessity and excellence of charity overfaith in the matter of justification (cf.1 Corinthians 13:1 sqq.). Wheneverfaith justifies it is notfaith alone, butfaith made operative and replenished by charity (cf.Galatians 5:6, "fides, quae per caritatem operatur"). In the plainest language the Apostle St. James says this: "ex operibus justificatur homo, et non ex fide tantum" (James 2:2); and here, by works, he does not understand thepagangoodworks to whichSt. Paul refers in the Epistle to the Romans, or the works done in fulfilment of theJewish Law, but the works ofsalvation made possible by the operation ofsupernatural grace, which was recognized bySt. Augustine (lib. LXXXIII, Q. lxxvi n. 2). In conformity with this interpretation and with this only is the tenor of the Scripturaldoctrine, namely, that over and abovefaith other acts arenecessary for justification, such as fear (Ecclus., i, 28), and hope (Romans 8:24), charity (Luke 7:47), penance with contrition (Luke 13:3;Acts 2:38;3:19),almsgiving (Daniel 4:24; Tob., xii, 9). Without charity and theworks of charityfaith is dead. Faith receives life only from and through charity (James 2:2). Only to deadfaith (fides informis) is thedoctrine applied: "Faith alone does not justify". On the other hand,faith informed by charity (fides formata) has the power of justification.St. Augustine (On the Holy Trinity XV.18) expresses it pithily thus: "Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem esse, sed non et prodesse." Hence we see that from the very beginning theChurch has taught that not onlyfaith but that a sincere conversion of heart effected by charity and contrition is also requisite for justification--witness the regular method of administeringbaptism and the discipline of penance in the early Church.

TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. viii) has, in the light of Revelation, assigned tofaith the only correct status in the process of justification, inasmuch as the council, by declaring it to be the "beginning, the foundation, and the root", has placedfaith at the very front in the whole process.

Faith is the beginning ofsalvation, because no one can be converted toGod unless he recognize Him as hissupernatural end and aim, just as a mariner without an objective and without a compass wanders aimlessly over the sea at the mercy of wind and wave.Faith is not only the initiatory act of justification, but the foundation as well, because upon it all the other predisposing acts rest securely, not in geometric regularity or inert as the stones of a building rest upon a foundation, but organically and imbued with life as the branches and blossoms spring from a root or stem. Thus there is preserved tofaith in theCatholic system its fundamental and co-ordinating significance in the matter of justification. A masterly,psychological description of the whole process of justification, which even Ad. Harnack styles "a magnificent work of art", will be found in the famous cap. vi, "Disponuntur" (Denzinger, n. 798). According to this the process of justification follows a regular order of progression in four stages: fromfaith to fear, from fear to hope, from hope to incipient charity, from incipient charity to contrition with purpose of amendment. If the contrition be perfect (contritio caritate perfecta), then active justification results, that is, thesoul is immediately placed in the state of grace even before the reception of the sacrament ofbaptism or penance, though not without the desire for the sacrament (votum sacramenti). If, on the other hand, the contrition be only an imperfect one (attritio), then the sanctifying grace can only be imparted by the actual reception of the sacrament (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cc. iv and xiv). TheCouncil of Trent had no intention, however, of making the sequence of the various stages in the process of justification, given above, inflexible; nor of making any one of the stages indispensable. Since a real conversion is inconceivable withoutfaith and contrition, we naturally placefaith at the beginning and contrition at the end of the process. In exceptional cases, however, for example in sudden conversions, it is quite possible for the sinner to overlap the intervening stages betweenfaith and charity, in which case fear, hope, and contrition are virtually included in charity.

The "justification byfaith alone" theory was byLuther styled the article of the standing and falling church (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae), and by his followers was regarded as the material principle ofProtestantism, just as the sufficiency of theBible without tradition was considered its formal principle. Both of these principles are un-Biblical and are not accepted anywhere today in their original severity, save only in the very small circle oforthodoxLutherans.

TheLutheran Church of Scandinavia has, according to theSwedishtheologian Krogh-Tonningh, experienced a silent reformation which in the lapse of the several centuries has gradually brought it back to theCatholic view of justification, which view alone can be supported by Revelation andChristian experience (cf. Dorner, "Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie", 361 sqq.,Munich, 1867; Möhler, "Symbolik", 16, Mainz, 1890; "Realencyk. fur prot. Theol.", s.v. "Rechtfertigung").

The Protestant theory of non-imputation

Embarrassed by the fatal notion thatoriginal sin wrought in man an utter destruction extending even to the annihilation of all moral freedom of election, and that it continues its existence even in the just man assin in the shade of an ineradicableconcupiscence,Martin Luther andCalvin taught verylogically that a sinner is justified by fiduciaryfaith, in such a way, however, thatsin is not absolutely removed or wiped out, but merelycovered up or not held against the sinner. According to the teaching of theCatholicChurch, however, in active justification an actual and real forgiveness ofsins takes place so that thesin is really removed from thesoul, not onlyoriginal sin bybaptism but also mortalsin by the sacrament of penance (Trent, Sess. V, can. v; Sess. VI, cap. xiv; Sess. XIV, cap. ii). This view is entirely consonant with the teaching ofHoly Scripture, for the Biblical expressions: "blotting out" as applied tosin (Psalm 1:3;Isaiah 43:25;44:22;Acts 3:19), "exhausting" (Hebrews 9:28), "taking away" [2 Samuel 12:13;1 Chronicles 21:8; Mich., vii, 18;Psalm 10:15 and102:12], cannot be reconciled with theidea of a mere covering up ofsin which is supposed to continue its existence in a covert manner. Other Biblical expressions are just as irreconcilable with thisLutheranidea, for instance, the expression of "cleansing" and "washing away" the mire ofsin (Psalm 1:4, 9;Isaiah 1:18;Ezekiel 36:25;1 Corinthians 6:11;Revelation 1:5), that of coming "from death to life" (Col. ii., 13;1 John 3:14); the removal from darkness to light (Ephesians 5:9). Especially these latter expressions are significant, because they characterize the justification as a movement from one thing to another which is directly contrary or opposed to the thing from which the movement is made. The opposites, black and white, night and day, darkness and light, life and death, have this peculiarity, that the presence of one means the extinction of its opposite. Just as the sun dispels all darkness, so does the advent of justifying grace drive awaysin, which ceases from that on to have an existence at least in theethical order of things, though in theknowledge ofGod it may have a shadowy kind of existence as something which once was, but has ceased to be. It becomes intelligible, therefore, that in him who is justified, thoughconcupiscence remain, there is "no condemnation" (Romans 8:50); and why, according to James (i, 14 sqq.),concupiscence as such is really nosin; and it is apparent thatSt. Paul (Romans 7:17) is speaking only figuratively when he callsconcupiscencesin, because it springs fromsin and bringssin in its train. Where in theBible the expressions "covering up" and "not imputing"sin occur, as for instance inPsalm 31:1 sq., they must be interpreted in accordance with the Divine perfections, for it is repugnant thatGod should declare any one free fromsin to whomsin is still actually cleaving. It is one ofGod's attributes always to substantiate His declarations; if He coverssin and does not impute it, this can only be effected by an utter extinction or blotting out of thesin. Tradition also has always taught this view of the forgiveness ofsins. (SeeDenifle, "Die abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther uber justitia Dei and justificatio", Mainz, 1905)

The Protestant theory of imputation

Calvin rested his theory with the negative moment, holding that justification ends with the mere forgiveness ofsin, in the sense of not imputing thesin; but otherReformers (Luther andMelanchthon) demanded a positive moment as well, concerning the nature of which there was a very pronounced disagreement. At the time of Osiander (d. 1552) there were from fourteen to twenty opinions on the matter, each differing from every other; but they had this in common that they all denied the interiorholiness and the inherent justification of theCatholicidea of the process. Among the adherents of the Augsburg Confession the following view was rather generally accepted: Theperson to be justified seizes by means of the fiduciaryfaith the exteriorjustice ofChrist, and therewith covers hissins; this exteriorjustice is imputed to him as if it were his own, and he stands beforeGod as having an outward justification, but in his inner self he remains the same sinner as of old. This exterior, forensic declaration of justification was received with great acclaim by the frenzied, fanatical masses of that time, and was given wide and vociferous expression in the cry: "Justitia Christiextra nos".

TheCatholicidea maintains that the formal cause of justification does not consist in an exterior imputation of thejustice ofChrist, but in a real, interior sanctification effected by grace, which abounds in thesoul and makes it permanently holy beforeGod (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii; can. xi). Although the sinner is justified by thejustice ofChrist, inasmuch as the Redeemer has merited for him the grace of justification (causa meritoria), nevertheless he is formally justified and made holy by his own personaljustice andholiness (causa formalis), just as aphilosopher by his own inherent learning becomes a scholar, not, however, by any exterior imputation of the wisdom ofGod (Trent, Sess. VI, can. x). To thisidea of inherentholiness whichtheologians call sanctifying grace are we safely conducted by the words ofHoly Writ.

To prove this we may remark that the wordjustificare (Gr.dikaioun) in theBible may have a fourfold meaning:

Only this last meaning can be intended where there is mention of passing to a new life (Ephesians 2:5;Colossians 2:13;1 John 3:14); renovation in spirit (Ephesians 4:23 sq.);supernatural likeness toGod (Romans 8:29;2 Corinthians 3:18;2 Peter 1:4) a new creation (2 Corinthians 5:17;Galatians 6:15); rebirth inGod (John 3:5;Titus 3:5;James 1:18), etc., all of which designations not only imply a setting aside ofsin, but express as well a permanent state ofholiness. All of these terms express not an aid to action, but rather a form of being; and this appears also from the fact that the grace of justification is described as being "poured forth in our hearts" (Romans 5:5); as "the spirit of adoption of sons" ofGod (Romans 8:15); as the "spirit, born of the spirit" (John 3:6); making us "conformable to the image of the Son" (Romans 8:28); as a participation in the Divine nature (2 Peter 1:4); the abiding seed in us (1 John 3:9), and so on. As regards the tradition of theChurch, even Harnack admits thatSt. Augustine faithfully reproduces the teaching ofSt. Paul. Hence theCouncil of Trent need not go back toSt. Paul, but only toSt. Augustine, for the purpose of demonstrating that theProtestant theory of imputation is at once againstSt. Paul andSt. Augustine.

Moreover, this theory must be rejected as not being in accordance with reason. For in a man who is at oncesinful and just, half holy and half unholy, we cannot possibly recognize a masterpiece ofGod'somnipotence, but only a wretched caricature, the deformity of which is exaggerated all the more by the violent introduction of thejustice ofChrist. Thelogical consequences which follow from this system, and which have beendeduced by theReformers themselves, are indeed appalling toCatholics. It would follow that, since thejustice of Christ is always and ever the same, everyperson justified, from the ordinary everydayperson to theBlessed Virgin, theMother of God, would possess precisely the same justification and would have, in degree and kind, the sameholiness andjustice. This deduction was expressly made byLuther. Can any man of sound mind accept it? If this be so, then the justification of children bybaptism is impossible, for, not having come to the age of reason, they cannot have the fiduciaryfaith wherewith they must seize thejustice of Christ to cover up theiroriginal sin. Verylogically, therefore, theAnabaptists,Mennonites, andBaptists reject the validity of infantbaptism. It would likewise follow that the justification acquired byfaith alone could be forfeited only by infidelity, a most awful consequence whichLuther (De Wette, II, 37) clothed in the following words, though he could hardly have meant them seriously: "Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et mille stupra." Luckily this inexorablelogic falls powerless against the decency and goodmorals of theLutherans of our time, and is, therefore, harmless now, though it was not so at the time of thePeasants' War in theReformation.

TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. vii)defined that the inherentjustice is not only the formal cause of justification, but as well the only formal cause (unica formalis causa); this was done as against theheretical teaching of the ReformerBucer (d. 1551), who held that the inherentjustice must be supplemented by the imputedjustice ofChrist. A further object of thisdecree was to check theCatholictheologianAlbert Pighius and others, who seemed todoubt that the innerjustice could be ample for justification without being supplemented by another favour ofGod (favor Dei externus) (cf.Pallavacini, Hist. Conc. Trident., VIII, 11, 12). Thisdecree was well-founded, for the nature and operation of justification are determined by the infusion of sanctifying grace. In other words without the aid of other factors, sanctifying grace in itself possesses the power to effect the destruction ofsin and the interior sanctification of thesoul to be justified. For sincesin and grace are diametrically opposed to each other, the mere advent of grace is sufficient to drivesin away; and thus grace, in its positive operations, immediately brings aboutholiness, kinship ofGod, and a renovation of spirit, etc. From this it follows that in the present process of justification, the remission ofsin, both original and mortal, is linked to the infusion of sanctifying grace as aconditio sine qua non, and therefore a remission ofsin without a simultaneous interior sanctification is theologically impossible. As to the interesting controversy whether the incompatibility of grace andsin rests on merely moral, or physical, or metaphysical contrariety, refer to Pohle ("Lehrbuch der Dogmatik", II 511 sqq., Paderborn, 1909);Scheeben ("Die Myst. des Christentums", 543 sqq., Freiburg, 1898).

The nature of sanctifying grace

The real nature of sanctifying grace is, by reason of its direct invisibility, veiled in mystery, so that we can learn its nature better by a study of its formal operations in thesoul than by a study of the grace itself. Indissolubly linked to the nature of this grace and to its formal operations are other manifestations of grace which are referable not to any intrinsic necessity but to thegoodness ofGod; accordingly three questions present themselves for consideration:

(a) The inner nature of sanctifying grace.
(b) Its formal operations.
(c) Itssupernatural retinue.

The inner nature

1. As we have seen that sanctifying grace designates a grace producing a permanent condition, it follows that it must not be confounded with a particularactual grace nor with a series ofactual graces, as some ante-Tridentinetheologians seem to have held. This view is confirmed by the fact that the grace imparted to children inbaptism does not differ essentially from the sanctifying grace imparted to adults, an opinion which was not considered as altogether certain underPope Innocent III (1201), was regarded as having a high degree of probability byPope Clement V (1311), and was defined as certain by theCouncil of Trent (Sess. V, can. iii-v). Baptized infants cannot be justified by the use ofactual grace, but only by a grace which effects or produces a certain condition in the recipient. Is this grace of condition or state, asPeter Lombard (Sent., I, dist. xvii, 18) held, identical with the Holy Spirit, whom we may call the permanent, uncreated grace (gratia increata)? It is quite impossible. For theperson of the Holy Ghost cannot be poured out into our hearts (Romans 5:5), nor does it cleave to thesoul as inherentjustice (Trent, sess. VI, can. xi), nor can it be increased bygoodworks (loc. cit., can. xxiv), and all this is apart from the fact that the justifying grace inHoly Writ is expressly termed a "gift [or grace] of the Holy Ghost" (Acts 2:38;10:45), and as the abiding seed ofGod (1 John 3:9). From this it follows that the grace must be as distinct from the Holy Ghost as the gift from the giver and the seed from the sower; consequently the Holy Spirit is ourholiness, not by theholiness by which He Himself is holy, but by thatholiness by which He makes us holy. He is not, therefore, thecausa formalis, but merely thecausa efficiens, of ourholiness.

Moreover, sanctifying grace as an active reality, and not a merely external relation, must be philosophically either substance or accident. Now, it iscertainty not a substance which exists by itself, or apart from thesoul, therefore it is a physical accident inhering in thesoul, so that thesoul becomes the subject in which grace inheres; but such an accident is inmetaphysics called quality (qualitas, poiotes) therefore sanctifying grace may be philosophically termed a "permanent, supernaturalquality of the soul", or, as theRoman Catechism (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50) says "divina qualitas in anima inhaerens".

2. Sanctifying grace cannot be termed a habit (habitus) with the same precision as it is called a quality.Metaphysicians enumerate four kinds of quality:

Manifestly sanctifying grace must be placed in the first of these four classes, namely habit or disposition; but as dispositions are fleeting things, and habit has a permanencytheologians agree that sanctifying grace is undoubtedly a habit, hence the name: Habitual Grace (gratia habitualis).Habitus is subdivided intohabitus entitativus andhabitus operativus. Ahabitus entitativus is a quality or condition added to a substance by which condition or quality the substance is found permanently good or bad, for instance: sickness or health, beauty, deformity, etc.Habitus operativus is a disposition to produce certain operations or acts, for instance, moderation or extravagance; thishabitus is called either virtue or vice just as thesoul is inclined thereby to a moral good or to a moralevil. Now, since sanctifying grace does not of itself impart any such readiness, celerity, or facility in action, we must consider it primarily as ahabitus entitativus, not as ahabitus operativus. Therefore, since the popular concept ofhabitus, which usually designates a readiness, does not accurately express theidea of sanctifying grace, another term is employed, i.e. a quality after the manner of a habit (qualitas per modum habitus), and this term is applied withBellarmine (De grat. et lib. arbit., I, iii). Grace, however, preserves an inner relation to asupernatural activity, because it does not impart to thesoul the act but rather the disposition to performsupernatural and meritorious acts therefore grace is remotely and mediately a disposition to act (habitus remote operativus). On account of this and other metaphysical subtleties theCouncil of Trent has refrained from applying the term habitus to sanctifying grace.

In the order of nature a distinction is made between natural and acquired habits (habitus innatus, andhabitus acquisitus), to distinguish between naturalinstincts, such, for instance, as are common to the brute creation, and acquired habits such as we develop by practice, for instance skill in playing a musical instrument etc. But grace issupernatural, and cannot, therefore, be classed either as a natural or an acquired habit; it can only be received, accordingly, by infusion from above, therefore it is asupernatural infused habit (habitus infusus).

3. Iftheologians could succeed in establishing the identity sometimes maintained between the nature of grace and charity, a great step forward would be taken in the examination of the nature of grace, for we are more familiar with the infused virtue of charity than with the hidden mysterious nature of sanctifying grace. For the identity of grace and charity some of the oldertheologians have contended--Peter Lombard,Scotus,Bellarmine,Lessius, and others--declaring that, according to theBible and the teaching of the Fathers, the process of justification may be at times attributable to sanctifying grace and at other times to the virtue of charity. Similar effects demand a similar cause; therefore there exists, in this view, merely a virtual distinction between the two, inasmuch as one and the same reality appears under one aspect as grace, and under another as charity. This similarity is confirmed by the further fact that the life or death of thesoul is occasioned respectively by the presence in, or absence from, thesoul of charity. Nevertheless, all these arguments may tend to establish a similarity, but do not prove a case of identity. Probably the correct view is that which sees a real distinction between grace and charity, and this view is held by mosttheologians, includingSt. Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez. Many passages in Scripture and patrology and in the enactments ofsynods confirm this view. Often, indeed, grace and charity are placed side by side, which could not be done without a pleonasm if they were identical. Lastly, sanctifying grace is ahabitus entitativus, andtheological charity ahabitus operativus: the former, namely sanctifying grace, being ahabitus entitativus, informs and transforms the substance of thesoul; the latter, namely charity, being ahabitus operativus, supernaturally informs and influences the will (cf.Ripalda, "De ente sup.", disp. cxxiii;Billuart, "De gratia", disp. iv, 4).

4. The climax of the presentation of the nature of sanctifying grace is found in its character as a participation in the Divine nature, which in a measure indicates its specific difference. To this undeniable fact of thesupernatural participation in the Divine nature is our attention directed not only by the express words ofHoly Writ:ut efficiamini divinae consortes naturae (2 Peter 1:4), but also by the Biblical concept of "the issue and birth from God", since the begotten must receive of the nature of the progenitor, though in this case it only holds in an accidental and analogical sense. Since this sameidea has been found in the writings of the Fathers, and is incorporated in the liturgy of the Mass, to dispute or reject it would be nothing short of temerity. It is difficult to excogitate a manner (modus) in which this participation of the Divine nature is effected. Two extremes must be avoided, so that thetruth will be found.

An exaggerated theory was taught by certain mystics andquietists, a theory not free from pantheiotic taint. In this view thesoul is formally changed intoGod, an altogether untenable and impossible hypothesis, sinceconcupiscence remains even after justification, and the presence ofconcupiscence is, of course, absolutely repugnant to the Divine nature.

Another theory, held by theScotists, teaches that the participation is merely of a moral-juridical nature, and not in the least a physical participation. But since sanctifying grace is a physical accident in thesoul, one cannot help referring such participation in the Divine nature to a physical and interior assimilation withGod, by virtue of which we are permitted to share those goods of the Divine order to whichGod alone by His own nature can lay claim. In any event the "participatio divinae naturae" is not in any sense to be considered a deification, but only a making of thesoul "like untoGod". To the difficult question: Of which specialattribute of God does this participation partake?Theologians can answer only by conjectures. Manifestly only the communicable attributes can at all be considered in the matter, whereforeGonet (Clyp. thomist., IV, ii, x) was clearly wrong when he said that the attribute of participation was theaseitas, absolutely the most incommunicable of all theDivine attributes.Ripalda (loc. cit., disp. xx;sect. 14) is probably nearer thetruth when he suggests Divinesanctity as the attribute, for the veryidea of sanctifying grace brings thesanctity ofGod into the foreground.

The theory of Francisco Suárez (De grat., VII, i, xxx), which is also favoured by Scripture and the Fathers, is perhaps the most plausible. In this theory sanctifying grace imparts to thesoul a participation in the Divine spirituality, which norational creature can by its own unaided powers penetrate or comprehend. It is, therefore, the office of grace to impart to thesoul, in asupernatural way, that degree of spirituality which is absolutelynecessary to give us anidea ofGod and His spirit, either here below in the shadows of earthly existence, or there above in the unveiled splendour ofHeaven. If we were asked to condense all that we have thus far been considering into a definition, we would formulate the following: Sanctifying grace is "a quality strictlysupernatural, inherent in thesoul as ahabitus, by which we are made to participate in the divine nature".

Formal operations

Sanctifying Grace has its formal operations, which are fundamentally nothing else than the formal cause considered in its various moments. These operations are made known by Revelation; therefore to children and to the faithful can the splendour of grace best be presented by a vivid description of its operations. These are:sanctity, beauty, friendship, and sonship ofGod.

1. Sanctity

Thesanctity of thesoul, as its first formal operation, is contained in theidea itself of sanctifying grace, inasmuch as the infusion of it makes the subject holy and inaugurates the state or condition ofsanctity. So far it is, as to its nature, aphysical adornment of thesoul; it is also amoral form of sanctification, which of itself makesbaptized children just and holy in the sight ofGod. This first operation is thrown into relief by the fact that the "new man", created in justice andholiness (Ephesians 4:24), was preceded by the "old man" ofsin, and that grace changed the sinner into a saint (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii:ex injusto fit justus). The two moments of actual justification, namely the remission ofsin and the sanctification, are at the same time moments of habitual justification, and become the formal operations of grace. The mere infusion of the grace effects at once the remission of original and mortalsin, and inaugurates the condition or state ofholiness. (See Pohle, Lehrb. der Dogm., 527 sq.)

2. Beauty

Although the beauty of thesoul is not mentioned by the teaching office of theChurch as one of the operations of grace, nevertheless theRoman Catechism refers to it (P. II, cap. ii, de bap., n. 50). If it be permissible to understand by the spouse in the Canticle of Canticles a symbol of thesoul decked in grace, then all the passages touching the ravishing beauty of the spouse may find a fitting application to thesoul. Hence it is that the Fathers express thesupernatural beauty of asoul in grace by the most splendid comparisons and figures of speech, for instance: "a divine picture" (Ambrose); "a goldenstatue" (Chrysostom); "a streaming light" (Basil), etc. Assuming that, apart from the material beauty expressed in thefine arts, there exists a purely spiritual beauty, we can safely state that grace as the participation in the Divine nature, calls forth in thesoul a physical reflection of the uncreated beauty ofGod, which is not to be compared with thesoul's natural likeness toGod. We can attain to a more intimateidea of the Divine likeness in thesoul adorned with grace, if we refer the picture not merely to the absolute Divine nature, as the prototype of all beauty, but more especially to the Trinity whose glorious nature is so charmingly mirrored in thesoul by the Divine adoption and the inhabitation of the Holy Ghost (cf. H. Krug, De pulchritudine divina, Freiburg, 1902).

3. Friendship

The friendship ofGod is consequently, one of the most excellent of the effects of grace;Aristotle denied the possibility of such a friendship by reason of the great disparity betweenGod and man. As a matter of fact man is, inasmuch as he isGod's creature, His servant, and by reason ofsin (original and mortal) he isGod's enemy. This relation of service and enmity is transformed by sanctifying grace into one of friendship (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii:ex inimico amicus). According to the Scriptural concept (Wisdom 7:14;John 15:15) this friendship resembles a mystical matrimonial union between thesoul and its Divine spouse (Matthew 9:15;Revelation 19:7). Friendship consists in the mutuallove and esteem of twopersons based upon an exchange of service or good office (Aristot., "Eth. Nicom.", VIII sq.). True friendship resting only on virtue (amicitia honesta) demands undeniably alove of benevolence, which seeks only thehappiness and well-being of the friend, whereas the friendly exchange of benefits rests upon autilitarian basis (amicitia utilis) or one of pleasure (amicitia delectabilis), which presupposes a selfishlove; still the benevolentlove of friendship must be mutual, because an unrequitedlove becomes merely one of silent admiration, which is not friendship by any means. But the strong bond of union lies undeniably in the fact of a mutual benefit, by reason of which friend regards friend as his other self (alter ego). Finally, between friends an equality of position or station is demanded, and where this does not exist an elevation of the inferior's status (amicitia excellentie), as, for example, in the case of a friendship between a king and noble subject. It is easy to perceive that all these conditions are fulfilled in the friendship betweenGod and man effected by grace. For, just asGod regards the just man with the purelove of benevolence, He likewise prepares him by the infusion oftheological charity for the reception of a correspondingly pure and unselfish affection. Again, although man'sknowledge of thelove ofGod is very limited, whileGod'sknowledge oflove in man is perfect, this conjecture is sufficient--indeed in human friendships it alone is possible--to form the basis of a friendly relation. The exchange of gifts consists, on the part ofGod, in the bestowal ofsupernatural benefits, on the part of man, in the promotion ofGod's glory, and partly in the performance of works of fraternal charity. There is, indeed, in the first instance, a vast difference in the respective positions ofGod and man; but by the infusion of grace man receives a patent of nobility, and thus a friendship of excellency (amicitia excellentiae) is established betweenGod and the just. (See Schiffini, "De gratia divina", 305 sqq., Freiburg, 1901.)

4. Sonship

In the Divine filiation of thesoul the formal workings of sanctifying grace reach their culminating point; by it man is entitled to a share in the paternal inheritance, which consists in thebeatific vision. This excellence of grace is not only mentioned countless times inHoly Writ (Romans 8:15 sq.;1 John 3:1 sq., etc.), but is included in the Scripturalidea of are-birth inGod (cf.John 1:12 sq.;3:5;Titus 3:5;James 1:18, etc.). Since the re-birth inGod is not effected by a substantial issuance from the substance ofGod, as in the case of theSon of God orLogos (Christus), but is merely an analogical or accidental coming forth fromGod, our sonship ofGod is only of an adoptive kind, as we find it expressed in Scripture (Romans 8:15;Galatians 4:5). This adoption was defined bySt. Thomas (III:23:1):personae extraneae in filium et heredem gratuita assumptio. To the nature of this adoption there are four requisites;

Applying these conditions to the adoption of man byGod, we find thatGod's adoption exceeds man's in every point, for the sinner is not merely a stranger toGod but is as one who has cast off His friendship and become an enemy. In the case of human adoption the mutuallove is presumed as existing, in the case ofGod's adoption thelove ofGod effects the requisite deposition in thesoul to be adopted. The great and unfathomablelove ofGod at once bestows the adoption and the consequent heirship to thekingdom of heaven, and the value of this inheritance is not diminished by the number of coheirs, as in the case of worldly inheritance.

God does not impose His favours upon any one, therefore a consent is expected from adult adopted sons ofGod (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii,per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum). It is quite in keeping with the excellence of the heavenly Father that He should supply for His children during thepilgrimage a fitting sustenance which will sustain the dignity of their position, and be to them a pledge ofresurrection and eternal life; and this is the Bread of theHoly Eucharist (seeEUCHARIST).

The supernatural retinue

This expression is derived from theRoman Catechism (P. II., c. i, n. 51), which teaches: "Huic (gratiae sanctificanti) additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus". As the concomitants of sanctifying grace, these infused virtues are not formal operations, but gifts really distinct from this grace, connected nevertheless with it by a physical, or rather a moral, indissoluble link--relationship. Therefore the Council of Vienne (1311) speaks ofinformans gratia et virtutes, and theCouncil of Trent, in a more general way, of gratia et dona. The threetheological virtues, the moral virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit in thesoul are all considered. TheCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, c. vii) teaches that thetheological virtues offaith, hope, and charity are in the process of justification infused into thesoul assupernatural habits. Concerning the time of infusion, it is anarticle of faith (Sess. VI, can. xi) that the virtue of charity is infused immediately with sanctifying grace, so that throughout the whole term of existence sanctifying grace and charity are found as inseparable companions. Concerning thehabitus offaith and hope, Francisco Suárez is of the opinion (as againstSt. Thomas andSt. Bonaventure) that, assuming a favourable disposition in the recipient, they are infused earlier in the process of justification. Universally known is the expression ofSt. Paul (1 Corinthians 13:13), "And now there remainfaith, hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity." Since, here,faith and hope are placed on a par with charity, but charity is considered as diffused in thesoul (Romans 5:5), conveying thus theidea of an infused habit, it will be seen that thedoctrine of theChurch so consonant with the teaching of the Fathers is also supported by Scripture. Thetheological virtues haveGod directly as their formal object, but the moral virtues are directed in their exercise to created things in their moral relations. All the special moral virtues can be reduced to the four cardinal virtues:prudence (prudentia),justice (justitia),fortitude (fortitudo), temperance (temperantia). TheChurch favours the opinion that along with grace and charity the four cardinal virtues (and, according to manytheologians, their subsidiary virtues also) are communicated to thesouls of the just assupernaturalhabitus, whose office it is to give to theintellect and the will, in their moral relations with created things, asupernatural direction and inclination. By reason of the opposition of theScotists this view enjoys only a degree of probability, which, however, is supported by passages in Scripture (Proverbs 8:7;Ezekiel 11:19;2 Peter 1:3 sqq.) as well as the teaching of the Fathers (Augustine,Gregory the Great, and others). Sometheologians add to the infusion of thetheological and moral virtues also that of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though this view cannot be called anything more than a mere opinion. There are difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this opinion which cannot be here discussed.

Thearticle of faith goes only to this extent, that Christ as man possessed the seven gifts (cf.Isaiah 11:1 sqq.;61:1;Luke 4:18). Remembering, however, thatSt. Paul (Romans 8:9 sqq.) considers Christ, as man, the mystical head ofmankind, and the August exemplar of our own justification, we may possibly assume thatGod gives in the process of justification also the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The crowning point of justification is found in the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It is the perfection and the supreme adornment of the justifiedsoul. Adequately considered, the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit consists of a twofold grace, the created accidental grace (gratia creata accidentalis) and the uncreated substantial grace (gratia increata substantialis). The former is the basis and the indispensable assumption for the latter; for whereGod Himself erects His throne, there must be found a fitting and becoming adornment. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit in thesoul must not be confounded withGod's presence in all created things, by virtue of theDivine attribute of Omnipresence. The personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in thesoul rests so securely upon the teaching ofHoly Writ and of the Fathers that to deny it would constitute a graveerror. In fact,St. Paul (Romans 5:5) says: "The charity ofGod is poured forth in our hearts, by theHoly Ghost, who is given to us". In this passage the Apostle distinguishes clearly between the accidental grace oftheological charity and the Person of the Giver. From this it follows that the Holy Spirit has been given to us, and dwells within us (Romans 8:11), so that we really becometemples of the Holy Ghost (1 Corinthians 3:16 sq.;6:19). Among all theFathers of the Church (excepting, perhaps,St. Augustine) it is the Greeks who are more especially noteworthy for their rapturous utterances touching the infusion of the Holy Ghost. Note the expressions: "The replenishing of thesoul with balsamic odours", "a glow permeating thesoul", "a gilding and refining of thesoul". Against thePneumatomachians they strive to prove the real Divinity of the Holy Spirit from His indwelling, maintaining that onlyGod can establish Himself in thesoul; surely no creature can inhabit any other creatures. But clear and undeniable as the fact of the indwelling is, equally difficult and perplexing is it in degree to explain the method and manner (modus) of this indwelling.

Theologians offer two explanations. The greater number hold that the indwelling must not be considered a substantial information, nor ahypostatic union, but that it really means an indwelling of the Trinity (John 14:23), but is more specifically appropriated to the Holy Ghost by reason of His notional character as the Hypostatic Holiness and Personal Love.

Another small group oftheologians (Petavius,Scheeben,Hurter, etc.), basing their opinion upon the teaching of the Fathers, especially the Greek, distinguish between theinhabitatio totius Trinitatis, and theinhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, and decide that this latter must be regarded as a union (unio, enosis) pertaining to the Holy Ghost alone, from which the other two Persons are excluded. It would be difficult, if not impossible to reconcile this theory, in spite of its deep mystical significance, with the recognized principles of thedoctrine of the Trinity, namely thelaw of appropriation and Divine mission. Hence this theory is almost universally rejected (seeFranzelin, "De Deo trino", thes. xliii-xlviii, Rome, 1881).

The characteristics of sanctifying grace

TheProtestant conception of justification boasts of three characteristics: absolutecertainty (certitudo), complete uniformity in all the justified (aequalitas), unforfeitableness (inamissibilitas). According to the teaching of theChurch, sanctifying grace has the opposite characteristics: uncertainty (incertitudo), inequality (inaequalitas), and amissibility (amissibilitas).

Uncertainty

Thehereticaldoctrine of theReformers, that man by a fiduciaryfaith knows with absolutecertainty that he is justified, received the attention of theCouncil of Trent (Sess. VI, cap. ix), in one entire chapter (De inani fiducia haereticorum), three canons (loc. cit., can. xiii-xv) condemning the necessity, the alleged power, and the function of fiduciaryfaith. The object of theChurch in defining thedogma was not to shatter the trust inGod (certitudo spei) in the matter of personalsalvation, but to repel the misleading assumptions of an unwarrantedcertainty ofsalvation (certitudo fidei). In doing this theChurch is altogether obedient to the instruction ofHoly Writ, for, since Scripture declares that we must work out oursalvation "with fear and trembling" (Philippians 2:12), it is impossible to regard our individualsalvation as something fixed and certain. Why didSt. Paul (1 Corinthians 9:27) chastise his body if not afraid lest, having preached to others, he might himself "become a castaway"? He says expressly (1 Corinthians 4:4): "For I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet am I not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord." Tradition also rejects theLutheranidea ofcertainty of justification.Pope Gregory the Great (lib. VII, ep. xxv) was asked by apious lady of the court, named Gregoria, to say what was the state of hersoul. He replied that she was putting to him a difficult and useless question, which he could not answer, becauseGod had not vouchsafed to him any revelation concerning the state of hersoul, and only after her death could she have any certainknowledge as to the forgiveness of hersins. No one can be absolutely certain of his or hersalvation unless--as toMagdalen, to the man with the palsy, or to the penitent thief--a special revelation be given (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xvi). Nor can atheologicalcertainty, any more than an absolutecertainty ofbelief, be claimed regarding the matter ofsalvation, for the spirit of the Gospel is strongly opposed to anything like an unwarrantedcertainty ofsalvation. Therefore the rather hostile attitude to the Gospel spirit advanced by Ambrosius Catherinus* (d. 1553), in his little work: "De certitudine gratiae", received such general opposition from othertheologians. Since no metaphysicalcertainty can be cherished in the matter of justification in any particular case, we must content ourselves with a moralcertainty, which, of course, is but warranted in the case ofbaptized children, and which, in the case of adults diminishes more or less, just as all the conditions of,salvation are complied with--not an easy matter to determine. Nevertheless any excessive anxiety and disturbance may be allayed (Romans 8:16, 38 sq.) by the subjective conviction that we are probably in the state of grace.

Inequality

If man, as theProtestant theory of justification teaches, is justified byfaith alone, by the externaljustice ofChrist, orGod, the conclusion whichMartin Luther (Sermo de nat. Maria) drew must follow, namely that "we are all equal toMary the Mother of God and just as holy as she". But if on the other hand, according to the teaching of theChurch, we arejustified by thejustice and merits of Christ in such fashion that this becomes formally our ownjustice andholiness, then there must result an inequality of grace inindividuals, and for two reasons: first, because according to the generosity ofGod or the receptive condition of thesoul an unequal amount of grace is infused; then, also, because the grace originally received can be increased by the performance ofgoodworks (Trent, Sess. VI, cap. vii, can. xxiv). This possibility of increase in grace bygoodworks, whence would follow its inequality inindividuals, find its warrant in those Scriptural texts in which an increase of grace is either expressed or implied (Proverbs 4:18;Sirach 18:22;2 Corinthians 9:10;Ephesians 4:7;2 Peter 3:18;Revelation 22:11). Tradition had occasion, as early as the close of the fourth century, to defend the old Faith of theChurch against thehereticJovinian, who strove to introduce into theChurch theStoicdoctrine of the equality of all virtue and all vice.St. Jerome (Con. Jovin., II, xxiii) was the chief defender oforthodoxy in this instance. TheChurch never recognized any other teaching than that laid down bySt. Augustine (Tract. in Jo., vi, 8): "Ipsi sancti in ecclesia sunt alii aliis sanctiores, alii aliis meliores." Indeed, this view should commend itself to every thinking man.

The increase of grace is bytheologians justly called asecond justification (justificatio secunda), as distinct from the first justification (justificatio prima), which is coupled with a remission ofsin; for, though there be in the second justification no transit fromsin to grace, there is an advance from grace to a more perfect sharing therein. If inquiry be made as to the mode of this increase, it can only be explained by thephilosophical maxim: "Qualities are susceptible of increase and decrease"; for instance, light and heat by the varying degree of intensity increase or diminish. The question is not atheological but aphilosophical one to decide whether the increase be effected by an addition of grade to grade (additio gradus ad gradum), as mosttheologians believe; or whether it be by a deeper and firmer taking of root in thesoul (major radicatio in subjecto), as manyThomists claim. This question has a special connection with that concerning the multiplication of thehabitual act.

But the last question that arises has decidedly atheological phase, namely, can the infusion of sanctifying grace be increasedinfinitely? Or is there a limit, a point at which it must be arrested? To maintain that the increase can go on toinfinity, i.e. that man by successive advances inholiness can finally enter into the possession of aninfinite endowment involves a manifest contradiction, for such a grade is as impossible as aninfinite temperature in physics. Theoretically, therefore, we can consider only an increase without any real limit (in indefinitum). Practically however, two ideals of unattained and unattainableholiness have been determined, which nevertheless, are finite. The one is the inconceivably greatholiness of the humansoul ofChrist, the other the fullness of grace which dwelt in thesoul of the Virgin Mary.

Amissibility

In consonance with hisdoctrine ofjustification byfaith alone,Luther made the loss or forfeiture of justification depend solely upon infidelity, whileCalvin maintained that thepredestined could not possibly lose their justification; as to those notpredestined, he said,God merely aroused in them a deceitful show offaith and justification. On account of the grave moral dangers which lurked in the assertion that outside of unbelief there can be no serioussin destructive ofDivine grace in thesoul, theCouncil of Trent wasobliged to condemn (Sess. VI, can. xxiii, xxvii) both these views. The lax principles of "evangelical liberty", the favourite catchword of the buddingReformation, were simply repudiated (Trent Sess. VI, can. xix-xxi). But the synod (Sess. VI cap. xi) added that not venial but only mortalsin involved the loss of grace. In this declaration there was a perfect accord withScripture andTradition. Even in theOld Testament theprophet Ezechiel (Ezekiel 18:24) says of the godless: "All his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered: in the prevarication, by which he hath prevaricated, and in hissin, which he hath committed, in them he shall die." Not in vain doesSt. Paul (1 Corinthians 10:12) warn the just: "Wherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall"; and state uncompromisingly: "Theunjust shall not possess thekingdom of God...neither fornicators, noridolaters, noradulterers.... nor covetous, nordrunkards...shall possess thekingdom of God" (1 Corinthians 6:9 sq.). Hence it is not by infidelity alone that theKingdom of Heaven will be lost. Tradition shows that the discipline of confessors in the early Church proclaims thebelief that grace and justification are lost by mortalsin. The principle ofjustification byfaith alone is unknown to the Fathers. The fact that mortalsin takes thesoul out of the state of grace is due to the very nature of mortalsin. Mortalsin is an absolute turning away fromGod, thesupernatural end of thesoul, and is an absolute turning to creatures; therefore, habitual mortalsin cannot exist with habitual grace any more than fire and water can co-exist in the same subject. But as venialsin does not constitute such an open rupture withGod, and does not destroy the friendship ofGod, therefore venialsin does not expel sanctifying grace from thesoul. Hence,St. Augustine says (De spir. et lit., xxviii, 48): "Non impediunt a vita Aeterna justum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur."

But does venialsin, without extinguishing grace, nevertheless diminish it, just asgoodworks give an increase of grace? Denys theCarthusian (d. 1471) was of the opinion that it does, thoughSt. Thomas rejects it (II-II:24:10). A gradual decrease of grace would only be possible on the supposition that either a definite number of venialsins amounted to a mortalsin, or that the supply of grace might be diminished, grade by grade, down to ultimate extinction. The first hypothesis is contrary to the nature of venialsin; the second leads to theheretical view that grace may be lost without the commission of mortalsin. Nevertheless, venialsins have an indirect influence on the state of grace, for they make a relapse into mortalsin easy (cf.Sirach 19:1). Does the loss of sanctifying grace bring with it the forfeiture of thesupernatural retinue of infused virtues? Since thetheological virtue of charity, though not identical, nevertheless is inseparably connected with grace, it is clear that both must stand or fall together, hence the expressions "to fall from grace" and "to lose charity" are equivalent. It is anarticle of faith (Trent, Sess. VI, can. xxviii, cap. xv) thattheologicalfaith may survive the Commission of mortalsin, and can be extinguished only by its diametrical opposite, namely, infidelity. It may be regarded as a matter of Church teaching thattheological hope also survives mortalsin, unless this hope should be utterly killed by its extreme opposite, namely despair, though probably it is not destroyed by it second opposite, presumption. With regard to the moral virtues, the seven gifts and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, which invariably accompany grace and charity, it is clear that when mortalsin enters into thesoul they cease to exist (cf. Francisco Suárez, "De gratia", IX, 3 sqq.). As to the fruits of sanctifying grace, seeMERIT.

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