Fear

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(CONSIDERED FROM A MORAL STANDPOINT.)

Fear isan unsettlement ofsoul consequent upon the apprehension of some present or future danger. It is here viewed from the moral standpoint, that is, in so far as it is a factor to be reckoned with in pronouncing upon the freedom ofhuman acts, as well as offering an adequate excuse for failing to comply with positive law, particularly if thelaw be of human origin. Lastly, it is here considered in so far as it impugns or leaves intact, in the court ofconscience, and without regard to explicit enactment, the validity of certain deliberate engagements or contracts.

The division of fear most commonly in vogue amongtheologians is that by which they distinguish serious fear (metus gravis) and trifling fear (metus levis). The first is such as grows out of the discernment of some formidable impending peril: if this be really, and without qualification, of large proportions, then the fear is said to be absolutely great; otherwise it is only relatively so, as for instance, when account is taken of the greater susceptibility of certain classes ofpersons, such as old men,women, and children. Trifling fear is that which arises from being confronted with harm of inconsiderable dimensions, or, at any rate of whose happening there is only a slender likelihood.

It is customary also to note a fear in which the element of reverence is uppermost (metus reverensalis), which has its source in the desire not to offend one'sparents and superiors. In itself this is reputed to be but trifling, although from circumstances it may easily rise to the dignity of a serious dread. A criterion rather uniformly employed bymoralists, to determine what really and apart from subjective conditions is, a serious fear, is that contained in this assertion. It is the feeling which is calculated to influence a solidly balanced man (cadere in virum constantem). Another important classification is that of fear which comes from some source within theperson, for example, that which is created by theknowledge that one has contracted a fatal disease fear which comes from without, or is produced namely, by some cause extrinsic to the terror-stricken subject. In the last named instance the cause may be either natural, such as probable volcanic eruptions, or recognizable in the attitude of some free agent. Finally it may be observed that one may have been submitted to the spell of fear either justly orunjustly, according as the one who provokes this passion remains within hisrights, or exceeds them, in so doing. Actions done under stress of fear, unless of course it be so intense as to have dethroned reason, are accounted the legitimate progeny of the human will, or are, as thetheologians say, simplyvoluntary, and therefore imputable. The reason is obvious, such acts lack neither adequate advertence nor sufficient consent, even though the latter be elicited only to avoid a greaterevil or one conceived to be greater. Inasmuch, however, as they are accompanied by a more or less vehement repugnance, they are said to be in a limited and partial sense involuntary.

The practical inference from this teaching is that anevil act having otherwise the bad eminence of grievoussin remains such, even though done out of serious fear. This istrue when the transgression in question is against thenatural law. In the case ofobligations emerging from positiveprecepts, whether Divine or human, a serious and well-founded dread may often operate as an excuse, so that the failure to comply with thelaw under such circumstances is not regarded assinful. The lawgiver is not presumed to have it in mind to impose an heroic act. This, however, does not hold good when the catering to such a fear would involve considerable damage to the common weal. Thus, for instance, aparishpriest, in aparish visited by a pestilence, is bound by thelaw of residence to stay at his post, no matter what his apprehensions may be. It ought to be added here that attrition, or sorrow forsin even though it be the fruit of dread inspired by the thought of eternal punishment, is not in any sense involuntary. At least it must not be so, if it is to avail in theSacrament of Penance for the justification of the sinner. The end aimed at by this imperfect sort of sorrow is precisely a change of will, and the giving up ofsinful attachment is an unreservedly good and reasonable thing. Hence there is no room for that concomitant regret, or dislike, with which other things are done through fear.

It is, of course, needless to observe that in what has been said hitherto we have been referring always to what is done as a result of fear, not to what takes place merely in, or with fear. Avow taken out of fear produced by natural causes, such as a threatened shipwreck, is valid; but one extorted as the effect of fearunjustly applied by another is invalid; and this last is probablytrue even when the fear is trifling, if it be the sufficient motive for making thevow. The reason is that it is difficult to conceive such a promise being acceptable toAlmighty God. So far asnatural law is concerned, fear does not invalidate contracts. Nevertheless, when one of the parties has suffered duress at the hands of the other; the contract is voidable within the choosing of the one so injured. As to marriage, unless the fear prompting its solemnization is so extreme as to take away the use of reason, the common teaching is that such consent, having regard for the moment only to thenatural law, would be binding. Its standing in ecclesiastical law is discussed in another article. It is worthy of note that mere insensibility to fear having its root whether in stolidity, orpride, or want of a proper rating of even temporal things, is not a valuable character asset. On the contrary, it represents a vicious temper ofsoul, and upon occasion its product may be notablysinful.

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