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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem thatprophecy does not pertain toknowledge. For it is written (Sirach 48:14) that after death the body of Eliseusprophesied, and further on (Sirach 49:18) it is said ofJoseph that "his bones were visited, and after death theyprophesied." Now noknowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death. Thereforeprophecy does not pertain toknowledge.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (1 Corinthians 14:3): "He that prophesieth, speaketh tomen unto edification." Now speech is notknowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem thatprophecy does not pertain toknowledge.
Objection 3. Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly andmadness. Yet both of these are consistent withprophecy; for it is written (Hosea 9:7): "Know ye, OIsrael, that theprophet was foolish and mad [Vulgate: 'thespiritualman wasmad']." Thereforeprophecy is not a cognitive perfection.
Objection 4. Further, just asrevelation regards theintellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. Nowprophecy is described as "inspiration" or "revelation," according toCassiodorus [Prolog. super Psalt. i]. Therefore it would seem thatprophecy does not pertain to theintellect more than to the affections.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Samuel 9:9): "For he that is now called aprophet, intime past was called a seer." Now sight pertains toknowledge. Thereforeprophecy pertains toknowledge.
I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists inknowledge, because, to wit,prophetsknow things that are far [procul] removed fromman'sknowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name fromphanos, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, asIsidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in theOld Testament, they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed things hidden inmystery." Hence among heathen nations they wereknown as "vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis]," [TheLatin 'vates' is from the Greekphates, and may be rendered 'soothsayer'] (Etym. viii, 7).
Since, however, it is written (1 Corinthians 12:7): "The manifestation of theSpirit is given to everyman unto profit," and further on (1 Corinthians 14:12): "Seek to abound unto the edification of theChurch," it follows thatprophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as theprophets declare for the instruction of others, the things theyknow through being taught ofGod, according to the saying ofIsaiah 21:10, "That which I have heard of theLord ofhosts, theGod ofIsrael, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, asIsidore says (Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be described as "proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro fantur]," that is, speak from a distance, "and foretell thetruth about things to come."
Now those things abovehuman ken which arerevealed byGod cannot be confirmed byhumanreason, which they surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, according toMark 16:20, "They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly,prophecy is concerned with the working ofmiracles, as a kind of confirmation of theprophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deuteronomy 34:10-11): "There arose no more aprophet inIsrael like untoMoses, whom the Lordknew face to face, in all the signs and wonders."
Reply to Objection 1. These passages speak ofprophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards theproof ofprophecy.
Reply to Objection 2. TheApostle is speaking there of theprophetic utterances.
Reply to Objection 3. Thoseprophets who are described as foolish and mad are nottrue butfalseprophets, of whom it is said (Jeremiah 3:16): "Hearken not to the words of theprophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord," and (Ezekiel 13:3): "Woe to the foolishprophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."
Reply to Objection 4. It is requisite toprophecy that theintention of themind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezekiel 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising of theintention is brought about by the motion of theHoly Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And theSpirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After themind'sintention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things ofGod; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite forprophecy, as regards the raising of themind, according toJob 32:8, "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding": whilerevelation isnecessary, as regards the very perception of Divine things, wherebyprophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness andignorance is removed, according toJob 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of darkness."
Objection 1. It would seem thatprophecy is ahabit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in thesoul, power, passion, andhabit." Nowprophecy is not a power, for then it would be in allmen, since the powers of thesoul are common to them. Again it is not apassion, since thepassions belong to theappetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II:22:2); whereasprophecy pertains principally toknowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. Thereforeprophecy is ahabit.
Objection 2. Further, every perfection of thesoul, which is not always in act, is ahabit. Nowprophecy is a perfection of thesoul; and it is not always in act, else aprophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seeminglyprophecy is ahabit.
Objection 3. Further,prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitousgraces. Nowgrace is something in thesoul, after the manner of ahabit, as stated above (I-II:110:2). Thereforeprophecy is ahabit.
On the contrary, Ahabit is something "whereby we act when we will," as theCommentator [Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says (De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use ofprophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (2 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit ofprophecy failing him,caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit ofprophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come," asGregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Thereforeprophecy is not ahabit.
I answer that, As theApostle says (Ephesians 5:13), "all that is made manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through material light, so too the manifestation ofintellectual sight takes place throughintellectual light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to itscause. Since thenprophecy pertains to aknowledge that surpassesnaturalreason, as stated above (Article 1), it follows thatprophecy requires anintellectual light surpassing the light ofnaturalreason. Hence the saying ofMicah 7:8: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of apassion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now theprophetic light is not in theprophet'sintellect by way of an abiding form, else aprophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearlyfalse. ForGregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit ofprophecy is lacking to theprophet, nor is it always within the call of hismind, yet so that in its absence heknows that its presence is due to agift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamitewoman (2 Kings 4:27): "Hersoul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me." The reason for this is that theintellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects theintellect chiefly to the effect ofknowing the principle of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the activeintellect theintellectknows chiefly the first principles of all thingsknownnaturally. Now the principle of things pertaining tosupernaturalknowledge, which are manifested byprophecy, isGod Himself, Whom theprophets do not see in Hisessence, although He is seen by the blessed inheaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according toPsalm 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light."
It follows therefore that theprophetic light is in theprophet'ssoul by way of apassion or transitory impression. This is indicatedExodus 33:22: "When myglory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock," etc., and1 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too theprophet's mind is always in need of a freshrevelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isaiah 1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master." This is also indicated by the very manner in whichprophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to such and such aprophet," or that "the word of the Lord," or "the hand of the Lord was made upon him."
But ahabit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking,prophecy is not ahabit.
Reply to Objection 1. This division of thePhilosopher's does not comprise absolutely all that is in thesoul, but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes fromhabit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having thehabit of that action.
However,prophecy may be reduced to apassion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense thePhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way, to be passive." For just as, innaturalknowledge, the possibleintellect is passive to the light of the activeintellect, so too inpropheticknowledge thehumanintellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.
Reply to Objection 2. Just as in corporeal things, when apassion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion—thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in theprophet'sintellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew—thus when themind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. HenceAugustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that ourprayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled."
We might, however, reply that aperson is called aprophet, even while hisprophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being deputed byGod, according toJeremiah 1:5, "And I made thee aprophet unto thenations."
Reply to Objection 3. Everygift ofgrace raisesman to something abovehumannature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to thesubstance of the act—for instance, the working ofmiracles, and theknowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom—and for such actsman is not granted ahabitualgift ofgrace. Secondly, a thing is abovehumannature as to the mode but not thesubstance of the act—for instance to loveGod and toknow Him in the mirror of His creatures—and for this ahabitualgift ofgrace is bestowed.
Objection 1. It would seem thatprophecy is only about future contingencies. ForCassiodorus says [Prol. super Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration orrevelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeabletruth." Now issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore thepropheticrevelation is about future contingencies alone.
Objection 2. Further, according to1 Corinthians 12, thegrace ofprophecy is differentiated from wisdom andfaith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits, which is aboutcreated spirits; and fromknowledge, which is abouthuman things. Nowhabits and acts are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II:54:2). Therefore it seems that the object ofprophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future contingencies alone.
Objection 3. Further, difference of objectcauses difference ofspecies, as stated above (I-II:54:2). Therefore, if oneprophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to follow that these are differentspecies ofprophecy.
On the contrary,Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that someprophecies are "about the future, for instance (Isaiah 7:14), 'Behold avirgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as (Genesis 1:1), 'In the beginningGodcreatedheaven and earth'"; some are "about the present," as (1 Corinthians 14:24-25), "If all prophesy, and there come in one thatbelieveth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest." Thereforeprophecy is not about future contingencies alone.
I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the body's sight extends to all colors, and thesoul'snaturalknowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the activeintellect. Nowpropheticknowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible toknow all things both Divine andhuman, bothspiritual and corporeal; and consequently thepropheticrevelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits apropheticrevelation concerning the perfections ofGod and theangels was made toIsaiah 6:1, where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated." Moreover hisprophecy contains matters referring tonatural bodies, according to the words ofIsaiah 40:12, "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains matters relating tohuman conduct, according toIsaiah 58:1, "Deal thy bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according toIsaiah 47:9, "Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness andwidowhood."
Since, however,prophecy is about things remote from ourknowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from ourknowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from theknowledge, either sensitive orintellective, of some particularman, but not from theknowledge of allmen; thus a particularmanknows by sense things present to him locally, which anotherman does notknow byhuman sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseusknewprophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (2 Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of oneman are manifestedprophetically to another, according to1 Corinthians 14:25; and again in this way what onemanknows by demonstration may be revealed to anotherprophetically.
The second degree comprises those things which surpass theknowledge of allmen without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account of a defect inhumanknowledge; such as themystery of theTrinity, which was revealed by theSeraphim saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (Isaiah 6:3).
The last degree comprises things remote from theknowledge of allmen, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies, thetruth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its verynature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows thatrevelation of future events belongs most properly toprophecy, and from thisprophecy apparently takes its name. HenceGregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since aprophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present."
Reply to Objection 1. Prophecy is there defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the other gratuitousgraces.
Reply to Objection 2. This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are thematter ofprophecy have the common aspect of being unknowable toman except by Divinerevelation; whereas those that are thematter of "wisdom," "knowledge," and the "interpretation of speeches," can beknown byman throughnaturalreason, but are manifested in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine light. As to "faith," although it is about things invisible toman, it is not concerned with theknowledge of the thingsbelieved, but with a man'scertitude of assent to thingsknown by others.
Reply to Objection 3. The formal element inpropheticknowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity ofspecies toprophecy, although the thingsprophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
Objection 1. It would seem that by the Divinerevelation aprophetknows all that can beknownprophetically. For it is written (Amos 3:7): "The LordGod doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants theprophets." Now whatever is revealedprophetically is something done byGod. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to theprophet.
Objection 2. Further, "God's works are perfect" (Deuteronomy 32:4). Nowprophecy is a "Divinerevelation," as stated above (Article 3). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters ofprophecy were revealedprophetically, since "the perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters ofprophecy are revealed to theprophet.
Objection 3. Further, the Divine light whichcausesprophecy is more powerful than the right ofnaturalreason which is thecause ofhuman science. Now a man who has acquired a scienceknows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarianknows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would seem that aprophetknows all matters ofprophecy.
On the contrary,Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes the spirit ofprophecy indicates the present to theprophet's mind and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future." Therefore theprophet does notknow all matters ofprophecy.
I answer that, Things which differ from one another need notexist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above (I-II:65:1-2) that all thevirtues must needsexist simultaneously on account ofprudence andcharity. Now all the things that areknown through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he whoknows a principle perfectly, as regards all to which itsvirtue extends,knows at the same time all that can beknown through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, orknown only in a general way, it does not follow that oneknows all those things at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may beknown, and some not.
Now the principle of those things that areprophetically manifested by the Divine light is the firsttruth, which theprophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for theirknowing all possible matters ofprophecy; but each oneknows some of them according to the specialrevelation of this or thatmatter.
Reply to Objection 1. The Lord reveals to theprophets all things that arenecessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, and some to another.
Reply to Objection 2. Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divinerevelation: hence it is written (1 Corinthians 13:8) that "prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e. imperfectly. The Divinerevelation will be brought to its perfection inheaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Corinthians 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking topropheticrevelation, but that it lacks none of those things to whichprophecy is directed.
Reply to Objection 3. He who has a scienceknows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have thehabit of a science perfectly, is toknow whatever is pertinent to that science. ButGod Who is the principle ofpropheticknowledge is notknown in Himself throughprophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.
Objection 1. It would seem that theprophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by theprophetic spirit. ForAugustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern betwixt Divinerevelations, and the dreams of her ownsoul." Nowprophecy is a Divinerevelation, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore theprophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit ofprophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.
Objection 2. Further,God commands nothing impossible, asJerome [Pelagius, Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works ofSt. Jerome] says. Now theprophets were commanded (Jeremiah 23:28): "Theprophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word withtruth." Therefore theprophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit ofprophecy from what he sees otherwise.
Objection 3. Further, thecertitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light ofnaturalreason. Now he that has science, by the light ofnaturalreasonknows for certain that he has it. Therefore he that hasprophecy by a Divine light is much morecertain that he has it.
On the contrary,Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be observed that sometimes theholyprophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by theprophetic spirit."
I answer that, Theprophet's mind is instructed byGod in two ways: in one way by an expressrevelation, in another way by a most mysterious instinct to "which thehuman mind is subjected withoutknowing it," asAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly theprophet has the greatestcertitude about those things which heknows by an expressrevelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him byGod; wherefore it is written (Jeremiah 26:15): "Intruth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, thefaith which relies on the utterances of theprophet would not be certain. A sign of theprophet'scertitude may be gathered from the fact thatAbraham being admonished in aprophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been most certain of the Divinerevelation.
On the other hand, his position with regard to the things heknows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which weknow by Divine instinct are not all manifested withpropheticcertitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus ofprophecy. It is thus that we are to understand the saying ofGregory. Lest, however, this should lead toerror, "they are very soon set aright by theHoly Ghost [For instance, cf.2 Samuel 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear thetruth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what wasuntrue," asGregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).
The arguments set down in the first place consider therevelation that is made by theprophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the objections is clear.
Objection 1. It would seem that thingsknown or declaredprophetically can befalse. Forprophecy is about future contingencies, as stated above (Article 3). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen ofnecessity. Therefore thematter ofprophecy can befalse.
Objection 2. Further, Isaiasprophesied toEzechias saying (Isaiah 38:1): "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (2 Kings 20:6). Again the Lord said (Jeremiah 18:7-8): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of theirevil, I also will repent of theevil that I have thought to do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according toJohn 3:10: "The Lord [Vulgate: 'God'] had mercy with regard to theevil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not." Therefore thematter ofprophecy can befalse.
Objection 3. Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutelynecessary, the consequent is absolutelynecessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises arenecessary always leads to anecessary conclusion, as we findproved in I Poster. 6. But if thematter of aprophecy cannot befalse, the following conditional proposition must needs betrue: "If a thing has beenprophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutelynecessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is alsonecessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for thenprophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it isuntrue that thematter ofprophecy cannot befalse.
On the contrary,Cassiodorus says [Prol. in Psalt. i] that "prophecy is a Divine inspiration orrevelation, announcing the issue of things with invariabletruth." Now thetruth ofprophecy would not be invariable, if itsmatter could befalse. Therefore nothingfalse can come underprophecy.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said (1 and 3 and 5),prophecy is a kind ofknowledge impressed under the form of teaching on theprophet'sintellect, by Divinerevelation. Now thetruth ofknowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since theknowledge of the disciple is a likeness of theknowledge of the teacher, even as innatural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator.Jerome speaks in this sense when he says [Comment. inDaniel 2:10 that "prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the sametruth must needs be inpropheticknowledge and utterances, as in the Divineknowledge, under which nothingfalse can possibly come, as stated inI:16:8. Therefore nothingfalse can come underprophecy.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated inI:14:13 thecertitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because thatknowledge regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Whereforeprophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeabletruth exclude the contingency of future things.
Reply to Objection 2. The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in theircauses, inasmuch as it sees the order ofcauses in relation to their effects. And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in theircauses, they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though this twofoldknowledge is always united in the Divineintellect, it is not always united in thepropheticrevelation, because an imprint made by an activecause is not always on a par with thevirtue of thatcause. Hence sometimes thepropheticrevelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying ofIsaiah 7:14: "Behold avirgin shall conceive." Sometimes, however, thepropheticrevelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge asknowing the order ofcauses to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet theprophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of theprophecy is that inferiorcauses, whether they benaturalcauses orhuman acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. On this way we are to understand the saying ofIsaiah 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not live"; in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death": and the saying ofJonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Itsmerits demand that it should be destroyed."God is said "to repent," metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by "changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [Cf.I:19:7 ad 2].
Reply to Objection 3. Since the sametruth ofprophecy is the same as thetruth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: "If this wasprophesied, it will be," istrue in the same way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent isnecessary, considered, not as something future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated inI:14:13 ad 2.