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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem thatidolatry is not rightly reckoned aspecies of superstition. Just asheretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. Butheresy is aspecies of unbelief, as stated above (II-II:11:1). Thereforeidolatry is also aspecies of unbelief and not ofsuperstition.
Objection 2. Further, latria pertains to thevirtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied toidolatry and to that which belongs to thetrue religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire offalsehappiness, and of the desire oftruehappiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship offalse gods, which is calledidolatry, and of the worship of thetrueGod, which is the latria oftrue religion. Thereforeidolatry is not aspecies ofsuperstition.
Objection 3. Further, that which is nothing cannot be thespecies of any genus. Butidolatry, apparently, is nothing: for theApostle says (1 Corinthians 8:4): "Weknow that anidol is nothing in the world," and further on (1 Corinthians 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice toidols is anything? Or that theidol is anything?" implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things toidols belongs properly toidolatry. Therefore sinceidolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be aspecies ofsuperstition.
Objection 4. Further, it belongs to superstition to give divinehonor to whom thathonor is not due. Now divinehonor is undue toidols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Romans 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than theCreator." Therefore thisspecies of superstition is unfittingly calledidolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures."
On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that whenPaul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given toidolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are toosuperstitious." Thereforeidolatry belongs tosuperstition.
I answer that, As stated above (II-II:92:2), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreatedGod alone, as stated above (II-II:81:1) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.
Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such assacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given toidols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of thedemons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained somethingGod-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], asAugustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. TheApostle alludes to both of these (Romans 1:23-25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed theglory of the incorruptibleGod into the likeness of the image of a corruptibleman, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than theCreator."
These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its materialsubstance, but by reason of itssoul, which theybelieved to beGod, for they heldGod to be nothing else than asoul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of hissoul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts,heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, andAugustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, thePlatonists, said that there is one supreme god, thecause of all things. After him they placed certainspiritualsubstancescreated by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed thesouls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these thedemons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placedhumansouls, which theybelieved to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of thedemons by reason of themerit of theirvirtue. To all these they gave divine worship, asAugustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).
The last two opinions were held to belong to "naturaltheology" which thephilosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the schools: while the other, relating to the worship ofmen, was said to belong to "mythicaltheology" which was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to "civiltheology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [De Civ. Dei vi, 5.
Now all these come under the head of the superstition ofidolatry. WhereforeAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented byman for making and worshippingidols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, issuperstitious."
Reply to Objection 1. Just as religion is notfaith, but a confession offaith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the termidolatry, but not by the termheresy, which only means afalse opinion. Thereforeheresy is aspecies of unbelief, butidolatry is aspecies ofsuperstition.
Reply to Objection 2. The term latria may be taken in two senses. On one sense it may denote ahuman act pertaining to the worship ofGod: and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether totrue religion or toidolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to thetrue or to afalse king. On another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is avirtue, it isessential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria oftrue religion, and toidolatry: just asprudence is applied equivocally to theprudence that is avirtue, and to that which is carnal.
Reply to Objection 3. The saying of theApostle that "anidol is nothing in the world" means that those images which were calledidols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. On the same sense we must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice toidols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as theGentiles thought, noruncleanness, as theJews held.
Reply to Objection 4. It was owing to the general custom among theGentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images.
Objection 1. It would seem thatidolatry is not asin. Nothing is asin that thetruefaith employs in worshippingGod. Now thetruefaith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related inExodus 25, and in theChurch are images set up which the faithful worship. Thereforeidolatry, wherebyidols are worshipped, is not asin.
Objection 2. Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But theangels and thesouls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will be nosin to pay them reverence by worship, ofsacrifices or the like.
Objection 3. Further, the most highGod should behonored with an inward worship, according toJohn 4:24, "God . . . they mustadore . . . in spirit and intruth": andAugustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God is worshipped byfaith, hope andcharity." Now a man may happen to worshipidols outwardly, and yet not wander from thetruefaith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worshipidols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.
On the contrary, It is written (Exodus 20:5): "Thou shalt notadore them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as agloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is asin to worshipidols whether outwardly or inwardly.
I answer that, There has been a twofolderror in this matter. For some [The School ofPlato] have thought that to offersacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only toGod but also to the others aforesaid, is due andgood in itself, since they held that divinehonor should be paid to every superiornature, as being nearer toGod. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most highGod Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship oflatria.
Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visiblesacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most highGod, as being better than those others, bettersacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [Augustine, as quoted below]. The reason is that, asAugustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "externalsacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as byprayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in oursacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."
Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given toidols, not as though it were somethinggood or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. ThusAugustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shalladore," says he, "in such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with custom rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v)Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from thephilosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about thenature of their gods, and the sovereigngood." Thiserror was embraced also by certainheretics [The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized intime ofpersecution to worshipidols outwardly so long as he keeps thefaith in his heart.
But this is evidentlyfalse. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is awicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of thetruefaith so too is it awicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart. WhereforeAugustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship ofidols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the peoplebelieved him to act honestly."
Reply to Objection 1. Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of theOld Law, nor again now in theChurch are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order thatbelief in the excellence ofangels andsaints may be impressed and confirmed in themind ofman. It is different with the image ofChrist, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in theIII:25:3.
The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.
Objection 1. It would seem thatidolatry is not the gravest ofsins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists offaith, hope andcharity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief,despair andhatred ofGod, which are opposed to internal worship, are graversins thanidolatry, which is opposed to external worship.
Objection 2. Further, the more asin is againstGod the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly againstGod by blaspheming, or denying thefaith, than by givingGod's worship to another, which pertains toidolatry. Thereforeblasphemy and denial of thefaith are more grievoussins thanidolatry.
Objection 3. Further, it seems that lesserevils are punished with greaterevils. But thesin ofidolatry was punished with thesin againstnature, as stated inRomans 1:26. Therefore thesin againstnature is a graversin thanidolatry.
Objection 4. Further,Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we say that you," viz. theManichees, "arepagans, or a sect ofpagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things thatexist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things thatexist not at all." Therefore thevice ofheretical depravity is more grievous thanidolatry.
Objection 5. Further, agloss ofJerome onGalatians 4:9, "How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of theLaw, to which they were then addicted, was asin almost equal to the worship ofidols, to which they had been given before their conversion." Thereforeidolatry is not the most grievoussin.
On the contrary, Agloss on the saying ofLeviticus 15:25, about theuncleanness of awoman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Everysin is anuncleanness of thesoul, but especiallyidolatry."
I answer that, The gravity of asin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of thesin itself, and thusidolatry is the most grievoussin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royalhonor to another than thetrue king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, insins that are committed againstGod, which indeed are the greatersins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to giveGod'shonor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up anotherGod in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of asin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus thesin of one thatsins knowingly is said to be graver than thesin of one thatsins throughignorance: and in this way nothing hindersheretics, if they knowingly corrupt thefaith which they have received, fromsinning more grievously than idolaters whosin throughignorance. Furthermore othersins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 1. Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of externalidolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additionalsin of falsehood, as stated above (Article 2).
Reply to Objection 2. Idolatry includes a grievousblasphemy, inasmuch as it deprivesGod of the singleness of His dominion and denies thefaith bydeeds.
Reply to Objection 3. Since it isessential to punishment that it be against thewill, asin whereby anothersin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make theman more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievoussin: and in this way thesin againstnature is less grievous than thesin ofidolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of thesin ofidolatry, in order that, as byidolatryman abuses the order of the divinehonor, so by thesin againstnature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his ownnature.
Reply to Objection 4. Even as to the genus of thesin, the Manicheanheresy is more grievous than thesin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divinehonor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies aboutGod. It is different with otherheretics, who confess theirbelief in oneGod and worship Him alone.
Reply to Objection 5. The observance of theLaw during thetime ofgrace is not quite equal toidolatry as to the genus of thesin, but almost equal, because both arespecies of pestiferoussuperstition.
Objection 1. It would seem that thecause ofidolatry was not on the part ofman. Onman there is nothing but eithernature,virtue, or guilt. But thecause ofidolatry could not be on the part ofman'snature, since rather doesman'snaturalreason dictate that there is oneGod, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither couldidolatry have itscause inman on the part ofvirtue, since "agood tree cannot bring forthevil fruit," according toMatthew 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according toWisdom 14:27, "the worship of abominableidols is thecause and the beginning and end of allevil." Thereforeidolatry has nocause on the part ofman.
Objection 2. Further, those things which have acause inman are found among men at all times. Nowidolatry was not always, but is stated [Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, whocaused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related byIsidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues ofmen: and theJews say that Ismael was the first to makeidols of clay. Moreover,idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Thereforeidolatry had nocause on the part ofman.
Objection 3. Further,Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. thedemons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply toidolatry. Thereforeidolatry had nocause on the part ofman.
On the contrary, It is written (Wisdom 14:14): "By the vanity ofmen they," i.e.idols, "came into the world."
I answer that, Idolatry had a twofoldcause. One was a dispositivecause; this was on the part ofman, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divinehonor, through eitherloving or revering them too much. Thiscause is assigned (Wisdom 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god." The same passage goes on to say (Wisdom 14:21) that "men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulgate: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood." Secondly, becauseman takes anatural pleasure in representations, as thePhilosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the unculturedman sawhuman images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wisdom 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then makethprayer to it, inquiring concerning hissubstance, and his children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of theirignorance of thetrueGod, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wisdom 13:1-2): "All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but haveimagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world."
The othercause ofidolatry was completive, and this was on the part of thedemons, who offered themselves to be worshipped bymen, by giving answers in theidols, and doing things which tomen seemed marvelous. Hence it is written (Psalm 95:5): "All the gods of theGentiles aredevils."
Reply to Objection 1. The dispositivecause ofidolatry was, on the part ofman, a defect ofnature, either throughignorance in hisintellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again,idolatry is stated to be thecause, beginning and end of allsin, because there is no kind ofsin thatidolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to thatsin bycausing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as certainsins were employed in the worship ofidols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certainsins may precedeidolatry and disposeman thereto.
Reply to Objection 2. There was noidolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so thatman still retained in his mind theknowledge of oneGod. On the sixth ageidolatry was banished by the doctrine and power ofChrist, who triumphed over thedevil.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the consummativecause ofidolatry.