 |
|
| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer is an act of theappetitive power. It belongs toprayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard byGod, according toPsalm 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor." Thereforeprayer is desire. But desire is an act of theappetitive power: and thereforeprayer is also.
Objection 2. Further,Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to begin everything withprayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves toGod and unite ourselves to Him." Now union withGod is effected by love which belongs to theappetitive power. Thereforeprayer belongs to theappetitive power.
Objection 3. Further, thePhilosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of theintellective part. Of these the first is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis," whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from theknown to the unknown. Nowprayer is not reducible to any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not of theintellective, but of theappetitive power.
On the contrary,Isidore says (Etym. x) that "topray is to speak." Now speech belongs to theintellect. Thereforeprayer is an act, not of theappetitive, but of theintellective power.
I answer that, According toCassiodorus [Comment. inPsalm 38:13 "prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]." Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends butcauses. Now one thing is thecause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of thecause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of thecause. Accordingly in this way the reason iscause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposingnecessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but alsohuman subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing thatman proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason thePhilosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best."
Now in the present instance we are speaking ofprayer [This last paragraph refers to theLatin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which senseAugustine [Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer is a petition," andDamascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "topray is to ask becoming things ofGod." Accordingly it is evident thatprayer, as we speak of it now, is anact ofreason.
Reply to Objection 1. The Lord is said to hear the desire of thepoor, either because desire is thecause of their petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something thanGod hears them before they put up aprayer, according to the saying ofIsaiah 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear."
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I:82:4;I-II:9:1 ad 3), thewill moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders theact ofreason, under the motion of thewill, from tending to an end such ascharity which is union withGod. Nowprayer tends toGod through being moved by thewill ofcharity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because when wepray we ought principally to ask to be united toGod, according toPsalm 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to approach theperson whom he petitions, either locally, as when he petitions a man, ormentally, as when he petitionsGod. HenceDionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call uponGod in ourprayers, we unveil ourmind in His presence": and in the same senseDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of themind toGod."
Reply to Objection 3. These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition tocause something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unbecoming topray.Prayer seems to benecessary in order that we may make our needsknown to theperson to whom wepray. But according toMatthew 6:32, "Your Fatherknoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming topray toGod.
Objection 2. Further, byprayer we bend themind of theperson to whom wepray, so that he may do what is asked of him. ButGod's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to1 Samuel 15:29, "But the Triumpher inIsrael will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we shouldpray toGod.
Objection 3. Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought withprayers." ButGod is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming topray toGod.
On the contrary, It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always topray, and not to faint."
I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefolderror concerningprayer. Some held thathuman affairs are not ruled byDivine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless topray and to worshipGod at all: of these it is written (Malachi 3:14): "You have said: He laboreth in vain that servethGod." Another opinion held that all things, even inhuman affairs, happen ofnecessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness ofDivine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection ofcauses: and this opinion also excluded the utility ofprayer. There was a third opinion of those who held thathuman affairs are indeed ruled byDivine providence, and that they do not happen ofnecessity; yet they deemed the disposition ofDivine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed byprayers and other things pertaining to the worship ofGod. All these opinions were disproved inI:19:7;I:19:8;I:22:2;I:22:4;I:115:6;I:116. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility ofprayer as neither to imposenecessity onhuman affairs subject toDivine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.
In order to throw light on this question we must consider thatDivine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from whatcauses and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among othercauseshuman acts are thecauses of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said ofnaturalcauses. And so is it with regard toprayer. For wepray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that whichGod has disposed to be fulfilled by ourprayers in other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive whatAlmighty God frometernity has disposed to give," asGregory says (Dial. i, 8)
Reply to Objection 1. We need topray toGod, not in order to makeknown to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of thenecessity of having recourse toGod's help in these matters.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, our motive inpraying is, not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by ourprayers, we may obtain whatGod has appointed.
Reply to Objection 3.God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of ourgood, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse toGod, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. HenceChrysostom says [Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes.]; Cf. Caten. Aur. onLuke 18: "Think whathappiness is granted thee, whathonor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest withGod inprayer, when thou talkest withChrist, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part ofjustice, it resides in thewill as in its subject.
Butprayer belongs to theintellective part, as stated above (Article 1). Thereforeprayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of thegift of understanding whereby themind ascends toGod.
Objection 2. Further, the act of "latria" falls under anecessity of precept.
Butprayer does not seem to come under anecessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Thereforeprayer seemingly is not an act of religion.
Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53. Butprayer seems not to offer anything toGod, but to. ask to obtain something from Him. Thereforeprayer is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 140:2): "Let myprayer be directed asincense in Thy sight": and agloss on the passage says that "it was to signify this that under the old Lawincense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Thereforeprayer is an act of religion.
I answer that, As stated above (II-II:81:4), it belongs properly to religion to showhonor toGod, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown toGod, belong to religion. Nowman shows reverence toGod by means ofprayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and bypraying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident thatprayer is properly an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 1. The will moves the other powers of thesoul to its end, as stated above (II-II:82:1 ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in thewill, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence ofGod. Now among the other powers of thesoul theintellect is the highest, and the nearest to thewill; and consequently after devotion which belongs to thewill,prayer which belongs to theintellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directsman'sintellect toGod.
Reply to Objection 2. It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept ofcharity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed inMatthew 7:7, where it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [Vulgate: 'Ask and it shall be given you.'].
Reply to Objection 3. Byprayingman surrenders his mind toGod, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words ofDionysius quoted above (Article 1, Objection 1). Wherefore just as thehuman mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed forGod's service, so too,prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought topray toGod alone.Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above (Article 3). ButGod alone is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we shouldpray toGod alone.
Objection 2. Further, it is useless topray to one who isignorant of theprayer. But it belongs toGod alone toknow one'sprayer, both because frequentlyprayer is uttered by an interior act whichGod aloneknows, rather than by words, according to the saying of theApostle (1 Corinthians 14:15), "I willpray with the spirit, I willpray also with the understanding": and again because, asAugustine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even thesaints,know not what the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought topray toGod alone.
Objection 3. Further, if wepray to any of thesaints, this is only because they are united toGod. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are inPurgatory, are closely united toGod bygrace, and yet we do notpray to them. Therefore neither should wepray to thesaints who are in Paradise.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of thesaints."
I answer that,Prayer is offered to aperson in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. On the first way we offerprayer toGod alone, since all ourprayers ought to be directed to the acquisition ofgrace andglory, whichGod alone gives, according toPsalm 83:12, "The Lord will givegrace andglory." But in the second way wepray to thesaints, whetherangels or men, not thatGod may through themknow our petitions, but that ourprayers may be effective through theirprayers andmerits. Hence it is written (Apocalypse 8:4) that "the smoke of theincense," namely "theprayers of thesaints ascended up beforeGod." This is also clear from the very style employed by theChurch inpraying: since we beseech the BlessedTrinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any of thesaints "topray for us."
Reply to Objection 1. To Him alone do we offer religious worship whenpraying, from Whom we seek to obtain what wepray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates inGod's presence.
Reply to Objection 2. The dead, if we consider theirnaturalcondition, do notknow what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according toGregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed shouldknow about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is madeknown to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they shouldknow the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them areknown to them through Divine manifestation.
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in this world or inPurgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able toknow what we think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance bypraying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when wepray toGod. According toDamascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "topray is to ask becoming things ofGod"; wherefore it is useless topray for what is inexpedient, according toJames 4:3, "You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according toRomans 8:26, "weknow not what we shouldpray for as we ought." Therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when wepray.
Objection 2. Further, those who ask anotherperson for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to makeGod will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to agloss onPsalm 32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to askGod for anything definite when wepray.
Objection 3. Further,evil things are not to be sought fromGod; and as togood things,God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to ask aperson to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to askGod for anything definite in ourprayers.
On the contrary,our Lord (Matthew 6 andLuke 11) taught Hisdisciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of theLord's Prayer.
I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2, "Socrates deemed that we should ask theimmortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant usgood things, because they at any rateknow what isgood for each one whereas when wepray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." This opinion istrue to a certain extent, as to those things which may have anevil result, and whichman may use ill or well, such as "riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to anevil end; honors, which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total wreck of afamily." Nevertheless there are certain goods whichman cannot ill use, because they cannot have anevil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby wemerit it: and these thesaints seek absolutely when theypray, as inPsalm 79:4, "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again inPsalm 118:35, "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."
Reply to Objection 1. Althoughman cannot by himselfknow what he ought topray for, "theSpirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our infirmity," since by inspiring us withholy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Henceour Lord said (John 4:24) thattrue adorers "mustadore . . . in spirit and intruth."
Reply to Objection 2. When in ourprayers we ask for things concerning oursalvation, we conform our will toGod's, of Whom it is written (1 Timothy 2:4) that "He will have allmen to be saved."
Reply to Objection 3.God so invites us to takegood things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devoutprayers.
Objection 1. It would seem thatman ought not to askGod for temporal things when heprays. We seek what we ask for inprayer. But we should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matthew 6:33): "Seek ye . . . first thekingdom of God, and Hisjustice: and all these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked ofGod inprayer.
Objection 2. Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the saying ofMatthew 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when wepray.
Objection 3. Further, byprayer ourmind should be raised up toGod. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the saying of theApostle (2 Corinthians 4:18), "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen areeternal." Thereforeman ought not to askGod for temporal things when heprays.
Objection 4. Further,man ought not to ask ofGod other thangood and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in aspiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not askGod for them in ourprayers.
On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 30:8): "Give me only the necessaries of life."
I answer that, AsAugustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): "It is lawful topray for what it is lawful to desire." Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts ofvirtue, as also thePhilosopher states (Ethic. i, 8).Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that "it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought topray that we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may gain possession of them."
Reply to Objection 1. We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place. HenceAugustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): "When He says that this" (i.e. thekingdom of God) "is to be sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to be sought afterwards, not intime but in importance, this as being ourgood, the other as our need."
Reply to Objection 2. Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (II-II:55:6).
Reply to Objection 3. When ourmind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.
Reply to Objection 4. From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something else, we askGod for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far as they are expedient forsalvation.
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not topray for others. Onpraying we ought to conform to the pattern given byour Lord. Now in theLord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we should notpray for others.
Objection 2. Further,prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of theconditions required forprayer that it may be heard is that onepray for oneself, whereforeAugustine incommenting onJohn 16:23, "If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says (Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when heprays for himself, not when heprays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but 'He will give it you. '" Therefore it would seem that we ought not topray for others, but only for ourselves.
Objection 3. Further, we are forbidden topray for others, if they arewicked, according toJeremiah 7:16, "Therefore do not thenpray for this people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On the other hand we are not bound topray for thegood, since they are heard when theypray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought not topray for others.
On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another, that you may be saved."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), when wepray we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desiregood things not only for ourselves, but also for others: for this isessential to the love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (II-II:25:1 andII-II:25:2;II-II:27:2;II-II:31:1). Thereforecharity requires us topray for others. HenceChrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [Opus Imperfectum,falsely ascribed toSt. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us topray for ourselves, fraternalcharity urges us topray for others: and theprayer that fraternalcharity proffers is sweeter toGod than that which is the outcome ofnecessity."
Reply to Objection 1. AsCyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because theMaster of unity did not wish us topray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He wished each one topray for all, even as He Himself bore all in one."
Reply to Objection 2. It is acondition ofprayer that onepray for oneself: not as though it werenecessary in order thatprayer bemeritorious, but as beingnecessary in order thatprayer may not fail in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that wepray for another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to hissalvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the part of theperson we arepraying for, according toJeremiah 15:1, "IfMoses and Samuel shall stand before Me, Mysoul is not towards this people." And yet theprayer will bemeritorious for theperson whoprays thus out ofcharity, according toPsalm 34:13, "Myprayer shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward," as thegloss expounds it.
Reply to Objection 3. We ought topray even for sinners, that they may beconverted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance inholiness. Yet those whopray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate, according toEcclesiastes 7:14, "Noman can correct whomGod hath despised." Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): "He thatknoweth his brother tosin asin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him, whosinneth not to death." Now just as the benefit of correction must not be refused to anyman so long as he lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, asAugustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too noman should be denied the help ofprayer.
We ought also topray for the just for three reasons: First, because theprayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore agloss onRomans 15:30, "Help me in yourprayers," says: "TheApostle rightly tells the lesser brethren topray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for theprayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which is possible to be obtained byprayer. Secondly, that many may thankGod for thegraces conferred on the just, whichgraces conduce to the profit of many, according to theApostle (2 Corinthians 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need theprayers of the less perfect.
Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not topray for our enemies. According toRomans 15:4, "what things soever were written, were written for our learning." NowHoly Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; thus it is written (Psalm 6:11): "Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very speedily [Vulgate: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']." Therefore we too shouldpray against rather than for our enemies.
Objection 2. Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. Butholy men seek vengeance of their enemies according toApocalypse 6:10, "How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their enemies, according toPsalm 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge." Therefore we should notpray for our enemies, but against them.
Objection 3. Further,man'sdeed should not be contrary to hisprayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else allwars would be unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (II-II:40:1). Therefore we should notpray for our enemies.
On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 5:44): "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you."
I answer that, Topray for another is anact ofcharity, as stated above (Article 7). Wherefore we are bound topray for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise oncharity (II-II:25:9), how we are bound to love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them theirnature, not theirsin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them in theindividual is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness of themind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in theindividual and to help him in a case ofnecessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one's enemies absolutely in theindividual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection.
In like manner it is a matter ofobligation that we should not exclude our enemies from the generalprayers which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not ofobligation, topray for them individually, except in certain special cases.
Reply to Objection 1. The imprecations contained inHoly Writ may be understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of theprophets "to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," asAugustine states [De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21. Secondly, in the sense that certain temporalevils are sometimes inflicted byGod on thewicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom ofsin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroyingsin by the correction ofmen. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divinejustice with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate insin.
Reply to Objection 2. AsAugustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), "themartyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom ofsin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "theirprayer for vengeance is expressed not in words but in theirminds, even as the blood ofAbel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Divinejustice.
Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be restrained fromsin: and this is for their owngood and for thegood of others. Consequently it is even lawful inpraying to ask that temporalevils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their ways. Thusprayer anddeed will not be contrary to one another.
Objection 1. It would seem that the seven petitions of theLord's Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be hallowed which is alwaysholy. But the name ofGod is alwaysholy, according toLuke 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is everlasting, according toPsalm 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages." Again,God'swill is always fulfilled, according toIsaiah 46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the name ofGod to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and for "Hiswill to be done."
Objection 2. Further, one must withdraw fromevil before attaininggood. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the attainment ofgood to be set forth before those relating to the removal ofevil.
Objection 3. Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now the chiefgift ofGod is theHoly Ghost, and thosegifts that we receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, since they do not correspond to thegifts of theHoly Ghost.
Objection 4. Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in theLord's Prayer, as appears from theeleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.
Objection 5. Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevolence. NowGod forestalls us by His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" (1 John 4:19). Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our "Father Who art inheaven," which seem to indicate a desire to winGod's benevolence.
On the contrary, The authority ofChrist, who composed thisprayer, suffices.
I answer that, TheLord's Prayer is most perfect, because, asAugustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if wepray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in thisprayer ofour Lord." For sinceprayer interprets our desires, as it were, beforeGod, then alone is it right to ask for something in ourprayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in theLord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that thisprayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the end. Now our end isGod towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing theglory ofGod, secondly, by willing to enjoy Hisglory. The first belongs to the love whereby we loveGod in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves inGod. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by which we ask to come to theglory of His kingdom.
To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its verynature, in another way,accidentally. Of its verynature thegood which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and principally, according to themerit whereby wemerit beatitude by obeyingGod, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as it is inheaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping us tomerit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable toman, and in which all the othersacraments are contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, asAugustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since theEucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal," asJerome expounds it.
We are directed to beatitudeaccidentally by the removal of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First, there issin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according to1 Corinthians 6:9-10, "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall possess thekingdom of God"; and to this refer the words, "Forgive us our trespasses." Secondly, there istemptation which hinders us from keepingGod's will, and to this we refer when we say: "And lead us not intotemptation," whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be conquered bytemptation, which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, "Deliver us fromevil."
Reply to Objection 1. AsAugustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean thatGod's name is notholy, but we ask that men may treat it as aholy thing," and this pertains to the diffusion ofGod'sglory among men. When we say, "Thy kingdom come, we do not imply thatGod is not reigning now," but "we excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign therein," asAugustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy commandments be obeyed' on earth as inheaven, i.e. bymen as well as byangels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four, according toAugustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the present life.
Reply to Objection 2. Sinceprayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of desire orintention, where the end precedes the things that are directed to the end, and attainment ofgood precedes removal ofevil.
Reply to Objection 3.Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to thegifts andbeatitudes. He says: "If it is fearGod whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask thatGod's name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it isknowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, let uspray that Hiswill be done, for thus we shall mourn no more. If it isfortitude whereby blessed ere they that hunger, let uspray that our daily bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let uspray lest we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the occasion of ourtemptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children ofGod, let uspray to be delivered fromevil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very fact become the free children ofGod."
Reply to Objection 4. According toAugustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke included not seven but five petitions in theLord's Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because, to wit, thewill ofGod tends chiefly to this—that we come to theknowledge of Hisholiness and to reign together with Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us fromevil," is omitted by Luke, so that each one mayknow himself to be delivered fromevil if he be not led intotemptation.
Reply to Objection 5.Prayer is offered up toGod, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of Hischarity in our regard, whereby he wills ourgood—wherefore we say: "Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it—wherefore we say: "Who art inheaven."
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer is not proper to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son andHoly Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them topray: for the Son said (John 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulgate: 'the'] Father," and theApostle says of theHoly Ghost (Romans 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us."
Objection 2. Angels are above rational creatures, since they areintellectualsubstances. Nowprayer is becoming to theangels, wherefore we read in thePsalm 96:7: "Adore Him, all you Hisangels." Thereforeprayer is not proper to the rational creature.
Objection 3. Further, the same subject is fitted topray as is fitted to call uponGod, since this consists chiefly inprayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call uponGod, according toPsalm 146:9, "Who giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him." Thereforeprayer is not proper to the rational creatures.
On the contrary,Prayer is anact ofreason, as stated above (Article 1). But the rational creature is so called from hisreason. Thereforeprayer is proper to the rational creature.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1)prayer is anact ofreason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is anact ofreason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordinglyprayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Thereforeprayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature.
Reply to Objection 1. Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of theirnature, whereasprayer belongs to one who receives throughgrace. The Son is said to ask orpray in respect of His assumed, i.e. Hishuman,nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and theHoly Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated inI:79:8,intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Henceintellectual creatures which are theangels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. On this senseprayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.
Reply to Objection 3. The young ravens are said to call uponGod, on account of thenatural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divinegoodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obeyGod, on account of thenatural instinct whereby they are moved byGod.
Objection 1. It would seem that thesaints inheaven do notpray for us. Aman's action is moremeritorious for himself than for others. But thesaints inheaven do notmerit for themselves, neither do theypray for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither therefore do theypray for us.
Objection 2. Further, thesaints conform their will toGod perfectly, so that they will only whatGod wills. Now whatGod wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for thesaints topray for us.
Objection 3. Further, just as thesaints inheaven are above, so are those inPurgatory, for they can no longersin. Now those inPurgatory do notpray for us, on the contrary wepray for them. Therefore neither do thesaints inheavenpray for us.
Objection 4. Further, if thesaints inheavenpray for us, theprayers of the highersaints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to implore the help of the lowersaints'prayers but only of those of the highersaints.
Objection 5. Further, thesoul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore thesouls of thesaintspray for us, so long as they are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call uponSaint Peter, but on hissoul, topray for us: yet theChurch does the contrary. Thesaints therefore do notpray for us, at least before theresurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Maccabees 15:14): "This is . . . he thatprayeth much for the people, and for all theholy city,Jeremias theprophet ofGod."
I answer that, AsJerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), theerror of Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we canpray one for another; but that after we are dead, none of ourprayers for others can be heard, seeing that not even themartyrs'prayers are granted when theypray for their blood to be avenged." But this is absolutelyfalse, because, sinceprayers offered for others proceed fromcharity, as stated above (Articles7 and8), the greater thecharity of thesaints inheaven, the more theypray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped byprayers: and the more closely they are united toGod, the more are theirprayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said ofChrist (Hebrews 7:25): "Going toGod by His own power . . . to make intercession for us" [Vulgate: 'He is able to save for ever them that come toGod by Him, always living to make intercession for us.']. HenceJerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If theapostles andmartyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, canpray for others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and triumph."
Reply to Objection 1. Thesaints inheaven, since they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the body'sglory, and for this theypray. But theypray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and theirprayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previousmerits and throughGod's acceptance.
Reply to Objection 2. Thesaints impetrate what everGod wishes to take place through theirprayers: and theypray for that which they deem will be granted through theirprayers according toGod's will.
Reply to Objection 3. Those who are inPurgatory though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in acondition topray, but rather in acondition that requires us topray for them.
Reply to Objection 4. It isGod's will that inferior beings should be helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought topray not only to the higher but also to the lowersaints; else we should have to implore the mercy ofGod alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime thatprayers addressed to asaint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because he is implored with greater devotion, or becauseGod wishes to makeknown his sanctity.
Reply to Objection 5. It is because thesaints while livingmerited topray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they wereknown in this life, and by which they are betterknown to us: and also in order to indicate ourbelief in theresurrection, according to the saying ofExodus 3:6, "I am theGod ofAbraham," etc.
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above (Article 4),prayer is addressed chiefly toGod. NowGodknows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocalprayer.
Objection 2. Further,prayer should liftman's mind toGod, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 2). But words, like other sensible objects, preventman from ascending toGod bycontemplation. Therefore we should not use words in ourprayers.
Objection 3. Further,prayer should be offered toGod in secret, according toMatthew 6:6, "But thou, when thou shaltpray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door,pray to thy Father in secret." Butprayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Thereforeprayer should not be vocal.
On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 141:2): "I cried to the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."
I answer that,Prayer is twofold, common andindividual. Commonprayer is that which is offered toGod by the ministers of theChurch representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such likeprayer should come to theknowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocalprayer. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of theChurch should say theseprayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to theknowledge of all.
On the other handindividualprayer is that which is offered by any singleperson, whether hepray for himself or for others; and it is notessential to such aprayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed in such likeprayers for three reasons. First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby themind of thepersonpraying is raised toGod, because by means of external signs, whether of words or ofdeeds, thehuman mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. HenceAugustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase ofholy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such like signs when they help to excite themind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede themind we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Psalm 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Samuel 1:13) that "she spoke in her heart." Secondly, the voice is used inpraying as though to pay a debt, so thatman may serveGod with all that he has fromGod, that is to say, not only with hismind, but also with his body: and this applies toprayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written (Hosea 14:3): "Take away alliniquity, and receive thegood: and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse to vocalprayer, through a certain overflow from thesoul into the body, through excess of feeling, according toPsalm 15:9, "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."
Reply to Objection 1. Vocalprayer is employed, not in order to tellGod something He does notknow, but in order to lift up themind of thepersonpraying or of otherpersons toGod.
Reply to Objection 2. Words about other matters distract themind and hinder the devotion of those whopray: but words signifying some object of devotion lift up themind, especially one that is less devout.
Reply to Objection 3. AsChrysostom says [Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectumfalsely ascribed toSt. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one topray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when youpray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet, "according toAugustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not wrong to be seen bymen, but to do this or that in order to be seen bymen."
Objection 1. It would seem that attention is anecessarycondition ofprayer. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they thatadore Him mustadore Him in spirit and intruth." Butprayer is not in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is anecessarycondition ofprayer.
Objection 2. Further,prayer is "the ascent of themind toGod" [Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24. But themind does not ascend toGod if theprayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is anecessarycondition ofprayer.
Objection 3. Further, it is anecessarycondition ofprayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander whilepraying he is not free ofsin, for he seems to make light ofGod; even as if he were to speak to anotherman without attending to what he was saying. HenceBasil says [De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and thither: because he thatprays thus not only will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provokeGod toanger." Therefore it would seem anecessarycondition ofprayer that it should be attentive.
On the contrary, Evenholy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of themind when theypray, according toPsalm 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken me."
I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocalprayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing isnecessary in two ways. First, a thing isnecessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is absolutelynecessary forprayer. Secondly, a thing is said to benecessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect ofprayer is threefold. The first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened bycharity, and this ismerit. On order to realize this effect, it is notnecessary thatprayer should be attentive throughout; because the force of the originalintention with which one sets aboutpraying renders the wholeprayermeritorious, as is the case with othermeritorious acts. The second effect ofprayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the originalintention, to whichGod looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the originalintention is lacking,prayer lacks bothmerit and impetration: because, asGregory [Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not theprayer of those who pay no attention to theirprayer." The third effect ofprayer is that which it produces at once; this is thespiritual refreshment of themind, and for this effect attention is anecessarycondition: wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 14:14): "If Ipray in a tongue . . . my understanding is without fruit."
It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocalprayer: one which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, which attends to the end ofprayer, namely,God, and to the thing we arepraying for. That last kind of attention is mostnecessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby themind is fixed onGod, is sometimes so strong that themind forgets all other things, asHugh of St. Victor states [De Modo Orandi ii].
Reply to Objection 1. Topray in spirit and intruth is to set aboutpraying through the instigation of theSpirit, even though afterwards themind wander through weakness.
Reply to Objection 2. Thehuman mind is unable to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness ofnature, becausehuman weakness weighs down thesoul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, whilepraying, themind ascends toGod bycontemplation, of a sudden it wanders off through weakness.
Reply to Objection 3. Purposely to allow one's mind to wander inprayer issinful and hinders theprayer from having fruit. It is against this thatAugustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When youprayGod with psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not depriveprayer of its fruit. HenceBasil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you are sotruly weakened bysin that you are unable topray attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, andGod will pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty."
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer should not be continual. It is written (Matthew 6:7): "When you arepraying, speak not much." Now one whoprays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocalprayer. Thereforeprayer should not last a long time.
Objection 2. Further,prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all theholier according as it is centered on one thing, according toPsalm 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." Therefore the shorterprayer is, the more is it acceptable toGod.
Objection 3. Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed byGod, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according toExodus 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should perish." ButGod has fixed for us the limits ofprayer by instituting theLord's Prayer (Matthew 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong ourprayer beyond its limits.
Objection 4.On the contrary, It would seem that we ought topray continually. Forour Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always topray, and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thessalonians 5:17): "Pray without ceasing."
I answer that, We may speak aboutprayer in two ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in itscause. Thecause ofprayer is the desire ofcharity, from whichprayer ought to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for thevirtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out ofcharity; and we ought to "do all things to theglory ofGod" (1 Corinthians 10:31). From this point of viewprayer ought to be continual: whereforeAugustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope andcharity are by themselves aprayer of continual longing." Butprayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, asAugustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "wepray toGod with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." Now thequantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance thequantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming thatprayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer withoutcausing weariness, it should be discontinued. WhereforeAugustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren inEgypt make frequent but very shortprayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is sonecessary inprayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in privateprayers by considering the attention of thepersonpraying, so too, in publicprayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.
Reply to Objection 1. AsAugustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "topray with many words is not the same as topray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written thatour Lord passed the whole night inprayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in order to set us an example." Further on he says: "Whenpraying say little, yetpray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much inprayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas topray much is to knock at the door of Him wepray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech."
Reply to Objection 2. Length ofprayer consists, not inpraying for many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.
Reply to Objection 3.Our Lord instituted thisprayer, not that we might use no other words when wepray, but that in ourprayers we might have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them.
Reply to Objection 4. One maypray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or throughpraying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in theperson whoprays—because he remains more devout even afterpraying, or in some otherperson—as when by his kindness a man incites another topray for him, even after he himself has ceasedpraying.
Objection 1. It would seem thatprayer is notmeritorious. Allmerit proceeds fromgrace. Butprayer precedesgrace, since evengrace is obtained by means ofprayer according toLuke 11:13, "(How much more) will your Father fromheaven give thegood Spirit to them that ask Him!" Thereforeprayer is not ameritorious act.
Objection 2. Further, ifprayermerits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought inprayer. Yet it does not alwaysmerit this, because even thesaints'prayers are frequently not heard; thusPaul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Thereforeprayer is not ameritorious act.
Objection 3. Further,prayer is based chiefly onfaith, according toJames 1:6, "But let him ask infaith, nothing wavering." Nowfaith is not sufficient formerit, as instanced in those who have lifelessfaith. Thereforeprayer is not ameritorious act.
On the contrary, Agloss on the words ofPsalm 34:13, "Myprayer shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if myprayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward." Now reward is not due save tomerit. Thereforeprayer ismeritorious.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 13)prayer, besidescausingspiritual consolation at thetime ofpraying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Nowprayer, like any othervirtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds fromcharity as its root, the proper object of which is theeternalgood that wemerit to enjoy. Yetprayer proceeds fromcharity through the medium of religion, of whichprayer is an act, as stated above (Article 3), and with the concurrence of othervirtues requisite for thegoodness ofprayer, viz.humility andfaith. For the offering ofprayer itself toGod belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing. that wepray to be accomplished belongs tocharity.Faith isnecessary in reference toGod to Whom wepray; that is, we need tobelieve that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility isnecessary on the part of thepersonpraying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too isnecessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first act and anecessarycondition of all its secondary acts, as stated above (II-II:82:1 andII-II:82:2).
As to its efficacy in impetrating,prayer derives this from thegrace ofGod to Whom wepray, and Who instigates us topray. WhereforeAugustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to ask, unless He were willing to give"; andChrysostomCf. Catena Aurea ofSt. Thomas onLuke 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words ofChrysostom says: "He never refuses to grant ourprayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint inpraying."
Reply to Objection 1. Neitherprayer nor any othervirtuous act ismeritorious withoutsanctifying grace. And yet even thatprayer which impetratessanctifying grace proceeds from somegrace, as from a gratuitousgift, since the very act ofpraying is "agift ofGod," asAugustine states (De Persever. xxiii).
Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes themerit ofprayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object ofmerit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition ofprayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above (Articles6 and7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do notmerit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we losemerit for instance if we ask ofGod the accomplishment of somesin, which would be an impiousprayer. And sometimes it is notnecessary forsalvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he whoprays maymeriteternal life bypraying, yet he does notmerit to obtain what he asks for. HenceAugustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He who faithfullypraysGod for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physicianknows better than the sickman what isgood for the disease." For this reason, too,Paul was not heard when heprayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, wepray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being conducive tosalvation, wemerit it not only bypraying, but also by doing othergooddeeds: therefore without anydoubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time," according toAugustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. WhereforeBasil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was notgood for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignlymeriteternal life for another, as stated above (I-II:114:6), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignlymerit for another things that pertain toeternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when wepray for others, as stated above (Article 7, Replies to 2 and 3). Hence it is that fourconditions are laid down; namely, to ask—"for ourselves—thingsnecessary forsalvation—piously—perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.
Reply to Objection 3.Prayer depends chiefly onfaith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly oncharity, but for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is throughfaith thatman comes toknow ofGod's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whenceprayer impetrates what it asks for.
Objection 1. It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing fromGod by theirprayers. It is written (John 9:31): "Weknow thatGod doth not hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying ofProverbs 28:9, "He that turneth away his ears from hearing thelaw, hisprayer shall be an abomination." Now an abominableprayer impetrates nothing fromGod. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing fromGod.
Objection 2. Further, the just impetrate fromGod what theymerit, as stated above (Article 15, Reply to Objection 2). But sinners cannotmerit anything since they lackgrace andcharity which is the "power ofgodliness," according to agloss on2 Timothy 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed ofgodliness, but denying the power thereof." and so theirprayer is impious, and yet piety it required in order thatprayer may be impetrative, as stated above (Article 15, Reply to Objection 2). Therefore sinners impetrate nothing by theirprayers.
Objection 3. Further,ChrysostomHom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectumfalsely ascribed toSt. John Chrysostom says: "The Father is unwilling to hear theprayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in theprayer inspired byChrist we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do not observe the form ofprayer instituted byChrist.
On the contrary,Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "IfGod were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner"; andChrysostom [Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say whether he be righteous orsinful."
I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: hisnature whichGod loves, and thesin which Hehates. Accordingly when a sinnerprays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with asinful desire,God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper intosin. For "God refuses in mercy what He grants inanger," asAugustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other handGod hears the sinner'sprayer if it proceed from agoodnatural desire, not out ofjustice, because the sinner does notmerit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [Cf.Article 15, Reply to Objection 1], provided however he fulfil the fourconditions given above, namely, that he beseech for himself thingsnecessary forsalvation, piously and perseveringly.
Reply to Objection 1. AsAugustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blindman before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there istruth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also the sinner'sprayer is said to be an abomination.
Reply to Objection 2. There can be no godliness in the sinner'sprayer as though hisprayer were quickened by ahabit ofvirtue: and yet hisprayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so a man who has not thehabit ofjustice is able to will somethingjust, as stated above (II-II:59:2). And though hisprayer is notmeritorious, it can be impetrative, becausemerit depends onjustice, whereas impetration rests ongrace.
Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Article 7, Reply to Objection 1) theLord's Prayer is pronounced in the commonperson of the wholeChurch: and so if anyone say theLord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him personally: for they aretrue as referred to theperson of theChurch, from which he is excluded bymerit, and consequently he is deprived of the fruit of hisprayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore hisprayers are heard, according toSirach 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thysins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest."
Objection 1. It would seem that the parts ofprayer are unfittingly described as supplications,prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according toOrigen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part ofprayer.
Objection 2. Further, according toDamascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "topray is to ask becoming things ofGod." Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."
Objection 3. Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.
On the contrary, suffices the authority of theApostle (1 Timothy 2:1).
I answer that, Threeconditions are requisite forprayer. First, that theperson whoprays should approachGod Whom heprays: this is signified in the word "prayer," becauseprayer is "the raising up of one's mind toGod." The second is that there should be a petition, and this is signified in the word "intercession." On this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is "intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped byGod, or we may simply indicate a fact, as inJohn 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The thirdcondition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part ofGod, or on the part of theperson who asks. The reason of impetration on the part ofGod is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according toDaniel 9:17-18, "For Thy own sake, incline, OGod, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication" [obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for impetration on the part of theperson who asks is "thanksgiving"; since "through giving thanks for benefits received wemerit to receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect [Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence agloss on1 Timothy 2:1 says that "in the Mass, theconsecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that "prayers are in theconsecration itself," in which especially themind should be raised up toGod; and that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end."
We may notice these four things in several of theChurch's collects. Thus in the collect ofTrinity Sunday the words, "AlmightyeternalGod" belong to the offering up ofprayer toGod; the words, "Who hast given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, "grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end, "ThroughOur Lord," etc. belong to supplication.
In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: "Supplication is bewailing one'ssins;prayer is vowing something toGod; intercession ispraying for others; thanksgiving is offered by themind toGod in ineffableecstasy." The first explanation, however, is the better.
Reply to Objection 1. "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.
Reply to Objection 2. "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly the ascent toGod.
Reply to Objection 3. Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded byprayer whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: andprayer is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consideration ofGod'sgoodness we dare approach Him.