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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem that the object offaith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object offaith is that which is proposed to us to bebelieved. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to bebelieved, but also things concerningChrist'shumannature, and thesacraments of theChurch, and thecondition of creatures. Therefore the object offaith is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2. Further,faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained inHoly Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Thereforefaith also is about all things contained inHoly Writ. But there are many things therein, concerningman and other creatures. Therefore the object offaith is not only the First Truth, but alsocreatedtruth.
Objection 3. Further,faith is condivided withcharity, as stated above (I-II:62:3). Now bycharity we love not onlyGod, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object ofFaith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary,Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the simple and everlastingtruth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object offaith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitivehabit includes two things: first, that which isknown materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it isknown, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what isknown materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions areknown.
Accordingly if we consider, infaith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For thefaith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it isrevealed byGod. Hence the mean on whichfaith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to whichfaith assents, they include not onlyGod, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent offaith, except as bearing some relation toGod, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation,man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment ofGod. Consequently from this point of view also the object offaith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes underfaith except in relation toGod, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1. Things concerningChrist'shumannature, and thesacraments of theChurch, or any creatures whatever, come underfaith, in so far as by them we are directed toGod, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained inHoly Writ.
Reply to Objection 3.Charity also loves our neighbor on account ofGod, so that its object, properly speaking, isGod, as we shall show further on (II-II:25:1.
Objection 1. It would seem that the object offaith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object offaith is the First Truth, as stated above (Article 1). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object offaith is not something complex.
Objection 2. Further, the exposition offaith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein thatGod is almighty, but: "Ibelieve inGod . . . almighty." Therefore the object offaith is not a proposition but a thing.
Objection 3. Further,faith is succeeded by vision, according to1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now Iknow in part; but then I shallknow even as I amknown." But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore thefaith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary,Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems thatfaith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thingknown is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to thehumanintellect is toknow thetruth by synthesis and analysis, as stated inI:85:5. Hence things that are simple in themselves, areknown by theintellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divineintellectknows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object offaith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which isbelieved, and thus the object offaith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we havefaith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object offaith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount oftruth.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the object offaith on the part of the thingbelieved.
Reply to Objection 2. The symbol mentions the things about whichfaith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to haveknowledge about things through their means, so is it infaith.
Reply to Objection 3. The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to1 John 3:2: "Weknow that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, byfaith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.
Objection 1. It would seem that somethingfalse can come underfaith. Forfaith is condivided with hope andcharity. Now somethingfalse can come under hope, since many hope to haveeternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said ofcharity, for many are loved as beinggood, who, nevertheless, are notgood. Therefore somethingfalse can be the object offaith.
Objection 2. Further,Abrahambelieved thatChrist would be born, according toJohn 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after thetime ofAbraham,God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that whatAbrahambelieved aboutChrist would have beenfalse. Therefore the object offaith can be somethingfalse.
Objection 3. Further, the ancientsbelieved in the future birth ofChrist, and many continued so tobelieve, until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when onceChrist was born, even before He began to preach, it wasfalse thatChrist was yet to be born. Therefore somethingfalse can come underfaith.
Objection 4. Further, it is a matter offaith, that one shouldbelieve that thetrue Body ofChrist is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightlyconsecrated, and that there was notChrist'strue Body there, but only bread. Therefore somethingfalse can come underfaith.
On the contrary, Novirtue that perfects theintellect is related to thefalse, considered as theevil of theintellect, as thePhilosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Nowfaith is avirtue that perfects theintellect, as we shall show further on (II-II:4:5). Therefore nothingfalse can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power,habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot beknown save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (Article 1) that the formal aspect of the object offaith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come underfaith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothingfalse can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, norevil undergoodness. It follows therefore that nothingfalse can come underfaith.
Reply to Objection 1. Since thetrue is thegood of theintellect, but not of theappetitive power, it follows that allvirtues which perfect theintellect, exclude thefalse altogether, because it belongs to thenature of avirtue to bear relation to thegood alone. On the other hand thosevirtues which perfect theappetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude thefalse, for it is possible to act in accordance withjustice ortemperance, while having afalse opinion about what one is doing. Therefore, asfaith perfects theintellect, whereas hope andcharity perfect theappetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anythingfalse come under hope, for a man hopes to obtaineternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help ofgrace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtaineternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs tocharity to loveGod, wherever He may be; so that it matters not tocharity, whetherGod be in theindividual whom we love forGod's sake.
Reply to Objection 2. That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was possible even afterAbraham's time, but in so far as it stands inGod's foreknowledge, it has a certainnecessity of infallibility, as explained inI:14:13 andI:14:15: and it is thus that it comes underfaith. Hence in so far as it comes underfaith, it cannot befalse.
Reply to Objection 3. AfterChrist's birth, tobelieve in Him, was tobelieve inChrist's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to theirfaith, but to ahuman conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have afalse opinion through ahuman conjecture, but it is quite impossible for afalse opinion to be the outcome offaith.
Reply to Objection 4. Thefaith of the believer is not directed to such and suchaccidents of bread, but to the fact that thetrue body ofChrist is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightlyconsecrated. Hence if it be not rightlyconsecrated, it does not follow that anythingfalse comes underfaith.
Objection 1. It would seem that the object offaith is something seen. ForOur Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hastbelieved." Therefore vision andfaith regard the same object.
Objection 2. Further, theApostle, while speaking of theknowledge offaith, says (1 Corinthians 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore what isbelieved is seen.
Objection 3. Further,faith is aspiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Thereforefaith is of things seen.
Objection 4. Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," asAugustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). Butfaith is of things heard, according toRomans 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Thereforefaith is of things seen.
On the contrary, TheApostle says (Hebrews 11:1) that "faith is the evidence of things that appear not."
I answer that,Faith implies assent of theintellect to that which isbelieved. Now theintellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which isknown either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by thehabit of understanding), or through something else alreadyknown (as in the case of conclusions which are held by thehabit of science). Secondly theintellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turnsvoluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied bydoubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there becertainty and no fear of the other side, there will befaith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move theintellect or the senses toknowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neitherfaith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by theintellect.
Reply to Objection 1. Thomas "saw one thing, andbelieved another" [St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, andbelieving Him to beGod, he made profession of hisfaith, saying: "My Lord and myGod."
Reply to Objection 2. Those things which come underfaith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen andbelieved at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would notbelieve unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to bebelieved.
Reply to Objection 3. The light offaith makes us see what webelieve. For just as, by thehabits of the othervirtues,man sees what is becoming to him in respect of thathabit, so, by thehabit offaith, thehuman mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a rightfaith, and not to assent to others.
Reply to Objection 4. Hearing is of words signifying what is offaith, but not of the things themselves that arebelieved; hence it does not follow that these things are seen.
Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are offaith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there isignorance, sinceignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not inignorance of those things we have tobelieve, sinceignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to1 Timothy 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are offaith can be an object of science.
Objection 2. Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are offaith. Therefore such things can be an object of science.
Objection 3. Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain matters offaith have been demonstrated by thephilosophers, such as theExistence and Unity ofGod, and so forth. Therefore things that are offaith can be an object of science.
Objection 4. Further, opinion is further from science thanfaith is, sincefaith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Thereforefaith and science can be about the same object also.
On the contrary,Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not offaith, but of perception." Therefore things that are offaith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be nofaith about things which are an object of science.
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.
Now as stated above (Article 4), it is impossible that one and the same thing should bebelieved and seen by the sameperson. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and ofbelief for the sameperson. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, isbelieved by another: since we hope to see some day what we nowbelieve about theTrinity, according to1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision theangels possess already; so that what webelieve, they see. On like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientificknowledge for oneman, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for anotherman, an object offaith, because he does notknow it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to bebelieved equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are offaith simply. Consequentlyfaith and science are not about the same things.
Reply to Objection 1. Unbelievers are inignorance of things that are offaith, for neither do they see orknow them in themselves, nor do theyknow them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand,know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light offaith which makes them see that they ought tobelieve them, as stated above (Article 4, Replies to 2 and 3).
Reply to Objection 2. The reasons employed byholy men toprove things that are offaith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to ourfaith is not impossible, or else they areproofs drawn from the principles offaith, i.e. from the authority ofHoly Writ, asDionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as wellproved in the eyes of thefaithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again,theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (I:1:2).
Reply to Objection 3. Things which can beproved by demonstration are reckoned among thearticles of faith, not because they arebelieved simply by all, but because they are anecessary presupposition to matters offaith, so that those who do notknown them by demonstration mustknow them first of all byfaith.
Reply to Objection 4. As thePhilosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have stated above about science andfaith; yet it is possible for one and the sameman to have science andfaith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the sameperson, about one and the same object, toknow one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one mayknow by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, byfaith, theTrinity. On the other hand, in one and the sameman, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion orfaith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it isessential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object offaith, on account of thecertainty offaith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science andfaith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object offaith is the unseen, as stated above.
Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are offaith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained inHoly Writ are matters offaith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distinguish certainarticles of faith.
Objection 2. Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object offaith is one and indivisible, as stated above (Article 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters offaith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of matters offaith into articles.
Objection 3. Further, it has been said by some [Cf.William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisibletruth concerningGod, exacting [arctans] ourbelief." Nowbelief is avoluntary act, since, asAugustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "nomanbelieves against his will." Therefore it seems that matters offaith should not be divided into articles.
On the contrary,Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divinetruth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divinetruth by way of analysis, since things which inGod are one, are manifold in ourintellect. Therefore matters offaith should be divided into articles.
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greekarthron [Cf.William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which theLatin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
Hence matters ofChristianfaith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the object offaith is something unseen in connection withGod, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently anymatter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters areknown or notknown, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing thatGod suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of theResurrection is distinct from the article of thePassion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
Reply to Objection 1. Some things are proposed to ourbelief are in themselves offaith, while others are offaith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as insciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object offaith consists in those things which we hope to see, according toHebrews 11:2: "Faith is thesubstance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things are in themselves offaith, which order us directly toeternal life. Such are theTrinity of Persons inAlmighty God [The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence ofGod, etc.], themystery ofChrist'sIncarnation, and the like: and these are distinctarticles of faith. On the other hand certain things inHoly Writ are proposed to ourbelief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance, thatAbraham had two sons, that a deadman rose again at the touch ofEliseus' bones, and the like, which are related inHoly Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divinemystery or theIncarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles.
Reply to Objection 2. The formal aspect of the object offaith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thingbelieved, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters offaith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters offaith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter offaith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinctarticles of faith, as we saw above.
Reply to Objection 3. This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from theLatin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that althoughfaith is exacted of noman by anecessity of coercion, sincebelief is avoluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by anecessity of end, since "he that cometh toGod mustbelieve that He is," and "withoutfaith it is impossible to pleaseGod," as theApostle declares (Hebrews 11:6).
Objection 1. It would seem that thearticles of faith have not increased in course oftime. Because, as theApostle says (Hebrews 11:1), "faith is thesubstance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to bebelieved.
Objection 2. Further, development has taken place, insciences devised byman, on account of the lack ofknowledge in those who discovered them, as thePhilosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine offaith was not devised byman, but was delivered to us byGod, as stated inEphesians 2:8: "It is thegift ofGod." Since then there can be no lack ofknowledge inGod, it seems thatknowledge of matters offaith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Objection 3. Further, the operation ofgrace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation ofnature. Nownature always makes a beginning with perfect things, asBoethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation ofgrace also began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver thefaith,knew it most perfectly.
Objection 4. Further, just as thefaith ofChrist was delivered to us through theapostles, so too, in theOld Testament, theknowledge offaith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according toDeuteronomy 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now theapostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as agloss says onRomans 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of theSpirit." Therefore it seems thatknowledge of matters offaith has not increased as time went on.
On the contrary,Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "theknowledge of theholy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries ofsalvation."
I answer that, Thearticles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine offaith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based onnaturalreason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as thePhilosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). On like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters offaith, such asGod'sexistence, and Hisprovidence over thesalvation ofman, according toHebrews 11: "He that cometh toGod, mustbelieve that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For theexistence ofGod includes all that webelieve toexist inGodeternally, and in these ourhappiness consists; whilebelief in Hisprovidence includes all those things whichGod dispenses intime, forman'ssalvation, and which are the way to thathappiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thusfaith in theRedemption ofmankind includesbelief in theIncarnation ofChrist, HisPassion and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards thesubstance of thearticles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later havebelieved, was contained, albeit implicitly, in thefaith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articlesbelieved explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some wereknown explicitly which were notknown explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said toMoses (Exodus 6:2-3): "I am theGod ofAbraham, theGod ofIsaac, theGod ofJacob [Vulgate: 'I am the Lord that appeared toAbraham, toIsaac, and toJacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Psalm 118:100): "I have had understanding above ancients": and theApostle says (Ephesians 3:5) that themystery ofChrist, "in other generations was notknown, as it is now revealed to His holyapostles andprophets."
Reply to Objection 1. Among men the same things were always to be hoped for fromChrist. But as they did not acquire this hope save throughChrist, the further they were removed fromChrist in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence theApostle says (Hebrews 11:13): "All these died according tofaith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh toChrist's advent had a more distinctknowledge of thegood things to be hoped for.
Reply to Objection 2. Progress inknowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress inknowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place insciences devised byman. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfectknowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in theknowledge offaith as time went on. Hence theApostle (Galatians 3:24) compares the state of theOld Testament to childhood.
Reply to Objection 3. Twocauses are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, andmatter. On the order of the activecause, the more perfect isnaturally first; and in this waynature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already inexistence. On the other hand, in the order of the materialcause, the imperfect comes first, and in this waynature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation offaith,God is the activecause, having perfectknowledge from alleternity; whileman is likened tomatter in receiving the influx ofGod's action. Hence, among men, theknowledge offaith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of activecauses, through beingdoctors offaith, nevertheless the manifestation of theSpirit is given to such men for the commongood, according to1 Corinthians 12:7; so that theknowledge offaith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in thefaith, so far as wasnecessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate consummation ofgrace was effected byChrist, wherefore thetime of His coming is called the "time of fulness [Vulgate: 'fulness of time']" (Galatians 4:4). Hence those who were nearest toChrist, wherefore before, likeJohn the Baptist, or after, like theapostles, had a fullerknowledge of the mysteries offaith; for even with regard toman's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to thetime of his youth.
Objection 1. It would seem that thearticles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can beknown by demonstration, do not belong tofaith as to an object ofbelief for all, as stated above (Article 5). Now it can beknown by demonstration that there is oneGod; hence thePhilosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many otherphilosophers demonstrated the sametruth. Therefore that "there is oneGod" should not be set down as anarticle of faith.
Objection 2. Further, just as it isnecessary tofaith that we shouldbelieveGod to be almighty, so is it too that we shouldbelieve Him to be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some haveerred. Therefore, among thearticles of faith, mention should have been made ofGod's wisdom andprovidence, even as of His omnipotence.
Objection 3. Further, toknow the Father is the same things as toknow the Son, according toJohn 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the same reason, about theHoly Ghost.
Objection 4. Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of theHoly Ghost. Now there are several articles about the Person of theHoly Ghost, and likewise about the Person of theSon. Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.
Objection 5. Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of theHoly Ghost, so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among thearticles of faith, a place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to theHoly Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by theprophets." Therefore thearticles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Objection 6. Further, the sacrament of theEucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles.
On the contrary stands the authority of theChurch who formulates the articles thus.
I answer that, As stated above (Articles4 and6), tofaith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy ineternal life, and by which we are brought toeternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen ineternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possesshappiness; and themystery ofChrist'sIncarnation, "by Whom we have access" to theglory of the sons ofGod, according toRomans 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3): "This iseternal life: that they mayknow Thee, the . . .trueGod, andJesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first distinction in matters offaith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to themystery ofChrist'shumannature, which is the "mystery ofgodliness" (1 Timothy 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to ourbelief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order ofnature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order ofgrace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification ofman are included in one article; while the third refers to the order ofglory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning theresurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard toChrist'shumannature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers toChrist's incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to HisPassion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent intohell; the fifth, toHis resurrection; the sixth, to Hisascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have oneknowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. theresurrection of the body, and theglory of thesoul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article.
Reply to Objection 1. Byfaith we hold manytruths aboutGod, which thephilosophers were unable to discover bynaturalreason, for instance Hisprovidence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity ofGod.
Reply to Objection 2. The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated inI:13:8. Now in beings having anintellect, power does not work save by thewill andknowledge. HenceGod's omnipotence includes, in a way, universalknowledge andprovidence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless Heknew them, and exercised Hisprovidence over them.
Reply to Objection 3. We have but oneknowledge of the Father, Son, andHoly Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin,knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, includeknowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being theHoly Ghost. From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall intoerror, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. ForAriusbelieved in the omnipotence andeternity of the Father, but did notbelieve the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. On like manner it wasnecessary to appoint a third article about the Person of theHoly Ghost, against Macedonius. On the same wayChrist's conception and birth, just as theresurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special difficulty.
Reply to Objection 4. It belongs to the Son andHoly Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to bebelieved. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son andHoly Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we stated inI:43:4.
Reply to Objection 5. The sanctification of a creature bygrace, and its consummation byglory, is also effected by thegift ofcharity, which is appropriated to theHoly Ghost, and by thegift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to theHoly Ghost.
Reply to Objection 6. Two things may be considered in the sacrament of theEucharist. One is the fact that it is asacrament, and in this respect it is like the other effects ofsanctifying grace. The other is thatChrist's body ismiraculously contained therein and thus it is included underGod's omnipotence, like all othermiracles which are ascribed toGod's almighty power.
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unsuitable for thearticles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. BecauseHoly Writ is the rule offaith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Deuteronomy 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule offaith, after theHoly Writ had once been published.
Objection 2. Further, according to theApostle (Ephesians 4:5) there is but "onefaith." Now the symbol is a profession offaith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Objection 3. Further, the confession offaith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent tobelieve inGod, but only those who have livingfaith. Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol offaith to be expressed in the words: "Ibelieve in oneGod."
Objection 4. Further, the descent intohell is one of thearticles of faith, as stated above (Article 8). But the descent intohell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
Objection 5. Further,Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, "Youbelieve inGod,believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says: "WebelievePeter orPaul, but we speak only ofbelieving 'in'God." Since then theCatholic Church is merely acreated being, it seems unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy,Catholic and Apostolic Church."
Objection 6. Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule offaith. Now a rule offaith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish thearticles of faith in a symbol.
On the contrary, TheuniversalChurch cannoterr, since she is governed by theHoly Ghost, Who is theSpirit oftruth: for such wasOur Lord's promise to Hisdisciples (John 16:13): "When He, theSpirit oftruth, is come, He will teach you alltruth." Now the symbol is published by the authority of theuniversalChurch. Therefore it contains nothing defective.
I answer that, As theApostle says (Hebrews 11:6), "he that cometh toGod, mustbelieve that He is." Now a man cannotbelieve, unless thetruth be proposed to him that he maybelieve it. Hence the need for thetruth offaith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from thetruth throughignorance of thefaith. It is from its being a collection of maxims offaith that the symbol [The Greeksymballein] takes its name.
Reply to Objection 1. Thetruth offaith is contained inHoly Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather thetruth offaith fromHoly Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require toknow thetruth offaith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it wasnecessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings ofHoly Writ, to be proposed to thebelief of all. This indeed was no addition toHoly Writ, but something taken from it.
Reply to Objection 2. The same doctrine offaith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about thetruth offaith, whenerrors arise, lest thefaith of simple-mindedpersons be corrupted byheretics. It was this that gave rise to thenecessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy ofheretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Reply to Objection 3. The confession offaith is drawn up in a symbol in theperson, as it were, of the wholeChurch, which is united together byfaith. Now thefaith of theChurch is livingfaith; since such is thefaith to be found in all those who are of theChurch not only outwardly but also bymerit. Hence the confession offaith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with livingfaith, so that even if some of the faithful lack livingfaith, they should endeavor to acquire it.
Reply to Objection 4. Noerror about the descent intohell had arisen amongheretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not repeated in thesymbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in thesymbol of the Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (Reply to Objection 2).
Reply to Objection 5. If we say: "'In' theholyCatholic Church," this must be taken as verified in so far as ourfaith is directed to theHoly Ghost, Who sanctifies theChurch; so that the sense is: "Ibelieve in theHoly Ghost sanctifying theChurch." But it is better and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "theholyCatholic Church," as Pope Leo [Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.
Reply to Objection 6. Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of thesymbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after thefaith was already spread abroad, and when theChurch was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand thesymbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at thetime ofpersecution, before thefaith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and futureerrors.
Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to theSovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol offaith. For a new edition of the symbol becomesnecessary in order to explain thearticles of faith, as stated above (Article 9). Now, in theOld Testament, thearticles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of thetruth offaith becoming clearer through greater nearness toChrist, as stated above (Article 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of theNew Law, there is no need for thearticles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of theSovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
Objection 2. Further, noman has the power to do what is forbidden under pain ofanathema by theuniversalChurch. Now it was forbidden under pain ofanathema by theuniversalChurch, to make a new edition of thesymbol. For it is stated in the acts of thefirst council of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after thesymbol of the Nicene council had been read through, theholy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with theHoly Ghost," and this under pain ofanathema.St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451,known as the"Latrocinium" and condemned by thePope. The same was repeated in the acts of thecouncil of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that theSovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of thesymbol.
Objection 3. Further,Athanasius was not theSovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published asymbol which is sung in theChurch. Therefore it does not seem to belong to theSovereign Pontiff any more than to otherbishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of theSovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5. Therefore it belongs to the authority of theSovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol.
I answer that, As stated above (Objection 1), a new edition of the symbol becomesnecessary in order to set aside theerrors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters offaith finally, so that they may be held by all with unshakenfaith. Now this belongs to the authority of theSovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more difficult questions that arise in theChurch are referred," as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 5. Henceour Lord said toPeter whom he madeSovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32): "I haveprayed for thee,"Peter, "that thyfaith fail not, and thou, being onceconverted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but onefaith of the wholeChurch, according to1 Corinthians 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question offaith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the wholeChurch, so that the wholeChurch may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of theSovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the wholeChurch, such as to convoke a general council and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1. Thetruth offaith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching ofChrist and theapostles. But since, according to2 Peter 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines andScriptures to their own destruction, it wasnecessary as time went on to express thefaith more explicitly against theerrors which arose.
Reply to Objection 2. This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for privateindividuals, who have no business to decide matters offaith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a newfaith, but the samefaith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if this becamenecessary through someheresy arising. Consequently this belongs to theSovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Reply to Objection 3.Athanasius drew up a declaration offaith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the wholetruth offaith, it was accepted by the authority of theSovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule offaith.