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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It seems that it is not an effect oflaw to make mengood. For men aregood throughvirtue, sincevirtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is "that which makes its subjectgood." Butvirtue is inman fromGod alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without us," as we stated above (I-II:55:4) in giving the definition ofvirtue. Therefore thelaw does not make mengood.
Objection 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys alaw is due to his beinggood. Therefore inmangoodness is presupposed to thelaw. Therefore thelaw does not make mengood.
Objection 3. Further, Law is ordained to the commongood, as stated above (I-II:90:2). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the business of thelaw to make mengood.
Objection 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as thePhilosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend thegood of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Thereforelaw does not make mengood.
On the contrary, ThePhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to makegood citizens."
I answer that, as stated above (I-II:90:1 ad 2;Answers 3 and 4), alaw is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now thevirtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that thevirtue of the irascible andconcupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "thevirtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as thePhilosopher says (Polit. i). But everylaw aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect oflaw is to lead its subjects to their propervirtue: and sincevirtue is "that which makes its subjectgood," it follows that the proper effect oflaw is to make those to whom it is given,good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if theintention of the lawgiver is fixed ontruegood, which is the commongood regulated according to Divinejustice, it follows that the effect of thelaw is to make mengood simply. If, however, theintention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simplygood, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition to Divinejustice; then thelaw does not make mengood simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this waygood is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called agood robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is twofold, as explained above (I-II:63:2), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for itcauses the acquiredvirtue; while it disposes to infusedvirtue, and preserves and fosters it when it alreadyexists. And sincelaw is given for the purpose of directinghuman acts; as far ashuman acts conduce tovirtue, so far doeslaw make mengood. Wherefore thePhilosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make mengood by habituating them togood works."
Reply to Objection 2. It is not always through perfectgoodness ofvirtue that one obeys thelaw, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates ofreason, which is a beginning ofvirtue, as stated above (I-II:63:1).
Reply to Objection 3. Thegoodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; henceAugustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then everyman is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man begood, unless he be well proportionate to the commongood: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the commongood of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens bevirtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for thegood of the community, that the other citizens be so farvirtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence thePhilosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "thevirtue of a sovereign is the same as that of agoodman, but thevirtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of agoodman."
Reply to Objection 4. A tyrannicallaw, through not being according to reason, is not alaw, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion oflaw; and yet in so far as it is something in thenature of alaw, it aims at the citizens' beinggood. For all it has in thenature of alaw consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make themgood, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.
Objection 1. It would seem that the acts oflaw are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and "punishment." For "everylaw is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous.
Objection 2. Further, the effect of alaw is to induce its subjects to begood, as stated above (Article 1). But counsel aims at a highergood than a command does. Therefore it belongs tolaw to counsel rather than to command.
Objection 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man togooddeeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect oflaw, so also is to reward.
Objection 4. Further, theintention of a lawgiver is to make mengood, as stated above (Article 1). But he that obeys thelaw, merely through fear of being punished, is notgood: because "although agooddeed may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," asAugustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore punishment is not a proper effect oflaw.
On the contrary,Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Everylaw either permits something, as: 'A braveman may demand his reward'": or forbids something, as: "Noman may ask aconsecratedvirgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits amurder be put to death."
I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is alaw a dictate ofreason, commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrativesciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of thelaw.
Now the precepts oflaw are concerned withhuman acts, in which thelaw directs, as stated above (Question 90, Articles 1 and 2;I-II:91:4). Again there are three kinds ofhuman acts: for, as stated above (I-II:18:8), some acts aregood generically, viz. acts ofvirtue; and in respect of these the act of thelaw is a precept or command, for "thelaw commands all acts ofvirtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts areevil generically, viz. acts ofvice, and in respect of these thelaw forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of these thelaw permits; and all acts that are either not distinctlygood or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment thatlaw makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect oflaw.
Reply to Objection 1. Just as to cease fromevil is a kind ofgood, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, everylaw is a kind of precept.
Reply to Objection 2. To advise is not a proper act oflaw, but may be within the competency even of a privateperson, who cannot make alaw. Wherefore too theApostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Corinthians 7:12) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect oflaw.
Reply to Objection 3. To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of thelaw, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect oflaw, but only to punish.
Reply to Objection 4. From becoming accustomed to avoidevil and fulfill what isgood, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly,law, even by punishing, leads men on to beinggood.