• To Thomism in the first sense are opposed, e.g., theScotists, who deny that satisfaction is a part of the proximate matter (materia proxima) of theSacrament of Penance. Anti-Thomists, in this sense of the word, reject opinions admittedly taught by St. Thomas.
• To Thomism in the second sense are opposed, e.g. theMolinists, as well as all who defend the moral instrumentalcausality of thesacraments in producing grace against the system of physical instrumentalcausality, the latter being adoctrine of the Thomistic School.

• Theangels and humansouls are without matter, but every material composite being (compositum) has two parts, prime matter and substantial form. In a composite being which has substantial unity and is not merely an aggregate of distinct units, there can be but one substantial form. The substantial form of man is hissoul (anima rationalis) to the exclusion of any othersoul and of any other substantial form. The principle of individuation, for material composites, is matter with its dimensions: without this there can be no merely numerical multiplication: distinction in the form makes specific distinction: hence there cannot be twoangels of the same species.
• The essences of things do not depend on thefree will ofGod, but on Hisintellect, and ultimately on His essence, which is immutable. Thenatural law, being derived from the eternal law, depends on the mind ofGod, ultimately on the essence ofGod; hence it is intrinsically immutable. Some actions are forbidden byGod because they are bad: they are not bad simply because He forbids them [see Zigliara, "Sum. phil." (3 vols., Paris, 1889), ccx, xi, II, M. 23, 24, 25].
• The will moves theintellectquoad exercitium, i.e. in its actual operation: theintellect moves the willquoad specificationem, i.e. by presenting objects to it:nil volitum nisi praecognitum. The beginning of all our acts is the apprehension and desire of good in general (bonum in communi). We desirehappiness (bonum in communi) naturally and necessarily, not by a free deliberate act. Particular goods (bona particularia) we choose freely; and the will is a blind faculty, always following the last practical judgment of theintellect (Zigliara, 51).
• The senses and theintellect are passive, i.e. recipient, faculties; they do not create, but receive (i.e. perceive) their objects (St. Thomas, I, Q. lxxviii, a. 3; Q. lxxix, a. 2; Zigliara, 26, 27). If this principle is borne in mind there is no reason forKant's "Critique of Pure Reason". On the other hand those faculties are not like wax, or the sensitive plate used by photographers, in the sense that they are inert and receive impressions unconsciously. The will controls the exercise of the faculties, and the process of acquiringknowledge is a vital process: the moving cause is always within the living agent.
• The Peripatetic axiom: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu" (Nothing is in theintellect that was not first in the senses), is admitted; but St. Thomas modifies it by saying: first, that, once the sense objects have been perceived, theintellect ascends to theknowledge of higher things, even ofGod; and, secondly, that thesoul knows its own existence by itself (i.e. by its own act), although it knows its own nature only by reflection on its acts. Knowledge begins by sense perception, but the range of theintellect is far beyond that of the senses. In thesoul as soon as it begins to act are found the first principles (prima principia) of allknowledge, not in the form of an objective illumination, but in the form of a subjective inclination to admit them on account of their evidence. As soon as they are proposed we see that they aretrue; there is no more reason for doubting them than there is for denying the existence of the sun when we see it shining (see Zigliara, op. cit., pp. 32-42).
• The direct and primary object of theintellect is the universal, which is prepared and presented to the passiveintellect (intellectus possibilis) by the activeintellect (intellectus agens) which illuminates the phantasmata, ormental images, received through the senses, and divests them of all individuating conditions. This is called abstracting the universalidea from the phantasmata, but the term must not be taken in a materialistic sense. Abstraction is not a transferring of something from one place to another; the illumination causes all material and individuating conditions to disappear, then the universal alone shines out and is perceived by the vital action of theintellect (Q. lxxxiv, a. 4; Q. lxxxv, a. 1, ad lum, 3um, 4um). The process throughout is so vital, and so far elevated above material conditions and modes of action, that the nature of the acts and of the objects apprehended proves thesoul to be immaterial and spiritual.
• Thesoul, by its very nature, isimmortal. Not only is ittrue thatGod will not annihilate thesoul, but from its very nature it will always continue to exist, there being in it no principle of disintegration (Zigliara, p. 9). Hencehumanreason can prove the incorruptibility (i.e.immortality) of thesoul.
• Theexistence of God is not known by an innateidea, it cannot beproved by argumentsa priori ora simultaneo; but it can be demonstrated bya posteriori arguments.Ontologism was never taught by St. Thomas or by Thomists (see Lepidi, "Exam. phil. theol. de ontologismo", Louvain, 1874, c. 19; Zigliara, Theses I, VIII).
• There are no human (i.e. deliberate) acts indifferentin individuo.

• Faith andscience, i.e.knowledge by demonstration, cannot co-exist in the same subject with regard to the same object (Zigliara, O, 32, VII); and the same istrue ofknowledge and opinion.
• The metaphysical essence ofGod consists, according to some Thomists, in theintelligere actualissimum, i.e. fulness of pure intellection, according to others in the perfection ofaseitas, i.e. in dependent existence (Zigliara, Th. VIII, IX).
• Thehappiness ofheaven, formally and in the ultimate analysis, consists in the vision, not in the fruition, ofGod.
• TheDivine attributes are distinguished from the Divine nature and from each other by a virtual distinction, i.e. by adistinctio rationis cum fundamento a parte rei. Thedistinctio actualis formalis ofScotus is rejected.
• In attempting to explain the mystery of the Trinity — in as far as man can conceive it — the relations must be consideredperfectiones simpliciter simplices, i.e. excluding all imperfection. The Holy Ghost would not be distinct from the Son if He did not proceed from the Son as well as from the Father.
• Theangels, being pure spirits, are not, properly speaking, in any place; they are said to be in the place, or in the places, where they exercise their activity (Summa, I, Q. lii, a. 1). Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as anangel passing from place to place; but if anangel wishes to exercise its activity first inJapan and afterwards in America, it can do so in two instants (ofangelic time), and need not pass through the intervening space (Q. liii).St. Thomas does not discuss the question "How manyangels can dance on the point of a needle?" He reminds us that we must not think ofangels as if they were corporeal, and that, for anangel, it makes no difference whether the sphere of his activity be the point of a needle or a continent (Q. lii, a. 2). Manyangels cannot be said to be in the same place at the same time, for this would mean that whilst oneangel is producing an effect others could be producing the same effect at the same time. There can be but oneangel in the same place at the same time (Q. lii, a. 3). Theknowledge of theangels comes throughideas (species) infused byGod (QQ. lv, a.2, lvii, a.2, lviii, a.7). They do not naturallyknow future contingents, the secrets ofsouls, or the mysteries of grace (Q. lvii, aa. 3, 45). Theangels choose eithergood orevil instantly, and with fullknowledge; hence their judgment is naturally final and irrevocable (Q. lxiv, a. 2).
• Man was created in the state ofsanctifying grace. Grace was not due to his nature, butGod granted it to him from the beginning (I, Q. xcv, a. 1). So great was the perfection of man in the state of originaljustice, and so perfect the subjection of his lower faculties to the higher, that his firstsin could not have beena venialsin (I-II:89:3).
• It is more probable that theIncarnation would not have taken place had man notsinned (III, Q. i, a. 3). In Christ there were three kinds ofknowledge: thescientia beata, i.e. theknowledge of things in the Divine Essence; thescientia infusa, i.e. theknowledge of things through infusedideas (species), and thescientia acquisita, i.e. acquired or experimentalknowledge, which was nothing more than the actual experience of things which he alreadyknew. On this last point St. Thomas, in the "Summa" (Q. ix, a. 4), explicitly retracts an opinion which he had once held (III Sent., d. 14, Q. iii, a. 3).
• Allsacraments of the New Law, including confirmation and extreme unction, were instituted immediately byChrist. Circumcision was a sacrament of theOld Law and conferred grace which removed the stain oforiginal sin. The children ofJews or of other unbelievers may not bebaptized without the consent of theirparents (III, Q. lxviii, a. 10; II-II, Q. x, a. 12;Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1481). Contrition, confession, and satisfaction are the proximate matter (materia proxima) of theSacrament of Penance. Thomists hold, against theScotists, that whenTransubstantiation takes place in the Mass the Body of Christ is not made presentper modum adduclionis, i.e. is not brought to the altar, but they do not agree in selecting the term which should be used to express this action (cf.Billuart, "De Euchar.", Diss. i, a. 7). Cardinal Billot holds ("De eccl. sacr.", Rome, 1900, Th. XI, "De euchar.", p. 379) that the best, and the only possible, explanation is the one given by St. Thomas himself: Christ becomes present bytransubstantiation, i.e. by the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of His body (III, Q. lxxv, a. 4; Sent., d. XI, Q. i, a. 1, q. 1). After theconsecration the accidents (accidentia) of thebread andwine are preserved byAlmighty God without a subject (Q. lxxxvii, a. 1). It was on this question that thedoctors ofParis sought enlightenment from St. Thomas (see Vaughan, "Life and Labours of St. Thomas", London, 1872, II, p. 544). The earlier Thomists, following St. Thomas (Suppl., Q. xxxvii, a. 2), taught that the sub-diaconate and the fourminor orders were partialsacraments. Some recent Thomists — e.g., Billot (op. cit., p. 282) and Tanquerey (De ordine, n. 16) — defend this opinion as more probable and more in conformity with the definitions of the councils. The giving of thechalice with wine and of thepaten with bread Thomists generally held to be an essential part ofordination to thepriesthood. Some, however, taught that theimposition of hands was at leastnecessary. On the question ofdivorce under theMosaic Law the disciples of St. Thomas, like thesaint himself (Suppl., Q. lxvii, a. 3), wavered, some holding that adispensation was granted, others teaching thatdivorce was merely tolerated in order to avoid greater evils.

1. The unity of substantial form in composite beings, applied to man, requires that thesoul be the substantial form of the man, so as to exclude even theforma corporeitatis, admitted byHenry of Ghent,Scotus, and others (cf. Zigliara, P. 13;Denzinger-Bannwart, in note to n. 1655).
2. In created beings there is a real distinction between theessentia (essence) and theexistentia (existence); between theessentia and thesubsistentia; between the real relation and its foundation; between thesoul and its faculties; between the several faculties. There can be no medium between adistinctio realis and adistinctio rationis, or conceptual distinction; hence thedistinctio formalis a parte rei ofScotus cannot be admitted. For Thomistic doctrines onfree will,God'sknowledge, etc., see below.

1. In thebeatific visionGod's essence takes the place not only of thespecies impressa, but also of thespecies expressa.
2. All moral virtues, the acquired as well as the infused, in their perfect state, are interconnected.
3. According toBilluart (De pecc., diss. vii, a. 6), it has been a matter of controversy between Thomists whether the malice of a mortalsin is absolutelyinfinite.
4. In choosing a medium between Rigorism and Laxism, the Thomisticschool has been Antiprobabilistic and generally has adopted Probabiliorism. Some defended Equiprobabilism, orProbabilismcum compensatione. Medina andSt. Antoninus are claimed by the Probabilists.
5. Thomistictheologians generally, whilst they defended theinfallibility of the Roman pontiff, denied that thepope had the power to dissolve amatrimonium ratum or to dispense from a solemnvow made toGod. When it was urged that somepopes had granted such favours, they cited other pontiffs who declared that they could not grant them (cf.Billuart, "De matrim.", Diss. v, a. 2), and said, withDominic Soto, "Factum pontificium non facit articulum fidei" (The action of apope does not constitute anarticle of faith, in 4 dist., 27, Q. i, a. 4). Thomists of today are of a different mind, owing to the practice of theChurch.
6. Thehypostatic union, without any additional grace, rendered Christ impeccable. The Word washypostatically united to the blood of Christ and remained united to it, even during the interval between His death andresurrection (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 718). During that same interval the Body of Christ had a transitory form, calledforma cadaverica (Zigliara, P. 16, 17, IV).
7. Thesacraments of the New Law cause grace not only as instrumental moral causes, but by a mode ofcausality which should be called instrumental and physical. In the attrition required in theSacrament of Penance there should be at least a beginning of thelove ofGod; sorrow forsin springing solely from the fear ofhell will not suffice.
8. Manytheologians of the Thomistic School, especially before theCouncil of Trent, opposed thedoctrine of Mary's Immaculate Conception, claiming that in this they were followingSt. Thomas. This, however, has not been the opinion either of the entireschool or of theDominican Order as a body. Father Rouard de Card, in his book "L'ordre des freres precheurs et l'Immaculée Conception "(Brussels, 1864), called attention to the fact that ten thousand professors of the order defended Mary's great privilege. At theCouncil of Trent twenty-fiveDominicanbishops signed a petition for the definition of thedogma. Thousands ofDominicans, in taking degrees at theUniversity of Paris, solemnly pledged themselves to defend the Immaculate Conception.
9. The Thomistic School is distinguished from otherschools oftheology chiefly by its doctrines on the difficult questions relating toGod's action on thefree will of man,God's foreknowledge, grace, andpredestination. In the articles on these subjects will be found an exposition of the different theories advanced by the differentschools in their effort to explain these mysteries, for such they are in reality. As to the value of these theories the following points should be borne in mind:
• No theory has as yet been proposed which avoids all difficulties and solves alldoubts;
• on the main and most difficult of these questions some who are at times listed asMolinists — notablyBellarmine, Francisco Suárez, Francis de Lugo, and, in our own days, Cardinal Billot ("De deo uno et trino", Rome, 1902, Th. XXXII) — agree with the Thomists in defendingpredestinationante praevisa merita.Bossuet, after a long study of the question of physical premotion, adapted the Thomistic opinion ("Du libre arbitre", c. viii).
• Thomists do not claim to be able to explain, except by a general reference toGod's omnipotence, how man remains free under the action ofGod, which they considernecessary in order to preserve and explain the universality ofGod'scausality and the independentcertainty of His foreknowledge. No man can explain, except by a reference toGod'sinfinite power, how the world was created out of nothing, yet we do not on this account deny creation, for weknow that it must be admitted. In like manner the main question put to Thomists in this controversy should be not "How will you explain man's liberty?" but "What are your reasons for claiming so much forGod's action?" If the reasons assigned are insufficient, then one great difficulty is removed, but there remains to be solved the problem ofGod's foreknowledge of man's free acts. If they are valid, then we must accept them with theirnecessary consequences and humbly confess our inability fully to explain how wisdom "reacheth . . . from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1).
• Most important of all, it must be clearly understood and remembered that the Thomistic system onpredestination neither saves fewer nor sends to perdition moresouls than any other system held byCatholictheologians. In regard to the number of theelect there is no unanimity on either side; this is not the question in dispute between theMolinists and the Thomists. The discussions, too often animated and needlessly sharp, turned on this point: How does it happen that, althoughGod sincerely desires thesalvation of all men, some are to be saved, and must thankGod for whatever merits they may have amassed, whilst others will be lost, and willknow that they themselves, and notGod, are to be blamed? — The facts in the case are admitted by allCatholictheologians. The Thomists, appealing to the authority ofSt. Augustine and St. Thomas, defend a system which follows the admitted facts to theirlogical conclusions. Theelect are saved by thegrace of God, which operates on their wills efficaciously and infallibly without detriment to their liberty; and sinceGod sincerely desires thesalvation of all men, He is prepared to grant that same grace to others, if they do not, by afreeact, render themselves unworthy of it. The faculty of placing obstacles toDivine grace is the unhappy faculty ofsinning; and the existence of moralevil in the world is a problem to be solved by all, not by the Thomists alone. The fundamental difficulties in this mysterious question are the existence ofevil and the non-salvation of some, be they few or be they many, under the rule of anomnipotent, all-wise, and all-mercifulGod, and they miss the point of the controversy who suppose that these difficulties exist only for the Thomists. Thetruth is known to lie somewhere betweenCalvinism andJansenism on the one hand, and Semipelagianism on the other. The efforts made bytheologians and the various explanations offered by Augustinians, Thomists,Molinists, and Congruists show how difficult of solution are the questions involved. Perhaps we shall neverknow, in this world, how a just and mercifulGod provides in some special manner for theelect and yet sincerely loves all men. The celebratedCongregatio de Auxiliis did not forever put an end to the controversies, and the question is not yet settled.

About this page

APA citation.Kennedy, D.(1912).Thomism. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14698b.htm

MLA citation.Kennedy, Daniel."Thomism."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 14.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1912.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14698b.htm>.

Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Kevin Cawley.

Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. July 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

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