State and Church

Please help support the mission of New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more — all for only $19.99...

TheChurch and the State are both perfectsocieties, that is to say, each essentially aiming at a common good commensurate with the need ofmankind at large and ultimate in a generic kind of life, and each juridically competent to provide all thenecessary and sufficient means thereto. The State is ethically demonstrated to be such, and theChurch has a like demonstration from thetheology ofChristian Revelation. By reason of coexistence on the earth, community of subjects, and a need in common of some of the same means of activity, it is inevitable that they should have mutual relations in the juridical order. To declare these relations in brief from anethical viewpoint, which is the scope of the present article, it will benecessary to state:

I. The basis of their respectiverights;
II. The range of their respective jurisdictions;
III. Their mutual corporate relation;
IV. The union of Church and State;
V. Counter theories.

The basis of rights

Allrights andduties on earth come ultimately fromGod through theDivine Law, either natural or positive. The character of our naturalrights andduties is determined by the purpose to which the Creator shaped the nature of man, and naturalknowledge of them is acquired byhumanreason from the aptitudes, tendencies, and needs of nature. Duties andrights descending from positiveDivine Law are determined by some additional purpose ofGod, over and above the exigencies ofhumannature, and are to be learned only from Divine Revelation, either in its explicit declaration or its rational content. Man has one ultimate purpose of existence: eternalhappiness in a future life. But man also has a twofold proximate purpose: to earn his title to eternalhappiness, and to attain to a measure of temporalhappiness consistent with the prior proximate purpose. The State is a natural institution, whose powers, therefore, come from thenatural law and are determined by the character of the natural purpose of the State plus whatever limitationGod has, because of qualifications in the last end of man,ordained in the Divine Positive Law. TheChurch is a positive institution of Christ theSon of God, whose powers, therefore, are derived from the Divine Positive Law and are determined by the nature of the purpose He has assigned to it, plus whatever further concession He has made to facilitate the accomplishment of that purpose. In any consideration of the mutual relations of Church and State the above propositions are fundamental.

The goal of the State is the temporalhappiness of man, and its proximate purpose the preservation of external juridical order and the provision of a reasonable abundance of means of human development in the interests of its citizens and their posterity. Man himself however, as we have said, has a further goal of perfecthappiness to be realized only after death, and consequently a proximate purpose to earn in this life his title to the same. In the pursuit of this latter purpose, speaking in the abstract, he had a natural right to constitute a social organization taking over the worship ofGod as a charge peculiarly its own. In the concrete however, i.e., as a matter of fact,God by positive law has vacated this natural right and established a universalsociety (the Church) for Divine worship and the securing of perfecthappiness in the hereafter.God, furthermore, has appointed for man a destiny which cannot be attained by mere natural means, and consequentlyGod has conceded to man additional means commensurate with this ultimate purpose, putting these means at the disposal of man through the ministration of theChurch. Finally, He has determined the form of external public worship to be rendered, centering it about a sacrifice, the efficacy of which is from itself, being, as it is, a repetition of the Sacrifice of Calvary. The goal, then, of theChurch is the perfectsupernaturalhappiness of man; its proximate purpose, to safeguard the internal moral order of right and wrong; and its external manifestation, to care for Divine worship and minister to man thesupernatural means of grace. The State, then, exists to help man to temporalhappiness theChurch, to eternal. Of these two purposes the latter is more ultimate, man's greater good, while the former is notnecessary for the acquisition of the latter. The dominating proximate purpose of man must be to earn his title toeternalsalvation: for that, if needs be, he must rationally sacrifice his temporalhappiness. It is clear, therefore, that the purpose of theChurch is higher in the order ofDivine Providence and of righteous human endeavour than that of the State. Hence, in case of direct collision of the two,God's will and man's need require that the guardian of the lower purpose should yield. Likewise the argument for the extension of the powers of the highersociety in a measure into the domain of the lower will not hold for such extension from the lower into the higher.

The range of jurisdiction

As there are many distinct States of equal natural right the subjects of each are restricted in number, and its government of them is practically confined within the limits of its own territory. Within this territory it has full power to govern them, defining theirrights and in some cases restricting the exercise of theserights conferring purely civilrights and imposing civilduties, holding its citizens to a proper condition of public morality, owningproperty and qualifying private ownership of the same--all within the exigencies of the civic purpose of preserving external juridical order and Promoting the prosperity of the citizens, and over all bound by the enactment of theDivine Law, both natural and positive. In a word, the State controls its own subjects, in the pursuit of its own natural end, in all things where a higher right does not stop it. A higher right will be a right existent because of an ulterior or a more essential destiny of man than the purpose which civilsociety pursues for him. TheChurch has theright to preach the Gospel everywhere, willing or nilling any state authority, and so to secure therights of its members among the subjects of any civil polity whatever. TheChurch has theright to govern her subjects wherever found, declaring for them moral right and wrong, restricting any such use of theirrights as might jeopardize their eternal welfare, conferring purelyecclesiasticalrights, acquiring and holdingproperty herself, and empowering her subordinate associations to do the same--all within the limits of the requirements of her triple purpose, as laid down by theDivine Positive Law, of preserving the internal order offaith andmorals and its external manifestation, of providing adequate means of sanctification for her members, and of caring for Divine worship, and over all bound by the eternal principles of integrity andjustice declared in thenatural andpositive Law of God.

In all purely temporal subject-matter, so long as it remains such, thejurisdiction of the State over its own subjects stands not only supreme, but, as far as theChurch is concerned, alone. Purely temporal matter is that which has anecessary relation of help or hindrance to man's temporalhappiness, the ultimate end of civilsociety or the State, in such wise that it is at the same time indifferent in itself as a help or hindrance to man's eternalhappiness. It is of two kinds: primarily it includes allhuman acts so related, and secondarilypersons or external things as far as they are involved in such acts. In all purely spiritual subject-matter, so long as it remains such, thejurisdiction of theChurch over herecclesiastical subjects obtains to the complete exclusion of the State; nor is theChurch therein juridically dependent in any way upon the State for the exercise of its legitimate powers. Purely spiritual subject-matter is primarily made up ofhuman acts necessarily related as help or hindrance to man's eternalhappiness, the last end of theChurch, and at the same time indifferent in themselves as a help or hindrance to man's temporalhappiness; secondarily it extends to allpersons and external objects as involved in such acts. In all subject-matter not purely spiritual nor purely temporal, but at the same time both spiritual and temporal in character, both jurisdictions may enter, and so entering give occasion to collision, for which there must be a principle of solution. In case of direct contradiction, making it impossible for both jurisdictions to be exercised, thejurisdiction of theChurch prevails, and that of the State is excluded. The reason of this is obvious: both authorities come fromGod in fulfillment of his purposes in the life of man: He cannot contradict Himself; He cannot authorize contradictory powers. His real will and concession of power is determined by the higher purpose of His Providence and man's need, which is the eternalhappiness of man, the ultimate end of theChurch. In view of this endGod concedes to her the only authority that can exist in the case in point.

In a case where there is no direct contradiction but a possibility of both jurisdictions being exercised without hurt to the higher, though neitherjurisdiction is voided, and they both might, absolutely speaking, be exercised without mutual consultation, practically there is a clear opening for some adjustment between the two, since both jurisdictions are interested in avoiding friction. Thoughconcordats were not devised precisely for this purpose, they have in many cases been used for such adjustment (seeCONCORDAT). Consistently with the superiority of essential purpose indicated above, the judicial decision as to when a question does or does not involve spiritual matter, either purely or in part, rests with theChurch. It cannot lie with the State, whosejurisdiction, because of the inferiority of its ultimate end and proximate purpose, has not such judicial faculty in regard to the subject-matter of ajurisdiction which is as far above its own as the ultimate end and proximate purpose thereof is above that of the State. In analogous fashion every higher court is always judge of its ownjurisdiction as against a lower.

All the above is matter of principle, argued out as a question of objective right, and it supposes that thejurisdiction is to be applied through the respective subjects of the same. In point of fact theduty of submission in a citizen of a State to the higherjurisdiction of theChurch does not exist where the citizen is not a subject of theChurch, for over such theChurch claims no governing power. It may also be by accident subjectively obscured in one who, though in point of right theChurch's subject, ingood faith fails, through anerroneousconscience, to recognize this fact, and, by consequence, theChurch's right and his ownduty. The subject of the State has been made fairly clear by human law and custom; but the frequent rebellion, continued through centuries, of great numbers of theChurch's subjects has confused in the mind of the non-Catholic world the notion of who is by revealed law a subject of theChurch. The juridical subject of theChurch is every human being that has validly received theSacrament of Baptism. This birth into theChurch bybaptism is analogous to the birth within the territory of a State of the off spring of one of its citizens. However, this newborn subject of the State can, under certain circumstances, renounce his allegiance to his native State and be accepted as the subject of another. Not so one born into theChurch bybaptism: forbaptism is a sacrament leaving an indelible character upon thesoul, which man cannot remove and so escape legitimate subjection. Yet, as in a State, a man may be a subject without fullrights of citizenship; may even, while remaining a subject, lose thoserights by his own act or that of hisparents; so, analogously, not every subject of theChurch is a member thereof, and once a member, he may lose the socialrights of membership in theChurch without ceasing to be its subject. For full membership in theChurch, besides validbaptism, one must by union offaith and allegiance be in fellowship with her, and not be deprived of therights of membership byecclesiastical censure. Hence, those validlybaptizedChristians who live inschism or, whether by reason of apostasy or of initialeducation, profess afaith different from that of theChurch, or areexcommunicated therefrom, are not members of theChurch, though as a matter of objectiveright andduty they are still her subjects. In practice theChurch, while retaining her right over all subjects, does not--except in some few matters not of moment here--insist upon exercising herjurisdiction over any but her members, as it is clear that she cannot expect obedience from thoseChristians who, being infaith or government separated from her, see no right in her to command, and consequently recognize noduty to obey. Over those who are notbaptized she claims noright to govern, though she has the indefeasible right to preach the Gospel among them and to endeavour to win them over to become members ofChrist's Church and so citizens of herecclesiastical polity.

Mutual corporate relation of Church and state

Every perfectsociety must acknowledge therights of every other perfectsociety; must render to it allduties consequent upon suchrights; must respect its autonomy; and may demand the recognition of its ownrights and the fulfilment ofobligations arising therefrom. Whether one may also command such recognition and fulfilment is another question: one does not involve the other; thus, for instance, theUnited States may demand itsrights ofEngland, but cannot commandEngland to acknowledge them, as theUnited States has no authority overEngland or any other nation. Prescinding from this for the moment, theChurch must respect therights of the State to govern its subjects in all purely temporal matters, and, if the subjects of the State are likewise subjects of theChurch, must hold the latter to the fulfilment of their civilduties as anobligation inconscience. On the other hand, in principle, as a matter of objectiveduty, the State is bound to recognize the juridicalrights of theChurch in all matters spiritual whether purely so or of mixed character, and its judicial right to determine the character of matters ofjurisdiction, in regard, namely, to their spiritual quality. The State, furthermore, is bound to render due worship toGod, as follows from the same argument from thenatural law whichproves man'sobligation to external worship, namely, that man must acknowledge his dependence uponGod and his subjection to Him in every capacity in which he is so dependent, and therefore not only in his private capacity as an individual but also in that public, corporate capacity whereby he and his fellow citizens constitute the State. Due worship, in the present economy, is that of the religion ofChrist, entrusted to the care of theChurch. The State must also protect theChurch in the exercise of her functions, for the reason that the State is bound to protect all therights of its citizens, and among these their religiousrights, which as a matter of fact would be insecure and fruitless were not theChurch protected. The State is even underobligation to promote the spiritual interests of theChurch; for the State is bound to promote whatever by reaction naturally works for the moral development of its citizens and consequently for the internal peace of the community, and in the present condition ofhumannature that development is necessarily dependent upon the spiritual influence of theChurch.

There being, then, anobligation upon the State as such, arising out of the Natural and the Divine Positive Law, to render public Divine worship in accordance with the guidance of theChurch, in whose charge Christ has placed the worship due in the present order of things, anobligation also to protect theChurch and to promote her interests, theChurch clearly has a perfect right to demand the fulfilment of theseduties, since their neglect would infringe her right to the benefit proceeding from the fulfilment. To have the further right to command the State in their regard implies that theChurch has aright to impose theobligations of her authority in their regard, to exact them authoritatively from the State. Now in purely temporal matters, while they remain such, theChurch cannot command the State any more than she can command the subjects of the State, even though these are at the same time her own subjects. But in spiritual and mixed matters calling for corporate action of the State, the question depends upon whether the physicalpersons who make up the moralpersonality of the State are themselves subjects of theChurch. In case they are, then theChurch has in consequencejurisdiction therein over the State. The reason is that owing to the supremacy inman's life purposes of his eternalhappiness, man in all his capacities, even of a civil nature, must direct his activities so that they shall not hinder this end, and where action even in his official or civil capacity isnecessary for this ultimate purpose he is bound to place the action: moreover, in all these activities so bearing on this end, since they are thereby spiritual matter, every subject of theChurch is under thejurisdiction of theChurch. If, then, the physicalpersons constituting the moralperson of the State are the subjects of theChurch, they are still, in this joint capacity, subject to her in like matters, namely, in the fulfilment of all civilduties of the State towards religion and theChurch. TheChurch, because of the uselessness of her insistence, or because of greater evils to be so avoided, may waive the exercise of thisjurisdiction; but in principle it is hers.

In practice we distinguish, from a religious point of view, four kinds ofcivil authority.

Again, the State as such does not in such matters directly act for thesupernatural purpose of theChurch (the eternalhappiness of its subjects), but for its own temporal purpose inasmuch as such action will make for their temporalhappiness; and so it acts for theChurch by indirection.

There is no parallel argument to give the State indirectlyjurisdiction over theChurch in matters purely temporal, and therefore of the State's sole competency. TheChurch is universal and cannot be a member or subject of any particular State. Even were there but one universal State in the world, theChurch would not be a member thereof, for its members are not citizens of the State to the extent that in every capacity they must submit their activities for the purpose of the State, particularly not the activities concerned directly with the higher purpose of eternal life. Moreover, theChurch is not constituted merely by the exercise of the naturalrights of the men who are citizens of the State, but by thesupernatural endowment of the Divine Positive Law. Finally, theChurch in its corporate capacity is not bound to seek the temporalhappiness of her members as a means to their eternal welfare, while the State as such is bound to Divine worship and to the protection and promotion of theChurch in the interests of religion, because this is anecessary element involved in the perfect temporalhappiness of theCatholic citizen. The State, therefore, has not, either in temporal or in spiritual things, any authority over theChurch as such, however much it may have in things purely temporal over the members of theChurch, who are subjects of the State. The State can, as was said above, demand itsrights of theChurch: it cannot command them.

Union of Church and state

There is some confusion in the public mind about the meaning of the union of Church and State. The essentialidea of such union is a condition of affairs where a State recognizes its natural andsupernatural relation to theChurch, professes the Faith, and practises the worship of theChurch, protects it, enacts nolaws to its hurt, while, in case of necessity and at its instance taking all just and requisite civil measures to forward the Divinely appointed purpose of theChurch--in so far as all these make for the State's own essential purpose, the temporalhappiness of its citizens. That this is in principle the normal and ethically proper condition for a trulyCatholic State should be evident from the religiousobligations of theCatholic State as above declared. That in practice it has in the past sometimes workedevil to both Church and State, is an accidental effect consequent upon the frailty and passion of the human instruments then ruling in Church, or in State, or in both. As a partial attempt at security against suchevil consequences, theChurch has for centuries establishedconcordats withCatholic States; but even these have not always saved the situation. Forconcordats, like all other agreements, however firm in principle, are in practice only as strong as the conscientiousness of those whoseduty it is to observe them. The conscienceless can destroy them at pleasure. Between theChurch and a non-Christian or aChristian, but non-Catholic, State a condition of separation, as meaning a condition of indifference of the State towards theChurch, is to be expected, as the foundation of the specificobligations involved in union are wanting. Such a separation for aCatholic State would be criminal, as ignoring the sacredobligations of the State.

For a State onceCatholic and in union with theChurch to declare a separation on the ground that it has ceased to beCatholic is an action which as a matter of objective right has no standing; for in objectivetruth theduty of the people would be to regain their lostfaith, if they had really lost it, or to live up to it if in reality it were not lost. But on the supposition that the essential constituency of a State has been transformed fromCatholics to those who, not byhypocritical pretence, but in the fulness ofgood faith, are notCatholics--a condition easier of supposition than of realization--the State through such mistakenconscience might seek for separation without subjective fault, provided the separation were effected without the summary dissolution of existing contracts, without the violation of vestedrights of theChurch or its members. It may be noted in passing that in the recent instances of separation inFrance andPortugal, i.e., the breaking up of an existing condition of union between Church and State, the separation has been effected where the bulk of the people is stillCatholic, has been conducted in violation ofrights and contracts both natural and positive, and has resulted, as it was aimed to do, in an attempt at complete subsection of theChurch and of all civil subjects in the matters of religion to the tyranny of administrations which scoff at all religion. That in States whosepersonality is constitutionally made up of every complexion of religiousfaith, much of it in its diversity sincere, there should be a governmental abstention from any specific denominational worship or profession ofbelief, and a general protection and encouragement of the individual in the practice of religion according to his own religious principles within the limits of theNatural Law, or of a general acceptance ofChristianity, seems a practical necessity ofevil times, when unity offaith is so widely lacking, and amodus vivendi which, if sincerely carried out, seems to work as little harm to objective right as can be expected in a condition of consciences sincerely differing in the matter of right established by the Divine Positive Law.

Counter theories

The theories opposed to theCatholic position on thetrue relations between the Church and State are threefold, differing in latitude of negation ofecclesiasticalright.

Absolute Liberalism

AbsoluteLiberalism is the most extreme. Having its source in the principles of theFrench Revolution and beginning with those who denied theexistence of God, it naturally takes the position that the State prescinds fromGod: the State, it says, isatheistic. Undertaking, with the elimination of revelation and the Divine Positive Law, to get back to purely natural principles, it accepted from Rousseau and theUtilitarians the principle that all right comes from the State, all authority from the consentient wills of the people of the State. The positionlogically followed that theChurch has norights--not even theright to existence--save such as are conceded to it by thecivil power. Hence it is not a perfectsociety, but a creature of the State, upon which it depends in all things, and upon which it must be directly subordinate, if it is to be allowed to exist at all. (SeeLIBERALISM.)

Qualified Liberalism

QualifiedLiberalism, as formulated by Cavour and Minghetti inItaly at the close of the first half of the nineteenth century, does not go so far. While claiming to admit that theChurch is more or less a perfectsociety with foundations in the Divine Positive Law ofChristian Revelation, it contends that the Church and State are disparate in such fashion as to prosecute their respective ends independently in behalf of the individual, having no subordination whatever one to the other. Consequently, in all public affairs the State must prescind from every religioussociety, and deal with such either as private associations existing within the State or as foreign corporations to be treated with accordingly. The axiom of this newerLiberalism is "A freeChurch in a free State", which in point of fact means an emasculated Church with no more freedom than the shifting politics, internal and external, of a State chose to give, which in the event, as was to be foreseen, amounted to servitude. (SeeITALY:Political and Civil Government: Church and State.)

Regalism

The Theory of the Regalists conceded to theChurch a certain amount of social right from its Divine Founder, but conditioned the exercise of all social powers upon the consent of the civil government. This theory, originating with Gallicanism, practically denied theChurch to be a perfectsociety inasmuch as it made itsjurisdiction depend for its valid exercise upon thecivil power. The theory gradually extended its contentions so far as to make theChurch indirectly subordinate to the State, attributing to the State the authority to forbid theChurch any juridical act that might work to the detriment of the State and to command theChurch in case of necessity to put forth her full powers to promote the interests of the State.

CONTACT US |ADVERTISE WITH NEW ADVENT