Revelation

Please help support the mission of New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more — all for only $19.99...

Meaning of revelation

Revelation may be defined as the communication of sometruth byGod to arational creature through means which are beyond the ordinary course ofnature.

Thetruths revealed may be such as are otherwise inaccessible to thehumanmind — mysteries, which even when revealed, theintellect of man is incapable of fully penetrating. But Revelation is not restricted to these.God may see fit to employsupernatural means to affirmtruths, the discovery of which is notper se beyond the powers of reason. The essence of Revelation lies in the fact that it is the direct speech ofGod to man. The mode of communication, however, may be mediate. Revelation does not cease to be such ifGod's message is delivered to us by aprophet, who alone is the recipient of the immediate communication. Such in brief is the account of Revelation given in the Constitution "De Fide Catholica" of theVatican Council. TheDecree "Lamentabili" (3 July, 1907), by its condemnation of a contrary proposition, declares that thedogmas which theChurch proposes as revealed are "truths which have come down to us fromheaven" (veritates e coelo delapsoe) and not "an interpretation of religious facts which thehumanmind has acquired by its own strenuous efforts" (prop., 22). It will be seen that Revelation as thus explained differs clearly from:

During the past century theChurch has been called on to reject aserroneous several views of Revelation irreconcilable withCatholicbelief. Three of these may here be noted.

Possibility of revelation

The possibility of Revelation as above explained has been strenuously denied from various points of view during the last century. For this reason theChurch held itnecessary to issue special decrees on the subject in theVatican Council. Its antagonists may be divided into two classes according to the different standpoints from which they direct their attack, viz:

If the existence of a personalGod be once established, the physical possibility at least of Revelation is undeniable.God, who has endowed man with means to communicate his thoughts to his fellows, cannot be destitute of the power to communicate His own thoughts to us. [Martineau, it istrue, denies that we possess faculties either to receive or to authenticate a divine revelation concerning the past or the future (Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 311); but such an assertion is arbitrary and extravagant in the extreme.] However, numerous difficulties have been urged on grounds other than that of physical possibility. In estimating their value it seems desirable to distinguish three aspects of Revelation, viz: as it makes known to us;

(1)truths of thenatural law,
(2) mysteries of thefaith,
(3) positiveprecepts, e.g. regarding Divine worship.

(1) The revelation oftruths of thenatural law is certainly not inconsistent withGod's wisdom.God so created man as to bestow on him endowments amply sufficient for him to attain his last end. Had it been otherwise, the creation would have been imperfect. If over and above this He decreed to make the attainment of beatitude yet easier for man by placing within his reach a far simpler and far more certain way of knowing thelaw on the observance of which his fate depended, this is an argument for the Divine generosity; it does not disprove the Divine wisdom. To assume, with certainRationalists, that exceptional intervention can only be explained on the ground thatGod was unable to embrace His ultimate design in His original scheme is a merepetitio principii. Further, thedoctrine oforiginal sin supplies an additional reason for such a revelation of thenatural law. Thatdoctrine teaches us that man by the abuse of hisfree will has rendered his attainment ofsalvation difficult. Though hisintellectual faculties are not radically vitiated, yet his grasp oftruth is weakened; his recognition of the moral law is constantly clouded bydoubts and questionings. Revelation gives to his mind thecertainty he had lost, and so far repairs the evils consequent on the catastrophe which had befallen him.

(2) Still more difficulty has been felt regarding mysteries. It is freely asserted that a mystery is something repugnant to reason, and therefore something intrinsically impossible. This objection rests on a mere misunderstanding of what is signified by a mystery. Intheological terminology a conception involves a mystery when it is such that the natural faculties of the mind are unable to see how its elements can coalesce. This does not imply anything contrary to reason. A conception is only contrary to reason when the mind can recognize that its elements are mutually exclusive, and therefore involve a contradiction in terms. A more subtle objection is that urged by Dr. J. Caird, to the effect that everytruth that can be partially communicated to the mind by analogies is ultimately capable of being fully grasped by the understanding. "Of all such representations, unless they are purely illusory, it must hold good that implicitly and in undeveloped form they contain rational thought and therefore thought which human intelligence may ultimately free from its sensuous veil. . . . Nothing that is absolutely inscrutable to reason can be made known tofaith" (Philosophy of Religion, p. 71). The objection rests on a wholly exaggerated view regarding the powers of the humanintellect. The cognitive faculty of any nature is proportionate to its grade in the scale of being. The intelligence of a finiteintellect can only penetrate a finite object; it is incapable of comprehending the Infinite. The finite types through which the Infinite is made known to it can never under any circumstances lead to more than analogousknowledge. It is further frequently urged that the revelation of what the mind cannot understand would be an act ofviolence to theintellect; and that this faculty can only accept thosetruths whose intrinsic reasonableness it recognizes. This assertion, based on the alleged autonomy of reason, can only be met with denial. The function of theintellect is to recognize and admit anytruth which is adequately presented to it, whether thattruth be guaranteed by internal or by external criteria. The reason is not deprived of its legitimate activity because the criteria are external. It finds ample scope in weighing the arguments for the credibility of the fact asserted. The existence of mysteries in theChristian religion was expressly taught by theVatican Council (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If anyone shall say that no mysteries properly so called are contained in the Divine revelation, but that all thedogmas of thefaith can be understood andproved from natural principles byhumanreason duly cultivated — let him beanathema."

(3) The older (Deist) School ofRationalists denied the possibility of a Divine revelation imposing anylaws other than those which natural religion enjoins on man. These writers regarded natural religion as, so to speak, a political constitution determining the Divine government of theuniverse, and held thatGod could only act as its terms prescribed. Thiserror likewise was proscribed at the same time (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If any one shall say that it is impossible or that it is inexpedient that man should be instructed regardingGod and the worship to be paid to Him by Divine revelation — let him beanathema."

It can hardly be questioned that the "autonomy of reasons" furnishes the main source of the difficulties at present felt against Revelation in theChristian sense. It seems desirable to indicate very briefly the various ways in which that principle is understood. It is explained by M. Blondel, an eminent member of the Immanentist School, as signifying that "nothing can enter into a man which does not proceed from him, and which does not correspond in some manner to an interior need of expansion; and that neither in the sphere of historic facts nor of traditionaldoctrine, nor of commands imposed by authority, can anytruth rank as valid for a man or any precept asobligatory, unless it be in some way autonomous and autochthonous" (Lettre sur les exigences, etc., p. 601). Although M. Blondel has in his own case reconciled this principle with the acceptance ofCatholicbelief, yet it may readily be seen that it affords an easy ground for the denial not merely of the possibility of external Revelation, but of the whole historic basis ofChristianity. The origin of thiserroneousdoctrine is to be found in the fact that within the sphere of the natural speculative reason,truths which are received purely on external authority, and which are in no way connected with principles already admitted, can scarcely be said to form part of ourknowledge. Science asks for the inner reason of things and can make no use oftruths save in so far as it can reach the principles from which they flow. The extension of this to religioustruths is anerror directly traceable to the assumption of the eighteenth-centuryphilosophers that there are no religioustruths save those which the humanintellect can attain unaided. The principle is, however, sometimes applied with a less extensive signification. It may be understood to involve no more than that reason cannot be compelled to admit any religiousdoctrine or any moralobligation merely because they possess extrinsic guarantees oftruth; they must in every case be able to justify their validity on intrinsic grounds. Thus Prof. J. Caird writes: "Neither moral nor religiousideas can be simply transferred to the human spirit in the form of fact, nor can they be verified by any evidence outside of or lower than themselves" (Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, p. 31). A somewhat different meaning again is implied in the canon of theVatican Council in which the right of theintellect to claim absolute independence (autonomy) is denied. "If anyone shall say thathumanreason is independent in such wise thatfaith cannot be commanded it byGod — let him beanathema" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. i). This canon is directed against the position maintained as already noted by the olderRationalists and theDeists, thathumanreason is amply sufficient without exterior assistance to attain to absolutetruth in all matters of religion (cf. Vacant, "Etudes Théologiques", I, 572; II, 387).

Necessity of revelation

Can it be said that Revelation isnecessary to man? There can be no question as to its necessity, if it be admitted thatGod destines man to attain asupernatural beatitude which surpasses the exigencies of his natural endowments. In that caseGod must needs reveal alike the existence of thatsupernatural end and the means by which we are to attain it. But is Revelationnecessary even in order that man should observe theprecepts of thenatural law? If our race be viewed in its present condition as history displays it, the answer can only be that it is, morally speaking, impossible for men unassisted by Revelation, to attain by their natural powers such aknowledge of that law as is sufficient to the right ordering of life. In other words, Revelation is morallynecessary. Absolute necessity we do not assert. Man,Catholictheology teaches, possesses the requisite faculties to discover thenatural law.Luther indeed asserted that man'sintellect had become hopelessly obscured byoriginal sin, so that even naturaltruth was beyond his reach. And theTraditionalists of the nineteenth century (Bautain,Bonnetty, etc.) also fell intoerror, teaching that man was incapable of arriving at moral and religioustruth apart from Revelation. TheChurch, on the contrary, recognizes the capacity ofhumanreason and grants that here and therepagans may have existed, who had freed themselves from prevalenterrors, and who had attained to such aknowledge of thenatural law as would suffice to guide them to the attainment of beatitude. But she teaches nevertheless that this can only be the case as regards a few, and that for the bulk ofmankind Revelation isnecessary. That this is so may be shown both from the facts of history and from the nature of the case. As regards the testimony of history, it isnotorious that even the most civilized ofpagan races have fallen into the grossesterrors regarding thenatural law; and from these it may safely be asserted they would never have emerged. Certainly theschools ofphilosophy would not have enabled them to do so; for many of these denied even such fundamental principles of thenatural law as thepersonality ofGod and the freedom of the will. Again, by the very nature of the case, the difficulties involved in the attainment of the requisiteknowledge are insuperable. For men to be able to attain such aknowledge of thenatural law as will enable them to order their lives rightly, thetruths of that law must be so plain that the mass of men can discover them without long delay, and possess aknowledge of them which will be alike free from uncertainty and secure from seriouserror. No reasonable man will maintain that in the case of the greater part ofmankind this is possible. Even the most vitaltruths are called in question and are met by serious objections. The separation oftruth fromerror is a work involving time and labour. For this the majority of men have neither inclination nor opportunity. Apart from the security which Revelation gives they would reject anobligation both irksome and uncertain. It results that a revelation even of thenatural law is for man in his present state a moral necessity.

Criteria of revelation

The fact that Revelation is not merely possible but morallynecessary is in itself a strong argument for the existence of a revelation, and imposes on all men the strictobligation of examining the credentials of a religion which presents itself withprima facie marks oftruth. On the other hand ifGod has conferred a revelation on men, it stands to reason that He must have attached to it plain and evident criteria enabling even the unlettered to recognize His message for what it is, and to distinguish it from allfalse claimants.

The criteria of Revelation are either external or internal: (1) External criteria consist in certain signs attached to the revelation as a divine testimony to itstruth, e.g.,miracles. (2) Internal criteria are those which are found in the nature of thedoctrine itself in the manner in which it was presented to the world, and in the effects which it produces on thesoul. These are distinguished into negative and positive criteria. (a) The immunity of the alleged revelation from any teaching, speculative or moral, which is manifestlyerroneous or self-contradictory, the absence of allfraud on the part of those who deliver it to the world, provide negative internal criteria. (b) Positive internal criteria are of various kinds. One such is found in the beneficent effects of thedoctrine and in its power to meet even the highest aspirations which man can frame. Another consists in the internal conviction felt by thesoul as to thetruth of thedoctrine (Suarez, "De Fide", IV, sect. 5, n. 9.) In the last century there was in certainschools of thought a manifest tendency to deny the value of all external criteria. This was largely due to theRationalist polemic againstmiracles. Not a few non-Catholic divines anxious to make terms with the enemy adopted this attitude. They allowed thatmiracles are useless as a foundation forfaith, and that they form on the contrary one of the chief difficulties which lie infaith's path. Faith, they admitted, must be presupposed before themiracle can be accepted. Hence these writers held the sole criterion offaith to lie in inward experience — in the testimony of the Spirit. Thus Schleiermacher says: "We renounce altogether any attempt to demonstrate thetruth and the necessity of theChristian religion. On the contrary we assume that everyChristian before he commences inquiries of this kind is already convinced that no other form of religion but theChristian can harmonize with hispiety" (Glaubenslehre, n. 11). TheTraditionalists by denying the power ofhumanreason to test the grounds offaith were driven to fall back on the same criterion (cf. Lamennais, "Pensées Diverses", p. 488).

This position is altogether untenable. The testimony afforded by inward experience is undoubtedly not to be neglected.Catholicdoctors have always recognized its value. But its force is limited to the individual who is the subject of it. It cannot be employed as a criterion valid for all; for its absence is noproof that thedoctrine is nottrue. Moreover, of all the criteria it is the one with regard to which there is most possibility of deception. Whentruth mingled witherror is presented to the mind, it often happens that the whole teaching,false andtrue alike, is believed to have a Divine guarantee, because thesoul has recognized and welcomed thetruth of some onedoctrine, e.g., the Atonement. Taken alone and apart from objectiveproof it conveys but a probability that the revelation istrue. Hence theVatican Council expressly condemns theerror of those who teach it to be the only criterion (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. iii).

The perfect agreement of a religiousdoctrine with the teachings of reason andnatural law, its power to satisfy, and more than satisfy, the highest aspirations of man, its beneficent influence both as regards public and private life, provide us with a more trustworthy test. This is a criterion which has often been applied with great force on behalf of the claims of theCatholicChurch to be the sole guardian of God's Revelation. These qualities indeed appertain in so transcendent a degree to the teaching of theChurch, that the argument must needs carry conviction to an earnest and truth-seeking mind. Another criterion which at first sight bears some resemblance to this claims a mention here. It is based upon the theory of Immanence and has of recent years been strenuously advocated by certain of the less extreme members of theModernist School. These writers urge that the vital needs of thesoul imperatively demand, as theirnecessary complement, Divine co-operation,supernatural grace, and even the supreme magisterium of theChurch. To these needs theCatholic religion alone corresponds. And this correspondence with our vital needs is, they hold, the one sure criterion oftruth. The theory is altogether inconsistent withCatholicdogma. It supposes that theChristian Revelation and the gift of grace are not free gifts fromGod, but something of which the nature of man is absolutely exigent; and without which it would be incomplete. It is a return to theerrors ofBaius. (Denz. 1021, etc.)

While theChurch, as we have said, is far from undervaluing internal criteria, she has always regarded external criteria as the most easily recognizable and the most decisive. Hence theVatican Council teaches: "In order that the obedience of ourfaith might be agreeable to reason,God has willed that to the internal aids of the Holy Spirit, there should be joined externalproofs of His Revelation, viz: Divine works (facta divina), especiallymiracles and prophecy, which inasmuch as they manifestly display theomnipotence and the omniscience ofGod are most certain signs of a Divine revelation and are suited to the understanding of all" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii). As an instance of a work evidently Divine and yet other thanmiracle or prophecy, the council instances theCatholicChurch, which, "by reason of the marvellous manner of its propagation, its surprisingsanctity, its inexhaustible fruitfulness in allgoodworks, its catholic unity and its invincible stability, is a mighty and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony to its own divine legation" (l. c.). Thetruth of the teaching of the council regarding external criteria is plain to any unprejudiced mind. Granted the presence of the negative criteria, external guarantees establish the Divine origin of a revelation as nothing else can do. They are, so to say, a seal affixed by the hand ofGod Himself, and authenticating the work as His. (For a fuller treatment of their apologetic value, and for a discussion of objections, seeMIRACLES;APOLOGETICS.)

The Christian revelation

It remains here to distinguish theChristian Revelation or "deposit offaith" from what are termedprivate revelations. This distinction is of importance: for while theChurch recognizes thatGod has spoken to His servants in every age, and still continues thus to favour chosensouls, she is careful to distinguish these revelations from the Revelation which has been committed to her charge, and which she proposes to all her members for their acceptance. That Revelation was given in its entirety toOur Lord and HisApostles. After the death of the last of the twelve it could receive no increment. It was, as theChurch calls it, a deposit — "thefaith once delivered to thesaints" (Jude, 2) — for which theChurch was to "contend" but to which she could add nothing. Thus, whenever there has been question of defining adoctrine, whether at Nicæa, atTrent, or at theVatican, the sole point of debate has been as to whether thedoctrine is found in Scripture or inApostolic tradition. The gift of Divine assistance (see I), sometimes confounded with Revelation by the less instructed of anti-Catholic writers, merely preserves thesupreme pontiff fromerror in defining thefaith; it does not enable him to add jot or tittle to it. All subsequent revelations conferred byGod are known asprivate revelations, for the reason that they are not directed to the wholeChurch but are for the good of individual members alone, They may indeed be a legitimate object for ourfaith; but that will depend on the evidence in each particular case. TheChurch does not propose them to us as part of her message. It istrue that in certain cases she has given herapprobation to certainprivate revelations. This, however, only signifies:

It may however be further asked, whether theChristian Revelation does not receive increment through the development ofdoctrine. During the last half of the nineteenth century the question ofdoctrinal development was widely debated. Owing toGuenther'serroneous teaching that the doctrines of thefaith assume a new sense as humanscience progresses, theVatican Council declared once for all that the meaning of theChurch's dogmas is immutable (De Fide Cath., cap. iv, can. iii). On the other hand it explicitly recognizes that there is a legitimate mode of development, and cites to that effect (op. cit., cap. iv) the words ofVincent of Lérins: "Let understandingscience and wisdom [regarding theChurch's doctrine] progress and make large increase in each and in all, in the individual and in the wholeChurch, as ages and centuries advance: but let it be solely in its own order, retaining, that is, the samedogma, the same sense, the same import" (Commonit. 28). Two of the most eminenttheological writers of the period,Cardinal Franzelin andCardinal Newman, have on very different lines dealt with the progress and nature of this development.Cardinal Franzelin in his "De Divina Traditione et Scriptura" (pt. XXII VI) has principally in view theHegelian theories ofGuenther. He consequently lays the chief stress on the identity at all points of theintellectual datum, and explains development almost exclusively as a process oflogical deduction.Cardinal Newman wrote his "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine" in the course of the two years (1843 45) immediately preceding his reception into theCatholicChurch. He was called on to deal with different adversaries, viz., theProtestants who justified their separation from the main body ofChristians on the ground thatRome had corrupted primitive teaching by a series of additions. In that work he examines in detail the difference between a corruption and a development. He shows how atrue and fertileidea is endowed with a vital and assimilative energy of its own, in virtue of which, without undergoing the least substantive change, it attains to an ever completer expression, as the course oftime brings it into contact with new aspects oftruth or forces it into collision with newerrors: the life of theidea is shown to be analogous to an organic development. He provides a series of tests distinguishing atrue development from a corruption, chief among them being the preservation of type, and the continuity of principles; and then, applying the tests to the case of the additions of Roman teaching, shows that these have the marks not of corruptions but oftrue and legitimate developments. The theory, though less scholastic in its form than that ofFranzelin, is in perfect conformity withorthodoxbelief.Newman no less than hisJesuit contemporary teaches that the wholedoctrine, alike in its later as in its earlier forms, was contained in the original revelation given to theChurch byOur Lord and HisApostles, and that its identity is guaranteed to us by theinfallible magisterium of theChurch. The claim of certainModernist writers that their views on the evolution ofdogma were connected withNewman's theory of development is the merest figment.

CONTACT US |ADVERTISE WITH NEW ADVENT