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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
I. Meaning
II. Principal Adversaries
III. Original Sin in Scripture
IV. Original Sin in Tradition
V. Original Sin in face of the Objections of Human Reason
VI. Nature of Original Sin
VII. How Voluntary
Original sin may be taken to mean: (1) thesin thatAdam committed; (2) a consequence of this firstsin, the hereditary stain with which we are born on account of our origin or descent fromAdam.
From the earliest times the latter sense of the word was more common, as may be seen bySt. Augustine's statement: "the deliberatesin of thefirst man is the cause of original sin" (De nupt. et concup., II, xxvi, 43). It is the hereditary stain that is dealt with here. As to thesin ofAdam we have not to examine the circumstances in which it was committed nor make theexegesis of thethird chapter of Genesis.
Theodorus of Mopsuestia opened this controversy by denying that thesin ofAdam was the origin of death. (See the "Excerpta Theodori", byMarius Mercator; cf. Smith, "A Dictionary of Christian Biography", IV, 942.) Celestius, a friend ofPelagius, was the first in theWest to hold these propositions, borrowed fromTheodorus: "Adam was to die in every hypothesis, whether hesinned or did notsin. Hissin injured himself only and not thehuman race" (Mercator, "Liber Subnotationem", preface). This, the first position held by thePelagians, was also the first point condemned at Carthage (Denzinger, "Enchiridion", no 101-old no. 65). Against this fundamentalerrorCatholics cited especiallyRomans 5:12, whereAdam is shown as transmitting death withsin.
After sometime thePelagians admitted the transmission of death — this being more easily understood as we see thatparents transmit to their childrenhereditary diseases — but they stillviolently attacked the transmission ofsin (St. Augustine, "Contra duas epist. Pelag.", IV, iv, 6). And whenSt. Paul speaks of the transmission ofsin they understood by this the transmission of death. This was their second position, condemned by theCouncil of Orange [Denz., n. 175 (145)], and again later on with the first by theCouncil of Trent [Sess. V, can. ii; Denz., n. 789 (671)]. To take the wordsin to mean death was an evident falsification of the text, so thePelagians soon abandoned the interpretation and admitted thatAdamcausedsin in us. They did not, however, understand bysin the hereditary stain contracted at our birth, but thesin that adults commit in imitation ofAdam. This was their third position, to which is opposed thedefinition ofTrent thatsin is transmitted to all by generation (propagatione), not by imitation [Denz., n. 790 (672)]. Moreover, in the following canon are cited the words of theCouncil of Carthage, in which there is question of asin contracted by generation and effaced by generation [Denz., n. 102 (66)].
The leaders of theReformation admitted thedogma of original sin, but at present there are manyProtestants imbued withSocinian doctrines whose theory is a revival ofPelagianism.
The classical text isRomans 5:12 sqq. In the preceding part theapostle treats ofjustification byJesus Christ, and to put in evidence the fact of His being the one Saviour, he contrasts with thisDivine Head ofmankind thehuman head whocaused its ruin. The question of original sin, therefore, comes in only incidentally.St. Paul supposes theidea that the faithful have of it from his oral instructions, and he speaks of it to make them understand the work ofRedemption. This explains the brevity of the development and the obscurity of some verses.
We shall now show what, in the text, is opposed to the threePelagian positions:
(1) Thesin ofAdam has injured thehuman race at least in the sense that it has introduced death — "Wherefore as by onemansin entered into this world and bysin death; and so death passed upon allmen". Here there is question of physical death. First, the literal meaning of the word ought to be presumed unless there be some reason to the contrary. Second, there is an allusion in this verse to a passage in theBook of Wisdom in which, as may be seen from the context, there is question of physical death.Wisdom 2:24: "But by theenvy of thedevil death came into the world". Cf.Genesis 2:17;3:3, 19; and another parallel passage inSt. Paul himself,1 Corinthians 15:21: "For by a man came death and by a man theresurrection of the dead". Here there can be question only of physical death, since it is opposed tocorporal resurrection, which is the subject of thewhole chapter.
(2)Adam by his fault transmitted to us not only death but alsosin, "for as by the disobedience of oneman many [i.e., allmen] were madesinners" (Romans 5:19). How then could thePelagians, and at a later periodZwingli, say thatSt. Paul speaks only of the transmission of physical death? If according to them we must readdeath where theApostle wrotesin, we should also read that the disobedience ofAdam has made usmortal where theApostle writes that it has made ussinners. But the wordsinner has never meantmortal, nor hassin ever meantdeath. Also inverse 12, which corresponds toverse 19, we see that by oneman two things have been brought on allmen,sin and death, the one being the consequence of the other and therefore not identical with it.
(3) SinceAdam transmits death to his children by way of generation when he begets them mortal, it is by generation also that he transmits to themsin, for theApostle presents these two effects as produced at the sametime and by the samecausality. The explanation of thePelagians differs from that ofSt. Paul. According to them the child who receives mortality at his birth receivessin fromAdam only at a later period when he knows thesin of thefirst man and is inclined to imitate it. Thecausality ofAdam as regards mortality would, therefore, be completely different from hiscausality as regardssin. Moreover, this supposed influence of the bad example ofAdam is almost chimerical; even the faithful when theysin do notsin on account ofAdam's bad example,a fortioriinfidels who are completelyignorant of the history of thefirst man. And yet all men are, by the influence ofAdam,sinners and condemned (Romans 5:18, 19). The influence ofAdam cannot, therefore, be the influence of his bad example which we imitate (Augustine, "Contra julian.", VI, xxiv, 75).
On this account, several recentProtestants have thus modified thePelagian explanation: "Even without being aware of it all men imitateAdam inasmuch as they merit death as the punishment of their ownsins just asAdam merited it as the punishment for hissin." This is going farther and farther from the text ofSt. Paul.Adam would be no more than the term of a comparison, he would no longer have any influence orcausality as regards original sin or death. Moreover, theApostle did not affirm that all men, in imitation ofAdam, are mortal on account of their actualsins; since children who die before coming to the use of reason have never committed suchsins; but he expressly affirms the contrary in the fourteenth verse: "But death reigned", not only over those who imitatedAdam, but "even over them also who have notsinned after the similitude of the transgression ofAdam."Adam'ssin, therefore, is the sole cause of death for the entirehuman race. Moreover, we can discern no natural connexion between anysin and death. In order that a determinedsin entail death there is need of apositive law, but before theLaw of Moses there was nopositive law ofGod appointing death as a punishment except thelaw given toAdam (Genesis 2:17). It is, therefore, his disobedience only that could have merited and brought it into the world (Romans 5:13, 14).
TheseProtestant writers lay much stress on the last words of thetwelfth verse. Weknow that several of theLatinFathers understood the words "in whom all havesinned", to mean, all havesinned inAdam. This interpretation would be an extraproof of the thesis of original sin, but it is notnecessary. Modernexegesis, as well as theGreekFathers, prefer to translate "and so death passed upon all menbecause all havesinned". We accept this second translation which shows us death as an effect ofsin. But of whatsin? "The personalsins of each one", answer our adversaries, "this is the natural sense of the words 'all havesinned.'" It would be the natural sense if the context was not absolutely opposed to it. The words "all havesinned" of thetwelfth verse, which are obscure on account of their brevity, are thus developed in thenineteenth verse: "for as by the disobedience of oneman many were madesinners." There is no question here of personalsins, differing inspecies and number, committed by each one during his life, but of one firstsin which was enough to transmit equally to all men a state ofsin and the title of sinners. Similarly in the twelfth verse the words "all havesinned" must mean, "all have participated in thesin ofAdam", "all have contracted its stain". This interpretation too removes the seeming contradiction between thetwelfth verse, "all havesinned", and the fourteenth, "who have notsinned", for in the former there is question of original sin, in the latter of personalsin. Those who say that in both cases there is question of personalsin are unable to reconcile these two verses.
On account of a superficial resemblance between thedoctrine of original sin and theManichaean theory of ournature beingevil, thePelagians accused theCatholics andSt. Augustine ofManichaeism. For the accusation and its answer see "Contra duas epist. Pelag.", I, II, 4; V, 10; III, IX, 25; IV, III. In our own times this charge has been reiterated by several critics and historians ofdogma who have been influenced by the fact that before hisconversionSt. Augustine was aManichaean. They do not identifyManichaeism with thedoctrine of original sin, but they say thatSt. Augustine, with the remains of his formerManichaean prejudices, created thedoctrine of original sin unknown before his time.
It is nottrue that thedoctrine of original sin does not appear in the works of the pre-Augustinian Fathers. On the contrary, their testimony is found in special works on the subject. Nor can it be said, as Harnack maintains, thatSt. Augustine himself acknowledges the absence of thisdoctrine in the writings of the Fathers.St. Augustine invokes the testimony of eleven Fathers, Greek as well asLatin (Contra Jul., II, x, 33). Baseless also is the assertion that beforeSt. Augustine thisdoctrine was unknown to theJews and to theChristians; as we have already shown, it was taught bySt. Paul. It is found in the fourth Book ofEsdras, a work written by aJew in the first century afterChrist and widely read by theChristians. This book representsAdam as the author of the fall of thehuman race (vii, 48), as having transmitted to all his posterity the permanent infirmity, the malignity, the bad seed ofsin (iii, 21, 22; iv, 30).Protestants themselves admit thedoctrine of original sin in this book and others of the same period (see Sanday, "The International Critical Commentary: Romans", 134, 137; Hastings, "A Dictionary of the Bible", I, 841). It is therefore impossible to makeSt. Augustine, who is of a much laterdate, the inventor of original sin.
That thisdoctrine existed inChristian tradition before St. Augustine'stime is shown by the practice of theChurch in thebaptism of children. ThePelagians held thatbaptism was given to children, not to remit theirsin, but to make them better, to give themsupernaturallife, to make themadoptive sons of God, and heirs to theKingdom of Heaven (seeSt. Augustine,Of Sin and Merit I.18). TheCatholics answered by citing theNicene Creed, "Confiteor unum baptisma in remissionem peccatorum". They reproached thePelagians with introducing twobaptisms, one for adults to remitsins, the other for children with no such purpose.Catholics argued, too, from theceremonies ofbaptism, which suppose the child to be under the power ofevil, i.e.,exorcisms,abjuration ofSatan made by the sponsor in the name of the child [Augustine, loc. cit., xxxiv, 63; Denz., n. 140 (96)].
We do not pretend toprove theexistence of original sin by arguments fromreason only.St. Thomas makes use of aphilosophicalproof whichproves theexistence rather of some kind of decadence than ofsin, and he considers hisproof as probable only,satis probabiliter probari potest (Contra Gent., IV, lii). ManyProtestants andJansenists and someCatholics hold thedoctrine of original sin to benecessary inphilosophy, and the only means of solving the problem of theexistence ofevil. This is exaggerated and impossible toprove. It suffices to show thathumanreason has no serious objection against thisdoctrine which is founded on Revelation. The objections ofRationalists usually spring from afalse concept of ourdogma. They attack either the transmission of asin or theidea of an injury inflicted on his race by thefirst man, of a decadence of thehuman race. Here we shall answer only the second category of objections, the others will be considered under a later head (VII).
(1) The law of progress is opposed to the hypothesis of a decadence. Yes, if the progress was necessarily continuous, but historyproves the contrary. The line representing progress has its ups and downs, there are periods of decadence and of retrogression, and such was the period, Revelation tells us, that followed the firstsin. Thehuman race, however, began to rise again little by little, for neither intelligence norfree will had been destroyed by original sin and, consequently, there still remained the possibility of material progress, whilst in the spiritual orderGod did not abandonman, to whom He had promisedredemption. This theory of decadence has no connexion with our Revelation. TheBible, on the contrary, shows us even spiritual progress in the people it treats of: the vocation ofAbraham, thelaw of Moses, the mission of theProphets, the coming of theMessias, arevelation which becomes clearer and clearer, ending in the Gospel, its diffusion amongst all nations, its fruits ofholiness, and the progress of theChurch.
(2) It isunjust, says another objection, that from thesin of oneman should result the decadence of the wholehuman race. This would have weight if we took this decadence in the same sense thatLuther took it, i.e.humanreason incapable of understanding evenmoraltruths,free will destroyed, the verysubstance ofman changed intoevil.
But according toCatholictheologyman has not lost hisnaturalfaculties: by thesin ofAdam he has been deprived only of the Divine gifts to which hisnature had no strictright, the complete mastery of hispassions, exemption from death,sanctifying grace, thevision of God in the next life. TheCreator, whose gifts were not due to thehuman race, had theright to bestow them on suchconditions as He wished and to make their conservation depend on the fidelity of thehead of the family. A prince can confer a hereditary dignity on condition that the recipient remains loyal, and that, in case of his rebelling, this dignity shall be taken from him and, in consequence, from his descendants. It is not, however, intelligible that the prince, on account of a fault committed by a father, should order the hands and feet of all the descendants of the guilty man to be cut off immediately after their birth. This comparison represents thedoctrine ofLuther which we in no way defend. Thedoctrine of theChurch supposes no sensible or afflictive punishment in the next world for children who die with nothing but original sin on theirsouls, but only the privation of thesight of God [Denz., n. 1526 (1389)].
This is a difficult point and many systems have been invented to explain it: it will suffice to give thetheological explanation now commonly received. Original sin is the privation ofsanctifying grace in consequence of thesin ofAdam. This solution, which is that ofSt. Thomas, goes back toSt. Anselm and even to the traditions of the earlyChurch, as we see by the declaration of theSecond Council of Orange (A.D. 529):one man has transmitted to the wholehuman race not only the death of the body, which is the punishment ofsin, but evensin itself,which is the death of thesoul [Denz., n. 175 (145)]. As death is the privation of the principle oflife, the death of thesoul is the privation ofsanctifying grace which according to alltheologians is the principle ofsupernaturallife. Therefore, if original sin is "the death of thesoul", it is the privation ofsanctifying grace.
TheCouncil of Trent, although it did not make this solutionobligatory by adefinition, regarded it with favour and authorized its use (cf. Pallavicini, "Istoria del Concilio di Trento", vii-ix). Original sin is described not only as the death of thesoul (Sess. V, can. ii), but as a "privation ofjustice that each child contracts at its conception" (Sess. VI, cap. iii). But the Council calls "justice" what we callsanctifying grace (Sess. VI), and as each child should have had personally his ownjustice so now after the fall he suffers his own privation ofjustice.
We may add an argument based on the principle ofSt. Augustine already cited, "the deliberatesin of thefirst man is the cause of original sin". This principle is developed bySt. Anselm: "thesin ofAdam was one thing but thesin of children at their birth is quite another, the former was the cause, the latter is the effect" (De conceptu virginali, xxvi). In a child original sin is distinct from the fault ofAdam, it is one of its effects. But which of these effects is it? We shall examine the several effects ofAdam's fault and reject those which cannot be original sin:
(1) Death and Suffering.- These are purely physicalevils and cannot be calledsin. MoreoverSt. Paul, and after him the councils, regarded death and original sin as two distinct things transmitted byAdam.
(2) Concupiscence.- This rebellion of the lowerappetite transmitted to us byAdam is anoccasion of sin and in that sense comes nearer tomoralevil. However, the occasion of a fault is not necessarily a fault, and whilst original sin is effaced bybaptismconcupiscence still remains in thepersonbaptized; therefore original sin andconcupiscence cannot be one and the same thing, as was held by the earlyProtestants (see Council of Trent, Sess. V, can. v).
(3) The absence ofsanctifying grace in the new-born child is also an effect of the firstsin, forAdam, having receivedholiness andjustice fromGod, lost it not only for himself but also for us (loc. cit., can. ii). If he has lost it for us we were to have received it from him at our birth with the other prerogatives of our race. Therefore the absence ofsanctifying grace in a child is a real privation, it is the want of something that should have been in him according to the Divine plan. If this favour is not merely something physical but is something in themoral order, if it isholiness, its privation may be called asin. Butsanctifying grace isholiness and is so called by theCouncil of Trent, becauseholiness consists in union withGod, and grace unites us intimately withGod.Moralgoodness consists in this, that our action is according to themorallaw, but grace is a deification, as the Fathers say, a perfect conformity withGod who is the first rule of all morality. (SeeGRACE.)Sanctifying grace therefore enters into themoral order, not as an act that passes but as a permanent tendency which exists even when the subject who possesses it does not act; it is a turning towardsGod,conversio ad Deum. Consequently the privation of this grace, even without any other act, would be a stain, amoral deformity, a turning away fromGod,aversio a Deo, and thischaracter is not found in any other effect of the fault ofAdam. This privation, therefore, is the hereditary stain.
"There can be nosin that is notvoluntary, the learned and theignorant admit this evidenttruth", writesSt. Augustine (De vera relig., xiv, 27). TheChurch has condemned the opposite solution given byBaius [prop. xlvi, xlvii, in Denz., n. 1046 (926)]. Original sin is not an act but, as already explained, a state, a permanent privation, and this can bevoluntary indirectly — just as adrunken man is deprived of hisreason and incapable of using his liberty, yet it is by his free fault that he is in this state and hence hisdrunkenness, his privation ofreason isvoluntary and can be imputed to him.
But how can original sin be even indirectlyvoluntary for a child that has never used its personalfree will? CertainProtestants hold that a child on coming to the use of reason willconsent to its original sin; but in reality no one ever thought of giving thisconsent. Besides, even before the use of reason,sin is already in thesoul, according to the data ofTradition regarding thebaptism of children and thesin contracted by generation. Sometheosophists andspiritists admit the pre-existence ofsouls that havesinned in a formerlife which they now forget; but apart from the absurdity of thismetempsychosis, it contradicts thedoctrine of original sin, it substitutes a number of particularsins for the onesin of acommon father transmittingsin and death to all (cf.Romans 5:12 sqq.). The wholeChristian religion, saysSt. Augustine, may be summed up in the intervention of two men, the one to ruin us, the other to save us (Of Sin and Merit I.24). The right solution is to be sought in thefree will ofAdam in hissin, and thisfree will was ours: "we were all inAdam", saysSt. Ambrose, cited bySt. Augustine (Opus imperf., IV, civ).St. Basil attributes to us the act of thefirst man: "Becausewe did not fast (whenAdam ate the forbidden fruit) we have been turned out of thegarden of Paradise" (Hom. i de jejun., iv). Earlier still is the testimony ofSt. Irenæus; "In theperson of thefirst Adam we offendGod, disobeying His precept" (Haeres., V, xvi, 3).
St. Thomas thus explains this moral unity of our will with the will ofAdam.
"Anindividual can be considered either as anindividual or as part of a whole, a member of asociety . . . . Considered in the second way an act can be his although he has not done it himself, nor has it been done by hisfree will but by the rest of thesociety or by its head, the nation being considered as doing what the prince does. For asociety is considered as a single man of whom theindividuals are the different members (St. Paul,1 Corinthians 12). Thus the multitude of men who receive theirhumannature fromAdam is to be considered as a single community or rather as a single body . . . . If theman, whose privation of originaljustice is due toAdam, is considered as a privateperson, this privation is not his 'fault', for a fault is essentiallyvoluntary. If, however, we consider him as a member of thefamily ofAdam, as if all men were only one man, then his privation partakes of thenature ofsin on account of itsvoluntary origin, which is the actualsin ofAdam" (De Malo, iv, 1).
It is this law of solidarity, admitted by common sentiment, which attributes to children a part of the shame resulting from the father's crime. It is not a personal crime, objected thePelagians. "No", answeredSt. Augustine, " but it is paternal crime" (Op. imperf., I, cxlviii). Being a distinctperson I am not strictly responsible for the crime of another; the act is not mine. Yet, as a member of thehumanfamily, I am supposed to have acted with itshead who represented it with regard to the conservation or the loss of grace. I am, therefore, responsible for my privation of grace, taking responsibility in the largest sense of the word. This, however, is enough to make the state of privation of grace in a certain degreevoluntary, and, therefore, "without absurdity it may be said to bevoluntary" (St. Augustine, "Retract.", I, xiii).
Thus the principal difficulties of non-believers against the transmission ofsin are answered.
"Free will is essentially incommunicable." Physically, yes; morally, no; the will of the father being considered as that of his children.
"It isunjust to make us responsible for an act committed before our birth." Strictly responsible, yes; responsible in a wide sense of the word, no; the crime of a father brands his yet unborn children with shame, and entails upon them a share of his own responsibility.
"Yourdogma makes us strictly responsible for the fault ofAdam." That is a misconception of ourdoctrine. Ourdogma does not attribute to the children ofAdam any properly so-called responsibility for the act of their father, nor do we say that original sin isvoluntary in the strict sense of the word. It istrue that, considered as "amoral deformity", "a separation fromGod", as "the death of thesoul", original sin is a realsin which deprives thesoul ofsanctifying grace. It has the same claim to be asin as has habitualsin, which is the state in which an adult is placed by a grave and personal fault, the "stain" whichSt. Thomas defines as "the privation of grace" (I-II:109:7;III:87:2, ad 3), and it is from this point of view thatbaptism, putting an end to the privation of grace, "takes away all that is really and properlysin", forconcupiscence which remains "is not really and properlysin", although its transmission was equallyvoluntary (Council of Trent, Sess. V, can. v.). Considered precisely asvoluntary, original sin is only the shadow ofsin properly so-called. According toSt. Thomas (In II Sent., dist. xxv, Q. i, a. 2, ad 2um), it is not calledsin in the same sense, but only in an analogous sense.
Severaltheologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, neglecting the importance of the privation of grace in the explanation of original sin, and explaining it only by the participation we are supposed to have in the act ofAdam, exaggerate this participation. They exaggerate theidea ofvoluntary in original sin, thinking that it is the only way to explain how it is asin properly so-called. Their opinion, differing from that ofSt. Thomas, gave rise to uncalled-for and insoluble difficulties. At present it is altogether abandoned.
APA citation.Harent, S.(1911).Original Sin. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11312a.htm
MLA citation.Harent, Stéphane."Original Sin."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 11.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1911.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11312a.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Sean Hyland.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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