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Justification

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(Latinjustificatio; Greekdikaiosis.)

A biblio-ecclesiastical term; which denotes the transforming of the sinner from the state of unrighteousness to the state ofholiness and sonship ofGod. Considered as an act (actus justificationis), justification is the work ofGod alone, presupposing, however, on the part of the adult the process of justification and the cooperation of hisfree will withGod's preventing and helping grace (gratia praeveniens et cooperans). Considered as a state or habit (habitus justificationis), it denotes the continued possession of a quality inherent in thesoul, whichtheologians aptly termsanctifying grace. Since the sixteenth century great differences have existed betweenProtestants andCatholics regarding thetrue nature of justification. As the dogmatic side of the controversy has been fully explained in the article onGRACE, we shall here consider it more from an historical point of view.

The Protestant doctrine on justification

Theideas on which theReformers built their system of justification, except perhaps fiduciaryfaith, were by no means really original. They had been conceived long before either byheretics of the earlier centuries or by isolatedCatholictheologians and had been quietly scattered as the seed of futureheresies. It was especially the representatives ofAntinomianism during the Apostolic times who welcomed theidea thatfaith alone suffices for justification, and that consequently the observance of the moral law is notnecessary either as a prerequisite for obtaining justification or as a means for preserving it. For this reasonSt. Augustine (De fide et operibus, xiv) was of the opinion that the Apostles James, Peter, John, and Jude had directed their Epistles against theAntinomians of that time, who claimed to have taken their doctrines — so dangerous to morality — from the writings ofSt. Paul. Until quite recently, it was almost universally accepted that the epistle of St. James was written against the unwarranted conclusions drawn from the writings ofSt. Paul. Of late, however,Catholicexegetes have become more and more convinced that the Epistle in question, so remarkable for its insisting on the necessity ofgoodworks, neither aimed at correcting thefalse interpretations ofSt. Paul'sdoctrine, nor had any relation to the teaching of theApostle of the Gentiles. On the contrary, they believe that St. James had no other object than to emphasize the fact — already emphasized bySt. Paul — that only suchfaith as is active in charity andgoodworks (fides formata) possesses any power to justify man (cf.Galatians 5:6;1 Corinthians 13:2), whilstfaith devoid of charity andgoodworks (fides informis) is a deadfaith and in the eyes ofGod insufficient for justification (cf.James 2:17 sqq.). According to this apparently correct opinion, the Epistles of both Apostles treat of different subjects, neither with direct relation to the other. For St. James insists on the necessity of works ofChristian charity, whileSt. Paul intends to show that neither the observance of theJewish Law nor the merely naturalgoodworks of thepagans are of any value for obtaining the grace of justification (cf. Bartmann, "St. Paulus u. St. Jacobus und die Rechtertigung", Freiburg, 1897).

Whether Victorinus, aneo-Platonist, already defended thedoctrine of justification byfaith alone, is immaterial to our discussion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in theMiddle Ages there were a fewCatholictheologians among theNominalists (Occam, Durandus, Gabriel Biel), who went so far in exaggerating the value ofgoodworks in the matter of justification that the efficiency and dignity ofDivine grace was unduly relegated to the background. Of late, FathersDenifle and Weiss have shown thatMartin Luther was acquainted almost exclusively with thetheology of theseNominalists, which he naturally and justly found repugnant, and that the"Summa" of St. Thomas and the works of other greattheologians were practically unknown to him. EvenRitschl ("Christliche Lehre von der Rechfertigung und Versohnung", I, 3rd ed., Bonn, 1889, pp. 105, 117) admits that neither theChurch in her official teaching nor the majority of hertheologians ever sanctioned, much less adopted, the extreme views of theNominalists. Nevertheless it was not a healthy reaction againstNominalism, butLuther's own state ofconscience that caused his change of views. Frightened, tormented, worn out by constant reflections on his own sinfulness, he had finally found, even before 1517, relief and consolation only in the thought that man cannot overcomeconcupiscence, and thatsin itself is a necessity. This thought naturally led him to a consideration of the fall of man and its consequences.Original sin has so completely destroyed our likeness toGod and our moral faculties in the natural order, that our will has lost its freedom regarding works morally good or bad, and we are consequently condemned to commitsin in every action. Even what we considergoodworks are nothing butsin. Since, according toLuther,concupiscence, of which death alone shall free us, constitutes the essence oforiginal sin, all our actions are corrupted by it. Concupiscence as an intrinsicallyevil disposition, has instilled its deadly poison into thesoul, its faculties, and its action (cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 6). But here we are forced to ask: If all our moral actions be the outcome of an internal necessity and constraint, how canLuther still speak ofsin in thetrue meaning of the word? Does notoriginal sin become identical with the "Evil Substance" of theManichæans, as later onLuther's follower, Flacius Illyricus, quitelogically admitted?

Against this dark and desolate background there stands out the more clearly the mercy ofGod, who for the sake of the Redeemer's merits lovingly offers to despairing man a righteousness (justitia) already complete in itself, namely the exterior righteousness ofGod or of Christ. With the "arm offaith" the sinner eagerly reaches out for this righteousness and puts it on as a cloak of grace, covering and concealing therewith his misery and hissins. Thus on the part ofGod, justification is, as the Formulary of Concord (1577) avows, a mere external pronouncement of justification, a forensicabsolution fromsin and its eternal punishments. Thisabsolution is based onChrist'sholiness whichGod imputes to man'sfaith. Cf. Solid. Declar. III de fide justif., sec. xi: "The term justification in this instance means the declaring just, the freeing fromsin and the eternal punishment ofsin in consideration of thejustice of Christ imputed tofaith byGod."

What then is the part assigned tofaith in justification? According toLuther (andCalvin also), thefaith that justifies is not, as theCatholicChurch teaches, a firmbelief inGod'srevealedtruths and promises (fides theoretica, dogmatica), but is the infallible conviction (fides fiducialis, fiducia) thatGod for the sake of Christ will no longer impute to us oursins, but will consider and treat us, as if we were really just and holy, although in our inner selves we remain the same sinners as before. Cf. Solid. Declar. III, sec. 15: "Through the obedience of Christ byfaith the just are so declared and reputed, although by reason of their corrupt nature they still are and remain, sinners as long as they bear this mortal body." This so-called "fiduciaryfaith" is not a religious-moral preparation of thesoul forsanctifying grace, nor afreeact of cooperation on the part of the sinner; it is merely a means or spiritual instrument (instrumentum, organon leptikon) granted byGod to assist the sinner in laying hold of the righteousness ofGod, thereby to cover hissins in a purely external manner as with a mantle. For this reason theLutheran formularies ofbelief lay great stress on thedoctrine that our entire righteousness does not intrinsically belong to us, but is something altogether exterior. Cf. Solid. Declar., sec. 48: "It is settled beyond question that ourjustice is to be sought wholly outside of ourselves and that it consists entirely inour Lord Jesus Christ." The contrast betweenProtestant andCatholic doctrine here becomes very striking. For according to the teaching of theCatholicChurch the righteousness andsanctity which justification confers, although given to us byGod as efficient cause (causa efficiens) and merited by Christ as meritorious cause (causa meritoria), become an interior sanctifying quality or formal cause (causa formalis) in thesoul itself, which it makes truly just and holy in the sight ofGod. In theProtestant system, however, remission ofsin is no real forgiveness, no blotting out of guilt. Sin is merely cloaked and concealed by the imputed merits of Christ;God no longer imputes it, whilst in reality it continues under cover its miserable existence till the hour of death. Thus there exist in man side by side two hostile brothers as it were — the one just and the otherunjust; the one asaint, the other a sinner; the one a child ofGod, the other a slave ofSatan — and this without any prospect of a conciliation between the two. For,God by His merely judicialabsolution fromsin does not take awaysin itself, but spreads over it as an outward mantle His own righteousness. TheLutheran (andCalvinistic)doctrine on justification reaches its climax in the assertion that "fiduciary faith", as described above, is the only requisite for justification (sola fides justificat). As long as the sinner with the "arm offaith" firmly clings to Christ, he is and will ever remain regenerated, pleasing toGod, the child ofGod and heir toheaven. Faith, which alone can justify, is also the only requisite and means of obtainingsalvation. Neither repentance nor penance, neitherlove ofGod norgoodworks, nor any other virtue is required, though in the just they may either attend or follow as a result of justification. (Cf. Solid. Declar, sec. 23: "Indeed, neither contrition norlove nor any other virtue, butfaith alone is the means by which we can reach forth and obtain the grace ofGod, the merit of Christ and the remission ofsin.") It is well known thatLuther in hisGerman translation of theBible falsifiedRomans 3:28, by interpolating the word "alone" (byfaithalone), and to his critics gave the famous answer: "Dr. Martin Luther wants it that way, and says, 'Papist and ass are the same thing: sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas'."

Since neither charity norgoodworks contribute anything towards justification — inasmuch asfaith alone justifies — their absence subsequently cannot deprive the just man of anything whatever. There is only one thing that might possibly divest him of justification, namely, the loss of fiduciaryfaith or offaith in general. From this point of view we get apsychological explanation of numerous objectionable passages inLuther's writings, against which evenProtestant with deep moral sense, such as Hugo Grotius and GeorgeBull, earnestly protested. Thus we find in one ofLuther's letters, written toMelancthon in 1521, the following sentence: "Be a sinner andsin boldly, but believe and rejoice in Christ more strongly, who triumphed oversin, death, and the world; as long as we live here, we mustsin." Could anyone do more to degradeSt. Paul's concept of justification thanLuther did in the followingblasphemy: "Ifadultery could be committed infaith, it would not be asin"? (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 16). Thedoctrine of justification byfaith alone was considered byLuther and his followers as an incontrovertibledogma, as the foundation rock of theReformation, as an "article by which theChurch must stand or fall" (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesia), and which of itself would have been a sufficient cause for beginning theReformation, as the Smalkaldic Articles emphatically declare. Thus we need not wonder when later on we seeLutherantheologians declaring that theSola-Fidesdoctrine, as theprincipium materiale ofProtestantism, deserves to be placed side by side with thedoctrine ofSola-Scriptura ("Bible alone", with the exclusion of Tradition) as itsprincipium formale — two maxims in which the contrast betweenProtestant andCatholic teaching reaches its highest point. Since, however, neither maxim can be found in theBible, everyCatholic is forced to conclude thatProtestantism from its very beginning and foundation is based on self-deception. We assert this ofProtestantism in general; for thedoctrine of justification as defended by the reformed Churches differs only in non-essentials fromLutheranism. The most important of these differences is to be found inCalvin's system, which taught that only such as arepredestined infallibly toeternalsalvation obtain justification, whilst in those notpredestinedGod produces a mere appearance offaith and righteousness, and this in order to punish them the more severely inhell (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 12).

From what has been said it is obvious that justification as understood byProtestants, presents the following qualities: its absolutecertainty (certitudo), its equality in all (aequalitas), and finally the impossibility of ever losing it (inamissibilitas). For if it be essential to fiduciaryfaith that it infallibly assures the sinner of his own justification, it cannot mean anything but a firm conviction of the actual possession of grace. If, moreover, the sinner be justified, not by an interior righteousness capable of increase or decrease, but throughGod'ssanctityeternally the same, it is evident that all the just from the common mortal to the Apostles and the Blessed Virgin Mary possess one and the same degree of righteousness andsanctity. Finally if, asLuther maintains, only the loss offaith (according toCalvin, not even that) can deprive us of justification, it follows that justification once obtained can never be lost.

Incidentally, we may here call attention to another significant fact, namely that it wasLuther who laid the foundation for the separation of religion and morality. For, by stating that fiduciaryfaith alone suffices for obtaining both justification and eternalhappiness, he minimized our moral faculties to such an extent that charity andgoodworks no longer affect our relations withGod. By thisdoctrineLuther opened a fundamental breach between religion and morality, betweenfaith and law, and assigned to each its own distinct sphere of action in which each can attain its end independent of the other. Prof. Paulsen ofBerlin was therefore justified in eulogizingKant, who followedLuther in this matter, as the Philosopher of Protestantism". (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 25.)

The harshness, want of harmony, intrinsic improbability, and contradiction ofHoly Writ contained in the system soon brought about a reaction in the very midst ofProtestantism. Osiander (d. 1552), at once an enthusiastic admirer ofLuther and an independent thinker, emphatically stated (in opposition toLuther andCalvin) that the justifying power offaith consists in a real, instrinsic union of Christ with thesoul, an opinion for which, asbeingCatholic, he was censured freely.Butzer (d. 1551) likewise admits, in addition to an "imputed exterior righteousness", theidea of an "inherent righteousness" as a partial factor in justification, thus meetingCatholicism half way.Luther's most dangerous adversary, however, was his friendMelancthon, who, in his praiseworthy endeavour to smooth over by conciliatory modifications the interior difficulties of this discordant system, laid the foundation for the famousSynergisten-Streit (Synergist Dispute), which was so soon to become embittered. In general it was precisely the denial of man'sfree will in the moral order, and of the impossibility of his full cooperation withDivine grace that repelled so many followers ofLuther. No sooner had Pfeffinger in his book, "De libero arbitrio" (Leipzig, 1555) taken up defence of man'sfree will than manytheologians of Jena (e.g. Strigel) boldly attacked theLutheranKlotz-Stock-und-Steintheorie (log-stick-and-stone theory), and tried to force from their adversaries the concession that man can cooperate withGod's grace. Thetheological quarrel soonproved very annoying to both parties and the desire for peace became universal. "The Half-Melanchtonians" had succeeded in smuggling Synergism into the "Book of Torgau" (1576); but before the "Formulary of Concord" was printed in themonastery ofBergen (nearMagdeburg, 1557), the article in question was eliminated as heterodox and the harshdoctrine ofLuther substituted in the symbols of theLutheran Church. The new breach in the system by the Synergisten-Streit was enlarged by a counter movement that originated among thePietists andMethodists, who were willing to admit the fallible assurance ofsalvation — given by fiduciaryfaith — only in case that that assurance was confirmed by internal experience. But what probably contributed most of all to the crumbling of the system was the rapid growth ofSocinianism andRationalism which during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gained so many adherents among theLutherans. Fiduciaryfaith was no longer considered a spiritual means to assist man in reaching out for the righteousness ofGod, but was identified with a disposition which is upright and pleasing toGod. Latterly, A.Ritschl defined justification as the change in the consciousness of our relation toGod and amplified thisidea by the statement that thecertainty of oursalvation is further determined by the consciousness of our union with theChristian community. Schleiermacher and Hengstenberg deviated still further from the olddoctrine. For they declared contrition and penance as alsonecessary for justification, thus "coming dangerously near the Catholic system", as Derner expresses it ("Geschichte der protest. Theologie",Munich, 1867, p. 583). Finally theLutheran Church of Scandinavia has in the course oftime experienced a "quiet reformation", inasmuch as it now, without being fully conscious of the fact, defends theCatholic doctrine on justification (cf. Krogh-Tonning, "Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation", Christiania, 1894). The strictorthodoxy of the Old Lutherans, e.g. in the Kingdom of Saxony and theState of Missouri, alone continues to cling tenaciously to a system, which otherwise would have slowly fallen into oblivion.

The Catholic doctrine on justification

We have an authentic explanation of theCatholic doctrine in the famous "Decretum de justificatione" of the Sixth Session (13 Jan., 1547) of theCouncil of Trent, which in sixteen chapters (cf.Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchir.", nn.793-810) and thirty-three canons (l.c., 811-43) gives in the clearest manner allnecessary information about the process, causes, effects, and qualities of justification.

The process of justification (processus justificationis)

Since justification as an application of the Redemption to the individual presupposes the fall of the entirehuman race, theCouncil of Trent quitelogically begins with the fundamental statement thatoriginal sin has weakened and deflected, but not entirely destroyed or extinguished the freedom of the human will (Trent, sess. VI, cap. i: "Liberum arbitrium minime extinctum, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum"). Nevertheless, as the children of Adam were really corrupted byoriginal sin, they could not of themselves arise from their fall nor shake off the bonds ofsin, death, andSatan. Neither the natural faculties left in man, nor the observance of theJewish Law could achieve this. SinceGod alone was able to free us from this great misery, He sent in Hisinfinitelove His only begotten SonJesus Christ, Who by His bitter passion and death on the cross redeemed fallen man and thus became the Mediator betweenGod and man. But if the grace of Redemption merited by Christ is to be appropriated by the individual, he must be "regenerated by God", that is he must be justified. What then is meant by justification? Justification denotes that change or transformation in thesoul by which man is transferred from the state oforiginal sin, in which as a child of Adam he was born, to that of grace and Divine sonship throughJesus Christ, the second Adam, our Redeemer (l.c., cap.iv: "Justificatio impii. . . translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adae, in statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam, Jesum Christum, Salvatorem nostrum"). In the New Law this justification cannot, according toChrist's precept, be effected except at the fountain of regeneration, that is, by thebaptism of water. While in Baptism infants are forthwith cleansed of the stain oforiginal sin without any preparation on their part, the adult must pass through a moral preparation, which consists essentially in turning fromsin and towardsGod. This entire process receives its first impulse from thesupernatural grace of vocation (absolutely independent of man's merits), and requires an intrinsic union of the Divine and human action, of grace and moral freedom of election, in such a manner, however, that the will can resist, and with full liberty reject the influence of grace (Trent, l.c., can.iv: "If any one should say thatfree will, moved and set in action byGod, cannot cooperate by assenting toGod's call, nor dissent if it wish. . . let him beanathema"). By thisdecree the Council not only condemned theProtestant view that the will in the reception of grace remains merely passive, but also forestalled theJansenistic heresy regarding the impossibility of resistingactual grace. With what little rightheretics in defence of theirdoctrine appeal toSt. Augustine, may be seen from the following brief extract from his writings: "He who made you without your doing does not without your action justify you. Without your knowing He made you, with your willing He justifies you, but it is He who justifies, that thejustice be not your own" (Serm. clxix, c. xi, n.13). RegardingSt. Augustine'sdoctrine cf. J. Jausbach, "Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus", II, Freiburg, 1909, pp. 208-58.

We now come to the different states in the process of justification. TheCouncil of Trent assigns the first and most important place tofaith, which is styled "the beginning, foundation and root of all justification" (Trent, l.c., cap.viii). Cardinal Pallavicini* (Hist. Conc. Trid., VIII, iv, 18) tells us that all thebishops present at the council fully realized how important it was to explainSt. Paul's saying that man is justified throughfaith. Comparing Bible and Tradition they could not experience any serious difficulty in showing that fiduciaryfaith was an absolutely new invention and that thefaith of justification was identical with a firmbelief in thetruths and promises ofDivine revelation (l. c.: "illumque [Deum] tanquam omnis justitiae fontem diligere incipiunt"). The next step is a genuine sorrow for allsin with the resolution to begin a new life by receivingholybaptism and by observing the commandments ofGod. The process of justification is then brought to a close by thebaptism of water, inasmuch as by the grace of this sacrament thecatechumen is freed fromsin (original and personal) and its punishments, and is made a child ofGod. The same process of justification is repeated in those who by mortalsin have lost theirbaptismal innocence; with this modification, however, that theSacrament of Penance replacesbaptism. Considering merely thepsychological analysis of the conversion of sinners, as given by the council, it is at once evident thatfaith alone, whether fiduciary or dogmatic, cannot justify man (Trent, l. c., can. xii: "Si quis dixerit, fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordiae, peccata remittentis propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse, qua justificamur, a.s."). Since our Divine adoption and friendship withGod is based on perfectlove ofGod or charity (cf.Galatians 5:6;1 Corinthians 13;James 2:17 sqq.), deadfaith devoid of charity (fides informis) cannot possess any justifying power. Only suchfaith as is active in charity andgoodworks (fides caritate formata) can justify man, and this even before the actual reception ofbaptism or penance, although not without a desire of the sacrament (cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cap. iv, xiv). But, not to close the gates ofheaven againstpagans and those non-Catholics, who without their fault do notknow or do not recognize the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance,Catholictheologians unanimously hold that the desire to receive thesesacraments is implicitly contained in the serious resolve to do all thatGod has commanded, even if His holy will should not become known in every detail.

The formal cause of justification

TheCouncil of Trent decreed that the essence of active justification comprises not only forgiveness ofsin, but also "sanctification and renovation of the interior man by means of thevoluntary acceptation ofsanctifying grace and othersupernatural gifts" (Trent, l. c., cap. vii: "Non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum"). In order to exclude theProtestantidea of a merely forensicabsolution and exterior declaration of righteousness, special stress is laid on the fact that we are justified byGod'sjustice, not that whereby He himself is just but that whereby He makes us just, in so far as He bestows on us the gift of His grace which renovates thesoul interiorly and adheres to it as thesoul's ownholiness (Trent, l. c., cap. vii: "Unica formalis causa [justificationis] est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab eo donati, renovamur spiritu mentis nostrae: et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes unusquisque suam"). This inner quality of righteousness andsanctity is universally termed "sanctifying (or habitual) grace", and stands in marked contrast to an exterior, imputedsanctity, as well as to theidea of merely covering and concealingsin. By this, however, we do not assert that the "justitia Dei extra nos" is of no importance in the process of justification. For, even if it is not the formal cause of justification (causa formalis), it is nevertheless itstrue exemplar (causa exemplaris), inasmuch as thesoul receives asanctity in imitation ofGod's ownholiness. TheCouncil of Trent (l. c. cap. vii), moreover, did not neglect to enumerate in detail the other causes of justification: the glory ofGod and of Christ as the final cause (causa finalis), the mercy ofGod as the efficient cause (causa efficiens), the Passion of Christ as the meritorious cause (causa meritoria), the reception of the Sacraments as the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis). Thus each and every factor receives its full share and is assigned its proper place. Hence theCatholic doctrine on justification, in welcome contrast to theProtestant teaching, stands out as a reasonable, consistent, harmonious system. For further explanation of the nature ofsanctifying grace, seeSUPERNATURAL GRACE. Regarding thefalse doctrine of theCatholictheologianHermes, cf.Kleutgen, "Theologie der Vorzeit", II (2nd ed., Munster, 1872), 254-343.

According to theCouncil of Trentsanctifying grace is not merelya formal cause, but "the only formal cause" (unica causa formalis) of our justification. By this important decision the Council excluded theerror ofButzer and someCatholictheologians (Gropper, Scripando, andAlbert Pighius) who maintained that an additional "external favour ofGod" (favor Dei externus) belonged to the essence of justification. The samedecree also effectually set aside the opinion ofPeter Lombard, that the formal cause of justification (i.e.sanctifying grace) is nothing less than thePerson of the Holy Ghost, Who is the hypostaticholiness and charity, or the uncreated grace (gratia increata). Since justification consists in an interiorsanctity and renovation of spirit, its formal cause evidently must be a created grace (gratia creata), a permanent quality, asupernatural modification or accident (accidens) of thesoul. Quite distinct from this is the question whether the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, although not required for justification (inasmuch assanctifying grace alone suffices), benecessary as a prerequisite for Divine adoption. Several greattheologians have answered in the affirmative, as for instanceLessius ("De summo bono", II, i; "De perfect. moribusque divin.", XII, ii);Petavius ("De Trinit.", viii, 4 sqq.);Thomassin ("De Trinit.", viii, 9 sqq.), andHurter ("Compend. theol. dogmat.", III, 6th ed., pp. 162 sqq.). The solution of the lively controversy on this point betweenFr. Granderath ("Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie", 1881, pp. 283 sqq.; 1883, 491 sqq., 593 sqq.; 1884, 545 sqq.) andProfessor Scheeben ("Dogmatik", II, sec. 169; "Katholik", 1883, I, 142 sqq.; II, 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq.; II, 465 sqq., 610 sqq.) seems to lie in the following distinction: the Divine adoption, inseparably connected withsanctifying grace, is not constituted by the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, but receives therefrom its full development and perfection.

The effects of justification

The two elements of active justification, forgiveness ofsin and sanctification, furnish at the same time the elements of habitual justification, freedom fromsin andholiness. According to theCatholic doctrine, however, this freedom fromsin and thissanctity are effected, not by two distinct and successive Divine acts, but by a single act ofGod. For, just as light dispels darkness, so the infusion ofsanctifying graceeo ipso dispels from thesoul original and mortalsin. (Cf. Trent, sess. VI, can. xi: "Si quis dixerit, homines justificari vel sola imputatione justitiae Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat. . ., a.s.") In considering the effects of justification it will be useful to compare theCatholic doctrine of real forgiveness ofsin with theProtestant theory thatsin is merely "covered" and not imputed. By declaring the grace of justification, orsanctifying grace, to be the only formal cause of justification, theCouncil of Trent intended to emphasize the fact that in possessingsanctifying grace we possess the whole essence of the state of justification with all its formal effects; that is, we possess freedom fromsin andsanctity, and indeed freedom fromsinby means ofsanctity. Such a remission ofsin could not consist in a mere covering or non-imputation ofsins, which continue their existence out of view; it must necessarily consist in the real obliteration and annihilation of the guilt. This genuinely Biblical concept of justification forms such an essential element ofCatholicism, that evenAntonio Rosmini's theory, standing half way betweenProtestantism andCatholicism, is quite irreconcilable with it. According toRosmini, there are two categories ofsin:

By the latterRosmini understood deliberatesins of commission (culpae actuales et liberae), by the former indeliberatesins (peccata non libera), which "do no harm to those who are of the people ofGod". This opinion was censured by the Holy Office (14 Dec., 1887), not only because without any reason it defended a twofold remission ofsin, but also because it stamped indeliberate acts assins (cf.Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchir.", n.1925).

Although it is aCatholicdogma thatsanctifying grace andsin (original and mortal) do never exist simultaneously in thesoul, there may be, nevertheless a diversity of opinion regarding the extent of this incompatibility, according as it is considered as either moral, physical, or metaphysical in character. According to the now universally rejected opinion of theNominalists (Occam, Gabriel Biel) and theScotists (Mastrius, Henno) the contrast between grace andsin is based on a freedecree and acceptation ofGod, or in other words, the contrast is merely moral. This wouldlogically imply in contradiction to the "unica causa formalis" of theCouncil of Trent, a twofold formal cause of justification (cf. Pohle, "Dogmatik", II, 4th ed., Paderborn, 1909, p. 512). Francisco Suárez (De gratia, VII, 20) and some of his followers in defending a physical contrast come nearer thetruth. In their explanation grace andsin exclude each other with the same necessity as do fire and water, although in both casesGod, by amiracle of hisomnipotence, could suspend the general law and force the two hostile elements to exist peacefully side by side. This opinion might be safely accepted weresanctifying grace only a physical ornament of thesoul. But since in reality it is anethical form of sanctification by which even an infant in receivingbaptism is necessarily made just and pleasing toGod, there must be between the concepts of grace and ofsin a metaphysical and absolute contradiction, which not even Divineomnipotence can alter and destroy. For this last opinion, defended by theThomists and the majority oftheologians, there is also a solid foundation inHoly Writ. For the contrast between grace andsin is as great as between light and darkness (2 Corinthians 6:14;Ephesians 5:8), between life and death (Romans 5:21;Colossians 2:13;1 John 3:14), betweenGod and idols, Christ andBelial (2 Corinthians 6:15 sqq.), etc. Thus it follows fromHoly Writ that by the infusion ofsanctifying gracesin is destroyed and blotted out of absolute necessity, and that theProtestant theory of "covering and not imputingsin" is both aphilosophical and atheological impossibility. Besides the principal effect of justification, i.e. real obliteration ofsin by means of sanctification, there is a whole series of other effects: beauty of thesoul, friendship withGod, and Divine adoption. In the article onGRACE these are described as formal effects ofsanctifying grace. In the same article is given an explanation of thesupernatural accompaniments — the threetheological virtues, the moral virtues, the seven gifts, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost. These, as freely bestowed gifts ofGod, cannot be regarded as formal effects of justification.

The qualities of justification

We have seen thatProtestants claim the following three qualities for justification:certainty, equality, the impossibility of ever losing it. Diametrically opposed to these qualities are those defended by theCouncil of Trent (sess. VI, cap. 9-11): uncertainty (incertitudo), inequality (inaequalitas), amissibility (ammisibilitas). Since these qualities of justification are also qualities ofsanctifying grace, seeGRACE.

Sources

PROTESTANT BELIEFS: Clasen, Die christliche Heilsgewissheit (1907); Haring, Dikaiosyne Theou bei Paulus (1896); cf. Denifle, Die abendlandischen Schriftausleger uber justitia Dei u. justificatio (Mainz, 1905); Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre (2nd ed., 1900); Nosgen, Der Schriftbeweis fur die evangelische Rechtfertigungslehre (1901); Schlatter, Der Glaube im N.T. (3rd ed., 1905); Feine, Das Gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus (1899); Idem, Jesus Christus u. Paulus (1902); Clemen, Paulus, sein Leben u. Wirken (2 vols., 1904); Gottschick, Die Heilsgewissheit des evangelishen Christen in Zeitschr. fur Theol. u. Kritik (1903), 349 sqq.; Denifle, Luther u. Luthertum in der ersten Entwicklung, I (Mainz, 1904); Ihmels, Die Rechtfertigung allein durch den Glauben, unser fester Grund Rom gegenuber in Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1904), 618 sqq.; Denifle and Weiss, Luther u. Luthertum etc., II (Mainz). Cf. also Harnack, Dogmengesch., III (4th ed., Freiburg, 1909); Ihmels in Herzog and Jauck, Realencycl. fur protest. Theol., s.v. Rechtfertigung.

CATHOLIC TEACHING: Vega, De justificatione doctrina universa, LL. XV absolute tradita (Venice, 1548); Bellarmine, De justificatione impii in Opp. omnia, VI (Paris, 1873); Nussbaum, Die Lehre der kathol. Kirche uber die Rechtfertigung (Munich, 1837); Wieser, S. Pauli doctrina de justificatione (Trent, 1874); Mohler, Symbolik (2nd ed., Mainz, 1890), secs. x-xxvii; Einig in Kirchenlex., s.v. Rechtfertigung; Rademacher, Die ubernaturliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen u. johanneischen Theologie (Freiburg, 1903); Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, II (Freiburg, 1900); Pohle, Dogmatik, II (4th ed., Paderborn, 1909), 484-5556; Hefner, Entstehungsgeach. des Trienter Rechtfertigungs-Dekretes (Paderborn, 1909); Prumbs, Die Stellung des Trid. Konz. zu der Frage nach dem Wesen der heilignachenden Gnade (Paderborn, 1910).

About this page

APA citation.Pohle, J.(1910).Justification. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08573a.htm

MLA citation.Pohle, Joseph."Justification."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 8.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1910.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08573a.htm>.

Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Terry Wilkinson.

Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

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