 |
|
| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
In general, exemption or immunity from liability toerror or failure;in particular intheological usage, thesupernatural prerogative by which theChurch of Christ is, by a special Divine assistance, preserved from liability toerror in her definitive dogmatic teaching regarding matters offaith andmorals. In this article the subject will be treated under the following heads:
It is well to begin by stating the ecclesiologicaltruths that are assumed to be established before the question of infallibility arises. It is assumed:
And this being assumed, the question that concerns us is whether, and in what way, and to what extent,Christ has made HisChurch to be infallible in the exercise of herdoctrinal authority.
It is only in connection withdoctrinal authority as such that, practically speaking, this question of infallibility arises; that is to say, when we speak of theChurch's infallibility we mean, at least primarily and principally, what is sometimes calledactive as distinguished frompassive infallibility. We mean in other words that theChurch is infallible in her objective definitive teaching regardingfaith andmorals, not that believers are infallible in their subjective interpretation of her teaching. This is obvious in the case ofindividuals, any one of whom mayerr in his understanding of theChurch's teaching; nor is the general or even unanimous consent of the faithful inbelieving a distinct and independent organ of infallibility. Such consent indeed, when it can be verified as apart, is of the highest value as aproof of what has been, or may be, defined by the teaching authority, but, except in so far as it is thus the subjective counterpart and complement of objective authoritative teaching, it cannot be said to possess an absolutely decisive dogmatic value. It will be best therefore to confine our attention to active infallibility as such, as by so doing we shall avoid the confusion which is the sole basis of many of the objections that are most persistently and most plausibly urged against thedoctrine ofecclesiastical infallibility.
Infallibility must be carefully distinguished both fromInspiration and fromRevelation.
Inspiration signifies a special positive Divine influence and assistance by reason of which the human agent is not merely preserved from liability toerror but is so guided and controlled that what he says or writes is truly the word ofGod, thatGod Himself is the principal author of the inspired utterance; but infallibility merely implies exemption from liability toerror.God is not the author of a merely infallible, as He is of an inspired, utterance; the former remains a merely human document.
Revelation, on the other hand, means the making known byGod, supernaturally of sometruth hitherto unknown, or at least not vouched for by Divine authority; whereas infallibility is concerned with the interpretation and effective safeguarding oftruths already revealed. Hence when we say, for example, that somedoctrine defined by thepope or by anecumenical council is infallible, we mean merely that its inerrancy is Divinely guaranteed according to the terms ofChrist's promise to HisChurch, not that either thepope or the Fathers of the Council are inspired as were the writers of theBible or that any new revelation is embodied in their teaching.
It is well further to explain:
IfGod bestowed the gift of prophecy onCaiphas who condemnedChrist (John 11:49-52;18:14), surely He may bestow the lesser gift of infallibility even on unworthy human agents. It is, therefore, a mere waste of time for opponents of infallibility to try to create a prejudice against theCatholic claim by pointing out the moral orintellectual shortcomings ofpopes or councils that have pronounced definitivedoctrinal decisions, or to try to show historically that such decisions in certain cases were the seemingly natural and inevitable outcome of existing conditions, moral,intellectual, and political. All that history may be fairly claimed as witnessing to under either of these heads may freely be granted without the substance of theCatholic claim being affected.
That theChurch is infallible in her definitions onfaith andmorals is itself aCatholicdogma, which, although it was formulated ecumenically for the first time in theVatican Council, had been explicitly taught long before and had been assumed from the very beginning without question down to the time of theProtestant Reformation. The teaching of theVatican Council is to be found in Session III, cap. 4, where it is declared that "thedoctrine offaith, whichGod has revealed, has not been proposed as aphilosophical discovery to be improved upon by human talent, but has been committed as a Divine deposit to the spouse ofChrist, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted by her"; and in Session IV, cap. 4, where it isdefined that theRoman pontiff when he teachesex cathedra "enjoys, by reason of the Divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wished HisChurch to be endowed in definingdoctrine regardingfaith andmorals". Even theVatican Council, it will be seen, only introduces the generaldogma of theChurch's infallibility as distinct from that of thepope obliquely and indirectly, following in this respect the traditional usage according to which thedogma is assumed as an implicate of ecumenical magisterial authority. Instances of this will be given below and from these it will appear that, though the wordinfallibility as a technical term hardly occurs at all in the early councils or in the Fathers, the thing signified by it was understood and believed in and acted upon from the beginning. We shall confine our attention in this section to the general question, reserving thedoctrine ofpapal infallibility for special treatment. This arrangement is adopted not because it is the best or mostlogical, but because it enables us to travel a certain distance in the friendly company of those who cling to the generaldoctrine ofecclesiastical infallibility while rejecting thepapal claims. Taking the evidence both scriptural and traditional as it actually stands, one may fairly maintain that it provespapal infallibility in a simpler, more direct, and more cogent way than it proves the generaldoctrine independently; and there can be nodoubt but that this is so if we accept as the alternative topapal infallibility the vague and unworkable theory of ecumenical infallibility which most High-ChurchAnglicans would substitute forCatholic teaching. Nor are the Easternschismatical Churches much better off than theAnglican in this respect, except that each has retained a sort of virtualbelief in its own infallibility, and that in practice they have been more faithful in guarding the doctrines infallibly defined by the early ecumenical councils. Yet certainAnglicans and all the Eastern Orthodox agree withCatholics in maintaining thatChrist promised infallibility to thetrue Church, and we welcome their support as against the generalProtestant denial of thistruth.
In order to prevent misconception and thereby to anticipate a common popular objection which is wholly based on a misconception it should be premised that when we appeal to the Scriptures forproof of theChurch's infallible authority we appeal to them merely as reliable historical sources, and abstract altogether from their inspiration. Even considered as purely human documents they furnish us, we maintain, with a trustworthy report ofChrist's sayings and promises; and, taking it to be a fact thatChrist said what is attributed to Him in theGospels, we further maintain thatChrist's promises to theApostles and their successors in the teaching office include the promise of such guidance and assistance as clearly implies infallibility. Having thus used the Scriptures as mere historical sources to prove thatChrist endowed theChurch with infallible teaching authority it is no vicious circle, but a perfectly legitimatelogical procedure, to rely on theChurch's authority forproof of what writings are inspired.
Merely remarking for the present that the texts in whichChrist promised infallible guidance especially to Peter and his successors in the primacy might be appealed to here as possessing ana fortiori value, it will suffice to consider the classical texts usually employed in the generalproof of theChurch's infallibility; and of these the principal are:
In Matthew 28:18-20, we haveChrist's solemn commission to theApostles delivered shortly before HisAscension: "All power is given to me inheaven and in earth. Going therefore, teach ye all nations;baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of theSon, and of theHoly Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." InMark 16:15-16, the same commission is given more briefly with the added promise ofsalvation to believers and the threat of damnation for unbelievers; "Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He thatbelieveth and isbaptized shall be saved; but he thatbelieveth not shall be condemned."
Now it cannot be denied by anyone who admits thatChrist established a visible Church at all, and endowed it with any kind of effective teaching authority, that this commission, with all it implies, was given not only to theApostles personally for their own lifetime, but to their successors to the end of time, "even to the consummation of the world". And assuming that it was the omniscientSon of God Who spoke these words, with a full and clear realization of the import which, in conjunction with His other promises, they were calculated to convey to theApostles and to all simple and sincere believers to the end of time, the only reasonable interpretation to put upon them is that they contain the promise of infallible guidance indoctrinal teaching made to the Apostolic College in the first instance and then to the hierarchical college that was to succeed it.
In the first place it was not without reason thatChrist prefaced His commission by appealing to the fullness of power He Himself had received: "All power is given to me", etc. This is evidently intended to emphasize the extraordinary character and extent of the authority He is communicating to HisChurch — an authority, it is implied, which He could not personally communicate were not He Himselfomnipotent. Hence the promise that follows cannot reasonably be understood of ordinary natural providential guidance, but must refer to a very specialsupernatural assistance.
In the next place there is question particularly in this passage ofdoctrinal authority — of authority to teach the Gospel to all men — ifChrist's promise to be with theApostles and their successors to the end of time in carrying out this commission means that those whom they are to teach in His name and according to the plenitude of the power He has given them are bound to receive that teaching as if it were His own; in other words they are bound to accept it as infallible. Otherwise the perennial assistance promised would not really be efficacious for its purpose, and efficacious Divine assistance is what the expression used is clearly intended to signify. Supposing, as we do, thatChrist actually delivered a definite body ofrevealedtruth, to be taught to all men in all ages, and to be guarded from change or corruption by the living voice of His visible Church, it is idle to contend that this result could be accomplished effectively — in other words that His promise could be effectively fulfilled unless that living voice can speak infallibly to every generation on any question that may arise affecting the substance ofChrist's teaching.
Without infallibility there could be no finality regarding any one of the greattruths which have been identified historically with the very essence ofChristianity; and it is only with those whobelieve in historicalChristianity that the question need be discussed. Take, for instance, the mysteries of theTrinity andIncarnation. If the earlyChurch was not infallible in her definitions regarding thesetruths, what compelling reason can be alleged today against theright to revive the Sabellian, or theArian, or the Macedonian, or theApollinarian, or theNestorian, or theEutychian controversies, and to defend some interpretation of these mysteries which theChurch has condemned asheretical?
One may not appeal to the inspired authority of the Scriptures, since for the fact of their inspiration the authority of theChurch must be invoked, and unless she be infallible in deciding this one would be free to question the inspiration of any of theNew Testament writings. Nor, abstracting from the question of inspiration, can it be fairly maintained, in face of the facts of history, that the work of interpreting scriptural teaching regarding these mysteries and several other points ofdoctrine that have been identified with the substance of historicalChristianity is so easy as to do away with the need of a living voice to which, as to the voice ofChrist Himself, all are bound to submit.
Unity of Faith was intended byChrist to be one of the distinctive notes of HisChurch, and thedoctrinal authority He set up was intended by His Divine guidance and assistance to be really effective in maintaining this unity; but the history of the earlyheresies and of theProtestant sects proves clearly, what might indeed have been anticipated a priori, that nothing less than an infalliblepublic authority capable of acting decisively whenever the need should rise and pronouncing an absolutely final and irreformable judgment, is really efficient for this purpose. Practically speaking the only alternative to infallibility is private judgment, and this after some centuries of trial has been found to lead inevitably to utterrationalism. If the early definitions of theChurch were fallible, and therefore reformable, perhaps those are right who say today that they ought to be discarded as being actuallyerroneous or even pernicious, or at least that they ought to be re-interpreted in a way that substantially changes their original meaning; perhaps, indeed, there is no such thing as absolutetruth in matters religious! How, for example, is aModernist who takes up this position to be met except by insisting that definitive teaching is irreversible and unchangeable; that it remainstrue in its original sense for all time; in other words that it is infallible? For no one can reasonably hold that fallibledoctrinal teaching is irreformable or deny the right of later generations to question the correctness of earlier fallible definitions and call for their revision or correction, or even for their total abandonment.
From these considerations we are justified in concluding that ifChrist really intended His promise to be with HisChurch to be taken seriously, and if He was truly theSon of God, omniscient andomnipotent, knowing history in advance and able to control its course, then theChurch is entitled to claim infallibledoctrinal authority. This conclusion is confirmed by considering the awful sanction by which theChurch's authority is supported: all who refuse to assent to her teaching are threatened witheternal damnation. This proves the valueChrist Himself set upon His own teaching and upon the teaching of theChurch commissioned to teach in His name; religious indifferentism is here reprobated in unmistakable terms.
Nor does such a sanction lose its significance in this connection because the same penalty is threatened for disobedience to fallible disciplinarylaws or even in some cases for refusing to assent todoctrinal teaching that is admittedly fallible. Indeed, every mortalsin, according toChrist's teaching, is punishable witheternal damnation. But if one believes in the objectivity of eternal and immutabletruth, he will find it difficult to reconcile with a worthy conception of theDivine attributes a command under penalty of damnation to give unqualified and irrevocable internal assent to a large body of professedly Divinedoctrine the whole of which is possiblyfalse. Nor is this difficulty satisfactorily met, as some have attempted to meet it, by calling attention to the fact that in theCatholic system internal assent is sometimes demanded, under pain of grievoussin, todoctrinal decisions that do not profess to be infallible. For, in the first place, the assent to be given in such cases is recognized as being not irrevocable and irreversible, like the assent required in the case of definitive and infallible teaching, but merely provisional; and in the next place, internal assent isobligatory only on those who can give it consistently with the claims of objectivetruth on theirconscience — thisconscience, it is assumed, being directed by a spirit of generous loyalty to genuineCatholic principles.
To take a particular example, ifGalileo who happened to be right while theecclesiastical tribunal which condemned him was wrong, had really possessed convincing scientific evidence in favour of the heliocentric theory, he would have been justified in refusing his internal assent to the opposite theory, provided that in doing so he observed with thorough loyalty all the conditions involved in theduty of external obedience. Finally it should be observed that fallible provisional teaching, as such, derives its binding force principally from the fact that it emanates from an authority which is competent, if need be, to convert it into infallible definitive teaching. Without infallibility in the background it would be difficult to establish theoretically theobligation of yielding internal assent to theChurch's provisional decisions.
InMatthew 16:18, we have the promise that "the gates ofhell shall not prevail" against theChurch that is to be built on the rock; and this also, we maintain, implies the assurance of theChurch's infallibility in the exercise of her teaching office. Such a promise, of course, must be understood with limitations according to the nature of the matter to which it is applied. As applied tosanctity, for example, which is essentially a personal and individual affair, it does not mean that every member of theChurch or of herhierarchy is necessarily asaint, but merely that theChurch, as whole, will be conspicuous among other things for theholiness of life of her members. As applied todoctrine, however — always assuming, as we do, thatChrist delivered a body ofdoctrine the preservation of which in its literaltruth was to be one of the chiefduties of theChurch — it would be a mockery to contend that such a promise is compatible with the supposition that theChurch has possiblyerred in perhaps the bulk of her dogmatic definitions, and that throughout the whole of her history she has been threatening men witheternal damnation inChrist's name for refusing to believe doctrines that are probablyfalse and were never taught byChrist Himself. Could this be the case, would it not be clear that the gates ofhell can prevail and probably have prevailed most signally against theChurch?
InChrist's discourse to theApostles at theLast Supper several passages occur which clearly imply the promise of infallibility: "I will ask the Father, and he shall give you anotherParaclete, that he may abide with you forever. The spirit oftruth . . . he shall abide with you, and shall be in you" (John 14:16, 17). "But theParaclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you" (ibid. 26). "But when he, the spirit oftruth, is come, he will teach you alltruth (John 16:13). And the same promise is renewed immediately before theAscension (Acts 1:8). Now what does the promise of this perennial and efficacious presence and assistance of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit oftruth, mean in connection withdoctrinal authority, except that theThird Person of the Blessed Trinity is made responsible for what theApostles and their successors may define to be part ofChrist's teaching? But insofar as the Holy Ghost is responsible for Church teaching, that teaching is necessarily infallible: what the Spirit oftruth guarantees cannot befalse.
In1 Timothy 3:15,St. Paul speaks of "the house ofGod, which is the church of the livingGod, the pillar and ground of thetruth"; and this description would be something worse than mere exaggeration if it had been intended to apply to a fallible Church; it would be afalse and misleading description. ThatSt. Paul, however, meant it to be taken for sober and literaltruth is abundantlyproved by what he insists upon so strongly elsewhere, namely, the strictly Divine authority of the Gospel which he and the otherApostles preached, and which it was the mission of their successors to go on preaching without change or corruption to the end of time. "When you had received of us", he writes to the Thessalonians, "the word of the hearing ofGod, you received it not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word ofGod, who worketh in you that have believed" (1 Thessalonians 2:13). The Gospel, he tells the Corinthians, is intended to bring "into captivity every understanding unto the obedience ofChrist" (2 Corinthians 10:5). Indeed, so fixed and irreformable is thedoctrine that has been taught that the Galatians (1:8) are warned toanathematize any one, even anangel fromheaven, who should preach to them a Gospel other than that whichSt. Paul had preached. Nor was this attitude — which is intelligible only on the supposition that theApostolic College was infallible — peculiar toSt. Paul. The otherApostles and apostolic writers were equally strong inanathematizing those who preached anotherChristianity than that which theApostles had preached (cf.2 Peter 2:1 sqq.;1 John 4:1 sqq.;2 John 7 sqq.;Jude 4); andSt. Paul makes it clear that it was not to any personal or private views of his own that he claimed to make every understanding captive, but to the Gospel whichChrist had delivered to theApostolic body. When his own authority as anApostle was challenged, his defense was that he had seen the risen Saviour and received his mission directly from Him, and that his Gospel was in complete agreement with that of the otherApostles (see, v.g.,Galatians 2:2-9).
Finally, the consciousness of corporate infallibility is clearly signified in the expression used by the assembledApostles in thedecree of the Council ofJerusalem: "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you", etc. (Acts 15:28). It istrue that the specific points here dealt with are chiefly disciplinary rather than dogmatic, and that no claim to infallibility is made in regard to purely disciplinary questions as such; but behind, and independent of, disciplinary details there was the broad and most important dogmatic question to be decided, whetherChristians, according toChrist's teaching, were bound to observe theOld Law in its integrity, asorthodoxJews of the time observed it. This was the main issue at stake, and in deciding it theApostles claimed to speak in the name and with the authority of the Holy Ghost. Would men who did not believe thatChrist's promises assured them of an infallible Divine guidance have presumed to speak in this way? And could they, in sobelieving, have misunderstood the Master's meaning?
If, during the early centuries, there was no explicit and formal discussion regardingecclesiastical infallibility as such, yet theChurch, in her corporate capacity, after the example of theApostles atJerusalem, always acted on the assumption that she was infallible indoctrinal matters and all the greatorthodox teachers believed that she was so. Those who presumed, on whatever grounds, to contradict theChurch's teaching were treated as representatives ofAntichrist (cf.1 John 2:18 sq.), and wereexcommunicated andanathematized.
It is needless to go on multiplying citations, since the broad fact is indisputable that in the ante-Nicene, no less than in the post-Nicene, period allorthodoxChristians attributed to the corporate voice of theChurch, speaking through the body ofbishops in union with their head and centre, all the fullness ofdoctrinal authority which theApostles themselves had possessed; and to question the infallibility of that authority would have been considered equivalent to questioningGod'sveracity and fidelity. It was for this reason that during the first three centuries the concurrent action of thebishops dispersed throughout the world proved to be effective in securing the condemnation and exclusion of certainheresies and maintaining Gospeltruth in its purity; and when from the fourth century onwards it was found expedient to assemble ecumenical councils, after the example of theApostles atJerusalem, it was for the same reason that thedoctrinal decision of these councils were held to be absolutely final and irreformable. Even theheretics, for the most part recognized this principle in theory; and if in fact they often refused to submit, they did so as a rule on the ground that this or that council was not really ecumenical, that it did not truly express the corporate voice of theChurch, and was not, therefore, infallible. This will not be denied by anyone who is familiar with the history of thedoctrinal controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and within the limits of this article we cannot do more than call attention to the broad conclusion inproof of which it would be easy to cite a great number of particular facts and testimonies.
Several of the objections usually urged against ecclesiastical infallibility have been anticipated in the preceding sections; but some others deserve a passing notice here.
It has been urged that neither a fallible individual nor a collection of fallibleindividuals can constitute an infallible organ. This is quitetrue in reference to naturalknowledge and would be alsotrue as applied to Church authority ifChristianity were assumed to be a mere product of natural reason. But we set out from an entirely different standpoint. We assume as antecedently and independently established thatGod can supernaturally guide and enlighten men, individually or collectively, in such a way that, notwithstanding the natural fallibility of human intelligence, they may speak and may be known withcertainty to speak in His name and with His authority, so that their utterance may be not merely infallible but inspired. And it is only with those who accept this standpoint that the question of theChurch's infallibility can be profitably discussed.
Again, it is said that even those who accept thesupernatural viewpoint must ultimately fall back on fallible human reasoning in attempting to prove infallibility; that behind any conclusion that is proposed on so-called infallible authority there always lurks a premise which cannot claim for itself more than a merely human and falliblecertainty; and that, since the strength of a conclusion is no greater than that of its weaker premise, the principle of infallibility is a useless as well as an illogical importation intoChristiantheology. In reply it is to be observed that this argument, if valid, would prove very much more than it is here introduced to prove; that it would indeed undermine the very foundations ofChristianfaith. For example, on purely rational grounds I have only moralcertainty thatGod Himself is infallible or thatChrist was the infallible mediator of a Divine Revelation; yet if I am to give a rational defense of myfaith, even in mysteries which I do not comprehend, I must do so by appealing to the infallibility ofGod and ofChrist. But according to thelogic of the objection this appeal would be futile and the assent offaith considered as a rational act would be no firmer or more secure than naturalhumanknowledge. Thetruth is that the inferential process here and in the case ofecclesiastical infallibility transcends the rule of formallogic that is alleged. Assent is given not to thelogical force of the syllogism, but directly to the authority which the inference serves to introduce; and this holds good in a measure even when there is question of mere fallible authority. Once we come tobelieve in and rely upon authority we can afford to overlook the means by which we were brought to accept it, just as a man who has reached a solid standing place where he wishes to remain no longer relies on the frail ladder by which he mounted. It cannot be said that there is any essential difference in this respect between Divine andecclesiastical infallibility. The latter of course is only a means by which we are put under subjection to the former in regard to a body oftruth once revealed and to be believed by all men to the end of time, and no one can fairly deny that it is useful, not to saynecessary, for that purpose. Its alternative is private judgment, and history has shown to what results this alternative inevitably leads.
Again, it is urged that the kind of submission demanded by infallible authority is incompatible with therights of reason and of legitimate inquiry and speculation, and tends to give to one'sfaith in his Creed a dry, formal, proud, and intolerant character which contrasts unfavourably with the warmhearted,humble, and tolerantfaith of the man who believes on conviction after free personal inquiry. In reply it is sufficient to say that submission to infallible authority implies no abdication of reason, nor does it impose any undue check on the believer's freedom to pursue inquiry and speculation. Were it so, how could onebelieve in revealeddoctrine at all without being accused, as unbelievers do accuseChristians, of committingintellectual suicide? If one believes in revelation at all one does so in deference toGod's authority an authority that is surely infallible; and so far as the principle of the objection is concerned there is no difference betweenecclesiastical and Divine infallibility. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that professingChristians should recur to such an argument, which, if consistently urged, would be fatal to their own position. And as regards freedom of inquiry and speculation in reference to revealed doctrines themselves, it should be observed thattrue freedom in this as in other matters does not mean unbridled licence. Really effective authoritative control is alwaysnecessary to prevent liberty from degenerating intoanarchy, and in the sphere ofChristian doctrine — we are arguing only with those who admit thatChrist delivered a body ofdoctrine that was to be held aseternallytrue — from the very nature of the case, the only effective barrier againstRationalism — the equivalent of politicalanarchy — is an infallibleecclesiastical authority. This authority therefore, by its decisions merely curtails personal freedom of inquiry in religious matters in the same way, and by an equally valid title, as the supreme authority in the State, restricts the liberty of private citizens.
Moreover, as in a well ordered state there remains within thelaw a large margin for the exercise of personal freedom, so in theChurch there is a very extensive domain which is given over totheological speculation; and even in regard to doctrines that have been infallibly defined there is always room for further inquiry so as the better to understand, explain, defend, and expand them. The only thing one may not do is to deny or change them. Then, in reply to the charge of intolerance, it may be said that if this be taken to mean an honest and sincere repudiation ofLiberalism andRationalism, infallibilists must plead guilty to the charge; but in doing so they are in good company.Christ Himself was intolerant in this sense; so were HisApostles; and so were all the great champions of historicalChristianity in every age. Finally it is altogetheruntrue, as everyCatholic knows and feels, thatfaith which allows itself to be guided by infallibleecclesiastical authority is less intimately personal or less genuine in any way thanfaith based on private judgment. If this docile loyalty to Divine authority whichtruefaith implies means anything, it means that one must listen to the voice of those whomGod has expressly appointed to teach in His name, rather than to one's own private judgment deciding whatGod's teaching ought to be. For to this, in final analysis, the issue is reduced; and he who chooses to make himself, instead of the authority whichGod has instituted, the final arbiter in matters offaith is far from possessing thetrue spirit offaith, which is the foundation of charity and of the wholesupernatural life.
Again it is urged by our opponents that infallibility as exercised by theCatholicChurch has shown itself to be a failure, since, in the first place, it has not preventedschisms andheresies in theChristian body, and, in the second place, has not attempted to settle forCatholics themselves many important questions, the final settlement of which would be a great relief to believers by freeing them from anxious and distressingdoubts. In reply to the first point it is enough to say that the purpose for whichChrist endowed theChurch with infallibility was not to prevent the occurrence ofschisms andheresies, which He foresaw and foretold, but to take away all justification for their occurrence; men were left free to disrupt the unity of Faith inculcated byChrist in the same way as they were left free to disobey any other commandment, butheresy was intended to be no more justifiable objectively thanhomicide oradultery. To reply to the second point we would observe that it seems highly inconsistent for the same objector to blameCatholics in one breath for having too muchdefineddoctrine in their Creed and, in the next breath, to find fault with them for having too little. Either part of the accusation, in so far as it is founded, is a sufficient answer to the other.Catholics as a matter of fact do not feel in any way distressed either by the restrictions, on the one hand, which infallible definitions impose or, on the other hand, by the liberty as to non-defined matters which they enjoy, and they can afford to decline the services of an opponent who is determined at all costs to invent a grievance for them. The objection is based on a mechanical conception of the function of infallible authority, as if this were fairly comparable, for example, to a clock which is supposed to tell us unerringly not only the large divisions of time such as the hours, but also, if it is to be useful as a timekeeper, the minutes and even the seconds. Even if we admit the propriety of the illustration, it is obvious that a clock which records the hours correctly, without indicating the smaller fractions of time, is a very useful instrument, and that it would be foolish to refuse to follow it because it is not provided with a minute or a second hand on the dial. But it is perhaps best to avoid such mechanical illustrations altogether. TheCatholic believer who has realfaith in the efficiency ofChrist's promises will notdoubt but that the Holy Ghost Who abides in theChurch, and Whose assistance guarantees the infallibility of her definitions, will also provide that any definition that may benecessary or expedient for the safeguarding ofChrist's teaching will be given at the opportune moment, and that such definable questions as are left undefined may, for the time being at least, be allowed to remain so without detriment to thefaith ormorals of thefaithful.
Finally, it is objected that the acceptance ofecclesiastical infallibility is incompatible with the theory ofdoctrinal development whichCatholics commonly admit. But so far is this from beingtrue that it is impossible to frame any theory of development, consistent withCatholic principles, in which authority is not recognized as a guiding and controlling factor. For development in theCatholic sense does not mean that theChurch ever changes her definitive teaching, but merely that as time goes on and humanscience advances, her teaching is more deeply analyzed, more fully comprehended, and more perfectly coordinated and explained in itself and in its bearings on other departments ofknowledge. It is only on thefalse supposition that development means change in definitive teaching that the objection has any real force. We have confined our attention to what we may describe as the rational objections against theCatholic doctrine of infallibility, omitting all mention of the interminableexegetical difficulties whichProtestanttheologians have raised against theCatholic interpretation ofChrist's promises to HisChurch. The necessity for noticing these latter has been done away with by the growth ofRationalism, thelogical successor of old-timeProtestantism. If the infallible Divine authority ofChrist, and the historicity of His promises to which we have appealed be admitted, there is no reasonable escape from the conclusion which theCatholicChurch has drawn from those promises.
Having established the generaldoctrine of theChurch's infallibility, we naturally proceed to ask what are the organs through which the voice of infallible authority makes itself heard. We have already seen that it is only in the episcopal body which has succeeded to thecollege ofApostles that infallible authority resides, and that it is possible for the authority to be effectively exercised by this body, dispersed throughout the world, but united in bonds of communion with Peter's successor, who is its visible head and centre. During the interval from the council of theApostles atJerusalem to that of their successors atNicaea this ordinary everyday exercise of episcopal authority was found to be sufficiently effective for the needs of the time, but when a crisis like theArian heresy arose, its effectiveness was discovered to be inadequate, as was indeed inevitable by reason of the practical difficulty of verifying that fact of moral unanimity, once any considerable volume of dissent had to be faced. And while for subsequent ages down to our own day it continues to be theoreticallytrue that theChurch may, by the exercise of this ordinary teaching authority arrive at a final and infallible decision regardingdoctrinal questions, it istrue at the same time that in practice it may be impossible to prove conclusively that such unanimity as may exist has a strictly definitive value in any particular case, unless it has been embodied in adecree of anecumenical council, or in theex cathedra teaching of thepope, or, at least, in some definite formula such as theAthanasian Creed. Hence, for practical purposes and in so far as the special question of infallibility is concerned, we may neglect the so calledmagisterium ordinarium ("ordinary magisterium") and confine our attention to ecumenical councils and thepope.
An ecumenical or general, as distinguished from a particular or provincial council, is an assembly ofbishops which juridically represents the universal Church as hierarchically constituted byChrist; and, since the primacy of Peter and of his successor, thepope, is an essential feature in the hierarchical constitution of theChurch, it follows that there can be no such thing as anecumenical council independent of, or in opposition to, thepope. No body can perform a strictly corporate function validly without the consent and co-operation of its head. Hence:
That anecumenical council which satisfies the conditions above stated is an organ of infallibility will not be denied by anyone who admits that theChurch is endowed with infallibledoctrinal authority. How, if not through such an organ, could infallible authority effectively express itself, unless indeed through thepope? IfChrist promised to be present with even two or three of His disciples gathered together in His name (Matthew 18:20),a fortiori He will be present efficaciously in a representative assembly of His authorized teachers; and theParaclete whom He promised will be present, so that whatever the council defines may be prefaced with the Apostolic formula, "it has seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." And this is the view which the councils held regarding their own authority and upon which the defender oforthodoxy insisted. The councils insisted on their definitions being accepted under pain ofanathema, whileSt. Athanasius, for example, says that "the word of the Lord pronounced by the ecumenical synod of Nicaea stands for ever" (Ep. ad Afros, n. 2) andSt. Leo the Great proves the unchangeable character of definitiveconciliar teaching on the ground thatGod has irrevocably confirmed itstruth "universae fraternitatis irretractabili firmavit assensu" (Ep. 120, 1).
It remains to be observed, in opposition to the theory ofconciliar infallibility usually defended by High ChurchAnglicans that once the requisitepapal confirmation has been given thedoctrinal decisions of anecumenical council become infallible and irreformable; there is no need to wait perhaps hundreds of years for the unanimous acceptance andapprobation of the wholeChristian world. Such a theory really amounts to a denial ofconciliar infallibility, and sets up in the final court of appeal an altogether vague and ineffective tribunal. If the theory betrue, were not theArians perfectly justified in their prolonged struggle to reverse Nicaea, and has not the persistent refusal of theNestorians down to our own day to accept Ephesus and of theMonophysites to accept Chalcedon been sufficient to defeat the ratification of those councils? No workable rule can be given for deciding when such subsequent ratification as this theory requires becomes effective and even if this could be done in the case of some of the earlier councils whose definitions are received by theAnglicans, it would still betrue that since the Photianschism it has been practically impossible to secure any such consensus as is required — in other words that the working of infallible authority, the purpose of which is to teach every generation, has been suspended since the ninth century, and thatChrist's promises to HisChurch have been falsified. It is consoling, no doubt, to cling to the abstractdoctrine of an infallible authority but if one adopts a theory which represents that authority as unable to fulfil its appointed task during the greater part of theChurch's life, it is not easy to see how this consolatorybelief is anything more than a delusion.
TheVatican Council has defined as "adivinely revealeddogma" that "theRoman Pontiff, when he speaksex cathedra — that is, when in the exercise of his office aspastor and teacher of allChristians he defines, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, adoctrine offaith ormorals to be held by the wholeChurch — is, by reason of the Divine assistance promised to him inblessed Peter, possessed of that infallibility with which theDivine Redeemer wished HisChurch to be endowed in defining doctrines offaith andmorals; and consequently that such definitions of theRoman Pontiff are irreformable of their own nature (ex sese) and not by reason of theChurch's consent" (Denzinger no. 1839 — old no. 1680). For the correct understanding of this definition it is to be noted that:
It should be observed in conclusion thatpapal infallibility is a personal and incommunicablecharisma, which is not shared by any pontifical tribunal. It was promised directly toPeter, and to each of Peter's successors in the primacy, but not as a prerogative the exercise of which could bedelegated to others. Hencedoctrinal decisions or instructions issued by theRoman congregations, even when approved by thepope in the ordinary way, have no claim to be considered infallible. To be infallible they must be issued by thepope himself in his own name according to the conditions already mentioned as requisite forex cathedra teaching.
FromHoly Scripture, as already stated, the specialproof of thepope's infallibility is, if anything, stronger and clearer than the generalproof of the infallibility of theChurch as a whole, just as theproof of his primacy is stronger and clearer than anyproof that can be advanced independently for the Apostolic authority of the episcopate.
"Thou artPeter (Kepha)", saidChrist, "and upon this rock (kepha) I will build my church, and the gates ofhell shall not prevail against it" (Matthew 16:18). Various attempts have been made by opponents of thepapal claims to get rid of the only obvious and natural meaning of these words, according to which Peter is to be the rock-foundation of theChurch, and the source of its indefectibility against the gates ofhell. It has been suggested, for example, that "this rock" isChrist Himself or that it is Peter'sfaith (typifying thefaith of future believers), not hisperson and office, on which theChurch is to be built. But these and similar interpretations simply destroy thelogical coherency ofChrist's statement and are excluded by the Greek and Latin texts, in which a kind of play upon the wordsPetros (Petrus) andpetra is clearly intended, and still more forcibly by the original Aramaic whichChrist spoke, and in which the same wordKêpha must have been used in both clauses. And granting, as the best modern non-Catholic commentators grant, that this text of St. Matthew contains the promise that St. Peter was to be the rock-foundation of theChurch, it is impossible to deny that Peter's successors in the primacy are heirs to this promise — unless, indeed, one is willing to admit the principle, which would be altogether subversive of thehierarchial system, that the authority bestowed byChrist on theApostles was not intended to be transmitted to their successors, and to abide in theChurch permanently. Peter's headship was as much emphasized byChrist Himself, and was as clearly recognized in the infant Church, as was the enduring authority of the episcopal body; and it is a puzzle which theCatholic finds it hard to solve, how those who deny that the supreme authority of Peter's successor is an essential factor in the constitution of theChurch can consistently maintain the Divine authority of the episcopate. Now, as we have already seen,doctrinal indefectibility is certainly implied inChrist's promise that the gates ofhell shall not prevail against HisChurch, and cannot be effectively secured withoutdoctrinal infallibility; so that ifChrist's promise means anything — if Peter's successor is in anytrue sense the foundation and source of theChurch's indefectibility — he must by virtue of this office be also an organ ofecclesiastical infallibility. The metaphor used clearly implies that it was the rock-foundation which was to give stability to the superstructure, not the superstructure to the rock.
Nor can it be said that this argument fails byproving too much — by proving, that is, that thepope should be impeccable, or at least that he should be asaint, since, if theChurch must be holy in order to overcome the gates ofhell, the example and inspiration ofholiness ought to be given by him who is the visible foundation of theChurch's indefectibility. From the very nature of the case a distinction must be made betweensanctity or impeccability, and infallibledoctrinal authority. Personalsanctity is essentially incommunicable as between men, and cannot affect others except in fallible and indirect ways, as byprayer or example; butdoctrinal teaching which is accepted as infallible is capable of securing thatcertainty and consequent unity of Faith by which, as well as by other bonds, the members ofChrist's visible Church were to be "compacted and fitly joined together" (Ephesians 4:16). It istrue, of course, that infallible teaching, especially on moral questions, helps to promotesanctity among those who accept, but no one will seriously suggest that, ifChrist had made thepope impeccable as well as infallible, He would thereby have provided for the personalsanctity of individual believers any more efficiently than, onCatholic principles, He has actually done.
HereChrist says toSt. Peter and to his successors in the primacy: "Simon, Simon, beholdSatan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat: But I haveprayed for thee, that thyfaith fail not: and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." This specialprayer ofChrist was for Peteralone in his capacity as head of theChurch, as is clear from the text and context; and since we cannotdoubt the efficacy ofChrist'sprayer, it followed that to St. Peter and his successors the office was personally committed of authoritatively confirming the brethren — otherbishops, and believers generally — in thefaith; and this implies infallibility.
Here we have the record ofChrist's thrice-repeated demand for a confession of Peter'slove and the thrice-repeated commission to feed the lambs and the sheep:
When therefore they had dined,Jesus said to Simon (Peter): Simon, son of John, do youlove me more than these? He said to him: Yes, Lord, youknow that Ilove you. He said to him: Feed my lambs. He said to him again: Simon, son of John, do youlove me? He said to him: Yes, Lord, youknow that Ilove you. He said to him: Feed my lambs. He said to him the third time: Simon, son of John, do youlove me? Peter was grieved, because he had said to him the third time: Do youlove me? And he said to him: Lord, youknow all things: youknow that Ilove you. He said to him: Feed my sheep.
Here the complete and supreme pastoral charge of the whole ofChrist's flock — sheep as well as lambs — is given to St. Peter and his successors, and in this is undoubtedly comprised supremedoctrinal authority. But, as we have already seen,doctrinal authority in the Church cannot be really effective in securing the unity offaith intended byChrist, unless in the last resort it is infallible. It is futile to contend, as nonCatholics have often done, that this passage is merely a record of Peter's restoration to his personal share in the collective Apostolic authority, which he had forfeited by his triple denial. It is quite probable that the reason whyChrist demanded the triple confession oflove was as a set-off to the triple denial; but ifChrist's words in this and in the other passages quoted mean anything, and if they are to be understood in the same obvious and natural way in which defenders of the Divine authority of the episcopate understand the words elsewhere addressed to theApostles collectively, there is no denying that the Petrine andpapal claims are more clearly supported by the Gospels than are those of a monarchical episcopate. It is equally futile to contend that these promises were made, and this power given, to Peter merely as the representative of the Apostolic college: in the texts of the Gospel, Peter is individually singled out and addressed with particular emphasis, so that, unless by denying with therationalist the genuineness ofChrist's words, there is nological escape from theCatholic position. Furthermore, it is clear from such evidence as theActs of the Apostles supply, that Peter's supremacy was recognized in the infant Church (seeP) and if this supremacy was intended to be efficacious for the purpose for which it was instituted, it must have included the prerogative ofdoctrinal infallibility.
One need not expect to find in the early centuries a formal and explicit recognition throughout theChurch either of the primacy or of the infallibility of thepope in the terms in which these doctrines are defined by theVatican Council. But the fact cannot be denied that from the beginning there was a widespread acknowledgment by other churches of some kind of supreme authority in theRoman pontiff in regard not only to disciplinary but also todoctrinal affairs. This is clear for example, from:
Evenheretics recognized something special in thedoctrinal authority of thepope, and some of them, likeMarcion in the second century andPelagius and Caelestius in the first quarter of the fifth, appealed toRome in the hope of obtaining a reversal of their condemnation by provincialbishops orsynods. And in the age of the councils, fromNicaea onwards, there is a sufficiently explicit and formal acknowledgment of thedoctrinal supremacy of theBishop of Rome.
And what is still more important, is the explicit recognition in formal terms, by councils which are admitted to be ecumenical, of the finality, and by implication the infallibility ofpapal teaching.
Thus it is clear that theVatican Council introduced no newdoctrine when it defined the infallibility of thepope, but merely re-asserted what had been implicitly admitted and acted upon from the beginning and had even been explicitly proclaimed and in equivalent terms by more than one of the early ecumenical councils. Until the Photian Schism in the East and the Gallican movement in the West there was no formal denial ofpapal supremacy, or ofpapal infallibility as an adjunct of supremedoctrinal authority, while the instances of their formal acknowledgment that have been referred to in the early centuries are but a few out of the multitude that might be quoted.
The only noteworthy objections againstpapal infallibility, as distinct from the infallibility of theChurch at large, are based on certain historical instances in which it is alleged that certainpopes in theex cathedra exercise of their office have actually taughtheresy and condemned asheretical what has afterwards turned out to betrue. The chief instances usually appealed to are those of PopesLiberius, Honorius, and Vigilius in the early centuries, and theGalileo affair at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Liberius, it is alleged, subscribed anArian orSemi-Arian creed drawn up by the Council ofSirmium andanathematized St. Athanasius, the great champion of Nicaea, as aheretic. But even if this were an accurate statement of historical fact, it is a very inadequate statement. The all-important circumstance should be added that thepope so acted under pressure of a very cruel coercion, which at once deprives his action of any claim to be consideredex cathedra, and that he himself, as soon as he had recovered his liberty, made amends for the moral weakness he had been guilty of. This is a quite satisfactory answer to the objection, but it ought to be added that there is no evidence whatever thatLiberius everanathematized St. Athanasius expressly as aheretic, and that it remains a moot point which of three or fourSirmian creeds he subscribed, two of which contained no positive assertion ofhereticaldoctrine and were defective merely for the negative reason that they failed to insist on the full definition of Nicaea.
The charge againstPope Honorius is a double one: that, when appealed to in theMonothelite controversy, he actually taught theMonothelite heresy in his two letters to Sergius; and that he was condemned as aheretic by theSixth Ecumenical Council, the decrees of which were approved byLeo II. But in the first place it is quite clear from the tone and terms of these letters that, so far from intending to give any final, orex cathedra, decision on thedoctrinal question at issue, Honorius merely tried to allay the rising bitterness of the controversy by securing silence. In the next place, taking the letters as they stand, the very most that can be clearly and incontrovertiblydeduced from them is, that Honorius was not a profound or acutetheologian, and that he allowed himself to be confused and misled by the wily Sergius as to what the issue really was and too readily accepted the latter's misrepresentation of his opponents' position, to the effect that the assertion of two wills inChrist meant two contrary or discordant wills. Finally, in reference to the condemnation of Honorius as aheretic, it is to be remembered that there is no ecumenical sentence affirming the fact either that Honorius's letters to Sergius containheresy, or that they were intended to define the question with which they deal. The sentence passed by the fathers of the council has ecumenical value only in so far as it was approved byLeo II; but, in approving the condemnation of Honorius, his successor adds the very important qualification that he is condemned, not for thedoctrinal reason that he taughtheresy, but on the moral ground that he was wanting in the vigilance expected from him in his Apostolic office and thereby allowed aheresy to make headway which he should have crushed in its beginnings.
There is still less reason for trying to found an objection topapal infallibility on the wavering conduct ofPope Vigilius in connection with the controversy of theThree Chapters; and it is all the more needless to delay upon this instance as most modern opponents of thepapal claims no longer appeal to it.
As to theGalileo affair, it is quite enough to point out the fact that the condemnation of the heliocentric theory was the work of a fallible tribunal. Thepope cannot delegate the exercise of his infallible authority to theRoman Congregations, and whatever issues formally in the name of any of these, even when approved and confirmed in the ordinary official way by thepope, does not pretend to beex cathedra and infallible. Thepope, of course, can convertdoctrinal decisions of the Holy Office, which are not in themselves infallible, intoex cathedrapapal pronouncements, but in doing so he must comply with the conditions already explained — which neitherPaul V norUrban VIII did in theGalileo case.
The broad fact, therefore, remainscertain that noex cathedradefinition of anypope has ever been shown to beerroneous.
A few brief remarks under this head will serve to make theCatholic conception of ecclesiastical infallibility still clearer. Three organs have been mentioned:
Through the first of these is exercised whattheologians describe as theordinarium magisterium, i.e. the common or everyday teaching authority of theChurch; through the second and third themagisterium solemne, or undeniably definitive authority. Practically speaking, at the present day, and for many centuries in the past, only the decisions of ecumenical councils and theex cathedra teaching of thepope have been treated as strictly definitive in the canonical sense, and the function of themagisterium ordinarium has been concerned with the effectivepromulgation and maintenance of what has been formally defined by themagisterium solemne or may be legitimatelydeduced from its definitions.
Even theordinarium magisterium is not independent of thepope. In other words, it is onlybishops who are in corporate union with thepope, the Divinely constituted head and centre ofChrist's mystical body, the onetrue Church, who have any claim to share in the charisma by which the infallibility of their morally unanimous teaching is divinely guaranteed according to the terms ofChrist's promises. And as thepope's supremacy is also an essential factor in the constitution of anecumenical council — and has in fact been the formal and determining factor in deciding the ecumenicity of those very councils whose authority is recognized byEastern schismatics andAnglicans — it naturally occurs to enquire howconciliar infallibility is related topapal. Now this relation, in theCatholic view, may be explained briefly as follows:
In the Vatican definition infallibility (whether of the Church at large or of thepope) is affirmed only in regard to doctrines offaith ormorals; but within the province offaith andmorals its scope is not limited to doctrines that have been formally revealed. This, however, is clearly understood to be whattheologians call the direct and primary object of infallible authority: it was for the maintenance and interpretation and legitimate development ofChrist's teaching that theChurch was endowed with this charisma. But if this primary function is to be adequately and effectively discharged, it is clear that there must also beindirect andsecondary objects to which infallibility extends, namely, doctrines and facts which, although they cannot strictly speaking be said to be revealed, are nevertheless so intimately connected withrevealedtruths that, were one free to deny the former, he wouldlogically deny the latter and thus defeat the primary purpose for which infallibility was promised byChrist to HisChurch. This principle is expressly affirmed by theVatican Council when it says that "the Church, which, together with theApostolic office of teaching received the command to guard the deposit offaith, possesses also by Divine authority (divinitus) theright to condemnscience falsely so called, lest anyone should be cheated by philosophy and vain conceit (cf.Colossians 2:8)" (Denz., 1798, old no. 1845).
Catholictheologians are agreed in recognising the general principle that has just been stated, but it cannot be said that they are equally unanimous in regard to the concrete applications of this principle. Yet it is generally held, and may be said to be theologically certain, (a) that what are technically described as "theological conclusions," i.e. inferencesdeduced from two premises, one of which is revealed and the other verified by reason, fall under the scope of theChurch's infallible authority. (b) It is also generally held, and rightly, that questions ofdogmatic fact, in regard to which definitecertainty is required for the safe custody and interpretation ofrevealedtruth, may be determined infallibly by theChurch. Such questions, for example, would be: whether a certainpope is legitimate, or a certain council ecumenical, or whether objectiveheresy orerror is taught in a certain book or other published document. This last point in particular figured prominently in theJansenist controversy, theheretics contending that, while the famous five propositions attributed toJansenius were rightly condemned, they did not truly express thedoctrine contained in his book "Augustinus".Clement XI, in condemning this subterfuge (see Denz., 1350, old no. 1317) merely reasserted the principle which had been followed by the fathers of Nicaea in condemning the "Thalia" of Arius, by the fathers of Ephesus in condemning the writings of Nestorius, and by theSecond Council of Constantinople in condemning theThree Chapters. (c) It is also commonly and rightly held that theChurch is infallible in thecanonization ofsaints, that is to say, whencanonization takes place according to the solemn process that has been followed since the ninth century. Merebeatification, however, as distinguished fromcanonization, is not held to be infallible, and incanonization itself the only fact that is infallibly determined is that thesoul of thecanonized saint departed in the state of grace and already enjoys thebeatific vision. (d) As to moralprecepts orlaws as distinct from moraldoctrine, infallibility goes no farther than to protect theChurch against passing universallaws which in principle would be immoral. It would be out of place to speak of infallibility in connection with the opportuneness or the administration of necessarily changing disciplinarylaws although, of course,Catholics believe that theChurch receives appropriate Divine guidance in this and in similar matters where practical spiritual wisdom is required.
A word or two under this head, summarizing what has been already explained in this and in other articles will suffice.
As regards matter, only doctrines offaith andmorals, and facts so intimately connected with these as to require infallible determination, fall under the scope of infallibleecclesiastical teaching. These doctrines or facts need not necessarily be revealed; it is enough if the revealed deposit cannot be adequately and effectively guarded and explained, unless they are infallibly determined.
As to the organ of authority by which such doctrines or facts are determined, three possible organs exist. One of these, themagisterium ordinarium, is liable to be somewhat indefinite in its pronouncements and, as a consequence, practically ineffective as an organ. The other two, however, are adequately efficient organs, and when they definitively decide any question offaith ormorals that may arise, no believer who pays due attention toChrist's promises can consistently refuse to assent with absolute and irrevocablecertainty to their teaching.
But before being bound to give such an assent, the believer has aright to be certain that the teaching in question is definitive (since only definitive teaching is infallible); and the means by which the definitive intention, whether of a council or of thepope, may be recognized have been stated above. It need only be added here that not everything in aconciliar orpapal pronouncement, in which somedoctrine is defined, is to be treated as definitive and infallible. For example, in the lengthyBull ofPius IX defining the Immaculate Conception the strictly definitive and infallible portion is comprised in a sentence or two; and the same istrue in many cases in regard toconciliar decisions. The merely argumentative and justificatory statements embodied in definitive judgments, howevertrue and authoritative they may be, are not covered by the guarantee of infallibility which attaches to the strictly definitive sentences — unless, indeed, their infallibility has been previously or subsequently established by an independent decision.
APA citation.Toner, P.(1910).Infallibility. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07790a.htm
MLA citation.Toner, Patrick."Infallibility."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 7.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1910.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07790a.htm>.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. June 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
Contact information. The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight. My email address is webmasterat newadvent.org. Regrettably, I can't reply to every letter, but I greatly appreciate your feedback — especially notifications about typographical errors and inappropriate ads.