(Latin,in, mortalis;German,Unsterblichkeit)
By immortality is ordinarily understood thedoctrine that the humansoul will survive death, continuing in the possession of an endless conscious existence. Together with the question of theexistence of God, it forms the most momentous issue with which philosophy has to deal. It belongs primarily to rational or metaphysicalpsychology and the philosophy of religion, though it comes also into contact with other branches ofphilosophy and some of the naturalsciences.
Belief in a future life of some sort seems to have been practically universal at all times. Here and thereindividuals have rejected thisbelief, and particular forms of religion or systems ofphilosophylogically incompatible with it have had adherents; still, however vague and inconsistent may have been the views among different peoples as to the character of the life beyond the grave, it remainstrue that the persuasion of the reality of a future existence seems to have been hitherto ineradicable throughout thehuman race as a whole. Thedoctrine of immortality, strictly or properly understood, means personal immortality, the endless conscious existence of the individualsoul. It implies that the being which survives shall preserve its personal identity and be connected by conscious memory with the previous life. Unless the individual's identity be preserved, a future existence has relatively little interest. From thedoctrine of immortality thus explained there have been sundry variations. Some have held that after a future life of greater or less duration thesoul will ultimately perish. Throughout the East there has been a widespread tendency tobelieve inmetempsychosis or transmigration—that individualsouls successively animate differenthuman beings, and even the bodies of lower animals. A special form of this view is the theory of metamorphosis, that in such a series of reincarnations thesoul undergoes or can undergo evolution and improvement of its condition.Pantheism, iflogical, can offer only an impersonal immortality, a future condition in which the individual is absorbed into the absolute—the oneinfinite being, whether conscious or unconscious. Practically, this differs little from annihilation. For the materialist, thesoul, or the conscious life, is but a function of the organism, and necessarily perishes at death. Positivists, however, while adopting this conclusion, would still cheermankind with the hope of a place in the "choir invisible", that is, a future existence in the minds and on the lips of future generations—a not very substantial form of immortality, and one of a very aristocratic character, the franchise being narrowly limited.
Egypt affords at a very earlydate the most abundant evidence of an extremely vivid and intensebelief in a future life. Offerings of provisions of all sorts to the spirits of the departed, elaborate funeral ceremonies, and the wonderfully skilful mummification of the bodies of the deceased, all bear witness to the strength of the Egyptians' convictions of the reality of the next life. (SeeEGYPT, especially sections onThe Future Life and The Book of the Dead.)
Thedoctrine of personal survival with a future retribution for good and ill conduct is found in the earliest forms ofBrahminism. At a later period aschool of Brahminphilosophers evolved a system of vaguePantheism in which absorption into the Infinite Being is the final goal. Still, the popularbelief has in practice always tended towardsPolytheism, whilst thedoctrine of successive reincarnations of thesoul in differenthuman beings or animals remained a constant expression ofbelief in survival. A special form of thisbelief is thedoctrine ofKarma—the persisting existence and transmission through re-incarnations of the sum of the past deeds and merits of the individual. Akin to thepantheistic absorption of philosophicPantheism is the theory ofNirvana, which forms a central feature in strictBuddhism. Whatever Nirvana may mean for thephilosophers andsaints ofBuddhism, for the multitude the ideal liberation from labour and pain is restful quiet, not death or extinction.
InChina worship of ancestors is evidence ofbelief in some form of personal survival which carries us back to the earliest ages of that most ancient and conservative nation. The departed spirits are both helped and propitiated to aid their descendants bysacrifices and sundry services of filialpiety (seeC).
Similarly inJapan, whatever may be the genuinelogical theory of thesoul in the religion of Shintoism, the popular mind finds in the great institution of ancestor worship instinctive satisfaction and expression for thebelief in a future life, which seems so deeply and universally rooted inhumannature.
That early Jewish history shows that the Hebrew nation did notbelieve in a future life, is sometimes stated. It istrue that temporal rewards and punishments fromGod are much insisted upon throughout theOld Testament, and that thedoctrine of a future life occupies a less prominent position there than we should perhaps have anticipated. Still, careful study of theOld Testament reveals incidental and indirect evidence quite sufficient to establish the existence of thisbelief among theIsraelites at an earlydate (seeGenesis 2:7;Wisdom 2:22-23;Ecclesiastes 12:7;Proverbs 15:24;Isaiah 35:10;51:6;Daniel 12:2, etc.). It would, however, on a priori grounds, have been incredible that the Hebrew people should not have held thisbelief, considering their intimate contact with the Egyptians on one side and the Chaldæans on the other (see Atzberger, "Die christliche Eschatologie", Freiburg, 1890).
The Greeks seem to have been among the first to attempt systematicphilosophical treatment of the question of immortality. Belief in a future life is clear in Homer, though the character of that existence is vague. Pindar's conception of immortality and of its retributive character is more distinct and also more spiritual. The Pythagoreans are vague and tinctured by OrientalPantheism, though they certainly taught thedoctrine of a future life and ofmetempsychosis. We have not definite texts definingSocrates' view, but it seems clear that he must have been a believer in immortality. It is, however, in the hands of his great pupilPlato that thedoctrine attained its most elaboratephilosophical exposition and defence.Plato's teaching on the subject is given in several of his writings, the "Meno", "Phædrus", "Gorgias", "Timæus", and "Republic", but especially in the "Phædo". There are many variations and seeming inconsistencies, with liberal use of myth and allegory, in the unfolding of hisideas in these different works. ForPlato, thesoul is a being quite distinct from the body, related to it as the pilot to the ship, the charioteer to the chariot. The rationalsoul is the propersoul of man. It is a Divine element, and it is this which is immortal. Among his arguments in favour of immortality are the following:
Finally, he urges, in many forms, the argument from retributivejustice and the necessity of future existence for adequate reward of the good and punishment of the wicked. InAristotle'sphilosophical system, on the other hand, the question of immortality holds so small a place that it isdoubtful whether he believed in a future personal life at all. He teaches clearly that thenous poietikos, the activeintellect, is indestructible and eternal; but then it is notcertain that he did not understand thisnous, in apantheistic sense. It is, however, in his Ethics thatAristotle is most disappointing on this subject. For obviously, the question of the reality of a future life is of the first importance in any completephilosophical treatment of morality, whilstAristotle in this treatise practically ignores the problem. His attitude here proves how much all modernethical philosophy owes to theChristian Revelation.
The Epicurean School offers us the most complete and reasoned negation of immortality among ancientphilosophers. Indeed the most recentMaterialism has little of force to add to Lucretius' elaborate exposition of the Epicurean arguments (De Natura Rerum, III). He is quite candid in stating that his object is to relieve men from fear of that life. The position of theStoics is more uncertain. TheirPantheism presents difficulties to thedoctrine of survival, yet at times they seem to favour thebelief. But inGreece andRome, as elsewhere, whatever may have been the teaching of thephilosophicalschools the mass of evenpaganmankind clung to afaith and hope in a future existence, however degraded and incoherent their conception of its character.
With the birth of theChristian religion thedoctrine of immortality took up quite a new position in the world. It formed the foundation of the whole scheme of theChristian Faith. No longer a dubiousphilosophical tenet, or a hazy popular opinion, it is now revealed in clear and distinct terms. Thedogma of the Fall, theChristian conception ofsin, the Incarnation of theSon of God, all the means of grace andredemption, and the priceless value of each humansoul are connected in significance with this article of the Creed. As part of theChristian Faith thisdoctrine was one of the chief factors in establishing the equality of man and the liberation of the slave. Thedoctrine received its completephilosophical elaboration fromSt. Thomas. Accepting theAristotelean theory that thesoul is the form of the body,Aquinas still insists that, possessing spiritual faculties ofintellect and will, it belongs to an altogether higher plane of existence than other animal forms. Though form of the body, it is not to be conceived as immersed according to its whole being in the body. That is, it is not completely and intrinsically dependent on the body which it animates, likeform educt ex materiâ. For the humansoul is created and infused into the body, and there is thus no intrinsic impossibility in its existing separate from the body. Still, as the humansoul possesses vegetative and animal faculties, its natural condition is that of union with a body, and during this life the activities of the spiritual powers ofintellect and will presuppose the co-operation of the organic faculties ofimagination and sensation. Even the most spiritual operations of thesoul are therefore extrinsically dependent on the bodily organism. The sensory and vegetative activities of thesoul should necessarily be suspended when thesoul is separated from the body, whilst its conscious spiritual life must then be carried on in some manner other than the present. What that manner is, our present experience does not enable us adequately to conceive. Yet St. Thomas holds that we can prove the fact of thesoul's conscious life when separate from the body.
Modern thought has not added much to the philosophy of immortality. Decartes' conception of thesoul would lend itself to some of thePlatonic arguments. In Leibnitz's theory thesoul is the chiefmonad in thehumannature. It is a simple, spiritual substance of a self-active nature. From this he infers its indestructibility and immortality, but he also believes that its pre-existence is similarly deducible.Spinoza'sPantheism is incompatible with the theory of personal immortality. InKant's critical philosophy, substantiality is a mere subjective category or form moulding our way of thinking. The conception of thesoul as a substance is illusory, and every attempt to establish immortality by rational argument is a mere sophism. Yet, like theexistence of God, he reinstates it as a postulate of the practical reason. For Hume and Sensationists generally, to whom the mind is merely a series ofmental states attached to certain cerebral changes, there can obviously be no metaphysical basis for thedoctrine of immortality, though J. Stuart Mill argues that hisschool need have no special difficulty in adhering to thebelief in an endless series of such conscious states.
As we have already observed, the immortality of the humansoul is one of the most fundamental tenets of theChristian Religion. Consequently, every evidence for the Divine character ofChristianity goes to prove and confirm the foundation upon which the whole edifice rests.Catholicphilosophers, however, with the exception ofScotus and his followers, have generally claimed to establish the validity of thebelief apart from revelation. Still its adequate treatment presupposes, as already demonstrated, some of the main theses of naturaltheology, ethics, andpsychology. It is itself the crowning conclusion of this last branch ofphilosophy. Only the briefest outline of the argument can be attempted here. For fuller discussion the reader may consult anyCatholic text-book ofpsychology. The following are the chief propositions involved in the building up of thedoctrine: The humansoul is a substance or substantial principle. It is a simple, or indivisible, and also a spiritual being, that is, intrinsically independent of matter. It is naturally incorruptible. It cannot be annihilated by any creature.God is bound to preserve thesoul in possession of its conscious life, at least for some time, after death. Finally, the evidence all leads to the conclusion that the future life is to continue for ever. By thehumanmind, orsoul, is meant the ultimate principle within me by which I feel, think, and will, and by which my body is animated. A substance, in contrast with an accident, is a being which subsists in itself, and does not merely inhere in another being as in a subject of inhesion. Now the ultimate subject to which mymental states belong must be a substance — even if that substance be the bodily organism. Further, reflexion, memory, and my whole conscious experience of my own personal identity assure me of the present abiding character of this substantial principle which is the centre of mymental life. Again, the simplicity and spiritual character of many of mymental acts or states prove the principle to which they belong to be of a simple and spiritual nature. The character of an activity exhibits the nature of the agent. The effect cannot transcend its cause. But carefulpsychological observation and analysis of many of mymental operations prove them to be both spiritual and simple in nature. Our universalideas,intellectual judgments and reasonings, and especially the reflective activity of self-consciousness manifest their simple or indivisible and spiritual character. They cannot be the activities of a corporeal agent or the actions of a faculty exerted by or essentially dependent on a material being.
Again,psychology shows that our volitions are free, and that the activity of free volition cannot be exerted by a material agent, or be intrinsically dependent on matter. If volition were thus intrinsically dependent on matter, all our acts of choice would be inexorably bound up with and predetermined by the physical changes in the organism. Thesoul is thus a simple or indivisible, substantial principle, intrinsically independent of matter. Not being composite, it is not liable to perish by corruption or internal dissolution nor by the destruction of the material principle with which it is united, since it is not intrinsically dependent on this latter being. If it perish at all, this must be by simple annihilation. But annihilation, like creation, pertains toGod alone, for, as shown in naturaltheology, it can be effected only by the withdrawal of the Divine activity, through which all creatures are immediately conserved in existence.God could of course, by an exercise of His absolute power, reduce thesoul to nothingness; but the nature of thesoul is such that it cannot be destroyed by a finite being. For positive evidence, however, that thesoul will continue after death in the possession of a conscious life, we must appeal to teleology and the consideration of the character of theuniverse as a whole. Allscience proceeds on the assumption that theuniverse is rational, that it is governed by reason,law, and uniformity throughout. Theistic philosophy explains, justifies, and confirms this postulate in establishing the government of theuniverse by the providence of aninfinitely wise and just Creator. But the consideration of certain characteristics of thehumanmind reveals a purpose which can be realized only by thesoul's continuing in the possession of a conscious life after death. Firstly, there is in the mind of man, as distinguished from all the lower animals, the capacity to look back to the indefinite past and forward to the distant future, the impulse to project itself inimagination beyond the limits of space and time, to rise to the conception of endless duration. There is an ever-increasing yearning forknowledge, a craving for an ever fuller possession oftruth, which expands and grows with every advance ofscience. There is the character of unfinishedness in ourmental life and development—the contrast between the capabilities of the humanintellect and its present destiny, "between the immensity of man's outlook and the limitations of his actual horizon, between the splendour of his ideals and the insignificance of his attainments" (Marshall), which all demand a future existence unless thehumanmind is to be a wasteful failure.
Again, there is the craving of the human will, the insatiate desire ofhappiness, universal throughout the race. This cannot be appeased by any temporaljoy. Finally, there is theethical argument. Human reason affirms that the performance ofduty is both right and reasonable in the fullest sense, that it cannot be better in the end for the man who violates the moral law than for him who observes it. But were this the only life this would often be the case. It would assuredly not be a rationaluniverse, and it would be in irreconcilable conflict with the notion of the moral government of the world by a Just and InfiniteGod, if vice were to be rewarded and virtue punished—that the swindler, the murderer, the adulterer, and the persecutor should enjoy the pleasures of this world to the end, whilst the honest man, the innocent victim, the chaste, and themartyr may undergo lifelonginjustice, privation, and suffering.
We have already traced at such length the history ofbelief in a future life that it is onlynecessary here to point out that a universal conviction of this kind, in opposition to all sensible appearances, must have its roots inman's rational nature, and therefore claims to be accepted as valid, unless we are prepared to hold that man's rational nature inevitably leads him into profounderror in a matter of fundamental importance to his moral life.
During the last quarter of a century considerable labour has been devoted to investigating what is called "experimental evidence" of another life. This, it is supposed, is specially suited to theZeitgeist of our day. The Society for Psychical Research, founded in 1882, has published a score of volumes of "Proceedings", and a dozen volumes of a "Journal", in which is accumulated a mass of evidence in regard to extraordinary phenomena connected with thought-reading, clairvoyance, telepathy, mesmeric trance, automatic writing, apparitions, ghosts, spiritualism, and the like. In the last few years, also, several works by individual investigators, who have selected material from the Society's "Proceedings" or elsewhere, have appeared, urging these phenomena as scientificproof, or rather as evidence guaranteed by scientific method, in favour of the hypothesis of another life.
The main evidence insisted on in most of the recent works is the alleged communications of certain mediums with thesouls of particular deceasedpersons. These mediums are, it is supposed, gifted with some supernormal faculty by which they get into relations with departed spirits. They receive at times, it is alleged, information from these discarnatesouls which they reveal to the investigator. Thisknowledge, it is asserted, is frequently of a kind which the medium cannot have attained by any recognized means, and therefore establishes the personal identity of the communicating spirit. In some cases the spirit furnishes much information about its present condition — which is, however, invariably of a very homely character. Amongst the grounds of objection against this line of argument it may be urged: The total number of mediums who give evidence of remarkable experiences is relatively small. Many are shown to be impostors. Those whose testimonies have been tested and authenticated are extremely few. The prominence of one or two well-known mediums in all the recent literature evinces this. The communications from the "departed" obtained even by the most successful mediums in their most fortunate experiments are very imperfect and disconnected in character, while the quality of the information received is ludicrously trivial, suggestive of the grade of intelligence we are wont to shut up in asylums for idiots (Royce). Further, the alleged mediumistic communications from the discarnate spirit, of however singular or private a nature, can never prove the personal identity of the spirit with any particular deceased human being. It can only prove that the "control" of the medium is exercised by an intelligence other than human; and there is no sort of evidence to prove theveracity of such an intelligence. The reality of occasional obsession byevil spirits has, since the time ofChrist, been always believed in theChurch. Finally, the mediumistic faculty, if it be the exercise of genuine power of communication withsouls passed out of this life, must, according toCatholictheology, be effected not by use of a merely supernormal personal aptitude, but by a preternatural agency. It is the teaching of theChurch that no good, but serious moralevil will be the ultimate result of invoking the intervention of such an agency in human affairs. The view thatfaith in life everlasting, revealed byChrist and guaranteed by themiraculous history of theChristian Religion, when once lost may be restored by the instrumentality of experiences like those of Moses Stainton or Mrs. Piper, does not seem very solidly founded (see OBSESSION andSPIRITUALISM).
ST. THOMAS,Con. Gent., II, lxxix, lxxxi;Summa Theol., I, QQ. lxxvi. xc; PLATO,Ph do; FELL,Immortality of the Human Soul, tr. (St. Louis and London, 1906); MAHER,Psychology (6th ed., New York and London, 1905); MARTINEAU,A Study of Religion (2 vols., 2nd ed., Oxford, 1889); ALGER,The Destiny of the Soul. A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life (14th ed., New York, 1889) contains a valuable bibliography of the subject, but the writer's presentation of Catholic doctrines is often grotesque; ELBÉ,Future Life in the Light of Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science, tr. (New York and London. 1907);The Ingersoll Lectures byWilliam James, Royce, Fiske, Osler (New York and Boston, 1896-1904) are useful on some particular points; ROHDE,Psyche. Seelenkult u. Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen (2 vols., 3rd ed., Freiburg, 1903); KNEIB,Der Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (Freiburg, 1903); KNABENBAUER,Das Zeugnis für die Unsterblichkeit (Freiburg, 1878); PIAT,Destinée de l'homme (Paris, 1898); JANET AND SÉAILLES,History of the Problems of Philosophy, tr. (London, 1902).
The literature of what claims to be the evidence of spiritualism has rapidly increased in recent years. See HYSLOP,Science and a Future Life (New York and London, 1906); DELANNE,Evidence for a Future Life, tr. (London, 1909); LODGE,Survival of Man (London, 1909); MYERS,Human Personality and its Survival of the Bodily State (London, 1902-3); IDEM,Science and a Future Life (New York and London, 1898); TWEEDALE,Man's Survival after Death (London, 1909).
APA citation.Maher, M.(1910).Immortality. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07687a.htm
MLA citation.Maher, Michael."Immortality."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 7.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1910.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07687a.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Douglas J. Potter.Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. June 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor.Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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