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(Latinfatum, fromfari, totell orpredict). This word is almost redundant in the vocabulary of aCatholic as such, for its meaning as the prime cause of events is better expressed by the termDivine Providence, while, as a constant force at work in the physicaluniverse, it is nothing more nor less thannatural law. HenceSt. Augustine says (City of God I): "If anyone calls the influence or the power ofGod by the name of Fate, let him keep his opinion, but mend his speech." Fate, in its popular meaning, is something opposed to chance, in so far as the latter term implies a cause acting according to no fixedlaws. The unseen power that rules the destinies of men was personified by the ancient Greeks under the name ofMoira, or, more generally, as three sistersMoirai, or Fates, whose names were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. Sometimes fate is described as having unlimited sway over gods and men, while at other times the gods, especially Zeus, are described as the rulers of human destiny, or as having the power to change the course of fate. With theMoirai the Romans identified their ownParcæ orFata.
Theidea of fate as a power in the world came, asSt. Thomas tells us (C.G., III, xciii), from the attempt to find a cause for events which appeared to follow no definite law and to be the result of mere chance. Many, who were not satisfied with the explanation of poets and mythologists, turned their thoughts to the heavenly bodies, which, acting according to definite and unchanginglaws themselves, were supposed to impress their influence upon events in the lower world (seeASTROLOGY).St. Thomas, who was no believer inastrology, evidently supposes that, while Providence acts according to fixedlaws in the sidereal system, there is no such uniformity in the case of natural phenomena on earth. These latter are therefore often the result of chance, as far as secondary causes are concerned, though not so in their relation toGod's Providence.
The Greek Philosopher Diodorus of Iasus tried to prove the universality of fate by an argument from thetruth of possibles(perì dunatô.) The contention was that no event can happen unless it waseternallytrue that it was going to happen. Thetruth of such a proposition cannot be changed, and therefore the event to which it refers must necessarily take place. It is something like the argument whichSt. Augustine employs to demonstrate the eternalintellect ofGod, but the fallacy of it as regards Fate is pointed out by Cicero (De Fato IX 18, 19), who shows that thetruth of the proposition depends on the actuality of the event. The definition which Cicero puts into the mouth of his brother Quintus identifies Fate with the necessity ofnatural law (De Divinatione I, 55, par. 125). His words are: "Fatum autem id appello quod Græciheimarménen, id est, ordinem seriemque causarum, quum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat", or, as we should say, fate is the result ofnatural law in the physical world. Cicero himself, however, says further on (ibid., II, 3, par. 6), "What is the use of maintaining the existence of Fate when, without Fate, an explanation of everything may be found in Nature or Fortune?"
Thedoctrine of fate held an important position in themonistic system of theStoics. Its universal existence was alogical consequence of their assumptions with regard to the physicaluniverse, for they recognized nothing that was not ultimately reducible to matter andnatural law. In theirethical system however, the problem of determinism presented greater difficulties; for their favourite commandment, of living according to nature, seemed to imply that "men at some time are masters of their fates", at least as regards the shaping of theirsouls to that conformity with Nature in which virtue was supposed to consist. TheEpicureans stoutly denied the existence of fate, and the unaccountable "swerve" of the atoms, as postulated by the founder of theirsect, was intended to preclude thelaw of necessity, not only in the case of the human will, but even in the elementary movements of primordial matter.
Theidea of fate amongorthodoxMohammedans is founded on thedoctrine ofGod's absolutedecree, and ofpredestination both for good and forevil. Theprophet encouraged his followers to fight without fear, and even with desperation, by assuring them that no timidity or caution could save their lives in battle or avert their inevitable destiny. Disputes about thisdoctrine have given rise to varioussects among theMohammedans, some explaining away and others denying the absolute nature of theDivine Will. TheKoran itself does not convey the impression thatMohammed's own views on the subject were either clear or consistent.
ThoughFree Will is not entirely ignored inBuddhism, it is, at any rate, practically suppressed. According to this system, "Man acts", says St-Hilaire, "during the whole of his life under the weight, not precisely of fatality, but of an incalculable series of former existences" (TheBuddha and his Religion, v 126).
In the theory of those who provide a purely materialistic explanation of theuniverse and maintain that the human will is just as much subject to unchanging andnecessarylaws as are all other phenomena, the universal sovereignty of fate is implied in the absolute reign of physical law.
According toCatholic teaching,God, who is the Author of theuniverse, has made it subject to fixed andnecessarylaws so that, where ourknowledge of theselaws is complete, we are able to predict physical events withcertainty. Moreover,God's absolutedecree is irrevocable, but, as He cannot will that which isevil, the abuse offree will is in no case predetermined by Him. The physical accompaniments of thefreeact of the will as well as its consequences, are willed byGod conditionally upon the positing of the act itself, and all alike are the object of His eternal foreknowledge. The nature of this foreknowledge is a matter still in dispute between the opposingschools ofBañez and Molina. Hence, thoughGod knows from alleternity everything that is going to happen, He does not will everything. Sin He does not will in any sense; He only permits it. Certain things He wills absolutely and others conditionally, and His general supervision, whereby these decrees are carried out, is calledDivine Providence. AsGod is a free agent, the order of nature is notnecessary in the sense that it could not have been otherwise than it is. It is onlynecessary in so far as it works according to definite uniformlaws and is predetermined by adecree which, though absolute, was nevertheless free.
Moreover, in the case ofmiracles,God interferes with the ordinary course of nature; and the supposition that, at certain periods of the world's evolution, such, for instance, as when man first appeared on the earth, there have been other providential interpositions involving new departures in the world-process, provides for certain facts in the region of organic life an explanation not less scientific than the opposite assumptions of the materialists.St. Thomas distinguishes fate from Providence, and calls it the order or disposition of secondary causes according to which they act in obedience to the First Cause.
It follows from what has been said that, in theCatholic view, theidea of fate--St. Thomas dislikes the word--must lack the note of absolute necessity, sinceGod's decrees are free, while it preserves the character of relative necessity inasmuch as such decrees, when once passed, cannot be gainsaid. Moreover,God knows what is going to happen because it is going to happen, and not vice versa. Hence the futurity of an event is alogical, but not a physical, consequence ofGod's foreknowledge. SeeFREE WILL,GOD,MIRACLE,PROVIDENCE.
APA citation.Kendal, J.(1909).Fate. InThe Catholic Encyclopedia.New York: Robert Appleton Company.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05793a.htm
MLA citation.Kendal, James."Fate."The Catholic Encyclopedia.Vol. 5.New York: Robert Appleton Company,1909.<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05793a.htm>.
Transcription.This article was transcribed for New Advent by Rick McCarty.
Ecclesiastical approbation.Nihil Obstat. May 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor.Imprimatur. +John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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