Ethics

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Definition

Many writers regard ethics (Gr.ethike) as any scientific treatment of the moral order and divide it intotheological, orChristian, ethics (moral theology) andphilosophical ethics (moral philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics, however, isphilosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the present article will treat the subject. Moral philosophy is a division of practical philosophy. Theoretical, or speculative, philosophy has to do with being, or with the order of things not dependent on reason, and its object is to obtain by the natural light of reason aknowledge of this order in its ultimate causes. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself with what ought to be, or with the order of acts which are human and which therefore depend upon our reason. It is also divided intologic and ethics. The former rightly orders theintellectual activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement oftruth, while the latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the former is thetrue; that of the latter is the good. Hence ethics may be defined as thescience of the moral rectitude ofhuman acts in accordance with the first principles of natural reason.Logic and ethics are normative and practicalsciences, because they prescribe norms or rules for human activities and show how, according to these norms, a man ought to direct his actions. Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive; for it orders the activity of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the other faculties of man in motion. Hence, to order the will is the same as to order the whole man. Moreover, ethics not only directs a man how to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets before him the absoluteobligation he is under of doing good and avoidingevil.

A distinction must be made between ethics andmorals, or morality. Every people, even the most uncivilized and uncultured, has its own morality or sum of prescriptions which govern its moral conduct. Nature had so provided that each man establishes for himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are applicable to the details of practical life, without the necessity of awaiting the conclusions ofscience. Ethics is the scientific orphilosophical treatment of morality. The subject-matter proper of ethics is the deliberate, free actions of man; for these alone are in our power, and concerning these alone can rules be prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed without deliberation, or through ignorance or coercion. Besides this, the scope of ethics includes whatever has reference to freehuman acts, whether as principle or cause of action (law,conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action (merit, punishment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object) under which ethics considers free acts is that of their moralgoodness or the rectitude of order involved in them ashuman acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a morally bad man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor artist or technician. Ethics has merely to do with the order which relates to man as man, and which makes of him a good man.

Like ethics,moral theology also deals with the moral actions of man; but unlike ethics it has its origin in supernaturallyrevealedtruth. It presupposes man's elevation to thesupernatural order, and, though it avails itself of the scientific conclusions of ethics, it draws itsknowledge for the most part fromChristian Revelation. Ethics is distinguished from the other naturalsciences which deal with moral conduct of man, asjurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first principles, but borrow their fundamental notions from ethics, and are therefore subordinate to it. To investigate what constitutes good or bad, just or unjust, what is virtue,law,conscience,duty, etc., whatobligations are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of jurisprudence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these principles must be presupposed by the former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are subordinated to ethics. The same is true of political economy. The latter is indeed immediately concerned with man's social activity inasmuch as it treats of the production, distribution and consumption of material commodities, but this activity is not independent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral law and must be dominated byjustice, equity, andlove. Political economy was wholly wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements of ethics.Sociology is at the present day considered by many as ascience distinct from ethics. If, however, by sociology is meant aphilosophical treatment ofsociety, it is a division of ethics; for the enquiry into the nature ofsociety in general, into the origin, nature, object and purpose of naturalsocieties (thefamily, the state) and their relations to one another forms an essential part of Ethics. If, on the other hand, sociology be regarded as the aggregate of thesciences which have reference to the social life of man, it is not a singlescience but a complexus ofsciences; and among these, so far as the natural order is concerned, ethics has the first claim.

Sources and methods of ethics

The sources of ethics are partly man's own experience and partly the principles and truths proposed by otherphilosophical disciplines (logic and mataphysics). Ethics takes its origin from the empirical fact that certain general principles and concepts of the moral order are common to all people at all times. This fact has indeed been frequently disputed, but recent ethnological research has placed it beyond the possibility ofdoubt. All nations distinguish between what is good and what is bad, between good men and bad men, between virtue and vice; they are all agreed in this: that the good is worth striving for, and thatevil must be shunned, that the one deserves praise, the other, blame. Though in individual cases they may not be one in denominating the same thinggood orevil, they are nevertheless agreed as to the general principle, that good is to be done andevil avoided. Vice everywhere seeks to hide itself or to put on the mask of virtue; it is a universally recognized principle, that we should not do to others what we would not wish them to do to us. With the aid of thetruths laid down inlogic and mataphysics, ethics proceeds to give a thorough explanation of this undeniable fact, to trace it back to its ultimate causes, then to gather from fundamental moral principles certain conclusions which will direct man, in the various circumstances and relations of life, how to shape his own conduct towards the attainment of the end for which he was created. Thus the proper method of ethics is at once speculative and empirical; it draws upon experience andmetaphysics. SupernaturalChristian Revelation is not a proper source of ethics. Only those conclusions properly belong to ethics which can be reached with the help of experience andphilosophical principles. TheChristianphilosopher, however, may not ignoresupernatural revelation, but must at least recognise it as a negative norm, inasmuch as he is not to advance any assertion in evident contradiction to therevealedtruth ofChristianity.God is the fountain-head of alltruth — whether natural as made known by Creation, orsupernatural as revealed through Christ and the Prophets. As ourintellect is an image of the Divine Intellect, so is all certain scientificknowledge the reflex and interpretation of the Creator's thoughts embodied in His creatures, a participation in His eternal wisdom.God cannot reveal supernaturally and command us to believe on His authority anything that contradicts the thoughts expressed by Him in his creatures, and which, with the aid of the faculty of reason which he has given us, we can discern in His works. To assert the contrary would be to denyGod's omniscience andveracity, or to suppose thatGod was not the source of alltruth. A conflict, therefore, betweenfaith andscience is impossible, and hence theChristianphilosopher has to refrain from advancing any assertion which would be evidently antagonistic to certainrevealedtruth. Should his researches lead to conclusions out of harmony withfaith, he is to take it for granted that someerror has crept into his deductions, just as the mathematician whose calculations openly contradict the facts of experience must be satisfied that his demonstration is at fault.

After what has been said the following methods of ethics must be rejected as unsound.

Historical view of ethics

As ethics is thephilosophical treatment of the moral order, its history does not consist in narrating the views of morality entertained by different nations at different times; this is properly the scope of the history of civilisation, and of ethnology. The history of ethics is concerned solely with the variousphilosophical systems which in the course oftime have been elaborated with reference to the moral order. Hence the opinions advanced by the wise men of antiquity, such as Pythagoras (582-500 B.C.), Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.),Confucius (558-479 B.C.), scarcely belong to the history of ethics; for, though they proposed various moraltruths and principles, they did so in a dogmatic and didactic, and not in a philosophically systematic manner. Ethics properly so-called is first met with among the Greeks, i.e.in the teaching ofSocrates (470- 399 B.C.). According to him the ultimate object of human activity ishappiness, and thenecessary means to reach it,virtue. Since everybody necessarily seekshappiness, no one is deliberately corrupt. Allevil arises fromignorance, and the virtues are one and all but so many kinds ofprudence. Virtue can, therefore, be imparted by instruction. The disciple ofSocrates,Plato (427-347 B.C.) declares that thesummum bonum consists in the perfect imitation ofGod, theAbsolute Good, an imitation which cannot be fully realised in this life. Virtue enables man to order his conduct, as he properly should, according to the dictates of reason, and acting thus he becomes like untoGod. ButPlato differed fromSocrates in that he did not consider virtue to consist in wisdom alone, but injustice, temperance, andfortitude as well, these constituting the proper harmony of man's activities. In a sense, the State is man writ large, and its function is to train its citizens invirtue. For his ideal State he proposed the community of goods and of wives and the publiceducation of children. ThoughSocrates andPlato had been to the fore in this mighty work and had contributed much valuable material to the upbuilding of ethics; nevertheless,Plato's illustrious disciple,Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), must be considered the real founder of systematic ethics. With characteristic keenness he solved, in his ethical and political writings, most of the problems with which ethics concerns itself. UnlikePlato, who began withideas as the basis of his observation,Aristotle chose rather to take the facts of experience as his starting-point; these he analysed accurately, and sought to trace to their highest and ultimate causes. He set out from the point that all men tend tohappiness as the ultimate object of all their endeavours, as thehighest good, which is sought for its own sake, and to which all other goods merely serve as means. Thishappiness cannot consist in external goods, but only in the activity proper tohumannature - not indeed in such a lower activity of the vegetative and sensitive life as man possesses in common with plants and brutes, but in the highest and most perfect activity of his reason, which springs in turn fromvirtue. This activity, however, has to be exercised in a perfect and enduring life. The highest pleasure is naturally bound up with this activity, yet, to constitute perfecthappiness, external goods must also supply their share. Truehappiness, though prepared for him by the gods as the object and reward of virtue, can be attained only through a man's own individual exertion. With keen penetrationAristotle thereupon proceeds to investigate in turn each of theintellectual and moral virtues, and his treatment of them must, even at the present time, be regarded as in great part correct. The nature of the State and of thefamily were, in the main, rightly explained by him. The only pity is that his vision did not penetrate beyond this earthly life, and that he never saw clearly the relations of man toGod.

A more hedonistic (edone, "pleasure") turn in ethics begins with Democritus (about 460-370 B.C.), who considers a perpetuallyjoyous and cheerful disposition as thehighest good andhappiness of man. The means thereto is virtue, which makes us independent of external goods — so far as that is possible — and which wisely discriminates between the pleasures to be sought after and those that are to be shunned. Pure Sensualism orHedonism was first taught by Aristippus ofCyrene (435-354 B.C.), according to whom the greatest possible pleasure, is the end and supreme good of human endeavour.Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) differs from Aristippus in holding that the largest sum total possible of spiritual and sensual enjoyments, with the greatest possible freedom from displeasure and pain, is man'shighest good. Virtue is the proper directive norm in the attainment of this end.

The Cynics, Antisthenes (444-369 B.C.) and Diogenes ofSinope (414-324 B.C.), taught the direct contrary ofHedonism, namely that virtue alone suffices forhappiness, that pleasure is anevil, and that the truly wise man is above humanlaws. This teaching soon degenerated into haughty arrogance and open contempt for law and for the remainder of men (Cynicism). TheStoics, Zeno (336-264 B.C.) and his disciples, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and others, strove to refine and perfect the views of Antisthenes. Virtue, in their opinion, consist inman's living according to the dictates of his rational, and, as each one's individual nature is but a part of the entire natural order, virtue is, therefore, the harmonious agreement with the Divine Reason, which shapes the whole course of nature. Whether they conceived this relation ofGod to the world in apantheistic or a theistic sense, is not altogether clear. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and it suffices for man'shappiness. All other things are indifferent and are, as circumstances require, to be striven after or shunned. The passions and affections are bad, and the wise man is independent of them. Among the RomanStoics were Seneca (4 B.C. — A.D. 65), Epictetus (born about A.D. 50), and theEmperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180), upon whom however, at least upon the latter two,Christian influences had already begun to make themselves felt. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) elaborated no newphilosophical system of his own, but chose those particular views from the various systems ofGrecian philosophy which appeared best to him. He maintained that moralgoodness, which is the general object of all virtues, consists in what is becoming to man as a rational being as distinct from the brute. Actions are often good or bad, just orunjust, not because of human institutions or customs, but of their own intrinsic nature. Above and beyond humanlaws there is anatural law embracing all nations and all times, the expression of the rational will of theMost High God, from obedience to which no human authority can exempt us. Cicero gives an exhaustive exposition of the cardinal virtues and theobligations connected with them; he insists especially on devotion to the gods, without which humansociety could not exist.

Parallel with the above-mentioned Greek and Roman ethical systems runs a sceptical tendency, which rejects every natural moral law, bases the whole moral order on custom or human arbitrariness, and frees the wise man from subjection to the ordinaryprecepts of the moral order. This tendency was furthered by theSophists, against whomSocrates andPlato arrayed themselves, and later on by Carnea, Theodore ofCyrene, and others.

A new epoch in ethics begins with the dawn ofChristianity. Ancientpaganism never had a clear and definite concept of the relation betweenGod and the world, of the unity of thehuman race, of the destiny of man, of the nature and meaning of the moral law.Christianity first shed full light on these and similar questions. AsSt. Paul teaches (Romans 2:24 sq.),God has written his moral law in the hearts of all men, even of those outside the influence ofChristian Revelation; thislaw manifests itself in theconscience of every man and is the norm according to which the wholehuman race will be judged on the day of reckoning. In consequence of their perverse inclinations, thislaw had to a great extent become obscured and distorted among thepagans;Christianity, however, restored it to its prestine integrity. Thus, too, ethics received its richest and most fruitful stimulus. Proper ethical methods were now unfolded, and philosophy was in a position to follow up and develop these methods by means supplied from its own store-house. This course was soon adopted in the early ages of theChurch by the Fathers andecclesiastical writers, asJustin Martyr,Irenaeus,Tertullian,Clement of Alexandria,Origen, but especially the illustriusDoctors of the Church,Ambrose,Jerome, andAugustine, who, in the exposition and defence ofChristiantruth, made use of the principles laid down by thepaganphilosophers. True, the Fathers had no occasion to treat moral questions from a purelyphilosophical standpoint, and independently of Christin Revelation; but in the explanation ofCatholic doctrine their discussions naturally led tophilosophical investigations. This is particularlytrue ofSt. Augustine, who proceeded to thoroughly develop alongphilosophical lines and to establish firmly most of thetruths ofChristian morality. The eternal law (lex aeterna), the original type and source of all temporallaws thenatural law,conscience, the ultimate end of man, the cardinal virtues,sin, marriage, etc. were treated by him in the clearest and most penetrating manner. Hardly a single portion of ethics does he present to us but is enriched with his keenphilosophical commentaries. Lateecclesiastical writers followed in his footsteps.

A sharper line of separation between philosophy andtheology, and in particular between ethics andmoral theology, is first met with in the works of the greatSchoolmen of theMiddle Ages, especially ofAlbert the Great (1193-1280),Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Bonaventure (1221-1274), andDuns Scotus (1274-1308). Philosophy and, by means of it,theology reaped abundant fruit from the works ofAristotle, which had until then been a sealed treasure to Western civilization, and had first been elucidated by the detailed and profound commentaries ofSt. Albert the Great andSt. Thomas Aquinas and pressed into the service ofChristian philosophy. The same is particularlytrue as regards ethics.St. Thomas, in his commentaries on the political and ethical writings of theStagirite, in his "Summa contra Gentiles" and his "Quaestiones disputatae," treated with his wonted clearness and penetration nearly the whole range of ethics in a purelyphilosophical manner, so that even to the present day his words are an inexhaustible source whence ethics draws its supply. On the foundations laid by him theCatholicphilosophers and theoologians of succeeding ages have continued to build. It istrue that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks especially to the influence of theco-calledNominalists, a period of stagnation and decline set in, but the sixteenth century is marked by a revival. Ethical questions, also, though largely treated in connexion withtheology, are again made the subject of careful investigation. We mention as examples the greattheologians Victoria,Dominicus Soto, L. Molina, Francisco Suárez,Lessius, andDe Lugo. Since the sixteenth century special chairs of ethics (moral philosophy) have been erected in manyCatholicuniversities. The larger, purelyphilosophical works on ethics, however do not appear until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an example of which we may instance the production of Ign. Schwarz, "Instituitiones juris universalis naturae et gentium" (1743).

Far different fromCatholic ethical methods were those adopted for the most part byProtestants. With the rejection of theChurch's teaching authority, each individual became on principle his own supreme teacher and arbiter in matters appertaining tofaith andmorals. True it is that theReformers held fast toHoly Writ as theinfallible source of revelation, but as to what belongs or does not belong to it, whether, and how far, it is inspired, and what is its meaning — all this was left to the final decision of the individual. The inevitable result was that philosophy arrogantly threw to the winds all regard forrevealedtruth, and in many cases became involved in the most perniciouserrors.Melanchthon, in his "Elementa philosophiae moralis", still clung to theAristotelean philosophy; so, too, did Hugo Grotius, in his work, "De jure belli et pacis". But Cumberland and his follower, Samuel Pufendorf, moreover, assumed, withDescartes, that the ultimate ground for every distinction betweengood andevil lay in the free determination ofGod's will, a view which renders thephilosophical treatment of ethics fundamentally impossible. Quite an influential factor in the development of ethics was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). He supposes that thehuman race originally existed in existed in a rude condition (status naturae) in which every man was free to act as he pleased, and possessed aright to all things, whence arose awar of all against all. Lest destruction should be the result, it was decided to abandon this condition of nature and to found a state in which, by agreement, all were to be subject to one common will (one ruler). This authority ordains, by thelaw of the State, what is to be considered by all as good and asevil, and only then does there arise a distinction betweengood andevil of universal binding force on all. ThePantheistBaruch Spinoza (1632-1677) considers theinstinct to self-preservation as the foundation ofvirtue. Every being is endowed with thenecessary impulse to assert itself, and, as reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it requires each one to follow this impulse and to strive after whatever is useful to him. And each individual possesses power and virtue just in so far as he obeys this impulse. Freedom of the will consists merely in the ability to follow unrestrainedly this natural impulse. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) bases ethics on the affections or inclinations of man. There are sympathetic, idiopathic, and unnatural inclinations. The first of these regard the common good, the second the private good of the agent, the third are opposed to the other two. To lead a morally good life,war must be waged upon the unnatural impulses, while the idiopathetic and sympathetic inclinations must be made to harmonize. This harmony constitutesvirtue. In the attainment of virtue the subjective guiding principle ofknowledge is the "moral sense", a sort of moralinstinct. This "moral sense" theory was further developed by Hutcheson (1694-1747); meanwhile "common sense" was suggested by Thoms Reid (1710-1796) as the highest norm of moral conduct. InFrance the materialisticphilosophers of the eighteenth century — as Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Holbach, Condillac, and others — disseminated the teachings of Sensualism andHedonism as understood byEpicurus.

A complete revolution in ethics was introduced byImmanuel Kant (1724-1804). From the wreck of pure theoretical reason he turned for rescue to practical reason, in which he found an absolute, universal, and categorical moral law. This law is not to be conceived as an enactment of external authority, for this would be heteronomy, which is foreign totrue morality; it is rather thelaw of our own reason, which is, therefore, autonomous, that is, it must be observed for its own sake, without regard to any pleasure or utility arising therefrom. Only that will is morally good which obeys the moral law under the influence of such a subjective principle or motive as can be willed by the individual to become the universal law for all men. The followers ofKant have selected now one now anotherdoctrine from his ethics and combined therewith various pantheistical systems. Fichte places man's supreme good and destiny in absolute spontaneity and liberty; Schleiermacher, in co-operating with the progressive civilization ofmankind. A similar view recurs substantially in the writings of Wilhelm Wundt and, to a certain extent, in those of the pessimist, Edward von Hartmann, though the latter regards culture and progress merely as means to the ultimate end, which, according to him, consists in delivering theAbsolute from the torment of existence.

The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good ofmankind to be the end and criterion of moral conduct, was renewed on a positive basis in the nineteenth century by Auguste Comte and has counted many adherents, e.g., inEngland, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; inGermany, G.T. Fechner, F.E. Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) sought to effect a compromise between socialUtilitarianism (Altruism) and privateUtilitarianism (Egoism) in accordance with the theory of evolution. In his opinion, that conduct is good which serves to augment life and pleasure without any admixture of displeasure. In consequence, however, of man's lack of adaptation to the conditions of life, such absolutegoodness of conduct is not as yet possible, and hence various compromises must be made betweenAltruism andEgoism. With the progress of evolution, however, this adaptability to existing conditions will become more and more perfect, and consequently the benefits accruing to the individual from his own conduct will be most useful tosociety at large. In particular, sympathy (injoy) will enable us to take pleasure in altruistic actions.

The great majority of non-Christian moralphilosophers have followed the path trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption that man, by a series of transformations, was gradually evolved from the brute, and therefore differs from it in degree only, they seek the first traces and beginnings of moralideas in the brute itself. Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these lines, and Spencer did not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on the pre-humanjustice,conscience, and self-control of brutes. Present-day Evolutionists follow his view and attempt to show how animal morality has in man continually become more perfect. With the aid of analogies taken from ethnology, they relate howmankind originally wandered over the face of the earth in semi-savage hordes,knew nothing of marriage or the family, and only by degrees reached a higher level of morality. These are the merest creations of fancy. If man is nothing more than a highly developed brute, he cannot possess a spiritual andimmortalsoul, and there can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the future retribution ofgood andevil, nor can man in consequence be hindered from ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the weel-being of others only in so far as it redounds to his own profit.

As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of evolution from their ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base their observations on scientific principles, but on social andeconomic considerations. According to K. Marx, F. Engels, and other exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of history", all moral, religious, juridical andphilosophical concepts are but the reflex of the economical conditions ofsociety in the minds of men. Now these social relations are subject to constant change; hence theideas of morality, religion, etc. are also continually changing. Every age, every people, and even each class in a given people forms its moral and religiousideas in accordance with its own peculiar economical situation. Hence, no universal code of morality exists binding on all men at all times; the morality of the present day is not of Divine origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make room for another system of morality. Allied to this materialistic historical interpretation, though derived from other sources, is the system of Relativism, which recognizes no absolute and unchangeabletruths in regard to ethics or anything else. Those who follow this opinion aver that nothing objectivelytrue can be known by us. Men differ from one another and are subject to change, and with them the manner and means of viewing the world about them also change. Moreover the judgments passed on matters religious and moral depend essentially on the inclinations, interests, and character of theperson judging, while these latter are constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from Relativism inasmuch as that not only is to be consideredtrue which is proven by experience to be useful; and, since the same thing is not always useful, unchangeabletruth is impossible.

In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it need not surprise us that, as regards ethical problems, scepticism is extending its sway to the utmost limits, in fact many exhibit a formal contempt for the traditional morality. According to Max Nordau, moralprecepts are nothing but "conventional lies"; according to Max Stirner, that alone is good which serves my interests, whereas the common good, thelove for all men, etc. are but empty phantoms. Men of genius and superiority in particular are coming more and more to be regarded as exempt from the moral law. Nietzsche is the originator of aschool whose doctrines are founded on these principles. According to him,goodness was originaly identified with nobility and gentility of rank. Whatever the man of rank and power did, whatever inclinations he possessed were good. The down-trodden proletariat, on the other hand were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without any other derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a gradual process that the oppressed multitude throughhatred andenvy evolved the distinction between good and bad, in the moral sense, by denominating the characteristics and conduct of those in power and rank as bad, and their own behaviour as good. And thus arose the opposition between the morality of the master and that of the slave. Those in power still continued to look upon their own egoistic inclinations as noble and good, while the oppressed populace lauded the "instincts of the common herd", i.e. all those qualitiesnecessary and useful to its existence — as patience, meekness, obedience andlove of one's neighbour. Weakness becamegoodness, cringing obsequiousness becamehumility, subjection tohated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant patience. "All morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely rearranged. Intellectual superiority is above and beyondgood andevil as understood in the traditional sense. There is no higher moral order to which men of such calibre are amenable. The end ofsociety is not the common good of its members; theintellectual aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its behalf the common herd, the "too many", must be reduced to slavery and decimated. As it rests with each individual to decide who belongs to thisintellectual aristocracy, so each man is at liberty to emancipate himself from the existing moral order.

In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which has manifested itself far and wide; namely, the effort to make all morality independent of all religion. It is clear that many of the above-mentioned ethical systems essentially exclude all regard forGod and religion, and this istrue especially of materialistic,agnostic, and in the last analysis, of allpantheistic systems. Apart, also, from these systems, "independent morality", called also "lay morality", has gained many followers and defenders.Kant'sideas formed the basis of this tendency, for he himself founded a code of morality on thecategorical imperative and expressly declared that morality is sufficient for itself, and therefore has no need of religion. Many modernphilosophers — Herbart, Eduard von Hartmann, Zeller, Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and a number of others — have followedKant in this respect. For several decades practical attempts have been made to emancipate morality from religion. InFrance religious instruction was banished from theschools in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This tendency manifests a lively activity in what is known as the "ethical movement", whose home, properly speaking, is in theUnited States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City. Similarsocieties were formed in other cities. These were consolidated in 1887 into the "Union of the Societies for Ethical Culture." Besides Adler, the chief propagators of the movement by word of mouth and writing were W.M. Salter and Stanton Coit. The purpose of thesesocieties is declared to be "the improvement of the moral life of the members of thesocieties and of the community to which they belong, without any regard totheological orphilosophical opinions". In most of theEuropean countries ethicalsocieties were founded on the model of the American organization. All these were combined in 1894 into the "International Ethical Asociation". Their purpose, i.e. the amelioration of man's moral condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneous to suppose that any such moral improvement can be brought about without taking religion into consideration. In fact many members of the ethicalsocieties are openly antagonistic to allreligions, and would therefore do away with denominationalschools and supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction. Even upon purely ethical considerations such attempts must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it betrue that even in the case of adults moral instruction without religion, without any higherobligation or sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so is it in the case of the young? It is evident that, judged from the standpoint ofChristianity, these efforts must meet with a still more decided condemnation.Christians are bound to observe not only the prescriptions of thenatural law, but also all theprecepts given by Christ concerningfaith, hope,love, Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. TheChristian, moreover, knows that withoutDivine grace and, hence, withoutprayer and the frequent reception of thesacraments, a morally good life for any considerable length of time is impossible. From their earliest years, therefore, the young must not only receive thorough instruction in all the Commandments, but must be exercised and trained in the practical use of the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and atmosphere in whicheducation develops and flourishes.

While, among non-Catholics ever since theReformation, and especially sinceKant, there has been an increasing tendency todivorce ethics from religion, and to dissolve it into countless venturesome and frequently contradictory systems,Catholics for the most part have remained free from theseerrors, because, in theChurch'sinfallible teaching authority, the Guardian ofChristian Revelation, they have always found secure orientation. It istrue that towards the end of the eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Illuminism andRationalism penetrated here and there intoCatholic circles and attempted to replacemoral theology by purelyphilosophical ethics, and in turn to transform the latter according to theKantian autonomy. This movement, however, was but a passing phase. With a reawakening of theChurch's activity, fresh impetus was given toCatholicscience, which was of benefit to ethics also and produced in its domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again had to the illustrius past ofCatholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and verification of principles of the moral order.Taparelli d'Azeglio led the way with his great work "Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appogiato sul fatto" (1840-43). Then followed, inItaly,Audisio,Rosmini,Liberatore,Sanseverino, Rosselli, Zigliara, Signoriello, Schiffini, Ferretti, Talamo, and others. InSpain this revival of ethics was due to, among others,J. Balmes,Donoso Cortés, Zefirio Gonzalez, Mendive, R. de Cepeda; inFrance andBelgium, to de Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair, Ath, Vallet, Charles Périn, Piat,de Pascal, Moulart, Castelein; inEngland and America, to Joseph Rickaby,Jouin, Russo, Hollaind,J.J. Ming. In German-speaking countries the reawakening of Scolasticism in general begins withKleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853); Philosophie der Vorzeit, 1860), and of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer* (Die Grundsätze der Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis seu philosophiae moralis universae, 1885-1900). After them came A. Stöckl, Ferd, Walter,Moy de Sons, C. Gutberlet, Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Rossetti, A.M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen, Willems, V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerousCatholic writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and political economy.

Outlines of ethics

It is clear that the following statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all ethical questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the most important problems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment. Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical ethics, and special, or applied ethics. General ethics expounds and verifies the general principles and concepts of the moral order; special ethics applies these general principles to the various relations of man, and determines hisduties in particular.

Reason itself can rise from theknowledge of the visible creation to the certainknowledge of theexistence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this fundamentaltruth the structure of ethics must be based.God created man, as he created all things else, for His ownhonour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper motive of the will's activity. IfGod were not the ultimate object and end of His own activity, he would depend upon His creatures, and would not beinfinitely perfect. He is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that he can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to aninfinitely perfect being, but for His glory. They are to manifest Hisgoodness and perfection. Irrational creatures cannot of themselves directly glorifyGod, for they are incapable of knowing Him. The are intended as means to the end for which rational man was created. The end of man, however, is toknowGod, tolove Him and serve Him, and thereby attain to perfect and unendinghappiness. Every man has within him an irresistible, indestructible desire for perfecthappiness; he seeks to be free from everyevil and to possess every attainable good. This impulse tohappiness is founded on man's nature; it is implanted there by his Maker; and hence will be duly realised, if nothing is wanting on the part of man's own individual endeavour. But perfecthappiness is unattainable in the present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable death puts an early end to all earthlyhappiness. There is reserved for man a better life, if he freely chooses to glorifyGod here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject toGod and keepsHis Commandments. Only from the viewpoint ofeternity do this earthly life and the moral order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does man, considered in the natural order, or apart from every influence ofsupernatural revelations, come toknow whatGod requires of him here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in order to arrive at eternalhappiness? — By means of thenatural law.

Frometernity there existed in the mind ofGod theidea of the world, which he determined to create, as well as the plan of government according to which He wished to rule the world and direct it to its end. Thisordination existing in the mind ofGod from alleternity, and depending on the nature and essential relations of rational beings, is theeternal law of God (lex aeterna Dei), the source from which all temporallaws take their rise.God does not move and govern His creatures by a mere external directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but by means of internal impulses and inclinations, which He has bound up with their natures. Irrational creatures are urged, by means of physical forces or natural impulses andinstincts to exercise the activity peculiar to them and keep the order designed for them. Man, on the other hand, is a being endowed with reason andfree will; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses andinstincts in a manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend on practical principles and judgments, which point out to him how he is to order his conduct. These principles must somehow or other be manifested to him by nature. All created things have implanted in their natures certain guiding principles,necessary to their corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule. He must be led by a natural inborn light, manifesting to him what he is to do, or not to do. This natural light is thenatural law. When we speak of man as possessing a natural, inborn light, it is not to be understood in the sense that man has innateideas. Innateideas do not exist. It istrue, nevertheless, that the Creator has endowed man with the ability and the inclination to form many concepts and develop principles. As soon as he comes to the use of reason, he forms, by a natural necessity, on the basis of experience, certain general concepts of theoretical reason — e.g. those of being and not being, ofcause and effect, of space and time — and so he arrives at universal principles, e.g. that "nothing can exist and not exist at the same time", that "every effect has its cause", etc. As it is in the theoretical, so also in the practical order. As soon as reason has been sufficiently developed, and the individual can somehow or other practically judge that he is something more than a mere animal, by an intrinsic necessity of his nature he forms the concept ofgood andevil, i.e. of something that is proper to the rational nature which distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore worth striving for, and something which is unbecoming and therefore to be avoided. Adn, as by nature he feels himself attracted by what is good, and repelled by what isevil, he naturally forms the judgments, that "good is to be done andevil avoided", that "man ought to live according to the dictates ofreason", etc. From hid own reflections, especially when assisted by instruction from others, he easily comes to the conclusion that in these judgments the will of a superior being, of the Creator and Designer of nature, has its expression. Around about him he perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is very easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and all-wise power. He himself has been appointed to occupy in the domain of nature the position of lord and master; he, too, must lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational being, not merely because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedience to his Creator. Man did not give himself his nature with all its faculties and inclinations; he received it from a superior being, whose wisdom and power are everywhere manifest to him in Creation.

The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoidevil", "Lead a life regulated according toreason", etc., from which all the Commandments of theDecalogue are derived, are the basis of thenatural law, of whichSt. Paul (Romans 2:14) says, that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an emanation of theDivine law, made known to all men by nature herself; it is the expression of the will of nature's Author, a participation of the created rational being in theeternal law of God. Hence theobligation it imposes does not arise from na's own autonomy, asKant held, nor from any other human authority, but from the will of the Creator; and man cannot violate it without rebelling againstGod, his master, offending Him, and becoming amenable to hisjustice. How deeply rooted among all nations this conviction of the higher origin of thenatural law was, is shown by the fact that for various violations of it (asmurder,adultery, perjury, etc.) they did their utmost to propitiate the angered deity by means ofprayers andsacrifices. Hence they looked upon the deity as the guardian and protector of the moral order, who would not let the contempt of it to go unpunished. The same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have attached to the moral order, a value far surpassing that all other earthly goods. The noblest among the nations maintained that it was better to undergo any hardship, even death itself, rather than prove recreant to one'sduty. They understood, therefore, that, over and above earthly treasures, there were higher and more lasting goods whose attainment was dependent upon the observance of the moral order, and this not by reason of any ordinance of man, but because of thelaw of God. This being premised, it is clearly impossible todivorce morality from religion without robbing it of itstrueobligation and sanction, of itssanctity and inviolability and of its importance as transcending every other earthly consideration.

Thenatural law consists of general practical principles (commands and prohibitions) and the conclusion necessarily flowing therefrom. It is the peculiar function of man to formulate these conclusions himself, though instruction and training are to assist him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take these principles as a guide of his conduct and apply them to his particular actions. This, to a certain extent, everybody does spontaneously, by virtue of an innate tendency. As in the case of all practical things, so in regard to what concerns the moral order, reason uses syllogistic processes. When aperson, e.g., is on the point of telling a lie, or saying what is contrary to his convictions, there rises before hismental vision the general precept of thenatural law: "Lying is wrong and forbidden." Hence he avails himself, at least virtually, of the following syllogism: "Lying is forbidden; what you are about to say is a lie; therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." The conclusion thus arrived at is ourconscience, the proximate norm of our conduct. Conscience, therefore, is not an obscure feeling or a sort of moralinstinct, but a practical judgment of our reason on the moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice ofconscience, our reward is peace and calm ofsoul, if we resist this voice, we experience disquiet and remorse.

Thenatural law is the foundation of all humanlaws andprecepts. It is only because we recognize the necessity of authority for humansociety, and because thenatural law enjoins obedience to regularly constituted authority, that it is possible for a human superior to imposelaws and commands binding inconscience. Indeed all humanlaws andprecepts are fundamentally the conclusions, or more minute determinations, of the general principles of thenatural law, and for this very reason every deliberate infraction of a law or precept binding inconscience is asin, i.e. the violation of a Divine commandment, a rebellion againstGod, an offence against Him, which will not escape punishment in this life or in the next, unless duly repented of before death.

The problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical, ethics, and their investigation in nearly all cases bear upon thenatural law, whose origin, nature, subject- matter,obligation, and properties it is the scope of ethics to explain thoroughly and verify. The generalphilosophicaldoctrine of right is usually treated in general ethics. Under no circumstances may the example ofKant and others be imitated in severing thedoctrine of right from ethics, or moral philosophy, and developing it as a seperate and independentscience. The juridical order is but a part of the moral order, even asjustice is but one of the moral virtues. The first principle of right: "Give every man his due"; "Commit noinjustice"; and thenecessary conclusions from these: "Thou shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not commitadultery", and the like, belong to thenatural law, and cannot be deviated from without violating one'sduty and one's neighbour'srights, and staining one'sconscience with guilt in the sight ofGod.

Special ethics applies the principles of general, or theoretical, ethics to the various relations of man, and thus deduces hisduties in particular. General ethics teaches that man must do good and avoidevil, and must inflict injury upon no one. Special ethics descends to particulars and demonstrates what is good or bad, right or wrong, and therefore to be done or avoided in the various relations ofhumanlife. First of all, it treats of man as an individual in his relations toGod, to himself, and to his fellow-men.God is the Creator, Master, and ultimate end of man; from these relations arise man'sduties towardGod. Presupposing his own individual efforts, he is, withGod's assistance, to hope for eternalhappiness from Him; he mustloveGod above all things as the highest,infinite good, in such a manner that no creature shall be preferred to Him; he must acknowledge Him as his absolute lord and master, adore and reverence Him, and resign himself entirely to His holy Will. The first, highest, and most essential business of man is to serveGod. In case it isGod's good pleasure to reveal asupernatural religion and to determine in detail the manner and means of our worship of Him, man is bound by thenatural law to accept this revelation in a spirit offaith. and to order his life accordingly. Here, too, it is plain that todivorce morality from religion is impossible. Religiousduties, those, namely, which have direct reference toGod, are man's principal and most essential moralduties. Linked to theseduties toGod are man'sduties regarding himself. Man loves himself by an intrinsic necessity of his nature. From this fact Schopenhauer drew the conclusion that the commandment concerning sel-love was superfluous. This would betrue, if it were a matter of indifference how manloved himself. But such is not the case; he mustlove himself with a well-orderedlove. He is to be solicitous for the welfare of hissoul and to do what isnecessary to attain to eternalhappiness. He is not his own master, but was created for the service ofGod; hence the deliberate arbitrary destruction of one's own life (suicide), as well as the freely intended mutilation of self, is a criminal attack on the proprietary rightGod has to man'sperson. Furthermore, every man is supposed to take a reasonable care to preserve his health. He has certainduties also as regards temperance; for the body must not be his master, but an instrument in the service of thesoul, and hence must be cared for in so far only as is conducive to this purpose. A furtherduty concerns the acquisition of external material goods, as far as they arenecessary for man's support and the fulfillment of his otherobligations. This again involves theobligation to work; furthermore,God has endowed man with the capacity for work in order that he might prove himself a beneficial member ofsociety; for idleness is the root of allevil. Besides these self-regardingduties, there are similar ones regarding our fellow-men:duties oflove,justice, fidelity, truthfullness, gratitude, etc. The commandment of thelove of our neighbour first received itstrue appreciation in theChristian Dispensation. Though doubtlessly contained to a certain extent in thenatural law, thepagans had so lost sight of the unity of thehuman race, and of the fact that all men are members of one vastfamily dependent uponGod, that they looked on every stranger as an enemy.Christianity restored tomankind the consciousness of its unity and solidarity, and supernaturally transfigured the natural precept tolove our neighbour, by demonstrating that all men are children of the same Father inheaven, were redeemed by the same blood of the same Saviour, and are destined to the same supernaturalsalvation. And, better still,Christianity provided man with the gracenecessary to the fulfillment of this precept and thus renewed the face of the earth. In man's intercourse with his fellow-men theprecepts ofjustice and of the other allied virtues go hand in hand with the precept oflove. There exists in man the natural tendency to assert himself when there is question of his goods orproperty. He expects his fellow-men to respect what belongs to him, and instinctively resists anyunjust attempt to violate this proprietorship. He will brook an injury from no one in all that regards his life or health, his wife or child, hishonour or good name; he resents faithlessness and ingratitude on the part of others, and the lie by which they would lead him intoerror. Yet he clearly understands that only then can he reasonably expect others to respect hisrights when he in turn respects theirs. Hence the general maxim: "Do not do to others, what you would not wish them to do to you"; from which are naturallydeduced the general commandments known to all men: "Thou shalt not kill, nor commit adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness against thy neighbour", etc. In this part of ethics it is customary to investigate the principles of right as regards private ownership. Has every man theright to acquireproperty? Or, at least, may notsociety (the State) abolish private ownership and assume possession and control of all material goods either wholly or in part, in order to thus distribute among the members of the community the products of their joint industry? This latter question is answered in the affirmative by the Socialists; and yet, it is the experience of all ages that the community of goods and of ownership is altogether impracticable in larger commonwealths, and would, if realized in any case, involve widespread slavery.

The second part of special, or applied, ethics, called by many sociology, considers man as a member ofsociety, as far as this can be made the subject ofphilosophical investigation. Man is by nature a social being; out of his innate needs, inclinations, and tendencies thefamily and State necessarily arise. And first of all the Creator had to provide for the preservation and propagation of thehuman race. Man's life is brief, were no provision made for the perpetuation of the human species, the world would soon become an uninhabited solitude, a well-appointed abode without occupants. HenceGod has given man the power and propensity to propagate his kind. The generative function was not primarily intended for man's individual well-being, but for the general good of his species, and in its exercise, therefore, he must be guided accordingly. This general good cannot be perfectly realized except in a lasting indissoluble monogamy. The unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond are requirements of thenatural law, at least in the sense that man may not on his own authority set them aside. Marriage is a Divine institution, for whichGod Himself has provided by means of definitelaws and in regard to which, therefore, man has not the power to make any change. The Creator might, of course, dispense for a time from the unity and indissolubility of the marriage tie; for, though the perfection of the married state demands these qualities, they are not of absolute necessity; the principal end of marriage may be attained to a certain degree without them.God could, therefore, for wise reasons grant adispensation in regard to them for a certain length of time.Christ, however, restored marriage to the original perfection consonant with its nature. Moreover He raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament and made it symbolic of His own union with theChurch; and had he done nothing more in this respect than restore thenatural law to its prestine integrity,mankind would be bound to Him by an eternaldebt of gratitude. For it was chiefly be means of the unity and indissolubility of the married life that the sanctuary of theChristianfamily was established, from whichmankind has reaped the choicestblessings, and compared with whichpaganism has no equivalent to offer. This exposition of the nature of marriage from a theistic standpoint is diametrically opposed to the views of modern Darwinists. According to them, men did not primitively recognize any such institution as the married state, but lived together in complete promiscuity. Marriage was the result of gradual development,woman was originally the centre about which thefamily crystallized, and from this latter circumstance there arises an explanation of the fact that many savage tribes reckon heredity and kinship betweenfamilies according to the lineal descent of thefemale. We cannot dwell long upon these fantastic speculations, because they do not consider man as essentially different from the brute, but as gradually developed from a purely animal origin. Although marriage is of Divine institution, not every individual isobliged, as a human being, to embrace the married state.God intends marriage for the propagation of thehuman race. To achieve this purpose it is by no meansnecessary for each and every member of the humanfamily to enter upon marriage, and this particularly at the present time, when the question of over-population presents so many grave difficulties to social economists. In this connexion certain other considerations from aChristian point of view arise, which do not, however, belong tophilosophical ethics. Since the principal end of marriage is the procreation andeducation of children, it is incumbent upon bothparents to co-operate according to the requirements of sex in the attainment of this end. From this it may readily be gathered whatduties exist between husband and wife, and betweenparents and their children.

The second naturalsociety, the State, is alogical andnecessary outcome of thefamily. A completely isolatedfamily could scarcely support itself, at all events it could never rise above the lowest grade of civilization. Hence we see that at all times and in all places, owing to natural needs and tendencies, larger groups offamilies are formed. A division of labour takes place. Eachfamily devotes itself to some industry in which it may improve and develop its resources, and then exchanges its products for those of otherfamilies. And now the way is opened to civilization and progress. This grouping offamilies, in order to be permanent, has need of authority, which makes for security, order, and peace, and in general provides for what isnecessary to the common good. SinceGod intends men to live together in harmony and order, He likewise desires such authority in the community as will have theright to procure what is needful for the common good. This authority, considered in itself and apart from the human vehicle in which it is placed, comes immediately fromGod, and hence, within its proper sphere, it imposes upon the consciences of the subjects theduty of obedience. In the light of this interpretation, the exercise of public power is vested with its proper dignity and inviolability, and at the same time is circumscribed bynecessary limitations. A group offamilies under a common authoritative head, and not subject to any similar aggregation, forms the primitive State, however small this may be. By further development, or by coalition with other States, larger States gradually come into existence. It is not the purpose of the State to supplant thefamilies, but to safeguard theirrights, to protect them, and to supplement their efforts. It is not to forfeit theirrights or to abandon their proper functions thatindividuals andfamilies combine to form the State, but to be secured in theserights, and to find support and encouragement in the discharge of the variousduties assigned them. Hence the State may not deprive thefamily of its right toeducate and instruct the children, but must simply lend its assistance by supplying, whenever needful, opportunities for the better accomplishment of thisduty. Only so far as the order and prosperity of the body politic requires it, may the State circumscribe individual effort and activity. In other words, the State is to posit the conditions under which, provided private endeavour be not lacking, each individual and eachfamily may attain totrue earthlyhappiness. Bytrue earthlyhappiness is meant such as not only does not interfere with the free performance of the individual's moralduties, but even upholds and encourages him therin.

Having defined the end and aim of the State, we are now in a position to examine in detail its various functions and extent. Private morality is not subject to State interference; but it is the proper function of the State to concern itself with the interests of public morality. It must not only prevent vice from parading in public and becoming a snare to many (e.g. through immoral literature, theatres, plays, or other means of seduction), but also see to it that the public ordinances andlaws facilitate and advance morally good behaviour. The State may not affect indifference as regards religion; theobligation tohonourGod publicly is binding upon the State as such. It istrue that the direct supervision of religious matters in the presentsupernatural order was entrusted byChrist to HisChurch; nevertheless, it is theduty of theChristian State to protect and uphold theChurch, the onetrue Church founded byChrist. Of course, owing to the unfortunatedivision ofChristians into numerous religious systems, such an intimate relation betwenChurch and State is at the present day but rarely maintained. The separation ofChurch and State, with complete liberty ofconscience and worship, is often the only practicalmodus vivendi. In circumstances such as these the State must be satisfied to leave the affairs of religion to various bodies, and to protect the latter in thoserights which have reference to the general public order. Theeducation and instruction of children belongsper se to thefamily, and should not be monopolized by the State. The latter has, however, the right and theduty to suppressschools which disseminate immoraldoctrine or foster the practice of vice; beyond such control it may not set limits to free individual endeavour. It may, however, assist the individual in his efforts to secure aneducation, and, in case these do not suffice, it may establishschools and institutions for his benefit. Finally, the State has to exercise important economical functions. It must protect privateproperty and see to it that inman's industrial life thelaws affectingjustice be carried out in all their force and vigour. But itsduties do not stop here. It should pass suchlaws as will enable its subjects to procure what is needed for their respectable sustenance and even to attain a moderate competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme poverty involve many dangers to the individual and tosociety. Hence the State should pass suchlaws as will favour the sturdy middle class of citizens and add to their numbers. Much can be done to bring about this desirable condition by the enactment of proper tax and inheritancelaws oflaws which protect the labouring, manufacturing, and agricultural interests, and which supervise and control trusts, syndicates, etc.

Although the authority of the State comes immediately fromGod, theperson who exercises it is not immediately designated by Him. This determination is left to the circumstances of men's progress and development or of their modes of social aggregation. According as the supreme power resides in one individual, or in a privileged class, or in the people collectively, governments are divided into three forms: the monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The monarchy is hereditary or elective, according as succession to supreme power follows the right of primogeniture of afamily (dynasty) or is subject to suffrage. At the present day the only existing kind of monarchy is the hereditary, the elective monarchies, such asPoland and the old German Sovereignty, having long since disappeared. Those States in which the sovereign power resides in the body of the people are called polycracies, or more commonly, republics, and are divided into aristocracies and democracies. In republics sovereignty is vested in the people. The latter elect from their number representatives who frame theirlaws and administer the affairs of government in their name. The almost universally prevailing form of government inEurope, fashioned upon the model created inEngland, is the constitutional monarchy, a mixture of the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms. The law- making power is vested in the king and two chambers. The members of one chamber represent the aristocratic and conservative element, while the other chamber, elected from the body of citizens, represents the democratic element. The monarch himself is responsible to no one, yet his governmental acts require the counter-signature of theministers, who in turn are responsible to the chamber.

With regard to its appointed functions the government of the State is divided into the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers. It is of primary importance that the State enact general and stablelaws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as this is required for the good order and well-being of the whole body. For this purpose it must possess theright to legislate; it must, moreover, carry out theselaws and provide, by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to the general good of the community; finally, it has to punish infractions of thelaws and authoritatively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose it has need of the judiciary power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties is founded on the necessity to preserve good order and of providing for the security of the whole body politic. In a community there are always found those who can in no other way be effectually forced to observe thelaws and respect therights of others than by the infliction of punishment. Hence the State must have theright to enact penalstatutes, calculated to deter its subjects from violating thelaws and the right, moreover, to actually inflict punishment after the violation has occurred. Among the legitimate modes of punishment is capital punishment. It is considered, and rightly so, a step forward in civilization, that nowadays a milder practice has been adopted in this regard, and that capital punishment is more rarely inflicted, and then only for such heinous crimes asmurder and high treason. Nevertheless humanitarian sentimentalism has nodoubt been carried to an exaggerated degree, so much so that many would on principle do away with capital punishment altogether. And yet, this is the only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from committing the gravest crimes.

When it is asserted, withAristotle, that the State is asociety sufficient for itself, this is to be consideredtrue in the sense that the State needs no further development to complete its organization, but not in the sense that it is independent in every respect. The greater the advance ofmankind in progress and civilization, the morenecessary and frequent the communication between nations becomes. Hence the question arises as to whatrights andduties mutually exist between nation and nation. That portion of ethics which treats this question from aphilosophical standpoint is called the theory ofinternational law, or of thelaw of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day deny the propriety of aphilosophical treatment ofinternational law. According to them the only internationalrights andduties are those which have been established by some positive measure either implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, indeed, is the position that must be taken by all who reject thenatural law. On the other hand, this position precludes the possibility of any positiveinternational law whatever, for lasting and binding compacts between various States are possible only when the primary principle of right is recognized — that it is just andobligatory to stand by lawful agreements. Now this is a principle ofnatural law; hence, those who deny the existence ofnatural law (e.g. E. von Hartmann) must consequently reject anyinternational law properly so called. In their opinion any international agreements are mere conventions, which each one observes as long as he finds itnecessary or advantageous. And so we are eventually led back to the principle of ancientpaganism, which, in the intercourse between nations, too often identified right with might. ButChristianity brought the nations into a closer union and broke down the barriers of narrow-minded policy. It proclaimed, moreover, theduties oflove andjustice as binding on all nations, thus restoring and perfecting thenatural law. The fundamental principles: "Give each one his due", "Do injury to no man", "Do not to others what you would not have them do to you", etc., have an absolute and universal value, and hence must obtain also in the intercourse between nations. Purely naturalduties andrights are comon to all nations; the acquired or positive ones may vary considerably. Various, too, are therights andduties of nations in peace and inwar. Since, however, there are, under this head, many details of adoubtful and changeable character, the codification ofinternational law is a most urgent desideratum. Besides this an international court should be established to attend to the execution of the various measurespromulgated by thelaw and to arbitrate in case of dispute. The foundations of such an international court of arbitration have been laid atThe Hague; unfortunately, its competence has been hitherto very much restricted, and besides, it exercises its functions only when the Powers at variance appeal to it of their own accord. In the codification ofinternational law no one would be more competent to lend effective cooperation and to maintain the principles ofjustice andlove which should exist between nations in their intercourse with one another, than thepope. No one can offer sounder guarantees for the righteousness of the principles to be laid down, and no one can exert greater moral influence towards carrying them into effect. This is even recognized by unprejudicedProtestants. At theVatican Council not only the manyCatholicbishops present, but theProtestant David Urquhart appealed to thepope to draw up a schedule of the more important principles ofinternational law, which were to be binding on allChristian nations. Religious prejudice, however, places many difficulties in the way of realizing this plan.

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