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By Pete Bublitz

The Preluding Months

In the early morning hours of August 19, 1942, a fleet of up to 250 shipssupported by over 70 Allied Air Force squadrons was carrying a force of6,000-plus men across the English Channel towards the areas that surrounded thecity of Dieppe, a port town located in the Pays de Caux region of northeasternFrance. They would be transported to their target beaches with anticipationfrom their superiors of delivering a series of damaging blows to the Germanfortifications in and around Dieppe. But as the minutes approached 0400 hours(4 a.m.), a German convoy approaching from the north would be the first blow tounravel the entire operation. Nine hours later, the convoy would return to itshomeports in defeat with high casualty counts. In the years after D-Day up tothe present, historians and military officials agreed that Jubilee, as theoperation was codenamed, was one of the Allies’ greatest military blunders ofWorld War II. The truth is, Jubilee was turning into a blundering operationlong before it was executed, due to a series of planning mistakes,miscalculations, and changes made in the weeks and months leading up to August19th.

With a majority of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans underoccupation during the opening three to four months of 1942, the mostsignificant focus of western military action by the Third Reich by early ’42had been shifted toward the deserts of North Africa through the success ofErwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps. Aside from ongoing conflict with nationalresistance and partisan groups throughout the western countries, the only majorblows to be inflicted upon Fortress Europe by land-based Allied forces werestrategically minor yet effective commando raids up and down the Atlanticcoastline.

Only in Eastern Europe did the advance of Nazi Germany’s armed forces meet aninflux of military action that would eventually bring them to a completestandstill during that period. Beginning in the early summer and lasting wellinto the late autumn of 1941, Soviet Russia had become the latest witness toformer peacetime ally Germany’s notorious blitzkrieg tactics and strategieswhen Operation Barbarossa was initiated in June of ’41. The 6th German Army hadundergone few to no delays and met light resistance as it moved deeper anddeeper into Russia. Upon reaching the outer boundaries of Moscow and Leningradin the north, however, the Germans would be stopped dead in their tracks by acombination of the unfriendly December weather and immediate Sovietcounteroffensives that showed the resilience of Soviet troops. These factors intheir halt would cause the Germans to redirect their advance away from thechief northern cities to the industrial centers around the Caucasus regions insouthern Russia by the time spring of 1942 began.

The Soviet Outcry

Because the German armies continued to carve out territories deep within theU.S.S.R, Premier Josef Stalin was still struggling against the Nazi war machinepounding outside his gates nearly four months after the Operation Typhoonoffensive against Moscow was ended. Despite managing to eliminate the supplyresources, bases, and hostels that would have been made available to theGermans through his ‘scorched earth’ policy, the only available area ofresources left unscathed was the Caucasus region around the Volga River. Andalthough a Soviet counteroffensive would proceed to push the Germans away fromMoscow until the end of April, it would merely redirect them further to thesouth where the mountains of the Caucasus loomed. In addition, the mass purgesthat had been ordered by Stalin would limit the availability of his ownmilitary staff as well as the manpower of his armies. Still, Allied aid wasbeing sent to the U.S.S.R from the west. While the Russians continued to bepushed back by the Germans, the U.S. and Britain had enacted a military aidprogramme in October ‘41 that would deliver mobile vehicles, aircraft and otherweapons and equipment.

As time passed, however, Premier Stalin became intent on asking for more thanadditional supplies fro, the Western Allies. What he most sought was relieffrom the massive German force that spanned the front. Likely believing thatRussia was being under looked during its conflict, Stalin would begin to rebukehis western Allies for what he called inaction. His high disdain for them hadbecome so built up that by late February of ’42, he would resort to the levelof adding injury to insult by publicly declaring his willingness to take uppossible negotiations with Germany. Although it is not fully known why, Stalinprobably made this statement to garner an effective response from the WesternAllies that would motivate them enough to take action in fulfilling what Stalinwanted. If the statement were for this purpose, then Stalin would be successfulin causing responsive actions (Villa 8).

The Responses of April

The statements, as it turned out, would bring about declared actions andresponses on both sides of the war. In Nazi Germany, Fuhrer Adolf Hitler hadsuspected what Stalin had intended for his speech and declared late in Marchthat the statements would sway the Western Allies to immediately act in aidingRussia by refocusing and committing their troops and strategies to theexecution of more raids and other operations along the coasts of WesternEurope. Therefore, he would send out an order for all German troops stationedalong the occupied coasts to be put and remain in an indefinite state of highalert and readiness (Villa 8).

What Hitler had suspected, unbeknownst to him, was proceeding to be verifiedacross the English Channel as well as the Atlantic. In Great Britain, theCombined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) under Lord Louis Mountbatten and itsplanning staff were busy trying to figure out what actions could possibly betaken to aid the Soviet Union, an issue that was continually pressured on themby Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British War Cabinet. Its work pacewould increase when, on April 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotovcalled for opening up a second front in the West during his visit to London.Sensing that a higher demand for more raids would be recommended, Captain JohnHughes-Hallet, a planner for COHQ’s Naval wing, took to compiling a list ofchief occupied locations along the coasts; locations which would serve aspossible targets for an upcoming series of raids. The first of these of raidswould have been scheduled to take place during the final weeks of May. Althoughunderstanding that more raids needed to be carried out in the upcoming months,Hughes-Hallet knew early that a number of minor raids would not be enough torelieve the Soviet Union. Only an action much larger than a single set of raidswould be impacting enough to bring about this relief (Villa 9).

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in the United States, the staffleaders of the American Armed Forces were also directing concern towards takingaction to remove some of the pressure off of Russia. Despite being dedicated tofighting the war on at least two fronts in two theaters, a group of top U.S.military officials who viewed Hitler’s Third Reich to be a greater threat thanImperial Japan and that coming to the assistance of the U.S.S.R was to be thefirst and top priority of the war in Europe. Chief among them was GeneralGeorge Marshall, who agreed that opening up a Western front was the best andonly means of meeting this sole objective. Yet Marshall also believed that thisfront could be opened up through one strategy effective enough to do this: across-Channel invasion undertaken by Allied forces by early 1943. It wasestimated, and intended, that a major invasion would deter German focus awayfrom the Russia via this new front. It would not, as planners decided in theupcoming months, be the main invasion but instead a preliminary mass raid totest out the factors and obstacles of a major invasion, including new militarytechnologies and enemy defense capabilities. It would serve as what plannerscalled a “reconnaissance-in-force” that would precede the actual invasion ofWestern Europe.

Thus, General Marshall traveled to Great Britain to discuss this possiblestrategy with Mountbatten and Combined Operations. By the time he arrived, COHQhad run low on acceptable targets for Allied raids. During his stay in Englandfrom April 4 to April 19, Marshall would manage to convince Mountbatten torefocus planning for a combined-force raid that would be much larger in scaleas well as manpower than an average raid. Lord Mountbatten expressed eagernessover this possibility and immediately put the COHQ planning staff to work onpossible invasion strategies (Black 2-4). Hughes-Hallet’s list was againconsulted, and it had been decided during the last days of April, by the COHQstaff, that a combined-force invasion would be undertaken at the small porttown of Dieppe. The decision to attack Dieppe originated from two proposedplans. The first plan centered on landing flank attack troops at theneighboring towns of Puits, one and a half miles east of Dieppe; Pourville, twoand a half miles west of the town; and Varengeville, three miles west ofPourville. The second plan called for paratroopers to be dropped onVarengeville and Berneval, a town four miles east of Puits; it also involvedflanking attack forces that would be landed at Puits and Pourville. On the 25thof April, members of COHQ’s Planning Staff decided that the second plan wouldbe chosen for consideration. (Buckley 230).

The Haste of May

After being analyzed, plan number two of the pair was chosen for a number ofreasons the planners believed were accurate. Chief among these was the matterof Dieppe being held by what COHQ officials believed to be a weak Germandivision with a scarce number of men; German reinforcements would be too slowto reach the defense positions in time; and that having men from the flankingpositions advance towards Dieppe would take up too much time. These observedfactors confirm the planners’ belief that a full frontal assault on Dieppecoupled with flank attacks at neighboring areas on both its sides would overrunand knock out the main defense forces stationed there and withdraw beforeGerman reinforcements arrived.

Around the time this plan was agreed upon, the military force that would carryout the attacks was already being put together. The COHQ staff would selectthree high-ranking men to head the wings of the assault: Capt. JohnHughes-Hallet would serve as commander of the naval forces, Air Vice-MarshalTrafford Leigh-Mallory would command the supporting Air Force squadrons, whileMajor General John Hamilton Roberts was selected to serve as commander of thecombined military force involved in the operation. Making up the ground forceswere a combination of British Commandos, Canadian infantry, and U.S. Rangers(Ford 17).

Even though the plan was still in the process of being fully detailed in termsof strategy and tactics, by early May the British War Cabinet was breathingdown the necks of Mountbatten and COHQ, mainly because the Soviets werecontinuing to breathe down the Cabinet’s neck. Rushed by repetitive demands forlayouts of the plan, on May 11th Mountbatten presented the plan to theCabinet’s Chiefs of Staff Committee before it could be thoroughly detailed.Rushing through the plan themselves, the Committee would approve the operationand assign it with the codename Rutter on May 13th. In addition to this, it wasdecided that Operation Rutter would be carried out some time during the latterweeks of June. (Buckley 230-231).

The Changes and Setbacks of June and July

Long after it was approved, however, the plans for Operation Rutter were stillundergoing alterations in terms of military involvement. The idea ofparatrooper usage for flanking attacks had been dropped in favor of landingcommandos at the outlying areas that surrounded Dieppe. It was also originallyintended for a pre-raid naval bombardment to take place during the morninghours before the troops were landed. Due to peer pressure over the claimedpossibility that a heavy bombardment would create major setbacks such asalerting the enemy too early and the destruction of key roads and buildingsbefore they could be secured, Mountbatten would relent this strategy. On June5, during his visit to the United States, Mountbatten made the decision tocancel the originally scheduled bombardment. On the issue of landing times,planners decided that simultaneous landings would become too condensed anddecided push the main assault time back half an hour after the flanking attacksbegan. These required changes convinced the Planning Staff to reschedule Rutterfor no earlier than July 4th and no later than July 8th (Villa 10-13).

The days leading up to the first week of July saw the relocation of groundtroops from their previous training locations to their departure ports insouthern England where they’d embark for the operation. During that first week,however, the Allied forces would be hampered by ongoing weather woes. Well intoJuly 8th and the days that followed, ongoing rainfall and storms would leavethe fleet docked. During that week the operation’s secrecy would receive anadditional sting much greater than the first. On July 7th, a reconnaissanceplane from the Luftwaffe spotted transport ships in the Solent docks anddropped two bombs on the H.M.S. Astrid and H.M.S. Josephine Charlotte. The bombdropped on the Astrid never went off, but the one dropped on JosephineCharlotte exploded in the crew’s quarters and killed more than fifteen sailors(Mellor 23). Though little damage was done, the attacks convinced COHQ thatwhat the Germans observed would likely hint them to an upcoming invasion andtherefore cause them to double their forces and prolong their state of highalert. As a result of this problem, coupled with continuous bad weather, COHQdecided to cancel Rutter indefinitely and send the troops back to theiroriginal training posts.

Only one week after its cancellation, Mountbatten and COHQ were alreadyproposing to have the raid revived and rescheduled. Although reviving andcarrying out the raid would be more risky at the moment than it was one monthprior, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was easily convinced enough to decide, onJuly 20th, that the raid was back on schedule. They would rename the entireoperation Jubilee, which was the codename for Dieppe itself. With the scheduleddate, August 19th, a go, Combined Operations would issue a preliminary orderfor Operation Jubilee on July 31st for all troops to be put on alert untilfurther notice. On the 17th of August, the troops would again be transported totheir assigned ports of departure, where they would embark with the navalconvoy towards their intended destination in the early evening hours of August18th (Ford 11).

The Players and the Stage

While the plan that revolved around the Dieppe raid was still in its earlyorganization stages, assembling the ground forces was still being discussed interms of which units it would consist of. After deliberation among COHQplanners head military officers, it was decided that the attack force takingpart in the ground operation would be an made up of volunteers from theCanadian Army, Commando Battalions, and soldiers from select Allied forces,including the 1st U.S. Ranger Battalion, British Secret Service, and No. 10Inter-Allied Commando. On the other side of the channel, the German troops ofthe 302nd Division were proceeding to build up their available reserve presenceas well as defense fortification throughout the area. At the same time,numerous heavy artillery and anti-aircraft gun emplacements were set upthroughout the towns and elevated areas that surrounded Dieppe, as well asDieppe itself, to support the defense lines that overlooked the beaches alongthe Channel coast and ports.

The Canadian Involvement

As of late April, when a plan to raid Dieppe was decided upon and authorized,the two main Canadian divisions stationed in England were the 1st and 2ndInfantry Divisions. Commanding 2nd Division was Major-General John HamiltonRoberts, while Lieutenant-General R.G.L. McNaughton would head 1st Division.Over time, however, McNaughton would be promoted up to Commander of allCanadian forces in England. Originally formed from national volunteer militiasand sent to Britain and Iceland for training during 1939-1940, the twodivisions’ total manpower would increase due to the passing of the NationalResources Mobilization Act in the summer of ’40. The Mobilization Act wouldaffect the Canadian military’s servicemen capacity through the extensiveconscription of Canadian men between the ages of 21 and 42. With the whole of2nd Division brought together in England by April of ’42, it would be stationedat Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery’s South Eastern Command (Villa212-213).

When it came time for COHQ to consider what forces could be used for the mainattack on Dieppe, the final decision was left to Montgomery and General BernardPaget. After deliberation, the two agreed that Canadian troops from SouthEastern Command would be the best bet for this part of the raid. Withencouragement from Lt.-Gen. McNaughton, Gen. Paget gave the order to assignMajor-Gen. Roberts’ 2nd Division with the assault. Roberts, in turn, selectedsix infantry regiments from the Division’s 4th and 6th Canadian Brigades.Chosen from Brigadier Sherwood Lett’s 4th Brigade were:

• the Royal Regiment of Canada, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Catto;
• the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry under Lieut.-Col. Robert Labatt;
• and Lieut.-Col. Fred Jasperson’s Essex Scottish Regiment.

The 6th Brigade, commanded by Brig. William Southam, would provide:

• Lieut.-Col. Dollard Menard’s Fusiliers Mont Royal Regiment;
• the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, commanded by Lieut.-Col.Alfred Gostling;
• and the South Saskatchewan Regiment under Lieut.-Col. Charles Merrit (Ford25).

Roberts also selected the 2nd Division’s 14th Canadian Tank Battalion, underthe command of Lieut.-Col. John Andrews, for involvement in the main attack.Nicknamed the Calgary Tanks, 14th Battalion was intended mostly to provideheavy armor support for the Canadian infantry troops landing at and aroundDieppe. The following regiments and ancillary units from other brigades anddivisions, supporting the two Brigades, included:

• selected units from the Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (the Black Watch),from 2nd Division’s 5th Brigade;
• a unit from the Canadian 1st Army Tank Brigade;
• the Toronto Scottish Machine Gun Regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Col. GuyStandish Gostling (Alfred Gostling’s brother);
• units from the three Royal Canadian Artillery Field Regiments of 2ndDivision;
• three companies from the Royal Canadian Engineers under Major B. Sucharov;
• the 2nd Provost Corps;
• the 11th Field Ambulance Brigade; and
• the Canadian Corps of Signals (Mellor 14).

With the roster for the Canadian targets in place, on May 8th the Canadianbrigades had received orders to begin training for the upcoming operation.During the remainder of May and most of June, the regiments’ units wouldundergo necessary preparation at the Isle of Wight, located off England’ssouthern coast, for their objectives during Rutter. In addition to standardmilitary training (weapons training, endurance marches, etc.), some of theunits would also receive commando-style training for certain special tasks.These tasks included cliff-climbing, street fighting, deployment from landingcraft, and unarmed hand-to-hand combat. Once training was completed, the menwere transferred to specific naval ports where they would remain stationeduntil they were to embark for Operation Rutter (Mellor 16-18).

Due to COHQ’s decision to cancel Operation Rutter, the men of the Canadian 2ndDivision were sent back to a South Eastern Command different from the onebefore they left. General Montgomery left S.E. Command to take control of theBritish 8th Army in North Africa, though prior to his departure he urged to noavail for COHQ to consider planning new attack at a different location insteadof refocusing on Dieppe. With the operation back on, renamed Jubilee, and“Monty” gone, S.E. Command was assigned to Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, whowas Commander of the Canadian I Corps at the time. All the pieces being inplace, the regiments would be transferred back to their embarking ports for theoperation and shipped out to Dieppe on August 18th (Ford 16).

The Presence of Commandos

As France proceeded to fall under Nazi occupation during the summer of ’40, themajor British armies were struggling to recuperate enough to continue the war.Still, Churchill vowed to keep Britain fighting beyond Britain itself. Thisearnestness would about the creation of the Commandos: British Special Forcesassigned with delivering blows to new German fortifications along the WestEuropean coasts. On the 23rd-24th of June 1940, at the French town of Boulogne,Commando units would introduce a new method of warfare to the Germans: theamphibious raid. The impact of this Commando raid would influence a long seriesof raids over the next two years. From the small islands of Spitzbergen (17Aug.-8 Sept. 1941) and Lofoten (4 March; 26 Dec. 1941) off of northern Norwayto the Vichy French town of Bayonne along the southern Biscay Bay coastline (5Apr. 1942), special Commando forces had managed to achieve tactical success byat least briefly disrupting German resources and defenses if not completelydamaging them. Most of all, the raids disrupted the chance of an entirelyPhoney War in Western Europe (Ladd 15-29).

By the time plans for Operation Rutter had been approved in May of ‘42,Commandos had become the most frequent source of Allied ground warfare inWestern Europe. They would also achieve their greatest acclaim one and a halfmonths prior, when units of the 2nd Commando undertook the St. Nazaire raid onMarch 27th-28th, 1942. The successful execution performed at St. Nazaire wouldlead many to call it the greatest amphibious raid of the war in West Europe.Recognizing their success, COHQ planners found it necessary to have Commandosinvolved in the upcoming raid on Dieppe. Therefore, it was decided thatCommandos would be used instead of paratroopers for the flanking attacks. Atotal of three separate Commando units were to undertake separate tasks duringthe raid. Selected by COHQ were:

• 3 Commando, commanded by Lieut.-Col. J.F. Durnford-Slater;
• 4 Commando under Lieut.-Col. Lord Lovat; and
• Lieut.-Col. J. Picton-Phillip’s Royal Marine A Commando, aka the RoyalMarines.

Two out the three units, 3 and 4 Commando, would undertake flanking attackswhile the Royal Marines were to be involved in the main attack at Dieppe’sbeaches (Ford 25, 31).

The Commandos would immediately begin their extensive training for theoperation once they had been given their assignments. 4 Commando would partakein training at Weymouth, 3 Commando would train for the operation in Sussex,while the Royal Marines trained at the Isle of Wight with the Canadians. Duringtheir training, the men would closely analyze Intelligence reports andreconnaissance pictures taken of the area and immediately work on a strategyplan of attack for their assignment. Once organized, the men would undergodaily speed-marches and repetitive assault simulations until they had it downperfectly. These training rehearsals would continue on and off until the timecame in mid-August for them to embark on their mission. When it did, they wouldreach the epitome of their training on the other side of the English Channel(Ford 24).

The Minor American Force

The trip made to England by General Marshall would not only result in theconsideration of opening a second front. On April 15, it was proposed that agroup of twelve U.S officers, twenty NCOs, and forty privates be selected totrain with British Commandos in order to create the blueprint for a largerAmerican commando unit. In addition to this group, it was proposed, anothertwenty officers and forty NCOs be trained so that they can be sent back to thestates to train more men. Lord Mountbatten also proposed that up to eightofficers from the U.S. armed forces serve as an American activities staff forCOHQ. Upon returning to the U.S., General Marshall selected Colonel LucianTruscott to work on Mountbatten’s staff with the assignment of selectingAmerican soldiers to train with the Commandos for the operation. When the timecame for the raid to be underway, the soldiers would be divided and serve withthe separate battalions involved in Dieppe (Black 3-4).

Truscott, seeking to compile men stationed in Ireland for an American Commandounit, would be responsible for the creation of the U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion inJune of ’42. They were to be trained at the Commando Basic Training Center inAchnacarry, Scotland. At this location, the Rangers were put through the sametraining procedures and raid preparations as regular British Commandos. As thedeadline for the Dieppe raid grew close, Lord Mountbatten approached Col.Truscott on the subject of whether or not he wanted U.S. Rangers involved inthe raid. Giving an affirmative yes, Truscott went ahead and selected up to 50Rangers (six officers and forty-four lower-ranking men), for the operation(Ford, 24). Over time, the combined Ranger force chosen for the raid would bedivided among the main forces taking part in what would become Jubilee. Up to40 Rangers, four officers and 36 men, would serve with Lieut.-Col.Durnford-Slater’s 3 Commando. Meanwhile, another four Rangers were assigned toLord Lovat’s 4 Commando. The final six Rangers would serve alongside theseparate Canadian battalions. They would receive their assigned forces andcontinue training well into mid-August, just a few days prior to theirdeparture (Black 29-32).

The German Buildup and the Set Stage

The order of alert issued by Hitler was to be handled under the command ofGeneral-feldmarschall (Field Marshal) Gerd von Rundstedt, the Commander inChief who presided over all army forces in occupied Western Europe. The orderwould be passed down to Generaloberst (Senior General) Curt Haase’s 15th GermanArmy, which occupied the areas from Holland’s Western Scheldt deltas to Caen,France. He would issue this order further down to the two generals commandingthe areas in and around Dieppe. First there was General der Panzertruppen(General of the Cavalries) Adolf Kuntzen, whose LXXXI Corps were in charge ofdefending the areas all along the Dieppe coastlines. Kuntzen would finally givethis order of alert to Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Konrad Haase andhis 302nd Infantry Division, which defended the beaches of Dieppe and thesurrounding towns (Ford 18).

This order of high alert would also affect the activities of German navalforces off the West European coastlines. It also increased the monitoring ofskies over the English Channel and Western Europe, underwent by specificLuftwaffe groups. Two of these groups, Jagdesgeschwaders (JG) 2 & 26,consisted of over 200 Focke Wulf FW 190 and Messerschmitt BF 109 fighters. Thegroups and their fighters were stationed at six air bases scattered throughoutFrance and southern Belgium. Stationed at bases in Belgium and Holland werefive Luftwaffe bomber groups: Kampfgeschwaders (KG) 2, 40, 53, & 77, andKustenfliegergruppe (Ku) 106. These five groups possessed over 105 Dornier Do217, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111 bombers combined. Along with those atDieppe, the harbors of numerous towns along the French coasts would also be puton high security alert and therefore double their defenses. After the fall ofFrance the Germans would dedicate the towns’ harbors to serving as naval depotsand landing docks. The short distance between these towns would make convoymovement, U-Boat activity, and naval patrols up and down the coastline morefrequent (Franks 29, 174; Ford 30, 78).

The 302nd Infantry Division was comprised mainly of the 570th, 571st, and 572ndInfantry Regiments. The 302nd’s Artillery Regiment, Reconnaissance Battalion,Anti-tank Battalion, Engineer Battalion, and Signal Battalion would providesupport to the infantry regiments. The 571st Regiment was centered in Dieppeand the areas surrounding it, while the 570th and 572nd would be stationed inthe outlying areas. Haase would leave the objective of defending the Dieppeareas to the entire 571st, under the command of Oberstleutnant (SeniorLieutenant) Hermann Bartelt. The battalions that made up the 571st werestationed at separate districts inside and outside of Dieppe. The headquartersof the 571st’s 1st Battalion was located in the village of Ouville, just southof Vasterival. The remainder of the regiment was located in different parts ofDieppe itself. The headquarters of the 571st’s 2nd Battalion, along the main HQof the 571st itself, were located at the Chateau on top of the western Dieppeheadlands. The 3rd Battalion’s HQ rested on the right side of the town’sharbor, where its mouth flowed into the channel. The main HQ for the 302ndDivision was suspected to be located southwest of Dieppe, in the town ofArques-la-Bataille. Still, the 302nd Division held a wide enough area to makedefense setup a top priority. The manner of which the 302nd would defend itsgrounds was likely based on the geography and landscape of the area (Ford 31,37-38).

The coastal edges along Dieppe were mostly steep cliffs, some of which werehigh enough to make climbing difficult. They would stoop down into rivervalleys in the areas where local rivers flowed into the sea. The three chiefrivers in the Dieppe area were:

• the Saane River, which flowed between the towns of Quiberville and St.Marguerite just west of Vasterival;
• the Scie River, which was surrounded on both sides by the town of Pourville;and
• the Arques River, which flowed into the mouth of Dieppe’s port.

The towns along the coastline would be marked by mile-long beaches met by seawalls up to 150 yards in depth. Surrounding Dieppe were two more headlands thathappened to spread landward. The headlands east of Dieppe looked down on thetown’s main port and docks, while the western headlands rose up behind thetown’s Casino. The large Casino, built for its original obvious purpose, wasleft abandoned when Germany invaded France during 1940. By 1942, it would beconverted by German forces into a garrisoned structure for defense purposes.The Casino stood alongside numerous other buildings (including a large tobaccofactory), on a beachfront called the Boulevard de Verdun. Located south ofDieppe were the Luftwaffe-occupied airfields of St. Aubin. The layout of Dieppeand the other towns would most influence how the Germans would put togethertheir defenses (Buckley 231).

The 571st Regiment, however, had a diminished amount of manpower. Spread outthinly along the beaches of Dieppe and the neighboring towns, were the 571st’smere total of 1500 soldiers. They were stationed not only in the townsthemselves, but also in the open areas and highlands between the towns thatoverlooking the beaches. A garrison of only 150 men, for example, defended thebeaches at Dieppe, while a smaller garrison of 50 men defended the beaches atPuits. Lacking in terms of infantry capacity, the Germans would focus onsetting up extensive defense perimeters throughout the area. Around the outerborders of Dieppe, the 571st had developed an ongoing barrier made up of thickbarbed wire, machine-gun pillboxes, and concrete walls. Along the town’sbeaches and headlands that loomed over them were scattered additional machinegun emplacements and barbed wire entanglements. The Germans further fortifiedthe beachfronts by barricading all roads and entries into the towns withconcrete walls and converting numerous buildings along the front into defensestructures (Ford 37-38).

The German command, in the months prior to August, also found it necessary toset up heavy weapon emplacements throughout the Dieppe area in order to supportthe infantry defense garrisons. By the time August rolled around, Dieppe wassecured by just as many, if not more, heavy weapons emplacements as regimentaldefenses. Dieppe’s headlands held a total of seven or eight 75mm artillery gunsand a maximum of ten 37mm-47mm anti-tank guns. Outside of western Dieppe and atLes Vertus (south of Dieppe), the Luftwaffe contributed two anti-aircraftbatteries (one at each location). The 302nd’s Artillery Regiment would alsoemplace a number of heavy weapons batteries around Dieppe. South of Vasterivalstood six 150mm guns, known as the Hess Battery. The Hitler Battery, whichconsisted of four 150mm guns, was located just west of Arques-la-Bataille. Atotal of sixteen 100mm howitzers would be divided among the 1st Mobile (N.E. ofAppeville), 2nd Mobile (S.E. of Puits), Goering (N.E. of Les Vertus), andRommel Batteries (S.W. of Greges). Finally, there was the Goebbels Battery, anemplacement that included three 170mm guns and four 105mm guns. With allfortifications in place, the 302nd’s troops would remain on alert for apossible Allied attack well into mid-August (Ford 31).

The Layout of the Assault 

The raid on Dieppe, during the time it was being planned, was likely COHQ’smost anticipated operation to date. This can be verified by the immensemilitary force taking part in the attack. Men from a total of ten to twentybattalions and regiments would cross the English Channel as the ground assaultforce for the raid. They would be supported by both a large naval fleet and avast number of Allied Air Force squadrons. This reconnaissance-in-force was tobe undertaken for a series of purposes. This raid was intended to test numerousfactors, including:

• the Allies’ ability to attack and capture a coastal port or town under enemyoccupation;
• their ability in operating and handling a large amphibious force;
• the effectiveness of new weapons, equipment, and vehicles (i.e. the Churchilltank), in combat; and
• the maximum strength and capabilities of German defenses along thecoastlines.

Observations made from these factors would be used to influence furtherplanning and preparations for an even larger amphibious assault in the monthsand years following Operation Jubilee. Once on the other side of the Channel,the men were to land on eight separate beaches at seven neighboring towns.These towns were stretched out along an 18-20km span of coastline. The groundtroops’ main tasks during the raid would be strenuous in the highest degree.Their main objectives included:

• the destruction of most or all German heavy defenses, the radar station inDieppe, and the facilities of the St. Aubin airfields;
• the capture and evacuation of German officials and naval barges in Dieppe’sharbor; and
• the capture of 302nd Division’s central HQ, believed to be located inArques-la-Bataille.

The beach sectors, upon which select regiments would land, would be given colorcodenames: Orange, Green, White, Red, Blue, and Yellow. Not only would theyland in different spots, but they would be ordered to land at opposing times.These times were to take place during the dawn hours, when the sun was six totwelve degrees below horizon.

The Yellow and Orange Beaches

The two flanking attacks undertaken by 3 and 4 Commando were to take place at0450 hours (4:50 a.m.), a half hour before the main raid on Dieppe was set tobegin. To the east of Dieppe, Lieut.-Col. Durnford-Slater, his 3 Commando, and39 U.S. Rangers under Capt. Roy Murray would land at the beaches of Berneval(Yellow Beach I) and Belleville-sur-Mer (Yellow Beach II). Each official wouldland with one of the two forces at the separate beaches. They were assignedwith one specific task: the men who landed at Yellow Beach I were to attack theGoebbels Battery on its right flank, while those landing at Yellow Beach IIwere to attack the Battery on its left flank. After their targets had beendisabled and their objectives accomplished, the Rangers and Commandos would bepicked up by their embarkation ships and return to English ports.

Similar tactics would be used by Lieut.-Col. Lord Lovat and 4 Commando incompleting their mission objectives. They were to land west of Dieppe, at thebeaches of Vasterival (Orange Beach I) and Quiberville (Orange Beach II). Over80 Commandos under Major Mills-Roberts would come ashore at Orange Beach I,while Lovat and 160-plus Commandos were to land at Orange Beach II. TheCommandos at Orange I were to undertake a frontal assault on the Hess Battery,while the Battery’s rear would be outflanked by the Commandos that landed atOrange II. Once Hess Battery had been knocked out and all other objectives hadbeen met, 4 Commando would also be evacuated and returned to England (Ford 42,45).

Green Beach

The total Canadian landing force would be divided among three central coasttowns in the Dieppe area. Two of these landings would serve as additional flankattacks that coincided with the Commando raids. At the town of Pourville(codenamed Green Beach), two assault regiments from Brig. Southam’s 6th Brigadewould be disembarked. The South Saskatchewan Regiment, which the first waves atGreen Beach were comprised of, was also scheduled to land at 0450 hours. Uponlanding, the Regiment was to secure a beachhead along the Scie River’s banksfor the waves that followed. Once secure, the S. Saskatchewan’s A and DCompanies were to maneuver towards Dieppe’s western outskirts, seize theoutlying radar station, and capture garrison emplacements located at QuatreVents Farm and Dieppe’s western headlands. It was at the latter rendezvouspoint that the two companies were meant to link up with companies from theRoyal Hamilton Light Infantry (scheduled to land at Dieppe’s White Beach sectora half hour after the South Saskatchewan Regiment landed). Meanwhile, theRegiment’s B and C Companies would advance forward to secure the town ofPourville itself, and then shift to take the western cliffs looming abovePourville.

Half an hour after the Green Beach assault began, the Cameron Highlanders ofCanada were scheduled to arrive on the shores of Pourville. Once landed, theywould cross through the area made secure by the South Saskatchewan Regiment.Once beyond the bridgehead, its first objective was to proceed southward alongthe Scie River and capture the Luftwaffe airfield at St. Aubin. Because theirlanding would coincide with those at the main beaches of Dieppe, the CameronHighlanders’ secondary objective was to link up with breakout companies fromthe Calgary Tanks prior to reaching the St. Aubin airfield and capturing. Oncethis was captured, the newly united force was to shift east and capture whatwas suspected to be the Divisional HQ of the 302nd in Arques-la-Bataille(Leasor 102-104; Ford 31, 33, & 55-56).

Blue Beach

The fourth flank attack scheduled to begin at 0450 hours would be carried outby 4th Brigade’s Royal Regiment of Canada. Accompanying the Royal Regimentwould be an individual company from the Canadian Black Watch Regiment. Theywould land east of Dieppe on the shores of Puits (Puys), which was codenamedBlue Beach. Their main objectives were to knock out a number of defenseemplacements, as well as two heavy weapons batteries, and secure the headlandseast and west of Puys. Once they had gained a foothold on the beach, the troopswere to breakout in three directions towards the outskirts of Puys. A mainassault force was to maneuver west and attack the headlands that dwarfed theeastern districts of Dieppe. They would also destroy an Anti-Aircraft batterylocated near the headlands. At these headlands, once they had been secured, theattack force was to link up with the Essex Scottish Regiment from Red Beach andmarch into Dieppe. A second task force was to move eastward and carry out thetask of disabling defense posts along the eastern cordon of barbed wire.Finally, a third task force was to progress southeast of Puys and destroy thefour 100mm howitzers that made up the Rommel Battery. Like the men involvedwith the other flank attacks, the troops at Blue Beach were to be evacuatedonce their objectives had been met (Mellor 26, 50; Ford 31, 54).

The Red and White Beaches

The largest and central force of the raid was to land on the beaches of Dieppeitself. The total number of regiments landing there would be divided andassigned to a beach on each side of the town’s harbor. On the shores ofDieppe’s western district, codenamed White Beach, the Royal Hamilton LightInfantry Regiment and large companies from the Calgary Tanks were to disembark.On its eastern district shores, codenamed Red Beach, the remainder of theCalgary Tanks would be landed alongside the Essex Scottish and Royal Marines.The Toronto Machine Regiment would provide covering fire for the infantrytroops, while the Royal Canadian Engineers were to clear away placed obstaclesso that the Calgary Tanks could advance through Dieppe and beyond it. Standingby as a floating reserve would be the Fusiliers Mont Royal Regiment. Along withthe Provost Corps, they would serve as the beaches’ main defense once they hadbeen secured until all assault forces had been evacuated.

Upon landing at White Beach, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was to break upinto two company forces that shifted in different directions. One force was tomove eastward, meet up with companies of the Essex Scottish and Calgary Tanksfrom Red Beach, and then proceed south to take the town square in the heart ofthe city. The remainder of the R.H.L.I. would shift west around the Casino andadvance toward the headlands, upon which the Chateau stood. Reaching the top,the force was to knock out what remained of three or four 75mm guns and capturethe Headquarters of both the 571st Regiment and its 2nd Battalion. Once theseobjectives were completed, the R.H.L.I. units would again split into twogroups. One of the groups was to undergo a 180-degree turnaround to link upwith the landing forces that took the town square, while the second group wouldadvance further west along the headlands to meet up with units from the SouthSaskatchewan Regiment. At the same time, the main assault force of the CalgaryTanks was to advance south of the original German defense perimeter, link upwith the Cameron Highlanders, and take the St. Aubin airfield. From there, theywere to shift east and destroy the four 150mm howitzers of the Hitler Battery.Once these were put out of commission, they were to proceed further east,capture the 302nd’s Divisional HQ, and take with them all vital Germanpersonnel and intelligence when they were ordered to be evacuated.

At Red Beach the Essex Scottish, the Royal Marines, and the remainder of theCalgary Tanks were to secure the town’s northwestern docks and transport backto the naval force with ships captured from the harbor. When the Royal Marineshad reached the edge of the northern docks, they were to split up into twoforces heading in opposite directions. One would proceed north to secure thebeachfront’s eastern edge and link up with units from the Essex Scottish. Twoother E.S. forces were to head west towards White Beach. One of these groupswas to link up with the R.H.L.I. and Calgary Tank units heading toward the townsquare. The third group was to break off from the group heading west and movesouth towards the town’s peninsular area that protruded in the harbor. It wouldthen cross a pair of bridges that connected the town’s two sides through thepeninsula over to the town’s east side. Once across, the E.S. would swingnorthward along the east docks, capture the Regiment’s 3rd Divisional HQ, andretrieve all vital personnel and intelligence that could be taken back toEngland (Mellor 26, 63; Ford 30-32, 35, 61, & 64).

Support from the Seas

The Commander of the Naval Forces, Capt. John Hughes-Hallet, would control atleast 237 ships during the operation. Firepower support for the amphibioustroops would come from eight destroyers, one large gunboat, and numerous escortcraft ranging from steam gun boats to Free French Chasseurs. The nine or tenmost heavily armed ships were the HMS Locust, HMS Alresford, HMS Bleasdale, HMSBerkeley, HMS Albrighton, HMS Garth, HMS Brocklesby, HMS Fernie, ORP Slazak,and HMS Calpe. The Calpe would serve as the HQ ship for the operation’s maincommanders, including Maj. John Roberts, Hughes-Hallet, Air Marshal TraffordLeigh Mallory, and numerous others. Providing the landing crafts needed fortransporting troops to the shores were nine Landing Ships: the HMS Glengyle,HMS Queen Emma, HMS Princess Beatrix, HMS Prince Charles, HMS Princess Astrid,HMS Prince Albert, HMS Prince Leopold, HMS Invicta, and HMS Duke of Wellington.The nine ships would provide sixty Assault Landing Craft (LCA), eight SupportLanding Craft (LCS), and seven Mechanised Landing Craft (LCM). Twenty motorlaunches (ML) and ten Landing Craft Flotillas were also involved in bringingtroops to shore. Aside from two Landing Craft Tank (LCT) Flotillas and oneLanding Craft Flak (LCF) Flotilla, there were a total of seven Landing CraftPersonnel (LCP) Flotillas. Two of these would disembark men at Yellow Beach,another three would land men at Green Beach, while two would be used asfloating reserves off the main Dieppe coast.

The ten capitol ships were to start a naval bombardment on assigned targettowns ten to twenty minutes before the first troops landed there. Providingadditional fire support were twelve motor gun boats (MGB), four steam gun boats(SGB), and seven Chasseurs from the Free French Navy. The total naval forcewould ship off from the ports of Southampton, Newhaven, Portsmouth, Shoreham,and Gosport, among others. The heaviest naval artillery they were equippedwith, however, happened to be weapons ranging from 4in. guns to 20mm lightcannons. Since the idea to execute a heavy bombardment during the precedinghours had been dropped, it would also be decided that no battleships or otherlarge naval craft would be involved in the operation. The most effective meansof a bombardment that could give the ground troops enough support would have tocome from the air (Ford 25-26, 30, & 33-36).

Support from the Skies

Overlooking the Air Force branch of the operation, Air Marshal Leigh-Malloryassigned the task of providing air support to an Inter-Allied Air Force. Amajority of the air power would come from the RAF’s Fighter Command Group No.11, in the guise of forty-eight Spitfire, eight Hurricane, three Typhoon, fiveBoston, one Beaufighter, two Blenheim, and four Mustang squadrons (a total ofat least seventy-one R.A.F. squadrons). A number of the involved RAF fightersquadrons were made up of pilots from various Allied forces including the U.S.,Canada, Free French, Poland, and New Zealand. The number of pilots from each ofthese Allied nations was so plentiful that select squadrons were made up ofpilots representing a single country of origin and original service (take the350th Belgian and 332nd Norwegian Spitfire Squadrons, for example). Supportingthe fighters was up to four B-17 squadrons from the USAAF 97th BombardmentGroup.

The provided squadrons for the air assault were to embark on their missionsfrom twenty-five Air Force bases scattered throughout southern England. Twelveof these bases resided in the areas surrounding London, while the otherthirteen were located along the southern English coastlines. Since the nightbombardment’s cancellation also applied to the Air Force, it was decided thatbombing raids and strafe-and-run targets would be limited to the Germanairfields and coastal defenses around Dieppe. This air support was intended tobegin around the same time the naval “bombardment” was scheduled to begin, justprior to the landing of the flank attack troops at their assigned beaches.

During the operation, the Combined Air Force would be assigned with twoobjectives: to serve as a source of firepower support for the ground forces andto sever the defense capabilities held by the Germans at Dieppe. The latterobjective was intended to affect the degree of which the first objective wouldbe achieved. Support from the RAF and USAAF squadrons was to be provided bycarrying out numerous tasks that included:

• disabling heavy gun emplacements inside and outside of Dieppe;
• bombing German defense positions scattered along headlands around the Dieppearea; and
• knocking out major defenses along the target beaches through strafe attacks.

These tasks, among others, were to be carried out before the ground troopslanded and continue while they were carrying out their own missions. Whentroops at the beaches had finished all of their objectives, the air squadronpresence was to be elevated to its highest level of support and remain at thatlevel until the final troops were evacuated. Attempting to meet the twoaforementioned objectives, it was hoped, would bring about a third objective:to coax the majority of Luftwaffe squadrons (stationed in the regions thatneighbored Dieppe), into engaging the RAF squadrons. Planners estimated thepreliminary attacks made on German defenses would entice the bulk of the localLuftwaffe into air combat. Doing this was estimated to not only deliver hugelosses to the number of German fighters and bombers, but also diminish the rateof casualties inflicted upon the ground forces by Luftwaffe fighter planes. Howthe progress of the Allied Air Force squadrons’ missions would carry out liedon the other side of the Channel they would fly over during the early hours ofAugust 19th (Franks 15-31, 207-208; Ford 26, 36-7, & 78).

The Pre-Raid Naval Skirmish 

During the daytime hours of August 18, minesweepers from the Royal Navy's 9thand 13th Minesweeping Flotillas were occupied with the task of clearing a widepath through German minefields in the English Channel. Through this opening,the naval force that set sail later on that evening would transport amphibioustroops toward their targets in and around Dieppe. The ships that carriedspecific troops would come from five separate ports in Southern England. Fromthe port of Newhaven came a maximum of twenty-three Group 5 LCPs from the 1stand 24th LCP Flotillas. Four of these LCPs, however, and were forced todiscontinue their mission and return to their port after suffering enginemalfunctions. Serving as escort craft were the steam gun boat SGB5, the motorlaunch ML346, and the flak landing craft LCF (L) 1.

Aboard these ships were the men of 3 Commando, on their way towards the twoYellow Beaches of Berneval. At the edge of the group, aboard SGB5, FlotillaCommander D.B. Wyburd and Lieut.-Col. Durnford-Slater were busy trying to makeout the coastline horizon six miles ahead of them. In the minutes approaching0345 hours, however, the SGB5 noticed a convoy of small German craftapproaching fast from the north. They at first believed these ships to benothing more than tugboats undergoing routine excursions during the night; thatis, until they noticed the ships were continuing to move closer. In due time,the convoy's eventual discovery of the flotilla would spell a disastrousundoing for the entire operation.

The Alerted Convoy and Unreceived Warnings

The convoy they had seen on the northern horizon, however, was not a band ofsmall tugboats leaving a nearby harbor to undergo mine-laying procedures. Itwas actually a group on course to Dieppe for a number of hours. Around 2200hours, as August 18th came to a close, a German convoy of five motor ships andthree wooden submarine chasers left the port of Boulogne heading south towardsDieppe. Under the command of Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) Wurmbach, theconvoy's main intention was to transfer between the ports for safe haven.However, because von Rundstedt declared August 19th to be a specific date forhigh enemy alerts, it is likely that the convoy also left its homeport thatnight with the purpose of patrolling the French coastlines for Allied shipmovement.

The appearance of the convoy may have caught the Yellow beach flotillas bysurprise, but its approach had actually been detected hours before the twogroups intersected. At 0130 hours (1:30 a.m.), British radar stations firstspotted these ships proceeding south along the French coast. An immediatereport of this surveillance was transmitted to the Jubilee naval force,although none of the ships were able to receive this message. Between 0230 and0300 hours (2:30-3:00 a.m.), the radar stations sent a second report on theirfindings to the armada. This time, it managed to be picked up by the HMS Fernieand several other ships. All of these ships, however, failed to forward thereceived message to the HMS Calpe (the fleet's HQ ship). Thus, with little tono knowledge of the convoy approaching, the far edge of the naval forcemaintained a steady pace up to the moment each group's identity was introducedby means of a naval flare (Leasor 122-124; Mellor 30; Ford 30).

The Star Shell that Foiled Jubilee's Secrecy

Around 0300 hours, as they inched through the waters off Berneval's outercoastline, Lieut. Wurmbach stood aboard the convoy's lead ship when he firstspotted a large group of ships several miles ahead. Their identity unknown tohim, Wurmbach lit a signal beacon in order to receive a response. When noneimmediately came, he dismissed it as a minor setback plaguing the other fleetand decided to leave the beacon lit for a limited period or until a responsehad been returned. When a this period neared its limit, Wurmbach stood by hisproposed dismissals and chose to wait an extended period for a return signal.By 0345 hours, when a response still did not come from the "unknown" ships, hefinally deemed these dismissals unlikely and considered it possible that theships were not from a friendly force. Taking steps of precaution, Wurmbachordered all convoy boats to put their guns on armed alert. Once all were oncomplete alert, a star shell was shot into the night sky and illuminated theAllied ships in front of them.

At 0347 hours, when both groups were able to view each other under the flare'slighting, a hail of gunfire exploded from each side. Due to its position, theSGB5 was one of the first ships to be severely damaged during the ongoing navalskirmish. Its radio system had been destroyed by one of the first shots firedat it, making the ship incapable of warning the Calpe about the loss ofsurprise attack. It also made them unable to call for aid from the HMSBrocklesby and ORP Slazak, the two destroyers closest to Group 5. Means ofcommunication aboard the two leading German ships had also been disabled earlyby immediate shelling. With only one sub chaser left and all radio systemsunavailable to alert German operators, Lieut. Wurmbach made the decision towithdraw the convoy under heavy fire to the Dieppe port. There he would rush toconfirm the incident (and warn of what was coming) to German officials whocould see it from the headlands and beaches along the Dieppe coast (Leasor122-124; Mellor 30-32).

The Issued State of Alert

By 0400 hours LCF 1 and ML346 had managed to enter the fray, sinking one chaserescort while setting another ablaze. Still, the two Allied escort ships wouldsuffer as much damage and crew casualties as the SGB5 had. In addition, up tofour LCPs were forced to turn back due also to severe damage and high casualtyrates aboard each craft. At 0430 hours, the leaders of Group 5 (Wyburd,Durnford-Slater, and Capt. Roy Murray) decided to transfer onto one of theseLCPs with the intention of reaching the HMS Calpe. There, hoping to avert themission, they would tell General Roberts of what occurred and that the fleet'spresence had been discovered. The LCPs that remained were split up into groupsthat clustered around the individual escort craft. Following the crippled SGB5were five LCPs, while another three LCPs remained with LCF 1 as they followedthe retreating German ships. After the four damaged LCPs turned back, however,a total of fifteen LCPs were accounted for prior to the German convoy'swithdrawal. An additional seven LCPs, along with ML346, had suddenly gonemissing.

Meanwhile, a Freya radar station located in Pourville happened to pick up largegroups of ships unidentifiable to them. When the star shells lit up over thewaters it faced and the exchange of gunfire began, the station observed thatthe large groups belonged to an Allied fleet. Within an hour, the station'sC.O. sent out a call to the 302nd Divisional HQ at Envermeu (its actuallocation) stating that specific beaches along the coastline were beingbombarded. Sensing that an invasion was underway, Lieut.-Gen. Konrad Haase gavethe order for all stationed Army troops and Luftwaffe squadrons nearby to beput on immediate alert. He would also put on standby alert the reserve forcesstationed at all inland towns, in order to make all reinforcements available incase of an overwhelming attack. To make support from artillery available, thisorder of alert would also be issued to the heavy gun batteries scatteredthroughout the area. At the Yellow Beaches of Berneval however, just as itsscarce defense troops took up their posts, a total of eight Allied craft hadappeared on the horizon line and were approaching the shores quickly (Leasor126-130; Mellor 30-32; Ford 40-43).

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Show Notes

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© 2026 Pete Bublitz

Pete Bublitz, whose first and middle names are Jonathan Peter, is an undergraduate student enrolled at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. His main school-based interest, in terms of courses, is to take up a history major among others. His personal interests include, but are not limited to, getting lost, music, comedy, and last but not least history.

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