Головна           текст українською           see: M.Panchuk. Political Rusynism in Ukraine

THE RUSYN QUESTION

Paul Robert MAGOSCI— Professor, Chair of UkrainianStudies, University of Toronto, Ph.D. in History

Who are the Rusyns?

In 1875, geographers from the old Hungarian Kingdomerected a monument in a remote region of their country that carried thefollowing inscription: "Precise instruments have confirmed this pointwhere the latitude and longitude lines meet as the center of Europe."(1)Just over a century later, in 1977, the former Soviet authorities, who by thenruled the area, erected a second monument to mark the center of the continentthat stretches from the Arctic shores of Norway in the north to the beaches ofCrete in the South, and from the coast of Ireland in the West to the UralMountains in the East. The precise center where the monuments are located isnear the village of Dilove (formerly Trebusany) in the foothills of the north-centralCarpathian Mountains that from time immemorial has been inhabited by an EastSlavic people called Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns (sometimes in English:Ruthenians). Thus, in geographic terms, the Rusyns are not a peripheral group,but rather one whose homeland — Carpathian Rus’ — is literally in the heartof Europe.

According to present day international boundaries,Rusyns live in a more or less compact territory within the boundaries of threecountries: Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland. There is also a small group of Rusynsin Yugoslavia, descendants of immigrants who left the Carpathian homeland inthe eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In theory, the number of Rusyns couldbe as high as 1.2 million people. This includes 977,000 in the Transcarpathianoblast (former Subcarpathian Rus’) of Ukraine; 130,000 in the Presov Region ofnortheastern Slovakia; 80,000 in the Lemko Region of southeastern Poland aswell as in other parts of that country; and 30,000 in the Vojvodina (Backa) andCroatia.

The Problem ofNomenclature

It is important to keep in mind what is meant by thetermRusyn.Traditionally, the nameRusynor its local variantRusniakhas been used by the East Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian region todescribe themselves. However, by the twentieth century, in particular itssecond half, the historic namesRusyn/Rusniakwere replaced by others,such as Ukrainian in Soviet Transcarpathia and the Presov Region of Slovakia,orLemkoin Poland. There are also Rusyns who have given up identifyingwith any East Slavic group, and instead associate with the dominant nationalityof the country in which they live, such asPolishin Poland orSlovakin Slovakia. These changes in national self-designation have in some casescome about gradually, prompted either by intellectual conviction or nationalassimilation, especially among families of nationally-mixed parentage. In thelatter case, children often choose to identify — or are identified by theirparents — with the dominant state nationality, Slovak or Polish.

More often, however, the change in nomenclature hasbeen the result of governmental decree banning the nameRusynfromofficial usage, as was the case after 1945 in Soviet Transcarpathia and Polandand by the early 1950s in Czechoslovakia. The result is that today one can findwithin the same ethno-linguistic group, within the same village, in some caseseven within the same family, people who identify as themselves a Rusyn, orLemko, or Ukrainian, or Slovak, or Pole. Moreover, in the case of the EastSlavic designations —Rusyn/Rusniak, Lemko, Ukrainian —some peopleconsider these as synonyms, others as mutually exclusive terms. In other words,some people will say that Rusyn is simply the older historic name forUkrainian,and thatLemkois a regional name ofUkrainian,while othersare convinced that the namesLemkoorRusniakare regional formsforRusynwhich, in turn, designates a people that is distinct from theUkrainian and every other surrounding nationality.

It should be noted that the estimated figure of 1.2million Rusyns given above refers to all people of the same linguistic andethnographic origin, regardless of how they designated themselves in documentssuch as internal identity papers, passports, or decennial censuses. Our concernhere will be primarily with the present-day Rusyn movement or with that portioncf the group (the precise numbers are unknown) that considers Rusyns tocomprise a distinct people.

HistoricalBackground

In it neither possible nor appropriate to providehere an extensive outline of Rusyn history. It is necessary, however, to keep afew historical factors in mind in order to comprehend the current situation.

Rusyns never had their own state or politicalindependence. Since the Middle Ages, the Rusyn homeland was ruled by Hungaryand Poland or Austria. Nonetheless, during the past century and a half, theyhave at various times been recognized by neighboring or ruling states as havingthe right to a territorial entity whose existence was justified on the groundsthat it was somehow of and for Rusyns that it would have some degree ofautonomy or self-rule. (2) The first experience in this regard came in late1849, when in the wake of the failure of the Hungarian revolution, the Austriangovernment divided Hungary into five military and seven civil districts. One ofthe civil districts (Ungvar/Uzhorod) was based in the Subcarpathian region andadministered by local Rusyn political and cultural activists. The experimentlasted only a few months.

Much more important was the period of politicalupheaval that followed World War I. At that time, in an effort to retainRusyn-inhabited lands within Hungary, the new government in Budapest created,in December 1918, an autonomous Rusyn Land (Rus’ka Kraїna) that continued tofunction even after a pro-Soviet Communist regime came to power in March1919. (3) Simultaneously, the recently founded Czechoslovak government alsocourted the Rusyns, offering them a self-governing province to be calledRusinsko (Rusynia), or Subcarpathian Rus’ (Podkarpatska Rus), if they wouldjoin the Czechs and Slovaks in their new state. In May 1919, the Rusynsaccepted the Czechoslovak offer. Most significantly, the Rusyn issue hadreached the international political forum, so that "the fullest degree ofself-government" for the "Ruthene territory south of theCarpathians" was guaranteed by two international treaties at the ParisPeace Conference (St.Germaine-en-Laye, September, 10, 1919 and Trianon, June 4,1920) and by the Czechoslovak constitution (February 29, 1920).

For the next two decades the vast majority of Rusyns— approximately three-fourths of the total number at the time — lived inSubcarpathian Rus, a territory that was Rusyn in name, that had its own Rusynschools, and that had all the trappings of self-rule including a governor, apartially elected diet, a national anthem, and a national theater. Finally, inlate 1938, actual autonomy was granted to Subcarpathian Rus’ (by then renamedCarpatho-Ukraine). Not only had autonomy been demanded by local politicians, itwas also one of the provisions of the infamous Munich Pact, which led to therestructuring of Czechoslovakia. The Carpatho-Ukraine was to function fornearly half a year until the complete liquidation of what remained ofCzechoslovakia in March 1939.

The twentieth century also witnessed threeshort-lived efforts at Rusyn independence. The first of these came in 1919,when after being successful in their bid to join fellow Rusyns of themountains, the Lemkos living in the former Austrian province of Galicia createdan independent republic that functioned for sixteen months before itsgovernment was arrested in March 1920 by the authorities of Poland, whichbecame the new ruler over Rusyn lands north of the Carpathians. At the sametime, along the eastern edge of Subcarpathian territory a regional ethnic groupknown as Hutsuls established their own republic which lasted four months(February-June 1919) before being driven out by troops from Romania. The lastunsuccessful attempt came two decades later, when the Carpatho- Ukrainianautonomous government symbolically declared its independence on the last day ofCzechoslovakia’s existence (March 15, 1939) before the province was invaded andreannexed to Hungary. (5) The point is that although Rusyns may never have hadtheir own state, they did have for a significant period of time in thetwentieth century the experience — and therefore historical memory — of theirown political entity, Subcarpathian Rus’, which was recognized both by thestate in which they lived (Czechoslovakia) and by the international community(Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations).

Although the Rusyn homeland is located in thegeographical center of Europe, it is at the same time on a cultural border. Itis on that great divide between the Catholic West and Orthodox East, whatRiccardo Picchio has classified in the broadest cultural terms asSlaviaromanaandSlavia orthodoxa. (6)They are, this division has had aprofound effect on the Rusyn psyche.

The very language or series of dialects that Rusynsspeak reflect the influences of both cultural spheres. Thus, while their speechclearly belongs to the realm of East Slavic languages, much of theirvocabulary, pronunciation stress, and even syntax is West Slavic.

The cultural divide is most graphically evident inwhat is for traditional Rusyn culture the all-important factor of religion.Some Rusyns are Orthodox, but the majority, at least during the past twocenturies, is Catholic, or more precisely Greek Catholic. These confessionaldifferences reflect a whole mindset that is either western- oreastern-oriented. The eastern mind-set tends to surrender the self to fate inthe hope that the Christian God and his intercessors, Christ and the VirginMary, might somehow alleviate the burdens of this earthly life. In contrast,the western mind-set seems to feel that if an individual receives education orpolitical training, he or she can somehow put their lives in order and thus beable to have some control over his/her destiny.

The east-west dichotomy in the Rusyn psyche alsoimpinges on attitudes toward national identity. The eastern orientation tendsto think in universalistic terms and be satisfied with viewing Rusyns as partof a single East Slavic Orthodox religious and cultural world.

The western orientation — epitomized by the verydistinctiveness of Greek Catholics from other Catholics — accepts the idea ofnational and linguistic particularity. Universalism versus particularism areattitudes that greatly influence Rusyn political and cultural leaders,especially regarding the nationality question.

Being a stateless people, Rusyns have had, at leastuntil the second half of the twentieth century, to depend on their leaders, theintelligentsia, to determine the precise direction of their national revival.The Rusyn national revival began during the second half of the nineteenthcentury and culminated during the interwar years, by which time it had evolvedinto a comprehensive movement concerned with political, cultural, and socialissues. Most of the nationalist intelligentsia did agree on one basic premise:that Rusyns are East Slavs, and that their linguistic and cultural traditionswere based in the East, albeit with pronounced western influences. What theycould not agree upon, however, was whether Rusyns were a branch of the Russiannationality, or of the Ukrainian nationality, or whether they formed a distinctfourth East Slavic Rusyn nationality. Not surprisingly, debates about nationaland linguistic orientation quickly got caught up in local partisan politics.Politicians had their own agendas, and they more often than not madeopportunistic use of the nationality question in order to promote party orother ideological interests.

As for the nationalist intelligentsia, they easilyfulfilled the precepts of all activists in the formative stages of nationalmovements. Namely, they had no difficulty using history to formulate anideology that was able to convince people they were either Russian, Ukrainian,or Rusyn. (7) The debate over the national orientation of the Rusyns was notyet resolved before the outbreak of World War II, despite the achievementsduring the interwar years of the Ukrainian orientation in the largest Rusynterritory, Subcarpathian Rus’ (Carpatho-Ukraine).

In a sense, the year 1939 marked an end to thenatural evolution of discussions about Rusyn nationality. This is because inthat year and for half a century, the nationality debate was effectivelystifled by state intervention. This happened first under fascist regimes inHungary (which reannexed Subcarpathian Rus’), in Slovakia (which retained thePresov Region), and the German-ruled General-gouvernement (which ruled theLemko Region); and then as a result of Soviet rule after 1945, whether directlyin Subcarpathian Rus (renamed Transcarpathian Ukraine) or through pro-SovietCommunist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As we know, the Communistera with its anti-democratic approach to the nationality question was to lastuntil the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. The only exception was the case of thesmall group of Rusyns in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia. Although aCommunist regime was installed in their land as well, the Yugoslav governmentallowed the Vojvodina Rusyns to decide their own national orientation.

This was not to be the case for the Rusyns living inthe Carpathian homeland. In short, the Soviet regime declared that furtherdebate was unnecessary because the nationality question was supposedly solved longago. Based on a decision made in 1924, all Rusyns, regardless what they mayhave called themselves, were declared to be Ukrainians. All those who opposedthe Ukrainian viewpoint were accused of having "anti-historical" and,therefore, "anti-Soviet" opinions: they often were removed from theirjobs or were arrested as "counterrevolutionaries." Closely connectedwith these developments was the liquidation first in Soviet Transcarpathia(1949) and then in Czechoslovakia (1950) of the Greek Catholic Church, which bythe mid-twentieth century had become the center of the Rusyn orientation.

When Communist regimes were established in Poland(1945) and Czechoslovakia (1948), they adopted the Soviet line and decreed thatthe Rusyn minorities within their borders were Ukrainians. They forbade Rusynpublications and the use of the name Rusyn in official documents. The situationwas particularly bad in Poland. Not only were the Lemko Rusyns declared to beUkrainians, they were forcibly deporteden massefrom their Carpathianhomeland in (1947) and scattered throughout the former German lands of(post-1945) western and northern Poland. (8)

It is ironic to note the advantages that accrued tothe governments in question through their use — or, more properly, misuse —of the name Ukrainian. For example, by declaring that the population wasUkrainian, this allowed the Soviet Union to justify the annexation in 1945 ofSubcarpathian Rus’, a territory that throughout the war it had agreed should bereturned to Czechoslovakia. Nationalist ideology could now conveniently serveStalin’s political designs on the international stage. In any case, could theSoviet workers’ state refuse the request of fellow "Ukrainianworkers" in Transcarpathia who "voluntarily" were demanding tobe united with "Mother Ukraine?"

In neighboring Poland, identification of Lemkos asUkrainians made it easier for the government to deport them, since theCommunist Polish Government argued that, as "Ukrainians," the Lemkoswere helping the anticommunist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was heldup in the Carpathians and still fighting the Polish and Soviet authoritiesafter the end of World War II. South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, theadministrative imposition of a Ukrainian identity beginning in 1952 proved tobe advantageous to those Slovaks who had always claimed that "theirRusniaks" were really "Slovaks of the Greek Catholic faith."(9)In essence, forced Ukrainization (along with the liquidation of local GreekCatholic Church and forced collectivization of agriculture) led during the1950s and 1960s to the most rapid degree of Slovakization and nationalassimilation that Rusyns ever experienced. It is nonetheless true that duringthis same period, the Czechoslovak government provided extensive funding tocreate a wide range of cultural organizations that were Ukrainian in nationalform but socialist in content. A well-paid local Ukrainian intelligentsia waseven able to attain several significant scholarly and literary achievements.However, this had little real effect upon the Rusyn peasant mass in Slovakia.For them, the choice was simple: if one could not be a Rusyn, better declareoneself a Slovak than a Ukrainian (which among other things was associated withthe hated East).

Once again Yugoslavia was the exception. Thegovernment there provided both funding and legal guarantees, while the localintelligentsia decided to adopt a Rusyn orientation and to develop the localspeech into a sociologically-complete Rusyn literary language. In fact, Rusynsbecame one of the five official nationalities in the autonomous province of theVojvodina.

Outside Yugoslavia the rule was that after 1954,Rusyns ceased to exist. All Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish documents andpublications referred to the population only as Ukrainians. (10) Publications inthe West, both by Ukrainian émigré and North American Soviet andEast European specialists, also accepted the view that Rusyns did not exist, orto quote theNew Columbia Encyclopedia(1975): "There is no ethnicor linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians (Rusyns).""The majority of the population of the Transcarpathia is Ukrainian."(11)

The CurrentSituation

Then came the 1980s. The first signs of change camein Poland, where the Lemko Rusyns, both those who were dispersed in the"West" of that country as well as about 10,000 who had managed toreturn to the Carpathian homeland, began to gather at annual culturalfestivals. These "unofficial" festivals received no governmentfinancial support, but by the same token they were not under any ideologicalcontrol. As a result, the Lemkos began to revive the idea that they wereneither Poles nor Ukrainians, but rather part of a distinct Slavic peopleclosely related to Rusyns living south of the mountains in Slovakia. The Lemkosseemed to be acting in isolation and for several years that was indeed thecase. (12)

Later came the changes brought about by the November1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. New initiative committees werefounded that were often dominated by individuals who had not been associatedwith the Communist regime. At first, the initiative committees tried totransform (they would say democratize) the older Ukrainian organizations, butwhen that failed they established their own Rusyn organizations andpublications.

At the very same time, in neighboring Transcarpathia,the first Rusyn-oriented organization to exist anywhere in Carpathian Rus’since World War II was established in February 1990 in the oblast’sadministrative center of Uzhorod. Known as Society of Carpatho-Rusyns(Tovarystvo Karpatskykh Rusyniv) and with branches throughout Transcarpathia,its goals were at first of a cultural and ecological nature, to promote andpreserve knowledge of local history and customs. But before long, the Societymoved on to political demands for the recognition of Rusyn as distinctnationality and the return of the autonomous status of Subcarpathian Rus’, astatus which they argued was illegally taken away in 1945. Before 1990 came toa close, a total of five new Rusyn organizations had come into existence whereRusyns live. Aside from the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns in UkrainianTranscarpathia were Rusyn Renaissance Society (Rusynska Obroda) inMedzilaborce, Czechoslovakia (est. March 1990); the Lemko Association(Stovarysynja Lemkiv) in Legnica, Poland (est. April 1990); the Society ofFriends of Subcarpathian Rus’ (Spolecnost pratel Podkarpatske Rusi) in Prague(est. October 1990); and the Ruska Matka (Rusyn Matka) in Ruski Kerestur,Yugoslavia (est. December 1990). By the spring of 1991, a sixth one wasestablished, this time in Hungary: the Rusyn organization in Hungary(Magyaroszagi Ruszinok Szervezete) in Budapest (est. May

1991). Most of these organizations have their ownRusyn-language newspapers, journals, (13) or access to existing publications.All five organizations have put forth basically the same demands: that Rusynsbe recognized as a distinct nationality, that a Rusyn literary language becodified and eventually be used in schools as medium of instruction, and thatRusyns be guaranteed all rights as a national minority in the countries wherethey live and in case of Transcarpathia that Rusyns be recognized as thedominant indigenous nationality.

As in all new or revived movements, the Rusynorientation must first be able to make itself known to the constituency itpurports to represent. This is inherently problematic, because with theexception of Yugoslavia, nowhere do Rusyns control the local media. Theirmessage, or a least awareness of their movement’s existence, has been helpedless by their own publications than by the fierce polemics that have filled thenon-Rusyn press in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and most especially SovietTranscarpathia. This is because from the moment the first Rusyn activity began,local pro-Ukrainian activists attacked the Rusyn orientation as"anachronistic", "ahistorical", "unenlightened","in the service of American imperialists", and "treacherous"to the Ukrainian nation. (14) As a result, more attention of asemi-sensationalist journalistic nature has been given the Rusyn problem thanmight otherwise have been the case. The Czech and Slovak press has also paidmuch — although more rational — attention to the Rusyn-Ukrainian debate,especially in the context of the nationality question that concernsCzechoslovak society as a whole.

Whatever latent isolation Rusyn leaders in theirrespective countries may have still felt was overcome in March 1991, when atthe initiative of the Rusyn Renaissance Society, the first World Congress ofRusyns was convened in Medzilaborce, Czechoslovakia. Indeed, despite a historyof interaction between Rusyn communities in the homeland as well as theimmigration in America during the twentieth century, this was, in fact, thefirst time representatives from all countries where Rusyns live (Ukraine,Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the United States) gathered together inone place. The congress constituted itself as a permanent umbrellaorganization, and its very existence had an enormous impact on instilling Rusynnational pride in over 300 persons who attended, not to mention innumerableothers who read about it through the generally widespread press coverage. (15)

It is interesting to note that one week after thecongress took place, Czechoslovakia conducted its decennial census in whichpeople for the first time since World War II had the right to answer that theywere of Rusyn nationality. Despite problems with the manner in whichnationality question was asked and subsequently classified, in Slovakia 17,000persons responded they were Rusyns as compared to 14,000 Ukrainians. (16) Thisraises the question of numbers. Observers will legitimately ask just how manypeople identify themselves as Rusyns? And even among those who respond Rusyn,does use of such a term necessarily mean they are denying a possiblesimultaneous identification as Ukrainians? Atthispoint, there is noway to know the precise answers to those questions. All we know is that inSlovakia, where given a chance in March 1991, of those people of East Slavicbackground who did not identify as Slovak and who had the choice between aRusyn or Ukrainian identity, 55 percent chose Rusyn. As for the number ofRusyns in Poland and Ukrainian Transcarpathia, we simply do not know at thisstage, nor do we have any indications — such as census data, scientificpolling, or membership in political parties — that might help to provide areasonable estimate.

What we can be certain of however, is that after fortyyears of Communist rule, Rusyns have not gone away. Today, there are Rusynorganizations, Rusyn publications, and a relatively wide range of writers,teachers, professionals, and peasants who continue to articulate in the pressand public manifestation of their belonging to a distinct Rusyn people. (17)

Protection forRusyns in the Future

As with many minorities, the future of their survivaldepends on the willingness of the governments in the states where they live toprovide them with adequate legal protection and perhaps financial assistancefor their national development. In this regard, the Rusyns need to inform andconstantly remind the international community that they exist. In turn Rusynsshould be able to expect that the international community will monitor theirstatus and, if necessary, put pressure on the governments of the Ukraine,Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in order to ensure that their nationalrights are protected.

In fact, all four states in which Rusyns live havealready ratified several agreements pertaining to national minorities at recentmeetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Ofparticular importance for Rusyns were the decisions reached in June 1990 at theCopenhagen meeting of the CSCE. At Copenhagen it was agreed that "tobelong to a national minority is a matter of person’s individual choice and nodisadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice." Moreover,"persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy theirrights individually as well as in community with other members of their group."(18)

This means that regardless how scholars orgovernments might define Rusyns, there are individuals and/or groups who callthemselves by that name and who believe the constitute a distinct nationality,and that they have a right to do so and to be recognized as Rusyns by thegovernments of the countries in which they live. The Copenhagen agreement alsorecognized the role of non-governmental organizations in promoting the interestsof national minorities, and it called on the participating states to assurethat the teaching of history and culture in the educational establishments"will also take account of the history and culture of national minorities."(19) At a follow-up CSCE meeting in Geneva (July 1991), member statesaccepted the provisions of a special report which guaranteed the right ofnational minorities to participate in non-governmental organizations outsidetheir country of residence. The report also reaffirmed the principle thatindividuals or organizations representing national minorities be allowed"unimpeded contacts .. across frontiers... with persons with whom theyshare a common ethnic or national origin. "(20)

Finally, at the most recent CSCE meeting held inMoscow (September-October 1991), member states reaffirmed the agreementsreached at all previous meetings and agreed further that "commitmentsundertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [including thosepertaining to national minorities] are matters of direct legitimate concern toall participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairsof the State concerned."(21)

Before looking specifically at what Rusyns need ineach country to protect and guarantee their future existence, it is necessaryto clarify the issue of international boundaries. In the Carpathian homeland,Rusyns live within the borders of three states, and in the past two years therehas been discussion in the Czech, Slovak, and Transcarpathian press thatcertain political activists are demanding the return of Ukraine’sTranscarpathian oblast (historic Subcarpathian Rus’) to Czechoslovakia. (22)There has even been talk that Transcarpathia might be returned to Hungary ordivided between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In fact, most of these propositionsare little more than the speculations of individuals that have been blown outof proportion by political rivals and by journalists seeking to report a goodstory. (23) The Czech-Slovak federal government publicly declared that it"cannot be concerned with the fate" of Transcarpathia. (24) And as forRusyn organizations that have come to existence in 1990, none of them nor theWorld Congress of Rusyns that met in 1991 has voiced any demand for border changes.On the contrary, all the new organizations as well as the vast majority ofRusyn spokespersons wherever they live warn against tampering with existinginternational boundaries.

On the other hand, the Society of Carpatho-Rusyns inTranscarpathia has called openly for the return of the status of autonomy thatSubcarpathian Rus’ enjoyed during the interwar years. (25) In order to determinethe views of the local population, the society, joined by other minorityorganizations, called for a question on Transcarpathian autonomy to be added tothe referendum on Ukrainian independence that was held on December 1, 1991. (26)There was a large voter turn-out, with 92.6% favoring Ukrainian independenceand 78% self-rule for Transcarpathia. (27) The issue of Transcarpathian autonomyelicited great interest in neighboring countries, although this is, in fact, aninternal issue for whatever kind of government and state structure is finallyestablished in what until recently was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.In short, Transcarpathia has been and should for the foreseeable future remaina part of Ukraine.

However, as a sovereign member of the internationalcommunity, Ukraine must, in turn, guarantee the individual and corporate rightsof Rusyns — or those citizens of Ukraine who wish to call themselves Rusyns.It is true that the Ukrainian government has already provided guarantees fornational minorities living on its territory: Russians, Jews, Poles/ Germans,Tatars,etc.To this list must be added Rusyns. This would mean that the"official" or, one might say, traditional Ukrainian view of Rusynshas to change. Namely Ukrainian authorities must accept the fact that withinits boundaries, primarily in its Transcarpathian oblast, there are people whodefine themselves as Rusyns in the sense of a nationality distinct fromUkrainians. Such people should have the right to declare themselves in theirpassports and internal documents as Rusyns, and the state census bureau shouldpublish data on the number of persons who identify as Rusyns and not simplyclassify them, as has been done until now, as Ukrainians. (28) If suchguarantees are provided, there is no reason why Rusyns in Transcarpathia couldnot remain Rusyns as well as function as fullfledged citizens of a sovereignand democratic Ukrainian state.

Following the trend that has taken hold in the formerSoviet Union, it would seem desirable that the new Ukrainian state become adecentralized entity in which each of its component regions would have a largedegree of autonomy in economic and cultural matters. (29) Thus, questions suchas what language might be taught in elementary schools, or what kind ofnational orientation should be adopted by regional cultural and educationalinstitutions, or what amount of funding might be given to Rusyn-orientedgroups, are all decisions that would be made by a people’s assembly in Uzhorodand not in Kyiv. Of course, its goes without saying that the free movement ofpeoples across borders with neighboring Rusyn regions in Slovakia and Polandmust be guaranteed. Fortunately, this possibility exists already, albeit with awaiting time at border crossings that every day of the week averages 15 to 20hours.

As for neighboring Slovakia, this situation ofRusyns, especially since the November 1989 Velvet Revolution, is much betterthan in either Ukrainian Transcarpathia or Poland. However, until now theSlovak government (generally through its Ministry of Culture) and the federalCzecho-Slovak government (through allotment of discretionary funds) have onlyprovidedad hocgrants to the new Rusyn organizations and publications,the normal budgetary allotments of the Slovak government intended for its EastSlavic Rusyn/Ukrainian minority to the Union of Rusyn-Ukrainians ofCzechoslovakia (SCURF), that is to the Ukrainian oriented cultural organizationthat is the direct descendant (still with largely the same leadership) as theformerly Communist-dominated Cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT). Slovakgovernment funding through other ministries also supports in Presov severalUkrainian university departments and institutes at Safarik University, aUkrainian radio station, and a Ukrainian publishing house, as well as theMuseum of Ukrainian Culture (recently renamed the Aleksander Pavlovyc RegionalMuseum) in Svidnik. Of the organizations receiving a normal budgetaryallotment, only the Alexander Duchnovyc Theater (formerly the UkrainianNational Theater) has a Rusyn orientation.

The Slovak government must recognize that there aretwo clearly-defined national orientations — Rusyn and Ukrainian — and ifsupport for national minorities is to continue in Slovakia, then theauthorities must provide funding for Rusyn as well as Ukrainian organizations.But how should the government divide a financial allotment among its EastSlavic minority, which until recently has been designated only as Ukrainian?Initially, it would seem that the only reasonable way would be to accept thepercentages revealed in the results of the 1991 census, which would mean 55% ofthe budget to Rusyn cultural organizations, schools, and media.

The question of schools in Slovakia is particularlyproblematic, because beginning in the 1960s the language of instruction in thevast majority of Rusyn-inhabited villages was changed — at the request ofparents themselves — from Ukrainian to Slovak. Moreover, as part of aconsolidation process during the past two decades, many small elementaryschools will be reopened in Rusyn villages, it is likely that Slovak will bethe language of instruction. However, the Slovak Ministry of Education mustprovide teachers and textbooks in Rusyn or in Ukrainian for those villages thatmay submit such requests. Most important, the standard Slovak-language historytextbooks used throughout Slovakia should include an adequate discussion of thehistory and culture of Rusyns and other minorities which will be of benefit toall students. This would be in keeping with the CSCE agreement reached.

The Rusyns or Lemko Rusyns of Poland perhaps need themost help. Not only is the majority of Lemko Rusyns scattered throughout thewestern and northern regions of Poland, but their fledging pro-Rusynorganization, the Lemko Association with its amateur theatrical troupe, and theolder Lemkovyna folk ensemble receive no financial support at all from thePolish government, either in the form of an annual budgetary allotment oradhocgrants. Whatever government funds assigned to national minoritycultural activity are given to the Union of Ukrainians of Poland (Ob’jednannjaUkrajinciv Polsci), the direct descendant of the Communist dominated UkrainianSocio-Cultural Society (USKY). Support for the new Union of Ukrainians mustcontinue, especially since most Ukrainians in Poland are not originally fromnor do they live in the Carpathian region. On the other hand, Lemko Rusyns mustalso be recognized as a distinct national minority and receive a fair share offunding.

How to determine what is a "fair share"will, of course, be difficult, since Poland does not even have nationality as acategory on its decennial census questionnaires. Perhaps a referendum attachedto the next national vote could indicate a question that lists all the nationalgroups in Poland and asks the respondent to which one he/she would wish toassign a portion of their taxes for cultural activity. This would be somewhatsimilar to municipalities in Canada that ask their residents to indicatewhether they want their tax dollars be assigned to public schools or to private(Catholic) schools. What even the mechanism decided upon, in keeping with itscommitments as a member state of the Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope, the Polish government is obliged to recognize Lemko Rusyns as adistinct national minority and to provide funding for Lemko organizations andLemko-language schools in those communities that demand them.

Lastly, we turn to the situation in ex-Yugoslavia.Ever since World War II, the Yugoslav policy of equality for its six componentrepublics and support for the national minorities that live within them hasencouraged the Croatian Republic and, in particular, the Vojvodina AutonomousRegion of the Serbian Republic to finance liberally Rusyn cultural andeducational activity. It is to be expected that when the republics ofYugoslavia sort out their present difficulties, the republics of Croatia and,in particular, Serbia, will continue their judicious support and protection oftheir respective Rusyn minorities.

The Rusyns are one example of the many groups whosuffered under the totalitarian regimes on East Central Europe during the pastfour decades. Now that those regimes no longer exist, there is a realopportunity to correct past injustices and to assure the future survival of theRusyns. It is, after all, in the interest of all four countries where Rusynslive — Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia — to become part of thelarger European community. The way in which those countries resolve the Rusynissue will, in part, determine to what degree they are ready for membership in thenew Europe.

Notes

1. Cf. Fedor Korecky, "The Center of Europe inHornitsi,"Nova dumka,VII {21} (Vukovar, 1979), pp. 101-102 (inRusyn)

2. For further details on the Rusyn political ethnicgroup in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cf. P. R. Magocsi,TheShaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848-1948(Cambridge,Mass., 1978), pp. 46-47, 93-95; 237-245.

3. Soviet Marxists literature has written much on thefirst 40 days of Soviet power in Transcarpathia. Cf. Borys Spivak and MykhailoTroyan,40 Unforgettable Days in the History of the Struggle for SovietPower in Transcarpathia in 1919(Uzhorod, 1967).

4. On the little-known Lemko Rusyn Republic cf. PaulRobert Magocsi, "The Ukrainian Question Between Poland and Czechoslovakia:The Lemko Rusyn Republic (1918-1920) and Political Thought in WesternRus’/Ukraine," Nationalities Paper (New York, in press).

5. The Ukrainian oriented emigrants from CarpathianUkraine lay special emphasis on the Declaration of March 15, 1939, claiming thatthis declaration shows how the Ukrainian orientation supposedly conquered thehearts and minds of the population even before the coming of Soviet power inlate 1944. Cf. Peter G. Stercho,The Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe’sCrossroads in Carpatho- Ukraine, 1919-1939

(New York, 1971).Thisviewpoint was widely disseminated in Ukraine during the Gorbachev period.Cf.Stenographic Transcript of the Fourth (Road) Session of the Grand Council ofRukh Held in Khust on the Fifty-Second Anniversary of Ukraine’s Declaration ofIndependence,No. 4 (Kyiv, 1990).

6. Ricardo Picchio, "Guidelines for theComparative of the Language Question Among the Slavs,"Aspects of theSlavic Language Question,vol. I, ed. Ricardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt(New Haven, Conn., 1984), pp. 1-42.

7. A somewhat more Russian oriented or Russophileintelligentsia among advocates of Orthodoxy who saw the latter the union ofEast Slavic culture and considered that there were three branches of the EastSlavs — Great, White and Little Russians, with the Rusyns being a subgroup ofthe last named — all of whim were but subgroups of a single general Russiannation. Representatives of the Ukrainian and Rusyn oriented intelligentsia werethe more Western-oriented Greek Catholics who were more open to ideas ofnational and regional differentiation. Ukrainophiles posited the unity of theirpeople "from the Carpathians to the Caucasus," while Rusynophileswere convinced that the Rusyn population of the Transcaucasus (from Proprady toTisza) were a separate people.

8. The deportations themselves were carried out instages. Between 1945 and 1946 about 200,000 Lemko Rusyns were"voluntarily" resettled in Ukraine in exchange for Poles who wereresettled inside Poland’s new postwar borders. Those 80,000 Lemko Rusyns whoremained in the hitherto Western Lemko regions were deported in 1947. Forgreater detail, cf. Kazimierz Pudlo, Lemkowie: process wrastania w srodowiskoDolnego Slaska, 1947-1958 (Wroclaw, 1987), esp. pp. 24-34.

9. Beginning in 1945 the new Rusyn political andcultural organizations were renamed as Ukrainian ones. Paradoxically, however,despite their names they used Russian or Rusyn as their language of instructionand communication. In 1952 the Communist Party of Slovakia began a policy ofUkrainization, banned the term Rusyn, and replaced Rusyn and Russian withUkrainian in the schools. Cf. Pavel Маси, "National Assimilation: The Caseof the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia,"East-Central Europe,II:2 (1975), pp. 101-131.

10. At a time when the Rusyn nationality was notofficially recognized by the USSR and its satellites, in Yugoslavia the Rusyns(Rusniaks) were recognized as a separate group with their own literarylanguage. Cf. A. M. Kaliuta,Introduction to Slavic Philology,(Minsk,1971), pp. 137-139 (in Russian).

11. "Ruthenia,"The New ColumbiaEncyclopedia,(New York and London, 1975), pp. 2383.

12. On the Lemko-Rusyn revival see the series ofarticles inCarpatho-Rusyn American,X, XI (1987-88).

13. Not including Besida, (Poland, 1989 - present),Otchyi khram (Uzhorod, 1990 - present, Podkarpatska Rus’ (Prague, 1990 -present), Rusyn (Medzilaborce, 1990 - present), and Narodny Novinky (Presov,1991 - present).

14. Pavlo Chuchka, "How the Rusyns BecameUkrainians,"Zakarpatska pravda,September 12-16, 1989; VasylMelnyk, "Neorusynism and Its Interpreters,"ibid.,August 18,21, 22, 24, 1990; Yuri Baleha, "Rusynism: Ideologists andProtectors,"ibid.,September 6, 7, 9, 1990; Oleksa Myshanych,"Who are They? On the Ideological Origins of the NewCarpatho-Rusynism,"Literatuma Ukraina,January 17, 1991.

15. Carpatho-Rusyn American, XIV:2, pp. 7-9; XIV:3(1991), pp. 8-9.

16. Mykola Mushynka, "How Many Rusyn-Ukrainiansare there in Slovakia,"Svoboda(Jersey City), July 9, 1991.

17. Among the most prominent are: in Transcarpathia,writers Volodymyr Fedyshynets, Vasyl Sochka, political activists MykhailoTomchany, Petro Hodmash, and Vasyl Zayets; in Czechoslovakia Rusyn Oborodapresident Vasyl Turok, government adviser on ethnic affairs Ivan Bistko, andeditor Aleksandr Zozuliak; in Poland, poets Petro Trokhanovsky, Olena Duts, andLemko Society president Andriy Kopsha; and in Yugoslavia Ruske slovo PublishingHouse director Liubomyr Medieshi, writers Diura Papharhai, and Natalia Dudash.

18. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of theConference of the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Copenhagen, 1990), pp. 40-41,par. 32.

19.Ibid.,p. 41, par. 34.

20. Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on NationalMinorities (Geneva, 1991), p. 10.

21. Documents of the Moscow Meeting of the Conferenceon the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991), p. 2.

22. The Republican Party of Czecho-Slovak officiallycalled for the return of Subcarpatian Rus to Czecho-Slovakia. "Zpet doCeskoslovenska,"Republika(Prague), October 18-24, 1990;"Rozhovor s predsedou SPR-RSC, Ph Dr. Miroslavem Sladkem,"ibid.,October1991. National Socialist Party chairman C. Czejka also called for the return ofSubcarpathian Rus to Czecho-Slovak jurisdiction. "NSS chtejf PodkarpatskouRus",Lidova demokracie(Prague), Septembers, 1991.

23. Prominent publicist and Prague representative ofthe Podkarpartska Rus’ Yaromir Horzhetz has written a number of articles on theRusyn movement for the Czech press, but this does not mean that the localpopulation supports the idea of the territory’s return to Slovakia. See hisarticles inLidova demokracie(Prague): "Svobodu pro PodkarpatskouRus" (October 7, 1991); "Cesi na Podkarpatsku" (September 18,1991); and "Podkarparsko zada samostatnou republiku" (October 20,1991). The Hungarian press has also shown an interest in demands forTranscarpathian autonomy: "Ruszin koztarsasag Karpataljan,"Magyarhirlap(Budapest), September 10, 1991; "A ruszinok kovetelese: legyenKarpatalja koztarsasag!"Naplo(Debrecen), October 3, 1991.

24. The citation is attributed to the thenCzechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dinstbr in "Svobodu pro PodkarpatskouRus,"Lidova demokracie,October 9, 1991.

25. The text of the declaration, which was sentformer USSR President Gorbachev, the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ukrainian parliament,and United nations, first appeared in the organ of the Carpatho-Rusyn Society,Otchyikhram,September-October 1990.

26. Ukrainy (Uzhorod), September 14/1991.

27. P. R. Magosci, "Rusyns Regain TheirAutonomy",Ukrainian Canadian Herald,March 16, 1992, p. 7.

28. Soviet rules of census ethnicity classificationof the State Committee on Statistics were defined by rules of Union Republicauthorities and the Institutes of Ethnography and Linguistics of the SovietAcademy of Sciences. Cf.Dictionary of Nationalities and Languages forCollating Answers to Questions 8 and 9 of the Census Forms(Moscow, 1988,in Russian). It is interesting to note the Institute of ethnography of the USSRAcademy of Sciences in an announcement (No. 14110/2171, February 6, 1990)stated: "Theoretically, Rusyns may be understood as something the sameorder as Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians and not as a subgroup of someother group, (document in possession of the author).

29. Discussions concerning Ukrainian state buildinghave already gone on for some years. Neighboring Galicia and Transcarpathia areconvinced

that they could function much better were theyindependent from the center in Kyiv. Cf. Ivan Hranchak, "RenewedAttributes of the Carpathian Land: A Federal Ukraine?"NovynyZakarpattia(Uzhorod), February 6, 1991

Source: Political Thought 1995, №2-3 (6) P.221-231.

Див. також:

Май Панчук. Політичне русинство в Україні. (Політична думка, 1995, №2-3(6)).     in english     російською

В. Маркусь. «Пудкарпатська рипублика».

Закарпаття. З Енциклопедії Українознавства-II.

Василь Ґренджа-Донський. Щастя і горе Карпатської України. Ужгород, 2002

Авґустин Волошин. Вибрані твори. Ужгород, 2002

На інших сторінках:

Олекса Мишанич. "Энциклопедия Подкарпатской Руси" і що за нею.

Олександр Гаврош.Автономія Закарпаття: народний самовияв чи номенклатурний путч?

Михайло Тиводар. Доводити, що Закарпаття — українське за духом, немає потреби.

Головна           текст українською           see: M.Panchuk. Political Rusynism in Ukraine