Title: A General's Letters to His Son on Minor Tactics
Author: Anonymous
Release date: July 25, 2016 [eBook #52640]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Charlie Howard and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
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Transcriber’s Notes
The Table of Contents was added by the Transcriber.
The maps just below most chapter headings originally were on thepages before those headings, but were moved by the Transcriber.
| Letter I | 9 |
| Letter II | 19 |
| Letter III | 25 |
| Letter IV | 31 |
| Letter V | 43 |
| Letter VI | 53 |
| Letter VII | 59 |
| Letter VIII | 63 |
| Letter IX | 73 |
| Letter X | 77 |
| Letter XI | 81 |
| Letter XII | 89 |
A GENERAL’S LETTERS
TO HIS SON ON
MINOR TACTICS
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
Copyright, 1918
By George H. Doran Company
Printed in the United States of America
It has very forcibly been brought home to methat not only young officers joining their unitsfrom training establishments, but also thosewho have been in France and have come backwounded, are often very ignorant on those pointsin minor tactics which they have not learntthrough actual experience on the battlefield, andthat this is especially the case with regard tothe proper control of fire. The battlefield is anexpensive place to acquire knowledge which canbe gained elsewhere, and it behooves us to doall we possibly can to train our young commandersunder peace conditions for the ordealsthey will have to encounter in the presence ofthe enemy.
Training which in ordinary times would formthe course of study for years now has to becrammed into a few months, and it stands tovireason that much which is essential remainsunlearnt.
I have generally found that the best way totrain young officers in minor tactics is by givingthem as realistically as possible little problemsto solve, and afterwards in the presence oftheir comrades to discuss their proposed dispositionsand then to tell them clearly what theyought to have done, giving reasons for everystep taken.
Where it is possible actually to carry out theexercise with troops, this is still better, so longas it is all done quickly, as this impresses thelesson to be learnt more strongly on the mindsof the students.
Many men who are in other ways excellentinstructors have not the facility for constructingproblems witha point, and this being thecase, it has occurred to me that I may be generallyhelping the training of young officers bypublishing these letters which are written incontinuation of those I addressed to my son onobtaining his commission. The importance ofthe subject with which they deal is self-evident.viiUnless the arrow-head, the platoon, be sharp,that is, unless the leader be skilful as well asbrave, the little combat will not be won, and itis the sum of the little combats which spells theresult of the battle.
There is not a word in this little book whichtransgresses the spirit of the training manualsand official instructions now in force.
“X. Y. Z.”
December 1, 1917.
My dear Dick,—
It is now nearly nine months since I wrotethe last of my letters of advice to you, and sincethen you have yourself been in France and havehad many experiences and hairbreadth escapes.
I am very thankful that your wound is only aslight one, and am glad that within a coupleof months you will probably once more be ableto take your place in the fighting-line, for thatis where your country demands your presence.It behoves you, in the meantime, to seize everyopportunity of studying your profession and familiarisingyourself as far as possible with the10different positions in which you may be placed,so that when you meet a similar situation in thefield you may recognise it for what it really is, inspite of the surroundings in which it is dressed,and may thus be more likely to solve it properlythan would be the case if you were dealing with aproblem which you had never thought over before.It would be difficult to exaggerate theimportance of the results which may depend onyour correctly answering the questions put toyou on the field of battle. These questions becomemore complex and more varied as the responsibilityof an officer’s position increases, butin the case of a junior officer they are seldomvery difficult, and all that is required to dealwith them properly is a little common sense anda cool head combined with courage and determination.
It is on the result of the many little fights ofwhich an action is composed that the result of abattle depends. The brilliant strategy of a commander-in-chiefand the fine tactics of a divisionalcommander cannot bear fruit unless thetroop-leading of the companies is well carried11out, and in the same way good troop-leading willprevent a defeat being turned into a rout. Individualgallantry, valuable as it may be, is boundto be thrown away if unaccompanied by skill.The experiences you have undergone shouldrender you more capable of assimilating therequisite knowledge than you were nine monthsago.
Before I proceed further, I will mention a fewaxioms which can seldom be neglected withoutbad results accruing. Some of these seem soself-evident that it would appear to be unnecessaryto state them, nevertheless they are all ofthem continually transgressed.
1. Impress on your men the importance ofadjusting their sights correctly. On a peacefield-day this axiom is sometimes neglected, andin the excitement of action it is often entirelyforgotten.
2. Keep your men together unless there issome very definite object for not doing so, andonly detach them for protective services,i.e.advance guards, etc.
3. Infantry mounted officers are apt to forget12that their horses are given to them in order togive them more mobility. There are many occasionson which, by cantering on and making arrangementsprevious to the arrival of the unitwhich they command, they can save a great dealof valuable time and often much marching andcounter-marching.
4. Never allow the pace in front to be hurriedon a march. It is much easier to marchat the head than at the rear of a column.
5. Before opening fire, carefully consider thesituation. If you feel certain of being able todeal with the enemy, let him approach closebefore disclosing yourself, and then destroy him.If, on the contrary, he is so much superior toyou that you cannot hope to be able to do this,you should open at a long range, but in thesecircumstances do not hurry the rate of fire tobegin with. It takes an exceptional man to firemore than 200 rounds in a short space of timewithout being shaken.
6. It is a sound rule always to pursue theline of action which your opponent does not wishyou to pursue. If, for instance, in the circumstances13mentioned in the above paragraph theenemy open fire on you at a long range, you maypresume that he does so in order to keep you atarm’s length, and if you halt you are probablydoing what he wishes you to do.
7. However small your party may be whenacting independently, it is responsible for itsown protection, and it should always have anadvance guard or its equivalent.
8. Whenever you have an opportunity of doingso, and the tactical situation allows of it,check your ranges by firing at an auxiliarymark where you can see the splash of your bullet,such as a dusty road or water.
9. When you have ascertained the correct distancesof the object, make a range-card and passon your information to neighbouring troops.
10. If you see a good opportunity of inflictingloss on the enemy, but it is impracticable tocheck the range, use combined sights.
11. Remember that if the target you areshooting at is large enough and you know therange, you can inflict heavy losses with rifle andmachine-gun fire at ranges well over 2,000 yards.
1412. Do not forget to make use of the mapwhen estimating a range.
13. Although the secret of success in an engagementis the proper co-operation of the differentarms of the service, the platoon commandermust not cry out for artillery assistancewhen he has the means of carrying out his taskin his own platoon, which, with its riflemen, itsLewis gunners, its bombers, and its rifle bombers,is, in itself, a miniature division. In anaction where telephonic communication hasbroken down this rule applies with specialforce.
14. Above all things, impress on your menthe enormous power of their rifle. I have heardmany stories of men not firing at all because theyhoped the enemy would come withinbombingrange. I have also heard of bodies of Germantroops streaming across the open unfired at becauseno order was given. I have also heard ofmachine guns stopping a German advance, whilstinfantry who were lying down beside them didnot fire a shot.
15. Rifle grenades and bombs both have their15proper uses, and in trench fighting it would bedifficult to get on without them. The formerare also excellent for giving covering fire whilsta post is being rushed; but if the infantryman’sworth be 100, of this 100, 85 per cent. belongs tohis rifle and bayonet, 10 per cent. to his riflegrenade, and 5 per cent. at the outside to hisbomb.
16. Never miss an opportunity to reorganiseyour company or platoon, as the case may be,ready for the next emergency.
17. After capturing a trench or work, getyour Lewis guns into position without any delay.From a small front they can bring a greatfire to bear, and they must be given the bestposition. Under the protection given by them,the remainder of your command must consolidate.
(For consolidation, see note to Scheme 7.)
18. Your duty towards the enemy is your dutytowards your neighbour reversed. Think howhe could make himself most objectionable to youand act in this manner towards him.
19. Always be certain that you understand16your orders, and if you are in doubt never hesitateto ask and make certain, even should yourcommanding officer have a short temper.
20. If you are detached for any specific purposeyou should always rejoin your unit whenyou have accomplished what you were told todo.
21. Do not fail to give negative information.Young officers are very apt to neglect this. Itmay be of great importance to a commandingofficer to know that a certain place is not heldby the enemy, and this is just the kind of informationthat his patrol leaders are apt to forgetto send him.
22. Always insist on any verbal order youmay give being repeated to you by the recipientbefore he leaves your presence.
23. In a retirement you send men to the rearwith orders to take up another position to protectyour retirement; always see that they areaccompanied by a competent leader, or when thelast party falls back they will very likely findthat their retirement is unsupported.
17Try to remember these axioms. My subsequentletters will be founded on their application.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
W X Yare Pill Boxes
W & Yhave been captured by usXstill holds out
December 7, 1917.
My dear Dick,—
I will now proceed to set you a few problemsin illustration of the axioms which I gave youat the end of my last letter.
The first will be on the subject of taking aGerman pill-box, for I have heard of many instancesof a pill-box holding up the advance ofa whole brigade for a very considerable period.I have also heard how many gallant but badlydevised attempts to carry it have failed, and thelives of officers and men have been sacrificed invain, and how eventually a better commandedplatoon has succeeded in taking it with verylittle loss.
W,X, andY are three pill-boxes about 150yards apart. We are attacking in the direction20of the arrows, that is, in a northerly direction.
Our men following close behind the barragetook pill-boxesW andY; but, partly owing tothe conformation of the ground and partly forother reasons, we failed to takeX, and this pill-boxis now holding up the whole of our advancebetweenW, wood, andY, knoll, with a machinegun, which is being fired from the inside of thepill-box, and which sweeps the whole groundbetween these points so effectively that directlywe attempt to advance our men are mown down.
It is apparent thatX has only one machinegun in action, though this is a very efficient one.
From the contours on the sketch, it is evidentthat the ground is convex in formation, that is,that it is nearly flat betweenX andH¹, but thatit slopes rapidly betweenH¹ andH, betweenB¹andB, and betweenC¹ andC.
The slopes are covered with brushwood. Theground between contour 120 and the pill-box ismeadow land.
The platoon originally told off to attackXwas wiped out.
You have been ordered to takeX with yourplatoon and to do so as quickly as possible.When you receive these orders you are yourselfatH, and, as you will see from the sketch, arenot under fire fromX.
What steps will you take to carry out yourorders?
Do not enter into an elaborate dissertation,but give short, concise orders, and if you desireto do so, append a short statement saying whyyou gave these orders.
As there is only one machine gun in action, ifX be attacked simultaneously fromB¹ andC¹,either one party or the other should succeed ingetting to the rear of the pill-box and blowingin the door.
No. 4 Section with the Lewis gun will choosea position somewhere to the north ofH, and on22my signal will open a rapid fire on the loopholesof the pill-box atX. No. 3 Section will choose aposition nearB¹, and when the Lewis gun opensfire, they will open a rapid rifle-grenade fire onX. One minute after the Lewis gun has opened,No. 1 Section will rush in fromC¹ and No. 2Section fromB¹.
I am aware that in the foregoing problem Ihave made the task of the platoon commander avery simple one. I wished, however, to avoidany points of controversy. If the ground shouldnot be so advantageous for your attack as thatabove depicted, the principle, viz. movement combinedwith fire, still remains the same. Youshould bring a converging attack to bear andadvance your men under cover of the fire of yourrifle grenades and Lewis guns, and by pushingmen forward from one shell-crater to another,you should generally be able to achieve yourobject if your plan be evolved on sound principles.It is also possible that smoke bombs couldbe used with advantage if the wind be favourable.
23The above problem is one which has oftenbeen put to young officers on the battlefield, andthey have not by any means always given a satisfactoryanswer to it, simple as it is.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
December 15, 1917.
My dear Dick,—
Since the early days of the campaign therehas been but little fighting in towns or villageswhich have not previously been so knocked aboutthat they could better be designated ruins thanhabitable places, but in the event of an advanceon a large scale towns and villages are certainto be the scenes of severe combats. I will thereforegive you three little problems in street-fighting.When you have read them, the pointsI call attention to will probably seem to you soself-evident that you will wonder that I haveconsidered it worth while to comment on them.Nevertheless, I am not quite sure that you willgive what I consider to be the correct answersto all of them, if you do not turn over the pageand look at the solutions I have given, beforestating your own.
The brigade to which you belong has entereda town from a southerly direction, and you areopposed by an enemy who has entered it froma northerly direction.
The company of which you are in commandhas been allotted the ground between the roadsB F,C G, both inclusive, your flanks are protected,the streets are about thirty feet broadwith pavements five feet broad, houses run allalong the streets.
(a) If you were to tell off a section to preventthe enemy advancing along the streetB Ffrom a northerly direction, which side of thestreet would it be best for them to occupy, andwhy?
(b) Your men occupy the streetsB D andD C, but no man can show his face in the streetA H, which is covered by machine guns andsnipers firing from nearA, and all men attemptingto cross the road atD have been shot. Several27houses in the streetB D have been knockeddown by shell fire.
In this street there are six empty wagons andin the houses in the street there is to be foundfurniture of all descriptions, as well as ropes,harness, and stables, with some horses in them.You are anxious to place a barricade across thestreetA H atD, so as to enable you to use thecrossing atD. How should you set about makingthis barricade?
(c) There is a house atH looking right downthe streetA H. Whereabouts in this houseshould you put your Lewis gun, and why?
(a) On the western side, because your men,shooting out of the windows in a northerlydirection, would then fire from their right shoulderswithout exposing their bodies.
(b) Fill the wagons with rubble from thehouses which have been knocked down. Fastensacking or sheets on to the wagon, so as to givecover from view between the body of the wagonand the ground. Throw a string attached to28a brick across the street. By means of this, pullover a rope and attach the wagons to this rope,and thus pull them into the position you require.
(c) At the back of a room in the house, whereyou can see but cannot be seen, firing throughthe window. If you choose a window near thetop of the house and put the Lewis gun on atable some distance back in the room, you willprobably be able to fire over the barricade whichyou are thinking of constructing atD.
I have put you three definite and very simplequestions with regard to street-fighting, for itmay often happen that correct action on thespur of the moment when a village is first enteredmay result in ground being easily gainedwhich would otherwise entail heavy fighting andserious loss to capture.
Street-fighting is a very big subject, and asa rule it gradually develops into undergroundwarfare.
Villages entered during a battle often havesnipers in the top stories or on the roofs of thehouses, and these are places in which you mayalso place a few good shots with great advantage.29This is an illustration of the advisability of doingto the enemy what you do not like his doing toyou.
I will send you another problem next week.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
December 22, 1917.
My dear Dick,—
You have told me that you have once or twicetemporarily commanded a company and haveasked me whether I think there is any advantagein a young and active company commanderbeing mounted.
In another part of your letter you ask whetherI think a defensive position should be taken upon a forward or on a reverse slope.
This latter is a very big question and one onwhich many pages could be written, but I shallconfine myself here to saying that it is imperativeto hold the crest line in order to get observation,but that, owing to the crest line andforward slope being so much more vulnerableby artillery fire than is the reverse slope, thereare many advantages in constructing the mainline of defence well behind the crest.
I find now that I have tried in a few words32to answer your second question before dealingwith the first one. The object of giving you ahorse is, firstly, to enable you to move aboutmore rapidly, and consequently to do your dutybetter; and secondly, because a company commander’swork really begins when the marchis over. It is infinitely more important thathe should be fresh than that any other man inthe company should be so. Again, by riding onin front and making proper arrangements forbivouacs or billets, he may save weary men muchmarching and counter-marching, and, what iseven more important, he will on other occasions,by being able to push on in front, save half anhour by thinking out proper tactical dispositionsbefore his men arrive. I will now give you alittle problem which will, I think, illustrate thetwo questions which you have asked me. Youmust, nevertheless, remember that there can beno hard-and-fast rule as to where a positionshould be taken up. We cannot alter the groundto suit our formation, and therefore our formationsmust be made to suit the ground. Theproper way to hold ground when the object is33to fight a rearguard action is quite differentfrom the way it should be held to fight a battleà l’outrance, and all I will commit myself todoing is to give my advice as to how a certainpiece of ground should be held in certain givencircumstances. I hope that the following problemwill, to a certain extent, answer both yourquestions.
An advance guard, of which the company youcommand forms part, has been pushed forwardto seize a position of which the ridgeB-I formsa part. The main body should reach the positionsome eight hours after your arrival there.You have been told that your first object is toprevent the enemy’s cavalry seizing the position.The enemy’s cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery,may be expected in the proximity of theposition within an hour or so after your arrival,but it is unlikely that his infantry and fieldartillery will arrive much before your own mainbody. The time of the year is July, the hour is4 p.m. The soil is sandy, but covered with34grass. You are riding at the head of your company,and are about two miles from the crestwhen a staff officer accompanied by the adjutantrides up to you and you receive the followinginstructions:
“Our cavalry have reached the crest of theridgeB C D E F G H I without encounteringopposition. You will be responsible for the frontfromE toI, both inclusive, until the main bodyarrives, and must make immediate arrangementsfor securing it against attack by hostile cavalryand horse artillery. Not a minute is to be lost.You will also do your best to prepare the frontallotted to you for defence against a strong infantryattack which the enemy will probablydeliver, though it is unlikely that he will be ina position to do so before dawn to-morrow.”
What would you do on receipt of these orders?
You should save time by handing over commandof your company and yourself cantering35on so as to examine the ground and carefullyconsider your plans before your company arrives.The line of argument you should adopton arrival on the ridge should be: “My first objectis to prevent cavalry, assisted by horseartillery, reaching the ridge, and not a singlemoment is to be lost in doing this.
“My second object is to consider carefullyhow the ground can best be prepared to resista determined infantry attack early to-morrowmorning. It is possible that the ridge may besubjected to shell fire soon after the arrival ofmy company, and I must make hay whilst thesun shines.”
The conclusions you would come to as a resultof this reasoning would probably be: “It is improbablethat I shall be able to entrench thewhole of my company before the enemy opensfire, but at all events I will try to make emplacementsfor my four Lewis guns on the ridge betweenE andI. They will thus be about eightyyards apart.
“I will use intensive labour to get these emplacementscompleted quickly.”
36By intensive labour is meant telling off threemen to each tool used and ordering the man todig with all his might and main for a couple ofminutes or until he is tired, and then to handhis tool over to another man who is ready toreceive it. By this means more work can bedone in half an hour than is usually done in anhour. For periods of under an hour, when menare working against time to achieve some importantobject, intensive labour is an excellentmethod to adopt, but it is not suited for longtasks where its use would wear men out. It isespecially applicable where the task worked atis so small that only a very limited number ofmen can work simultaneously.
“I will, at the same time, construct trenchesconnecting these Lewis gun posts. It is possiblethat the arrival of the enemy’s guns will obligeme to relinquish work until the night, but thefact that the trenches have been commenced inthe daytime will very much assist the men intheir night work. I will afterwards constructsupporting points at the farmL and betweenMandN on the reverse slope.”
If you concur with these conclusions, whatprinciple will govern your action in putting thefarm into a state of defence? You will noticethat the farm shows a bigger front to the east andthe west than it does to the north and the south.It is constructed of strong masonry and has twostories.
You should use the southern rooms in thefarm for your machine guns rather than thenorthern ones, as you will there be more protectedfrom shell fire. You must keep yourdefence as much below ground as possible, usingcellars if they are available, and otherwise diggingtrenches inside the walls so as to have yourloopholes a few inches above the ground level.
Construct head cover with strong baulks closeover your heads, so that in the event of the wholebuilding being brought down, it will not affectyou, but only give you more cover from high-anglefire. If possible put wire round the3839northern end of the building. Arrange to flankthe work betweenM N, which should in turnprotect your front.
Work for 40 men & 2 m. gs. or Lewis guns.It only requires 40 to hold it, but wouldgive cover to twice as many
Angles at B & C arbitraryto suit ground.
What description of work will you make betweenM andN?
The best form of work to construct will beone made on the principle of that shown in theannexed diagram. As will be seen, this consistsof a series of island traverses strung togethermore or less in the shape of an “S.” The advantageof this is not only that it is suitable forall-round defence, but that the whole of thegarrison can fire simultaneously in almost anydirection, the weakest points beingA andD.The work shown in the diagram would requirea garrison of about forty men, but it could givecover to eighty. It is less vulnerable by artilleryfire than almost any other form of work.It is an easy work to construct in so far that a40large number of men can work at it at the sametime without interfering with each other. Theacuteness or obtuseness of the angles atB andC must depend entirely upon the ground, but itstands to reason that the more the angles approachright angles, the more is the work suitablefor all-round defence.
The “crucifix” strong point is also a goodpattern, but I think that the one that I havegiven you is better, as it is in every way a lesssatisfactory mark for the enemy artillery, andalso gives you quite as good, if not better, opportunityof using all your rifles in every direction.
My next letter will contain a problem for arearguard commander.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
January 1, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
The last scheme I gave you dealt with thetaking up of a position when an attack by a weakforce was probable within an hour or so of youroccupying it, and also with the strengthening ofthe same position for an expected attack by astronger force twelve hours later. This onedeals with a rearguard action. It is straightforwardand plain. The object that troops fightinga rearguard action should have in mind isto keep the enemy at arm’s length, to punishhim severely if he is too bold, and at the sametime not to compromise their own retreat, unlessduty requires them to sacrifice themselves inorder to save the main body. I will now set youthe problem before I make my own solution tooevident by my remarks. It is my intention to44add a few more words at the end of this letter,but I do not wish you to look at them until youhave written your own solution.
The banks of the River Lea are steep, theriver is about four feet six inches deep, exceptnear the ford. The bottom is muddy. At theford it is forty yards broad, in most other placesabout twenty yards. The fields on either sideare firm. The roads shown on the sketch aredry and dusty. The soil is chalky. The depthof the river at the ford is two feet six inches.The date is June 20.
One of the orderlies attached to you reportsthat at Slag Farm there is a large quantity ofwire, some of it barbed.
The brigade to which you belong is retiringin a southerly direction. The baggage movedin front of the brigade. The time is 5.30 p.m.You with your company, to which six mountedorderlies have been attached, are near HomeFarm, the remainder of your battalion, which isin rear of the brigade, is passing through Silverton,45when the adjutant rides up to you and givesyou the following order:
“Information has been received that a hostilecavalry brigade is pursuing. You will take suchsteps as you may consider necessary to preventthe enemy crossing the River Lea between StoneBridge and Slag Farm, both inclusive, until 7p.m., at which hour you will be relieved by cavalry.You will be careful not to compromiseyour own retreat. Having accomplished yourtask, you will rejoin your unit.”
How do you appreciate the situation, andwhat steps will you take to carry out your instructions?
The River Lea is in all places within 800 yardsof the ridge, and as the conditions are particularlyfavourable for fire action from the ridge,there is no necessity for you to place your mendown the forward slope. The circumstanceswhich render the situation so favourable for fireaction are that it is practically impossible for46the enemy’s cavalry to cross the River Lea, exceptat the bridge or at the ford. The bridgeand the road, with ponds on either side of it,just to the north of the bridge, form a defile 150yards long, through which the enemy must pass.The ponds and the river also afford you an excellentopportunity to check the range by the splashof your bullets.
By filling the ford with wire you should alsosucceed in making that very difficult to cross.The great objection to putting men on the forwardslope is that they will come under severefire from the horse artillery which will accompanythe cavalry, and that under cover of thisfire the cavalry are much more likely to be ableto cross than they would be if fired at from aconcealed position on the ridge. Besides whichall movement by men on the forward slope wouldbe seen and the men themselves would not be ableto retire until dark.
1. Nos. 3 and 4 Platoons will proceed underLieutenant Smith to the neighbourhood of Cross47Farm, where they will take up the best positionsthey can find with the object of protecting thecrossing of the River Lea.
It has been reported that a large quantity ofwire, some of it barbed, is to be found at SlagFarm. Lieutenant Smith will take steps to obstructthe ford with this with the object ofdenying its use to the enemy.
2. No. 1 Platoon will take up a position nearHome Farm and No. 2 Platoon near Hope Farm,also with the object of preventing the crossingof the River Lea.
3. No. 2 Platoon from Hope Farm will fireranging shots on to the ford at Slag Farm, ChalkPit, and the two road junctions to the north ofthe ford, and when the officer commanding theplatoon is certain by the observation of his firethat he has obtained the correct ranges, he willpass this information to the officer commandingNo. 1 Platoon.
The officer commanding No. 1 Platoon willrange on the ponds near the bridge and on theroad junction to the north of them, and willsimilarly pass the range chart to the officer commanding48No. 2 Platoon. This ranging will becarried out at once in order that the rangingby Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons may be finished beforethe ranging is commenced by the officers commandingNos. 3 and 4 Platoons, which will becarried out under the orders of LieutenantSmith.
N.B.—I am quite aware that a company issupposed to carry a Barr & Stroud range-finder.Although this is an excellent instrument whenit is in thorough order, there is really no suchreliable range-finder as a rifle fired at a markwhich will show the impact of the bullet.
In the proper solution of the foregoing scheme,everything really depends upon your fire orders.I am presuming that your men are fairly welltrained with the rifle. I wish, of course, that allour men were trained up to the standard of theOld Contemptibles, but “Rome was not built ina day,” nor can discipline and good marksmanshipbecome part of a man’s second nature as aresult of only a few months’ training. If, however,your men are reasonably good shots and49can fire at least fifteen rounds a minute (theyought to fire twenty under peace conditions),in such cases as the above much more will dependupon whether you give correct fire orders thanupon whether the men are first-class marksmenor only moderately good shots. You can comparea company of first-class marksmen to aChoke-bore gun which shoots farther and harderbut requires a skilled game shot to use withadvantage, whereas a company of moderately-trainedshots would resemble an ordinary scattergun, with which the ordinary shot wouldprobably do more execution. If you give a rangeas 1,200 yards when it is only 1,000 yards andyou have marksmen, no shots will fall on theobject; whereas if your company were composedof third-class shots, the chances are that it wouldbe well sprinkled with bullets. Do not thinkfrom this that I prefer the third-class shots, forthat is very decidedly not the case; but if youhave a highly finished weapon, you want a goodman behind it, although in the hands of such aone it will do brilliant execution. If you have acompany of good shots and are not certain of a50range, your best plan is to fire with combinedsights and thus to increase the depth of the fire-sweptground. This method, although in manycases the best to adopt, is bound to diminish theefficacy of your fire, for if the correct range be1,200 yards and you fire one platoon at 1,000yards, one at 1,100, one at 1,200, and one at1,300, it stands to reason that you can only hopeto get a quarter as many hits as you would doif you gave the whole four platoons the correctrange; but even that is better than giving therange at 1,000 and missing the mark altogether.It is a bad plan to go “Nap” before you havelooked at your hand. I shall later on give youcertain little problems for solution in which Iam of opinion that combined sights should beused. In the problem under consideration, however,their use would be absolutely wrong. Youcan check all the ranges by seeing the splash ofthe bullets either in the ponds, in the river, or onthe Chalk Pit, and you should be content withnothing except the correct range. Young officersare always apt to consider that so long as theyhave taught their company to shoot fairly well,they have done their duty with regard to musketry.51This is, in reality, by no means the case.The company is simply the sportsman’s gun;the commander has to learn how to use it.
There are many circumstances under which aman has to pick out his own target, as, for instance,when the enemy is attacking, and hereeverything depends upon his individual marksmanship.There are, however, many other occasionsin which if 10 per cent. of the effect dependsupon whether the men are first-classmarksmen or only ordinary decent shots, 90 percent. will depend upon whether the officer givesfire orders properly adapted to the situation.The above problem is an illustration of this principle.
You should notice that in my solution I carefullyarranged that the party comprised of Nos.2 and 3 Platoons should not commence ranginguntil Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons had finished. Werethey to fire simultaneously, confusion in thesplashes made by the bullets would be the result.
Don’t forget to hand over your range card toyour relief.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
January 7, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
I will set you another problem.
The force to which you belong has made anight march. Your platoon now forms part ofa new outpost line. You halted in a ditch atline markedD, with a thin hedge on the enemy’sside of it, which gives you good cover from view.Your idea was to use this place as the headquartersof your picket, and as soon as it wasthoroughly light to throw groups out in front.Your platoon consists of forty men and a Lewisgun. Soon after dawn and when your men arestill in the trench atD, you see what you taketo be a strong platoon of the enemy advancingstraight towards you from the north; a coupleof groups of men are fifty yards in front, andthe remainder of the platoon is advancing infours along a country road, which passes close54to your position. You see the platoon when it isatA about 1,000 yards off.
What action will you take?
There seems to be every chance of your beingable to ambuscade this party, and you shouldlet it advance until the groups which the mainbody has in front of it are within fifty yards ofyour picquet. You should tell off a few men onthe flanks to deal with these groups, and turnthe fire of the whole of the rest of your platoonon to the main body. You must be careful to seethat all your men lie down, that no one butyourself has his head above ground level, andyou must camouflage yourself. The suspense insuch a situation as this makes great demands onthe men’s discipline, and they are apt to look upand be seen by the enemy, thus destroying allhope of surprise.
The situation is exactly the same as inProblem5a, except that instead of a platoon advancing55towards you, there is a whole companymarching in fours, with four groups 100 yardsin front of it.
What action would you take?
Exactly the same as in Problem 5a. Theenemy is in this case four times as strong as youare, but the effect of surprise should more thanmake up for this, and the first minute after youopen fire should decide the action in your favour.
The situation is again exactly the same as in5a and5b, except that a whole battalion witheight groups 200 yards in front of it is advancing.
What action would you take?
In this case the situation is changed. Youare an outpost, and your first duty is to warnyour main body in case of an attack and to giveit time to prepare itself. It is just possible that56if you allow the battalion to approach to within300 yards you might deal it such a blow as toalmost destroy it; but if, on the contrary, thecovering groups were composed of really goodsoldiers and the companies were well commanded,there would be a great chance of your beingrushed, and this is a risk which you ought notto take, for it would compromise the whole situation.In these circumstances you should thereforetake steps to open a rapid fire on the enemyimmediately with your men and your Lewis gun.Your object in doing this would be to keep himat arm’s length and delay his advance as muchas possible so as to give your supports and reservestime to prepare themselves.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
January 15, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
In this letter I am going to set you anotherfire problem. It is one in which, presumingthat the men are fairly well trained in musketry,everything depends on the orders givenby the company commander.
You are in command of a company and aremarching in a northerly direction along the roadW B E, with scouts in front of you. On reachingthe top of the ridge atB your scouts haltand beckon to you. You go forward and seewhat appears to be an enemy’s battalion atX,by the bank of the River Spate. The battalionis in close column and the men are lying downresting. The country all round the battalionis open. There is a thin hedge on the top ofthe ridgeA B C through which you can see and60through which you could fire, but which givesyou cover from view.
State how the situation presents itself to youand also give your exact orders.
You should reason with yourself as follows:
“If I advance beyond the hedge I shall beseen and my company will be opposed by a battalion.There seems to be an excellent opportunityof surprising the enemy, who shows nosign of moving, with my concentrated fire, andI shall consequently make my plans deliberately.From my map I judge the distance from thetop of the ridge to the bridge over the RiverSpate to be 1,300 yards, and the centre of thebattalion about 1,400 yards, but as I want tobe quite sure of getting the battalion intomy bracket, I shall use combined sights.I shall first line up the whole company 30yards behind the hedge, and then order No. 1Platoon to fix their sights at 1,300, No. 2 at 1,400,No. 3 at 1,500, and No. 4 at 1,600 yards, with theLewis gun of No. 1 Platoon at 1,350, that of No.612 at 1,400, that of No. 3 at 1,450, and that of No.4 at 1,500 yards. I shall then order the wholecompany to creep up into position, and when thetarget has been properly pointed out I shallblow my whistle, on which every man will firetwenty rounds rapid and each Lewis gun sixdrums. At the end of the twenty rounds I can,if necessary, correct my ranges. Men are, as arule, more apt to fire high than low, and I shouldhave given the ranges 1,200, 1,300, 1,400, 1,500,instead of 1,300, 1,400, 1,500, 1,600, had it notbeen that the river will prevent the enemy rushingstraight towards me if he finds the fire ishigh, whereas if my ranges are short he could getout of range by retiring.”
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
January 22, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
The following is a problem in trench warfaresuch as you may be called upon to solve any dayin the trenches.
The company of which you are in commandhas succeeded in getting into a trench a sectionof which is given in the diagram. It has onlyincurred about 10 per cent. of casualties. Thetrench is the last of the German system, andthere is a clear field of fire for about 100 yardsin the direction in which the enemy has retired;after that there is a thick wood.
Your telephone communication has brokendown and it is evident that you will for sometime have to rely on your own resources. Yourflanks are secured by troops on your right andleft. Your company now numbers 120 rank and64file. The front allotted to you measures about150 yards. The trench which you are now occupyingwas considerably shelled by us previousto its capture, and what was the rear of thetrench when the Germans held it, namelyH G F,has been considerably broken down in half adozen places. It is quite possible that the Germanswill counter-attack from the wood withoutdelay. It is evident from the section of thetrench depicted on the diagram that you cannotfire out of it as it is at present.
What action will you take to prepare for theenemy’s counter-attack?
Your position is a difficult one, for there isno place from which your men can fire. Youcannot even use the stepC, nor the parapetA K,for the paradosH G is, as is usually the case,eighteen inches higher than is the old crest lineatA. In the short time at your disposal it willbe next to impossible to make a continuous step65so as to enable you to fire overH, and in the circumstancesthe best thing for you to do is to concentratethe whole of your energies on gettingyour Lewis guns into position and to use intensivelabour for the purpose.1 It is possible thatyou may be able to get one or two of the Lewisguns satisfactorily into position at some of theplaces in which the revetment inF G H has beenknocked down. If, in your company, you havehalf a dozen iron or wire grips which you canutilise to pull down the sandbag revetment, youwill find them of the greatest assistance, for menwho only have their hands to work with find itvery difficult to get a grip on a sandbag whichis in a revetment.
You must at once place look-out men to giveyou warning of any sign of the enemy assemblingin the edge of the wood to your front and beprepared to open on them with rifle grenades.
The real advantage that a machine gun orLewis gun has over a rifle is that from a smallpoint of vantage one of these weapons can poura tremendous hail of fire, and in such circumstances66as those depicted above there is no doubtbut that the first consideration should be to getyour Lewis guns into position.
If possible, it is best to place these in pairs,shooting obliquely and crossing their fire in frontof you. As soon as this is done you should thinout and organise your defence in depth. Thisbeing carried out, you must determine what localitiesyou will hold and where you will haveyour gaps. You should generally have a localityin front of any communication trench leadingup from the rear. As soon as you have determinedon your localities, you must set-to andbuild a fire step. The next measure to take inorder of importance is to collect ammunition andplace it at convenient points. After you havedone this, try to put wire or some other obstaclein front. In advising this, I am presuming thatyou have reached your final objective. Be carefulto remove any old German wire behind youwhich will prevent your own supports coming upover the open to reinforce you. Try to get yourlocalities marked by lamps at night, that yourown friends in rear can see where they are.
After hard fighting you have driven the enemyout of the trenchA B C, and he has retired upthe communication trenchD E F in the directionof his supports. You are in command of aplatoon and have been ordered to take steps toprevent the enemy again advancing along thecommunication trenchE D B. It is not the intentionof your commanding officer to advance atpresent any farther than the points he has alreadyreached. The time is an hour before dark.
What steps will you take to carry out the instructionsyou have received?
Pull knife-rests2 down into the trenchD E F,also throw wire into it if available. At once puta couple of men at the pointD to cover thetrenchD E with their rifles. As soon as you areable to do so, dig a short trench fromG toD andplace a Lewis gun atG to enfiladeD E. Youmay have to wait until after dark before you6869actually carry this out, but you should makearrangements for doing it by daylight. It wouldnot be a bad plan to tie a few tins on to the knife-restswhich you have thrown into the trench, sothat the rattle, if they are moved, will give youwarning of any one’s approach. The Lewis gunatG will be practically out of bombing rangefromE F.
2 A knife-rest is a portable wire entanglement about 10 feetlong, made upon a wooden frame-work.
There are as many different types of stops asthere are different sorts of trenches. Some ofthese types are better than others, but there isno type which is suitable under all circumstances.Everything must depend on the exactlocal conditions and on the means at your disposal.It does not require much ingenuity todevise a good stop for a trench if you haveleisure to think the matter out, but just as aremark which would be commonplace if given asthe result of matured deliberation is regardedas brilliant if made as a quick repartee, so intactics to do what is right under fire is quitea different thing to answering a question on anexamination paper. Nevertheless, to have answered70a similar question on an examinationpaper, or, still better, to have done it as a tacticalexercise, renders it very much more likelythat you will do the right thing when you arefaced by a similar problem in earnest. I, therefore,counsel you to carefully consider the differentsorts of trenches which you come acrossand to think out carefully how you would put astop in them, or how you turn them to shoot inthe opposite direction. In the diagram I havegiven you it is just possible that by cutting downthe elbow atE, you may be able to enfilade thesection of trenchE F fromA. This would, however,depend on the ground and on the actualconstruction of the trenches concerned.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
February 1, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
This week my letter will be a short one, as itonly contains one very simple problem.
You are on outpost duty and have been toldthat the General is very anxious to get one ortwo live prisoners. Your picquet is at somecross-roads a quarter of a mile south of theroadA B marked on the map. You have reasonto believe that it is probable that the enemywill patrol down the roadA B.A B is a goodroad with strong fences on either side of it, andwith ditches on the road side of the fence.
Does any special way of taking prisoners alivein this road suggest itself to you?
A very good plan to adopt in these circumstanceswould be what the Japanese used to callthe trap-door. If your post consists of six men,leave four under the leader atA and tell them toconceal themselves in the ditch, and place two,also concealed in the ditch, forty yards in frontof the matB. If the enemy’s patrol comes along,the men atB should allow it to pass them andthen give a signal and at the same time themselvestake steps to cut off the patrol’s retreat,whilst the four men atA prevent it advancingfarther.
The above little scheme is so simple that Ishould feel that I ought to apologise for settingit, were it not that I am quite certain that threeout of four of your comrades to whom you mayset it will not give the proper solution.
I saw a similar little problem given to menof different regiments in India. The only troopswho answered it properly were Pathans. It apparentlymuch resembles traps which they setfor one another in their inter-tribal fights. Although75some twenty teams competed, neitherBritish troops, Sikhs, Hindustani, Mohammedans,nor Rajputs ever managed to successfullycatch their men.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
February 7, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
The problem I am setting you to-day has todo with fire control.
You are on outpost facing in a northerly directionand are in command of a picquet consistingof the headquarters of a platoon with a Lewisgun and thirty men atG. A man who hasbeen sent in from a group on your left tellsyou that a company of the enemy is movingacross your front from left to right along theroadA B C D E F. He says that the companyis marching with an advanced guard of oneplatoon about 200 yards in front of it. Theplatoon has a couple of groups 200 yards in frontof it again. Five minutes after you have receivedthis notice, you see a group of the enemymarching from the wood atB.
How do you appreciate the situation and whataction do you intend to take?
So long as you remain carefully concealed atG and your men do not show themselves, it is atleast as likely as not that the enemy’s scouts willnot discover you. If, however, they should do so,your danger will come from the enemy’s companyand the platoon in front of it and not fromthe scouts, and it is with these larger bodies thatyou must make your plans to deal. At this closerange you ought to be able to put them out ofaction in the first minute after opening fire. Ifyour men conceal themselves properly, even ifthe scouts do discover you, they will not do sountil the enemy’s main body is nearing the pointC. Your orders should consequently be somewhatas follows:
“Let every man conceal himself.
“The Lewis gun and Nos. 1 and 2 Sectionsof the platoon on my command to open fire willdirect their fire half left on the main body of79the enemy’s company, which will be the rearmostparty. No. 3 Section will deal with the platoonforming the advanced guard, and No. 4 Section,taking its orders from the section commander,will deal with isolated groups. No man will putup his head until I give the order to fire. Thewhole platoon will use fixed sights.”
You should at once issue these preliminaryorders. If you are not discovered, do not openfire until the head of the main body hasreachedD.
Napoleon used to say that if you ever saw yourenemy making a mistake, you should give himlots of time to make it thoroughly before punishinghim. Do not pull the bait out of the pike’smouth until he has properly gorged it. Thismaxim applies equally whether you are dealingwith armies or only with platoons. I, myself,remember in my early days missing a tiger sixtyyards off, when, if I had only waited, he wouldhave walked right under the tree on which I wasseated.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
February 10, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
I hope you will master and remember the principleswhich govern the problem I am settingyou to-day. Although very simple, it requiresa little more thought than most of those whichhave preceded it.
The Germans have broken through our frontline. Your company, with its four Lewis gunsand with four Vickers guns which have beenplaced under your command, has been hastilythrown into the trenchB, which is well constructedand well concealed, and has a good fieldof fire to the east. Four 18-pounder guns werein action at a hundred yards north of the trenchB, but two of these guns have already been putout of action by the enemy’s artillery. The Germansare advancing in great numbers regardless82of sacrifice and are now about a mile distant.Their object is evidently to take the ridgeA C,and it is of the utmost importance that theyshould be frustrated in their endeavours. Thefront allotted to you to defend runs fromZClump on the north toU Farm on the south.Other troops are responsible outside these limits.You have in the trenchB 50,000 rounds of ammunitionbesides that which the men have onthem. You are senior to the officer in commandof the remaining two 18-pounders.
What action would you take? and give yourreasons.
Let us first of all consider how many roundsa minute you could expect the troops underyour command to fire in the following circumstances:
(a) If the fire were only to be continued fortwo minutes.
(b) If it were to be kept up for half an hour.
| Rounds. | |
| (a) If it were to be kept up for two minutes only, you might expect 100 infantrymen to fire from fifteen to twenty rounds a minute (let us say) | 3,200 |
| Four Lewis guns to fire 600 rounds each in the two minutes | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers to fire 750 rounds each in two minutes | 3,000 |
| 8,600 | |
| (b) If the fire were to be kept up for half an hour you might justly expect infantry to fire at an average rate of five rounds a minute | 15,000 |
| It would be unwise to attempt to exceed this average rate of fire, for even if your men were muscularly able to continue firing at a greater rate, it is a known thing that the nervous strain of firing is such that there are but few men who can fire 200 rounds consecutively without breaking down, and it is of paramount importance that you should keep a certain amount of reserve force in hand in case the enemy gets to a really close range. | |
| Four Lewis guns would during the half-hour be able to fire 600 rounds each, and if these rounds were fired at fairly long ranges would still be in a position to fire 600 rounds rapid when the enemy got to close quarters. The platoon commanders would, however, be well advised to regard these Lewis guns as their reserves and to do nothing to risk their being ready to fire 600 rounds at the critical moment. They should, therefore, use them very sparingly at medium ranges | 2,400 |
| Four Vickers Maxims should be able to fire at an average rate of 200 rounds a minute | 24,000 |
In other words, in the two minutes you couldfire at the average rate of over 4,000 rounds aminute, but for half an hour could only keep84up an average rate of about 800 rounds a minute.Another thing to be considered is that youraverage of hits at the closer ranges would begreater than they would be at the farther ranges.There is, however, no reason why you should notinflict as much loss as possible on the enemy atmedium and long ranges, provided you know atwhat distance to fire. We used to consider inSouth Africa that when we were advancingagainst a position held by the enemy, he usedto shoot straighter at 500 yards than he did at200, for, fine shots as the Boers were, their excitementat our near approach disturbed theiraccurate shooting. You may therefore expectthat your men will shootcomparatively betterwhen the enemy is at medium ranges than whenhe is very close, provided that they know thedistance.
It cannot be expected that you will go in forsuch a long disquisition at a moment when youare called upon to act, but you should have consideredthese points beforehand, at all events tosuch an extent that you would have decided toopen fire when the enemy was still at comparatively85long ranges, but to increase this fire ashe got closer and to reserve the maximum rateof fire until you can pour it in with deadly effect.You must always remember that you are dealingwith human beings who have nerves and notwith machines. As I have previously said, theabove principles should be those on which youdecide to act, but the first thing you should dowould be to send to the officer commanding thesection of guns and inquire from him the rangesof any objects within rifle shot which he hasascertained, and you should at the same timedesire him to obtain for you the ranges of anyother prominent objects near which the enemymust pass, so that if his remaining guns areknocked out you will know what sights to use.Whilst this is being done, you should divideyour front between your platoon commanders.The Lewis guns should remain with their platoons,but you would be wise to keep the VickersMaxims under your own special command, sothat you can turn them on to any portion of theadvancing line which seems especially to threatenyou. In fact, you should look on these as your86reserve. Having thus considered the situation,you should issue the following orders:
“Fire fronts are allotted as under:
No. 1 Platoon to the right of FarmU.
No. 2 Platoon from farmU toY tree.
No. 3 Platoon fromY tree to farmW.
No. 4 Platoon to the left of farmW.”
Order No. 2.—“Ranges are being ascertainedfrom the artillery and will be passed to platooncommanders. Platoon commanders can open fireat their own discretion, but must bear in mindthe enormous importance of being ready in allrespects to use the full power of their fire shouldthe enemy succeed in getting to close ranges. Thefour Vickers Maxim guns will, under my orders,fire at any portion of the enemy’s advance whichappears to be especially threatening.”
The majority of regimental officers now servingdo not at all appreciate the enormous effectof rifle and machine-gun fire at medium and longranges, nor the importance of taking every stepin their power to obtain the accurate ranges assoon as they have taken up a position. Theeffect of the fire of a fairly good company in87such circumstances as those above depicted andacting on the above carefully considered fireorders would be enormous, whereas if the firefronts were not properly allotted and if rangeswere unknown, it would be of comparativelylittle value.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
February 20, 1918.
My dear Dick,—
What would you do in the following circumstances?
A force is retiring in a north-westerly direction.The River Lea shown on the map is unfordable.Two companies are acting as thepoint of the rearguard. Their orders are to holdthe bridges atA andB. The bridge atB is tobe held until 10 a.m. and the bridge atA until10.30 a.m. If they can hold out until these hours,it is estimated that it will enable the main bodyto get away unmolested. The trees shown onthe map are mostly oak, and are on an averageforty feet high. The roads marked on the mapare metalled and good. The farm buildings atDare strong. You are commanding B Companyof your battalion, which is atB bridge, and90are senior to Captain A., a reliable officer, whois occupyingA trench just south ofA wood. At9.15 a.m. two scouts mounted on motor bicyclesinform you that they have patrolled to the frontand that none of the enemy are within threemiles of you except a few companies nearE,who are acting as support to an attack which isbeing made againstA bridge. At 9.20 a.m. youreceive the following message from Captain A.,dated 9 a.m.: “Please do whatever you can tosupport me. I am being heavily shelled, andinfantry are trying to push acrossA bridge. Ifear that there is no chance of my being able tohold out until 10.30 a.m.”
What action would you take? State yourreasons for the manner in which you would actand then definitely say what you intend to do.
What you should always aim at is to obey thespirit of an order rather than its letter. Youknow Captain A. to be a reliable officer, and hesays that he fears that he cannot hold out until9110.30. If the enemy seizeA trench before thathour, not only will your retreat be cut off, butthe object of ordering A and B Companies tohold the bridges so as to enable the main bodyto get a good start will be defeated. The nearesthostile infantry to you, atE, is some twomiles off, that is to say, some forty minutes’march. In the circumstances it is your duty togo to the assistance of A Company. The nextthing is to consider how you can best help himto carry out his retirement and also how youcan best prevent the enemy from following upyour main body. If you were to march straighttoA wood, it is doubtful whether you wouldhelp him very materially. The artillery firingfrom the south of the river would deal with thereinforcements you brought up and placed inAtrench, similarly to the way it dealt with B Company.By far your better plan will be to marchas quickly as possible toD wood and occupy thestrong buildings atD farm. From the farmbuildings you will be able to prevent the enemymarching along the road fromA toX, andshould be able to comply with the spirit92of the order, and by the delay you will thusentail on the enemy’s movements you will beable to effect the same purpose as if you hadactually prevented him from crossingA bridgebefore 10.30. You should be able to hold on toD farm until artillery are brought up toA wood,and should then be able to slip away along theroadB X. Without aeroplane observation, hostileartillery could not observe the effect of theirfire from the S. of the river, as trees intercepttheir view.
B Company will at once march toD wood andoccupyD farm.
I am marching immediately toD farm, whichI hope to reach before 10 a.m. From this placeI shall be in a position to facilitate your retreatand prevent your being pursued farther thanAwood. You may retire as soon as you see thatI have established myself in the farm buildings.93Having accomplished the object for which wehave been sent out, I shall continue my retirementtoX.
These twelve little schemes I have set you are,as I think you will admit, all very simple, butI am willing to wager that you have not answeredall of them correctly, even though theywere only applications of the axioms which Igave in the letter which preceded them. Thedifficulty is, in the heat of the moment, to decidecorrectly which of the axioms deals with thespecial situation, and nothing but practice willget over this difficulty.
You should always take every opportunityof discussing with your comrades little tacticalsituations which have occurred, or those whichmay occur. In talking over the former, do notdo so with the object of passing censure, butmerely with the view of learning what to do andwhat not to do should you find yourself in asimilar situation.
Whenever you have an opportunity, carefullyexplain the situation to your men. This is necessary94if you expect them to co-operate intelligentlyin bringing about your designs.
In the solution of any little scheme whichyou may set to your subordinates, insist on definiteorders being given and do not be contentwith vague disquisitions. When any little problemwhich you have set has been unsatisfactorilysolved, let another leader fall in, take command,and do it again properly. This is the best wayto ensure the proper solution being thoroughlyunderstood and remembered for application on afuture occasion. So long as you do not censurea superior in front of his men, it is a good thingto make your remarks in such a way that everybodycan hear them.
You must guard against technical instructorsgiving wrong impressions. The bombing sergeantis inclined to impress on the men thatthere is no such weapon as the bomb. The instructorsin the rifle grenade and the Lewis gunare also apt to talk so much of the value of theweapons in which they instruct that their pupilscome away with very false ideas. The Lewis-gunsergeant, although he never fails to tell the men95that the Lewis gun can fire at the rate of 600rounds a minute, very often does forget to informthem that after firing 600 rounds it takestwenty minutes or half an hour to cool before itis capable of firing any more. It is all very wellfor these men to be enthusiasts, but you mustsee that they abide strictly by the truth andavoid giving false impressions.
I will close this letter with a few remarks onthe moral forces. As Napoleon said, these are,compared with the physical, as three is to one.Men’s courage and determination and the willto conquer are more than half the battle. Thesituation to-day is no less serious than it waswhen I ended the last of my Twelve Letters toyou, and it behoves you to devote the whole ofyour time and your energy to making yourselfin every way efficient, and you must always bearin mind that it is possible that the little action inthe winning or losing of which your right orwrong decision may be the principal factor maybe the turning-point of a great battle.
Your affectionate father,
“X. Y. Z.”
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominantpreference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; one unbalanced quotationmark was remedied.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
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