Quick Kill In Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil WarCSC 1984SUBJECT AREA Intelligence ABSTRACTAuthor: STAFFORD, Michael R., Major, United States ArmyTitle: QUICK KILL IN SLOW MOTION: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WARPublisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff CollegeDate: 1 April 1984This paper examines the lessons of the Nigerian CivilWar from the perspective of a U.S. military officer. Itseeks to analyze the factors which stand out from the firstmodern war in independent Black Africa and equate theirsignificance to general military concepts.A summary of the historical and cultural aspects whichpredicated the civil war preceeds a review of the developmentof the Nigerian military. Capabilities of the Federal andRebel forces are acknowledged and lead to discussion of the strategies of the respective sides.Selected battles and campaigns are evaluated to definethe strengths and weaknesses of the combatant organizations.The impact of the introduction of relatively sophisticatedtechnology is viewed in light of the capacity to use thattechnology. The effects of the personalities of the twoprinciple leaders, Gowon (Nigeria) and Ojukwu (Biafra), onthe war's character are studied.Several themes surface. First is that once the militarypoliticized, it could not control the course of events inNigeria. Second, the necessity for rapid expansion ofmilitary forces on both sides predestined their inefficiencyand limited effectiveness due to training and leadershipshortfalls. Finally, technology, and its application, mustfit the specific battlefield.The paper closes with a review of conclusions generatedfrom the analyses throughout the work.WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Quick Kill in Slow Motion:The Nigerian Civil WarMajor Michael R. Stafford, USA 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI owe my sincere appreciation and gratitutde to the manyprofessionals who assisted and encouraged me during theproduction of this paper. First, Lieutenant Colonel WilliamIsom, Director of African Studies, National War College, andLieutenant Colonel William Hubard, USA, Major Mary Becka,USA, and Dr. William Stoakley (all of the DefenseIntelligence Agency), gave their time, considerableexpertise, and recommendations to the direction of this work.Second, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Bitiyong, Nigerian Army,provided substance to my research through his correspondence.Finally, I need also acknowledge Lieutenant ColonelDonald Bittner, USMC, Mrs. Mary Porter, the ReferenceLibrarian at Breckinridge Library, and Mrs. Marvella McDill,Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's encouragement was substantial,and he painstakingly edited the first draft of thismanuscript. Mrs. Porter amazed me with her dexterity inobtaining relatively scarce documents which were used in theresearch for this paper. Mrs. McDill diligently andcheerfully typed this document.To each of these kind people, I offer my thanks.TABLE OF CONTENTS PageMaps IAfrica iii II Nigeria iv IIINigerian Regions-January 1967 v IV Midwestern Invasion, August-September 1967 vi V Status, October 1968 vii VI Airlift, November 1968 viii VIIBiafra, May 30, 1969 ixVIIIFinal Collapse, December 1969-January 1970xINTRODUCTION1CHAPTER IROOTS OF CONFLICT5Pre-War History5The Nigerian Military 10The Ibo Experience 16 IITHE COMBATANT FORCES 20The Federal Side 20The Rebel Forces 26 IIITHE WAR BEGINS 30Initial Phase (June-July 1967) 30The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967) 35 IV THE WAR DEVELOPS 43The Influence of Gowon 431 Division Operations 452 Division Operations 503 Marine Commando Division Operations 54 V OJUKWU'S BIAFRA 62 IV TO THE END OF THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 1968- JANUARY 1970) 71 VIITHE AIR WAR 80The Rebel Air Force 80 The Federal Air Force 86VIIICONCLUSIONS 90END NOTES 97SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 107APPENDICES A. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 113 B. LIST OF PROMINENT PERSONS 115Click here to view imageINTRODUCTIONThe Nigerian Civil War marked a significant milestone inthe military history of independent Black Africa. For thefirst time, 20th Century technology reached a battlefieldwhere Black African met Black African in conventional combat.The expansion of capabilities, from the chaoticspears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic-rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria, introduced newdimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara.The premise of this paper is that a study of theNigerian Civil War offers the opportunity to understand howthe introduction of sophisticated weapons affects the combatcapabilities and actions of the military in the developingcountries of the world. The quantities of modern weapons in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict were not substantial, but theirimpact was great. There were no tanks or heavy artillery(122mm Russian Guns were the largest), so the individualbattle lethality can not compare to the Arab-Israeliconflicts or other technology-intensive campaigns. However,the Nigerian Civil War caused the deaths of hundreds ofthousands of people, primarily through the starvationassociated with seige warfare. In the end this war proved asunjust and deadly as war can become. Those who suffered themost were once again the very young and the very old.Much has been written about the Nigerian Civil War.There are many fine histories detailing the development ofthe country and the factors which led to the Civil War of1967 to 1970. For this reason, this paper only capsulizesthis information. Likewise, there is only limited spaceexpended here to review the Nigerian military's evolution,growth and eventual initiation of two 1966 coups d'etat whichproved to be immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War.Robin Luckham thoroughly analyzes this subject in his book,The Nigerian Military (Cambridge: University Press, 1971).Other areas which have received considerable analysisinclude international politics and foreign intervention, therelief efforts and the implications of the policy ofstarvation, the economics of civil war, and the propagandawar waged within the civil war itself. Because of the widerange of information available on these topics, I selected anarea of research more directly related to my profession--theanalysis of the military campaign.This paper is not a detailed history of the war inNigeria. Rather, selected battles and campaigns arediscussed and analyzed based on their significance to theoutcome of the war, their edification of certain lessons ofthe conflict, or their benefit in illustrating pointsregarding the development of the forces involved or the waritself. In all cases, effort has been exerted to use writtenaccounts from actual participants and observers, especiallymilitary personnel, in formulating analysis of the subjectevents. This proved necessary for two reasons. The firstwas the propaganda war mentioned above. Press releases fromthe two sides were so distorted that the New York Times, forexample, ran adjacent Biafran and Nigerian sourced stories.The other reason is the bias exhibited by foreigncorrespondents covering the war. On the Nigerian side,access to the war zone was extremely limited since themilitary controlled the movements of journalists, thuseffectively censuring much information. The Biafrans allowedfreer movement by the media, seeking every advantage incourting world opinion. This often resulted in the co-optingof journalists. As Frederick Forsyth noted about hisperspective, if "I may be accused of presenting the Biafracase, this would not be without justification. It [his book]is the Biafra story, and it is told from the Biafranstandpoint."(1)Realizing that participants may have reputations atstake, multiple accounts of individual incidents were a must.This has been possible in most cases, since Biafran andNigerian versions of most episodes were available.After assembling the military analyses of the selectedbattles and campaigns, a summary of historical factorsleading up to the Civil War was compiled to aid the reader inunderstanding the content of the conflict. This is found inChapter One. Finally, a brief summary of conclusions isprovided as the final chapter to highlight the mostsignificant aspects of the Nigerian Civil War.For those interested in further reading or study on thedetails of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict, the bibliography hasbeen annotated with this writer's comments on the content andvalue of each listing to this research. It is important tonote that readings should be balanced between authors ofBiafran and Nigerian perspectives.CHAPTER 1 ROOTS OF CONFLICTUnderstanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil Warbegins with a knowledge of the unique and complex factorswhich led to the secession of Biafra and subsequent openhostilities. By their nature, these causes drew worldwideattention to the potential redivisions of Black Africanboundaries along traditional cultural, tribal andgeographical lines. (The Organization of African Unityattempted to avoid the possible disintegration of its statesinto conflict and civil war by establishing in its 1963charter the policy of keeping the national boundaries drawnby the former colonial powers.) Later in this chapter, Ishall examine how the military in Nigeria was shaped anddriven by these influences and as an institution contributedto the chaos that ended as civil war.Pre-War History. Nigeria is the most populous countryin Africa. At the start of the civil war in 1967, shepossessed about 56 million inhabitants. Most of these peoplebelonged to one of three tribes--the Northern Hausa--Fulani,the Western Yoruba, or the Eastern Ibo. The West and Eastare collectively called "The South."Before the imposition of European influence in the 19thCentury, these tribes shared little common experience. Theywere separated geographically. The Northern Hausa-Fulanitribes were situated in dry savannahs south of the Sahara andaccessible to the influences of the Mediterranean region,especially Islam. City states there developed under the ruleof powerful emirs and the Islamic religion took root.The Yoruba in the West maintained more contact with theNorth than did the Eastern tribes, due to their highlydeveloped trading activities and moderately open territory.Urban dwellers, the Yoruba were divded into states, eachcentered on a city. The tribe was industrious; crafts werenumerous; and the religion complex due to interaction withmany outside cultures. The relative sophistication ofYoruban society helped it withstand the trauma of Europeanrule.(1)The Ibo of the Eastern region were initially quitedifferent from the hard-working, intelligent people thatdeveloped after the arrival of the British. Isolated in thedense, wet woodlands of the Niger Delta, the Ibo lacked thesophistication of the Yoruba or the coastal minority tribes.In contrast, the originally backward Ibo emerged from theBritish colonial period as the most westernized tribe,espousing Christianity (as did some Yoruba) and provingadaptable to the imported work ethic due to their initiativeand vigor.(2)Having earlier exploited the Niger area slave trade,Britain decided to stop it in the early 19th Century. Firstthe Royal Navy patrolled the coastal waters with vesselscontrolled from a consulate set up on Fernando Po, a Spanishisland possession 150 miles southeast of the Niger RiverDelta. In 1861 Britain claimed control of Lagos with thegoal of ending the slave trading which originated at thatport. Having established a mainland foothold, Britishinfluence gradually reached further inland.(3) The OilRivers Protectorate was established in (what is now) SouthernNigeria to administer traders doing business in that region, and the Niger Company was chartered to trade in the NigerRiver Basin.By 1885, when Bismarch called the Berlin Conference.Britain was firmly established in Nigeria. As was thepurpose of the conference, Africa was divided among theEuropean nations into spheres of influence. This divisionwas made wholly on the competitive political situations inEurope and did not take into account those factors on whichwestern nation-states had historically been built.Geographical and cultural influences such as naturalboundaries, tribal locations and tribal differences weretotally ignored. With the acceleration of Britishinvolvement, this set the stage for the artificial fusion ofthree distinctly different populations.In 1886 the National African Company (also known as theRoyal Niger Company) was granted a royal charter to overseethe territories north of Oil Rivers Protectorate; by 1893this had become the Niger Coast Protectorate. The NationalAfrican Company was empowered to establish a police force andprovide government services in the north.In 1897 the kingdom of Benin was brought under Britishcontrol. After the annexation of other southwest areas, theProtectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900. Inthe same year, the charter of the National African Companywas revoked and the North redesigned the Protectorate ofNorthern Nigeria. The two southern protectorates were unitedin 1906, and by 1914 the British consolidated control overall of Nigeria. What had in fact happened was the joining ofthree different foreign administrative organizations ratherthan the unification of three different indigenouspeoples.(4)The first governor of the unified Nigeria was FrederickDealtry Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard. He introduced in Nigeriathe system of indirect rule, in which local government wasessentially delegated in toto to tribal chiefs or indigenousruling bodies. These local authorities acted under thesupervision, or more accurately in many cases, the advice ofBritish administrators. In Nigeria, this allowed thecontinuation of strong regional political differences.Little progress occurred in Nigeria until the end ofWorld War II, when nationalistic movements surfaced in Africaas well as much of the rest of the colonial world. This wasactually part of the unrest in the European empires aspeoples in various areas sought to remove outside rule fromtheir homes. Powerful political parties developed n eachsector of the country. Chief Awolowo founded the ActionGroup in the West. However, the old city-states remained,dividing the West between local and regional interests. TheEast saw the formation of a single democratic party, theNational Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). Thetheme of this party, which was led by Dr. Azikiwe, wasnational unity--the formation of a single, powerfulindependent state. The Northern emirs responded to thegrowing political awareness in the South by submerging theirregion in the "designedly local and monolithic" NorthernPeoples Congress.(5)With British assistance, these three regions negotiateda constitutional government which resulted in the looselyconstituted federation established when independence wasachieved in October of 1960. In this federation, two of thethree parties had to form a coalition to gain control of thegovernment. Incredibly, the Ibo of the East who advocated astrong federal union and the more conservative Northernerswho favored a weak confederation united.(6) Dr. Azikiwebecame President and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the North was named Prime Minister.The Westerners, as oddman out, vented their frustrationin a division of their party between Awolowo and his followers, and local party segments led by Western RegionalPremier Akintola. Akintola's faction aligned with the North, and formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), while theother factions united with the Eastern Ibo to establish theUnited Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).Open hostility in the West resulted in Federalintervention, under strange circumstances, and the discoveryof "immense defalestions of regional revenues into partyfunds and private hands"(7). Awolowo was tried, convictedand imprisoned for treason, and his rival, Akintola, gainedpower based on his alignment with the Northern Party.Civil unrest was increased by other incidents duringthis time. The 1962 census results were released in 1963 andshowed a total Nigerian population of 55.6 million people, ofwhich 29.8 million were identified as living in the NorthernRegion. This outright majority caused other regions tovehemently discount the accuracy of the census.As the 1964 parlimentary elections neared, corruptionwas rife. Local political activity was marked byintimidation, and cheating was rampant, especially in theNorth. The UPGA boycotted the elections, but later accepteda second election in 1965 and garnered about a fourth of theseats. In that year the events surrounding the WesternRegional legislative election bordered on civil war. Clashesbetween Akintola's NNA and the UPGA brought about many deathsand recorded another episode in the headlong tumble fromindependence to civil war (8).The Nigerian Military. Into this cauldron of seethinghistorical, political and cultural antagonism stepped themilitary in the first coup attempt of January 1966. Thediscord between regions was based on tribal differencesaccentuated by religious and social disparities. Themilitary, as an institution, was intertwined with thesecontradictions and could not act independently from the restof Nigerian society. Hence, instead of stabilizing thecountry, the armed forces led it to civil war with a coup inJaunary 1966 and a counter-coup in July of the same year.Former military ruler Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjomaintained that these coups were the immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War. He has noted that the political equationwas altered, and the fragile trust existing among the threemajor tribes was shattered.(9)But the military lacked the size to control Nigeria. Atthe time of the first coup, Nigerian forces totaled only10,500. The Army was the largest with 9,000 soldiers. TheNavy numbered 900, including 80 officers, and the newlyformed Air Force boasted about 700 men. In a country morethan twice the size of California, the military was spreadtoo thinly and was without the training, equipment andsophistication to suitably dominant Nigeria's vast area andpopulation. Additionally, this small organizationreverberated with the ethnic turmoil confronting the rest ofthe country which further reduced its ability to handle thecivil strife.The Nigerian Army traced its roots back to the WestAfrican Frontier Force created in the late 19th Century bythe chartered companies to administer their respectiveregions.(10) By 1914 this force included a Gold CoastRegiment, the Sierra Leone Battalion and a Gambia Company.In that year, Nigerian and Gold Coast (Ghana) units fought inTogoland against the Germans there, and a detachment of British Colonial forces and a French Senegalese unitcampaigned in the German Cameroons.(11) In Accra, theBritish established the West Africa Command to exercisecommand and control of its regional colonial units. Itremained until 1956, when it was disbanded because Ghanagained independence and desired its own army, thus forcingthe break up of the Regional Force.(12)About 30,000 Nigerians served with the British Forces inWorld War II. The 81 and 82 (West Africa) Divisions included Nigerian soldiers who saw action in Burma. Nigerian troops also served with the Royal West African Frontier Force inEthiopia against the Italians, and later Nigerian unitsserved with British units in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Palestineand Sicily. Allied commanders were reportedly generous intheir praise of Nigeria's soldiers and units.(13)Until independence the Nigerian Army consisted ofrecruits essentially from the lower levels of Nigeriansociety, with a high concentration of minority tribe members.The officer corps was predominately British with a gradual,slow transition to "Nigerianization" from 1949 to 1964.Ethnic politics delayed the announcement of a NigerianCommander of the Army until 1965 when Major General JohnsonA. Ironsi, an Ibo, was given that position.After independence, military service gained prestige,and the more educated Southerners, particularly Ibo, began toenlist in increasing numbers. With decreasing Britishfunding, the Nigerians were forced to escalate militaryspending. The armed forces which before received littleinterest (14) became a matter of national pride and pressuresto expand the military size became a popular issue.(15) In1958 the Nigerian military numbered 7,600 officers and men.By 1964 it had increased by 2,900. Growth in the Navy and arelatively ambitious Air Force program accounted for much ofthis expansion.Quota systems were implemented in 1958 for the enlistedranks and in 1961 for the officer grades to balance servicecompositions with national regional demographics. These twoefforts served to highlight tribal differences within andpoliticize the small military. Along with the Nigerianiza-tion of the Officer Corps (see Table I), the quota systemthoroughly confused the dynamics of officer development. Therapid influx of officers created an age imbalance and aprofessional gap. Promotion rates accelerated, especiallyfor officers commissioned before 1960. An officer accessedat age 20, could be a lieutenant colonal at 31. When theClick here to view imageofficer ranks began to stabilize in 1965 after all theBritish officers had departed, younger officers becamefrustrated because of slower promotion rates.(16) Thisfrustration may have found outlets in political action, firstby the "Majors' Coup" in January 1966 followed by thecounter-"Captains' Coup" the following July. The most directimpact of these two coups on the Nigerian military was thedestruction of the command structure and the polarization ofthe forces along two lines, basically Ibo and non-Ibo (thefirst coup was planned and executed by a predominately Ibogroup of officers, while the second coup was led by non-Iboofficers; this served to create a mutual suspicion). Theloss of relatively experienced officers (see Table II) wouldprove particularily damaging to the Federal side in the CivilWar because of the migration of middle grade Ibo officers toBiafra.The impact of the coups was even more devastating to the country as a whole. The early coup destroyed the delicatefirst republic. Though the coup was organized to endcorruption throughout the Nigerian political system, the neteffect only placed the military in power, while thecorruption found a way to continue. It in fact was astandard justification for subsequent coups, cited inmilitary takeovers in 1975 and as recently as January 1984.In a British TV interview, the leader of the January 1966coup, Major Chukwumah Nzeogwu stated,We wanted to get rid of rotten and corruptministers, political parties, trades unions and thewhole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. Wewanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way.This was the only way. We could not afford to letthem live if this was to work. We got some but notall. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but wewere not ruthless enough. As a result he and theother compromisers were able to supplant us.(19)Instead of ending the corruption, the coups triggeredhostilities which blanketed the country in civil war andforced the rapid expansion of the military. But the Nigerianmilitary could not provide the stability to serve as aunifying institution for an oil-rich emerging power in BlackAfrica.The Ibo Experience. A final point needs to be maderegarding the animosity toward the Ibo. In their acceptanceof European values and the Christian religion, the Ibofurther differentiated themselves from the other tribes ofNigeria, particularly those of the North. The Ibo provedthemselves intelligent, ambitious and conscientious. Thesetraits enabled the Ibo to capitalize on educationalopportunities and saw them dominate administrativeorganizations, like the civil service and similar positionsin industry. They did especially well on the GeneralQualification Examination for Officer Placement in themilitary, due to their higher education level.(20) Thiseventually became a factor in the establishment of a regionalquota system for officer recruitment, so as to achieve anethnic balance in the armed forces.Resentment built up among the other tribes of the nearIbo monopoly of the skilled professions and white collarjobs. Old tribal prejudices were aggravated by the beliefthat the Ibo were trying to dominate Nigeria. The coup ofJanuary 1966, instigated by Ibo majors, led to the death ofthe key non-Ibo leaders in the country and, though apparentlyunplanned, placed Ibo General Ironsi in power. After aninitial period of relief at the believed end of corruption,doubts formed among the non-Ibo population and a feardeveloped that the coup was another step in an Ibo plan tocontrol the country.Hundreds of Ibo were massacred in May 1966 in a backlashto the coup. General Ironsi had failed to take positivesteps to stabilize the political situation by harshlypunishing the plotters, most of whom were jailedindefinitely. The appearance of complicity and the growingnationwide unrest created the climate for the counter-coup inJuly 1966; this coup was initiated by non-Ibo company gradeofficers. Ironsi was brutally slain and his Chief of Staff,Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu "Jack" Gowon, was a compromisechoice as his replacement. Gowon was the senior Northernofficer serving in the Army at the time; however, his choicecreated some interesting aspects since he was Christian, froma middle belt minority tribe, and had been hithertorelatively obscure. The second coup saw the directed movement of troops andtroop units to the regions of their respective ethnicheritage. The exodus of Ibo to the Eastern Region grew and,increasingly, that region in a de facto sense partitioneditself from the rest of Nigeria. Led by Lieutentant ColonelChukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, like Gowow a British-trained combatofficer, the Eastern Region slowly emerged as the safe havenhomeland of the Ibo peoples. In October of 1966, despiteGowon's declaration that the Ibo would be protected, pogramsand rioting resulted in the mutilation and death of thousandsof Ibo and a mass flight to the Eastern Region by a millionand a half Ibo. This October 14, 1966 Time eyewitnessaccount indicates the terror of that period:...A Lagos-bound jet had just arrived fromLondon, and as the Kano passengers were escortedinto the customs shed, a wild-eyed soldier stormedin, brandishing a rifle and demanding, 'InaNyammari?'--Hausa for 'Where are the damned Ibos?'There were Ibo among the customs officials, andthey dropped their chalk and fled, only to be shotdown in the main terminal by other soldiers.Screaming their bloody curses of a Moslem holy war,the Hausa troops turned the airport into ashambles, bayoneting Ibo worders in the bar,gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling Ibopassengers off the plane to be lined up and shot.From the airport the troops fanned out throughdowntown Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotelsand on the streets. One contingent drove theirLand Rover to the rail road station where more than100 Ibos were waiting for a train, and cut themdown with automatic fire.The soldiers did not have to do all thekilling. They were soon joined by thousands ofHausa civilians, who rampaged through the cityarmed with stones, cutlasses, machetes, andhomemade weapons of metal and broken glass. Crying'Heathen!' and 'Allah!!' the mobs and troopsinvaded the sabon gari (strangers' quarter),ransacking, looting and burning Ibo homes andstores and murdering their owners....All night long and into the morning themassacre went on. Then tired but fulfilled, theHausas drifted back to their homes and barracks toget some breakfast and sleep. Municipal garbagetrucks were sent out to collect the dead and dumpthem into mass graves outside the city...:(21)The fear of extermination built out of such incidents was thefoundation of the will to resist a vastly superior forcethroughout the Civil War. The Ibo nurtured fear in their enclaveof Eastern Nigeria with the resulting belief that only secessionand the formation of a separate country would ensure theirsecurity and safety. On May 30, 1967. Ojukwu cast aside Gowon'scontinuing efforts to maintain a federal government and proclaimedthe formation of the independent Republic of Biafra.The resulting Civil War lasted over two and half years.The cost in human life has been estimated as high as two millionpeople, and Nigeria's expanding oil-based economy simmered whenits unimpeded growth could have raised the country to a positionof international responsibility unparalled in Black Africa. CHAPTER 2THE COMBATANT FORCESThe Federal Side. When war broke out, the Nigerianmilitary was beset with numerous problems. The Army was nottotally inexperienced, having sent two battalions with theUnited Nations Peacekeeping Force to the Congo between 1960and 1964 and a smaller force to Tanzania later for a similarpeacekeeping mission. But the small 10,000-man Army thatexisted in 1966 was wrecked by the divisiveness of the tribalstrife. Many senior leaders were killed during the twocoups, and the migration of Ibo to the East resulted in theloss of more experienced officers and NCOs. According to onesource, the Federals were able to claim about 184 officerswhile the Biafrans had 93 at the start of the war.(1) Thedifficulties of selection, training and development ofofficers, including the distorted promotion schedules and agestructures (note that the military head of the country,Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, was 32 years of age at the outbreakof the war), were outgrowths of the rapid expansion of theArmy to 80,000 at the end of 1967 (2) and more than 200,000by the end of the war. Battalions were formed with 5 or 6(vice 30+) officers in late 1967. The resulted in tentativecommand and control and rudimentary staff work.(3)The seeds of indiscipline were watered by the nature ofthe force constructed. The Nigerian Army never had to resortClick here to view imageWhat existed on the Nigerian Air Force was located at Kadunain the Northern Region. Naval Forces were headquartered atthe port near Lagos.to conscription to fill its ranks. Instead, it raised thepay of privates to $46 a month (in a nation with per capitaincome at the time of about $120/year) and quickly filled itsranks with thousands of recruits, notably the uneducated fromthe middle belt minority tribes; but immigrants came fromChad seeking a better life. These untrained, unsophisticatedsoldiers highlighted the shortage of skilled personnel inspecialized areas like maintenance and administration.(5)Table III documents the concentration of Nigerian ArmyForces in the North before the war. This disparity wasprobably due to political manipulation. In any event, thestructure left the Midwest State completely unprotected andonly ceremonial and administrative units in Lagos. Tocounter this situation and prosecute the early Nigerianstrategy, the Army was reorganized along these lines:Click here to view imageArmy Headquarters was in Lagos and even with early growth ofthe Army, it still tried to maintain the centralizedadministrative control that existed before the war. Nocentral field control was established, and this problem wasexascerbated when the Chief of Staff, Colonel Joe Akapan,died in a helicopter crash in the first month of fighting.Until the last months of the war, the Nigerians failed toexert unity of command in their operations. By the timethree divisions were formed, each operated independently. NoCorps Headquarters was established. Instead, each DivisionCommander acted as a "feudal baron", competing with the otherDivisions for resources amd attention, often returning toLagos to conduct business at the headquarters while fightingcontinued in sector. For most of the war, the Nigerian Armywas configured into three divisions:Click here to view imagea.1 Division had been organized around what remainedof the Nigerian Army. Representing the best trained anddisciplined of Nigerian forces, the division had about 40,000soldiers in six infantry brigades. Although its leaders wereslow and meticulous, 1 Division never failed in accomplishingits missions (6).b.2 Division included three infantry brigades andaround 20,000 troops (7). Hastily formed during the MidwestCrises of August 1967, its lack of capable leadership andlimited experience resulted in numerous failures on thebattlefield. c.3 Marine Commmando Division distinguished itselfthroughout most of the war. With a total strength of about35,000 (8), this division was divided into eight commmandobrigades which executed numerous amphibious and riverineoperations throughout the war.The Nigerian Navy was instrumental in blockading Biafra.Though there were few ships available, the Nigerians fullydemonstrated their conceptual understanding of the need tocontrol the coastline and adjacent waters. A frigate, theN.A.S. Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained fromthe Netherlands in 1966. The British had provided twominesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft.(9) TheRussians also sold the Federals three torpedo boats (10) andseveral radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels (11) after thewar started. These last vessels were effective in canalizingrelief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues.The Nigerian Air Force had not existed until 1962 andwas building as the war commensed. The British had startedthe Air Force training, but terminated it when the Nigeriansunilaterally voided a military landing rights agreement. TheWest Germans than assumed the program in 1963. Training wasconducted both in West Germany and Nigeria, but ended in July1967 with the first air raid on Kaduna Airfield when a WestGerman trainer reportedly was killed. The other trainersleft immediately.(12) Over 100 Nigerian pilots werequalified on trainer aircraft. Many of these pilots were Ibowho were lost to the Air Force with the advent of war.Regardless, the Nigerians had no combat aircraft. In early1967, her fleet consisted of five Dakota (C-47) transports,20 Dornier DO-27 light liaision planes, and 12 P149DPiaggios.(13) The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from theLuftwaffe Training Mission.But help soon arrived; a July 1967 trip to Moscow borefruit in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and17's, as well as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers(adapted for strafing and bombing). In all the Nigeriansreceived about 15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war (14) andhosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical advisors.Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted thejet aircraft through the first part of the war. In early1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi.Additionally, the Federals boasted two BAC Jet Provosts(gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters(purchased from Australia) and five DC-3's (borrowed fromNigerian Airways).(15)In total, the Nigerian Air Force represented a flexibleand intimidating factor which had significant theoreticalstrategic impact on the war effort. Yet even with itstremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, theNigerians never fully exerted their advantage. In fact, theAir Force figured prominently in two of the more negativeaspects of the conflict, the bombing and strafing of thecivilian population and the failure of the Federals to stopthe airlift into Biafra after it was cut off from every othermeans of support.The Rebel Forces. The Biafran Army grew to a strengthof nearly 90,000. Formed around the nucleaus of 2000 formerNigerian soldiers, the Rebel Army also felt growth pains; itwas eternally wanting for experience, ammunition and food.Overwhelmingly outmanned and outgunned, poorly led andlacking an adequate support base, the Biafran Army stillmanaged to survive for two and a half years against whateasily became the strongest military force in Black Africa.The Biafrans maintained five undersized divisions andseveral special units like the Biafran Organization ofFreedom Fighters (BOFF) and the 4th Commando Brigade. Thoughguerrilla tactics did enhance Biafran operations, they werenever embraced as the disparity between the two forces might have indicated. Ojukwu, in fact, was marked as a "prisonerof classic British tactics."(16) His methods were based onthe belief that a secure homeland was essential for the Ibo.As such, his priority was the maintenance of an impenetrabledefensive parameter.There was little artillery or mortars in the BiafranArmy, and advanced armaments consisted of homemade rocketsand land mines, fabricated tanks and pre-World War II Frencharmored cars. Desperate for war materials, the Biafrans wereoften dependent on captured Federal equipment. This createdproblems. Rebel soldiers would stop to pick up clothing andsupplies instead of pursuing retreating Federal troops. Whenthe Nigerians discovered this trait, they baited preplannedartillery and mortar targets with military supplies.(17)The shortage of equipment also meant that the Biafranswere unable to capitalize on the large numbers of volunteerswhich initially streamed in. Time magazine reported that oneof the elite Biafran Brigades had enough arms for only 3,000of its 6,000 men.(18) This situation persisted until thesummer of 1968 when the French announce support of theBiafran cause.The Biafran Navy was essentially a non-entity after theraid on Bonny. It consisted almost entirely of machine gunmounted Chris-Crafts taken from the Port Harcourt SailingClub (19), and armed harbor and river craft. Though theRebels tried to obtain naval vessels, they were unsuccessful and never seriously influenced the naval war.The Biafran Air Force, however, evolved into a viableinstitution. Twice it countributed to Biafran initiatives.Early in the war, the Air Force consisted of:Click here to view imageKeeping this ancient fleet in the air rapidly overwhelmed theBiafrans. The initial value of these aircraft was thepsychological effect they created in the disorganized earlystage of the war. The bombers made harassing attacks onLagos and the Northern air fields, creating large scale panicwith their erratic bombing with homemade munitions. Thehelicopters likewise dampened Federal fervor on the battlefield. Used primarily for reconnaissance, Federalsoldiers soon discovered they were not safe when theAlouettes were in the air due either to aerially supportedartillery or mortar attacks, or homemade bombs dropped fromthe aircraft. They quickly learned to seek cover when thehelicopters were flying.(22)Besides the continuing airlift, the next importantcontribution made to the air war came at the end. A Swedishcitizen was moved by the suffering created in Biafra byFederal air raids. This man, Count Carl von Rosen, decidedto get the Biafrans a countering air capability andintroduced 19 Swedish single engine MFI-90 airplanes. Eachof these trainers had 12 rockets in a pod mounted under thewing and was capable of flying undetected at tree top levelto its targets. These tactics had an immediate impact on the Nigerians, but it was a case of too little, too late as thewar ended before the potential of this small air force could be realized. They were particularly effective in attacksagainst fixed targets, like oil wells and equipment.(23)The Biafrans simply were never able to match therelative Federal might. The oil revenue with which theyexpected to finance their war effort was soon cut off as theFederal blockade was enforced. By the time massive Frenchaid was received, the war was lost and the aid merelyprolonged the suffering.CHAPTER 3 THE WAR BEGINSI need not tell you what horror, whatdevastation and what extreme human suffering willattend the use of force. When it is over and the smoke and dust have lifted, and the dead areburied, we shall find, as other people have found,that it has all been futile, entirely futile, insolving the problem we set out to solve. (1)Initial Phase. (June-July 1967). No one heard theprophetic words of Colonel R.A. Adebayo, Governor of the WestRegion of Nigeria. Both sides were totally unprepared forwhat was to come. This was the foremost lesson at the startof the war. On the Federal side, there was no comprehensionof the paranoia which encompassed the Ibo being. Instead,Gowon expected a "police acton" whereby the rebelliousBiafrans would be surrounded and isolated from the world;then Biafran resistance would quickly fade and Federalvictory would be rapid--"a quick kill."Even before the Biafran Independence Announcement, theFederal government cut off telephone, telegraph and postalservice to the rebellious state. Afterwards, airlines,railroads and highways were closed, and the small NigerianNavy prepared to blockade all shipping except oil tankers.Even these were restricted from transit as hostilitiesintensified.Mobilization was half-hearted at best. In the North,the Chairman of Internal Administrative Services warnedprovincial administrators of the impending conflict. Limitedtraining in civil defense began and evacuation planning wasconducted in the event of raids on the larger cities.Ex-servicemen, some 7,000, were recalled to active duty andformed four new infantry battalions. The Army startedrecruiting members from the local and national policeforces.(2)After a five week lull, the first offensive actionsbegan. Barely qualifying as skirmishes, they marked aFederal campaign to advance from the North on four axes withthe objective of crushing Biafran resistance and seizingtheir capital of Enugu. After some initial successes, theNigerians began to meet increasing Rebel resistance. Itbecame apparent that they had underestimated the measure ofresolve of the poorly equipped Biafran Army. Alsohighlighted were the lack of training and discipline of theNigerian Army and the difficulties they would experience dueto their long lines of communication. The offensive groundto a halt, and the rebellion that they expected would takeonly days to crush exhibited more long term potential.The Biafrans set their strategy as the establishment ofa secure homeland for the Ibo and the development of a mightwhich, as Ojukwu stated, no force in Black Africa couldovercome.(3) Like the Federals, the Rebels stressed civildefense procedures. With limited military resources, yetdriven by terrible fear, the people of the region prepareddefensive positions on likely avenues of approach, formedlocal militias and secured Nigerian-owned war materials thatremained in the region. In fact, Rebel preparations beganwell in advance of the actual secession date. They startedin earnest with the massive influx of refugee Ibo during andafter the September/October 1966 pogroms. Non-Easterners hadbeen ordered out of the region at that time, and there areclear indications that secession was planned from that point.(4)The Biafrans met the initial Federal advances from theNorthern Region with full resistance. They used to theiradvantage the fact that they were fighting in their hometerritory, capitalizing on the availability of manpower tohinder Federal advances. Traps, ditches and obstacles wereplaced in the paths of attacking Nigerians. These onlyslowed the Federals, who used their superior firepower tosaturate prepared positions and their mobility advantage tooutflank Biafran strong points. At Obollo Eke, for example,artillery and mortar shelling began at 6 a.m. August 3, 1967,and continued until 8 a.m. After a brief attack, artillerypreparations resumed, followed by another probe. Thisalternating pattern of two hours of shelling and a probingattack continued during daylight hours for four days beforethe Rebles were pushed out of Obollo Eke.(5)The extensive road network in northern Biafra createdflank defensive problems. After the first loses of Biafranterritory at Obudu, the Rebels planned to fall back to Ogoja.In retreat they ran into a Federal ambush and learned justhow vulnerable their flanks were.(6) Quickly they adjustedtheir tactics, moving to the flanks when armored vehiclesassaulted their lines and reclosing the ranks after theypassed. The Rebels soon resorted to hit-and-run tactics inthe form of ambushes to harrass Nigerian operations. Butthey never abandoned their static defenses, and from the verybeginning the Biafrans were victims of their lack of militaryexperience.One bright spot for the Biafrans appeared on July 21,1967 when a World War II American-made B-26 bomber piloted bya Polish expatriot, called "Kamikaze" Brown, bombed andstrafed Federal positions at Obukpa. This greatly liftedBiafran morale (7), but offered ominous clouds for futureevents. Both Great Britain and the Untied States hadrejected Nigerian requests for aircraft. By July 31 Nigerianrepresentatives were reported in Moscow (8) and expansion ofthe war's lethality was imminent. (Note: Arms supply was amajor part of a critical issue, outside intervention, whichdominated international discussion of the Nigerian CivilWar.)Another event which portended the calamities to followwas the amphibious assault on and capture of the Island ofBonny at the mouth of the Port Harcourt Harbor. This Federaloperation was important for two reasons. First, itdemonstrated a boldness, fluidity and imagination seldom seenin Federal operations. The Bonny assault was not remarkablein its execution; however, the operation was in markedcontrast to the "skirmishes, slow, cautious probes, and longdistance bombardments of doutful object with doubtfulaccuracy [and an] incredible amount of aimless and wastefulshooting" (9) which dominated the northern battlefields. OnBonny a 1000 man invasion force loaded on two shipsoverwhelmed a company--sized garrison after a limited navalbombardment. Destroyed was Biafra's only real naval vessel,a Nigerian patrol boat seized at secession; more important,Port Harcourt, the major port and oil terminal in Biafra, waseffectively sealed off.This leads to the second importance of the Bonny capture. It pinpoints the failure of Biafran leaders toappreciate the incredible consequence of losing their sealines of communications. They did not see the need to secureadequate sea power before the war began and were unable tocorrect their shortcoming when it became apparent how seriousthe Federals were about enforcing their blockade of theBiafran coastline. The New York Times noted at this stage ofthe war that Biafra had a "better-than-even chance ofsurvival" ...but that it was... "clear, that the East cannotsurvive for many months unless the naval blockade isbroken."(10) Instead of confronting this problem, howeverthe Biafrans turned inward.The Midwestern Invasion (August-September 1967). The twoforces fought tentatively through July of 1967 and intoAugust, with the Federals steadily gaining ground. Then theBiafrans, who had seemed interested only in a defensive war,launched an attack into the Midwestern State. This markedthe turning point in the war, as the Rebels gambled on a disastrous offensive campaign."We have no territorial ambitions. We do not want tocapture anybody or punish anybody. We just want to be left alone,"(11) Ojukwu wrote. The drive into the Midwest,however, stood in stark contrast to this claim, Biafra hadmoved boldly beyond simply protecting the Ibo enclave andseized the initiative, taking the war to the Federals. The objectives of the strike were lightning attacks on, and thecapture of, the Federal capital of Lagos and the WesternState capital of Ibadan. The occupation of these twocapitals was expected to cause an immediate collapse of the Federal government and an end to the war. But the way theRebel forces spread throughout the region, it is clear thatOjukwa had other objectives in their advance. Among thesewere establishment of internal control of the MidwesternState and limited prosecution of the war into the NorthernState.The execution of the plan higlighted the incompetenceof the strategic planners in Biafra. Just as they failed tofully grasp the implications of a naval blockade, they lackedthe professional skills and imagination (and patience, andresources) to coordinate an effective attack. The plan tookadvantage of the sparse Federal forces which were thinlyspread throughout the region in small garrisons, more aninternal security force than an army. But the plan did notcorrectly account for many of the non-military factorsbearing on the situation, nor did it have sufficientflexibility to confront in any realistic sense changingconditions.The Midwestern State was in a precarious position, asmall, wealthy area caught between the secessionist Ibo andthe Federal captial of Lagos. In its boundaries were some800,000 Ibo who could be expected to have sympathies for theEast. Primarily agrarian, the region was rich in palm oil,rubber and timber, while oil was a growing resource.One-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of herreserves were located here. This made the Midwest a desirable property for both sides.(12)At 3 a.m. on August 9, a 100 vehicle column (about 1000men) crossed the Onitsha Bridge over the Niger River. Withinhours Rebel troops occupied the Midwest captial of Benin,while others had fanned out towards Okene (see Map IV) in thenorth, Owo, also north, and Sapele and Warri to the south.The takeover was facilitated by an insurrection of Ibo-ledtroops in the region and few shots were actually fired.Evidence is strong that Federal military leaders of Iboorigin secretly collaborated with the Biafrans, providingintelligence on Federal troop dispositions and coordinating a revolt from Nigeria in conjunction with the offensive.(13)As a result, operational security and surprise were achieved.The inital success of the raids, coupled with an August 11air attack on Lagos, had a devastating psychological effecton the Federal side.In compensation for the tremendous security surroundingthe operation, the Biafrans delayed the formation of theirbrigade-sized task force, conducted no rehersal and evenwithheld appointment of the task force commander until theday before the attack.(14) This demonstrated a lack ofappreciation for the necessity of building teamwork andcohesion in military units and entered several unknowns intothe Midwest operational equation.a. Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, wasselected to be the operational commander for politcal reasons rather than his military skills. There was a beliefthat a non-Ibo leader would help gain Midwest and Westernsupport for the Biafran attack and in the end, help unite allof the South against the North. This not withsanding, Banjoignored his principal objective, Lagos, and twice held up hisadvance. At Benin he halted to "reorganize" his forces,though they had not fired a shot. Time was lost in anargument between Benin and Enugu over who was to be the newgovernor of the region.(15) After three days the Rebelsadvanced on to the west before stopping at Ore. Forgetingthat their success depended on speed, the Biafrans werehesitant to face the uncertainty of continued advance.(16)Lack of agrresive leadership and unity of purpose resultedin a two week delay after which the Rebels lost theinitiative.b. The shock of the invasion and the lack of disciplinedisplayed by Biafran soldiers produced adverse results. Thesupport expected for the Midwest Ibo did not materialize asexpected, and the negative reaction by non-Ibo in the Midwestand West was far worse than anticipated. It evidenced apolitical blindness in the Biafran leadership akin to theirmilitary shortcomings. John de St. Horre notes that thispolitical blindness was "too often repeated to be a chancephenomenon."(17)c.The political "wheeling and dealing" that took placein Benin over control of the region, at the expense ofmilitary objectives, lent a suspicious cast to the Biafranleadership. The motives and actions of all officers becamesuspect because of the rumor of "saboteurs" within theleadersip.(18) This prejudgement severely hampered commandand control in Biafra thereafter and is discussed in Chapter5.d.The Biafrans probably lacked the capability toconduct such an offensive operation. In his book, ReluctantRebel, Fola Oyewole details the lack of preparation for theMidwest offensive by his company. Here is a summary of oneepisode. Upon his return from a battalion field exercise, hewas ordered to form a new company at Onitsha. He deliveredhis car and possessions to family members in that city andreported immediately to his battalion. Within hours he movedto the Midwest. His unit's mission was the capture of thearmy barracks at Ugbelli. With an officer cadet as hisexecutive officer and no experienced noncommissionedofficers, the company was bused to the objective area. Tenmiles from Ugbelli, he stopped the column and provided ashort briefing, though he was without intelligence orreconnasissance. Fortunately there was no opposition at theobjective. Even so, the untrained and undisciplined troopsengaged in sporatic firing which resulted in one wound.(19)Such episodes illustrate just how unprepared the Rebels werefor the war. The vehicles used for the attack includedhomemade armored cars, farm trucks and passenger cars. TheBiafran soldiers were poorly equipped, and many were withoutuniforms. They were lucky to meet only token resistance fromthe few Federal Forces.From the Federal side, the Midwest Invasion achieved onesignificant result. It broke the complacency surrounding theFederal war effort, and unified the ojectives of Lagos, theWest and the North. The entire country was intimidation bythe aggressiveness of the Eastern Ibo and the response was immediate. In a demand for Federal action, anti-Ibo riots broke out in Lagos and Ibadan. A dawn-to-dusk curfew wasimposed at Ibadan, and troops and armored cars presented ashow of force in Lagos to buoy public confidence.Militarily, the reaction was more substantive. A warcabinet was formed in Lagos. Remaining Federal forcesoperating in the Midwest fell back to blocking positions,most notably to the south of Ore about 120 miles from Lagos on the overland axis of advance from Benin. There they werereinforced by a company of Federal Guards from Lagos. A newunit, 2 Division, commanded by then Lieutenant ColonelMurtala Mohammed, sent its 7 Brigade to Ore, while the 6 and8 Brigades were placed on the northern border of the Midwestto occupy the Biafran's right flank.Lagos must have been reminiscent of Paris and her taxisduring the first battle of the Marne. Ground wagons and red-and-silver buses delivered soldiers from Lagos to the front.Six hundred soldiers were recalled from Bonny, and 500 morewere moved by rail from Kaduna in the north. The war in the north of Biafra slowed as attention and resources were drawnto overcome the threat in the Midwest. Nigeria's leadingplaywright, Wole Soyinka, observed that "the short, surgicalpolice action is being conducted with blunt and unsterilescapels."(20)By mid-August, blown bridges and their own hesitationhad stopped the Biafrans. The very factor which had hamperedthe Federal offensive earlier, long lines of communcations,now was a problem for the Rebels. A small force from thebeginning, it was stretched too far to withstand the growingFederal pressure.Abruptly, the Rebel offensive ended as the Federals tookthe initiative. After a single, fierce, battalion-level,infantry battle at Foriku, just south of Ore, Biafranresistance faded into an "accelerating retreat" characterizedby minor delaying actions, blown bridges and crateredroads.(21) The two northern brigades were in a race tooutflank the Biafrans and cut off their retreat to the NigerRiver Bridge at Onitsha. In their haste, the Biafrans leftbehind many soldiers who did not receive word to withdraw andwere consequently captured. Benin was evacuated days beforethe Federals arrived. The remnants of the invading forcecrossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha, blowing two spans intheir passing. The destruction of the bridge, a giantedifice commemorative of Nigerian progress, was symbolic of a final isolation for Biafra and a new and deadlier phase ofthe war.From the Midwest Invasion the Biafrans had hoped to showthe world that they were a legitimate power deserving ofinternational recognition; instead the foray ended withdisaster. The Rebels gained some food, materiel, and theassets of the Bank of Benin which were expropriated in theoccupation. But the losses far overshadowed those minorgains:a.The Federals declared all out war, launching thefirst air strikes of the war at Enugu, Onitsha, Port Harcourtand Calabar among others.(22)b. The Biafrans removed the buffer of the midweststate. All sympathy in the South was lost as non-Ibo becamepro-Federals. Additionally, the blockade became moreeffective as trade that had flourished in the Niger died.(23)c. The loss of resources, men and materiel, in theMidwest hastened the fall of Enugu. The withdrawal of theseassets had weakened the defense of the northern region. When these forces did not return and the Federals resumed theiradvance with a rekindled fervor, the early fall of theBiafran capital was assured.(24)d.Finally, the initiative was surrendered to theFederals. With the offensive they initiated in mid-August,the Federals began to display their superiority. Theconflict slowed to the plodding war of attrition that wouldcontinue for over two years. The norther border was closed by the Nigerian 1 Division, the Midwestern Region had beenclearly by 2 Division, and the Navy had blockaded most of thesea approaches. The Cameroons had closed their rugged borderin June 1967, and the noose was slowly tightened by theFederals. CHAPTER 4 THE WAR DEVELOPS(October 1967-August 1968)The Biafrans had gambled on taking the initiative awayfrom the Federal forces. Pushed back across the Niger Riverafter the abortive Midwest invasion, they had lost any chanceof victory and had spurred the Nigerians into action. TheFederal response was a three-pronged offensive from thenorth, the west and the south, while they methodicallytightened their blockade. The result was the isolation ofBiafra and the gradual collapse of the Rebel state into asmaller and smaller enclave.The Influence of Gowon. The deliberateness of theNigerian effort was indicative of the character of theFederal leader, now Major General Yakubu "Jack" Gowon. Thisoccurred despite the fact that personally Gowon was atypicalof the people he led. Born into a Methodist minister'sfamily in 1934, Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribein the predominantely Moslem north. He was educated inNigeria and received military training in the British-operated Officer Training School at Teshire, Ghana and atEton Hall and the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst inEngland. He and his counterpart on the Rebel side, Ojukwu,had similar military backgrounds.Both were commissioned in the Army in 1957 and servedwith the United Nations Force in the Congo. After staffcollege in Camberley, England, Gowon was promoted toLieutenant Colonel in 1963. In 1965 he attended the JointServices Staff College in England, returning to Nigeria twodays before the first coup of January 15, 1966; his absencefrom Nigeria may actually have saved his life. In any event,Major General ironsi took power and appointed him Chief ofStaff of the Nigerian Army. In the aftermath of the July1966 counter-coup, Gowon was a compromise selection to headNigeria though he apparently was not involved in the coup.Where Ojukuw was outgoing, openly ambitious andcharismatic, Gowon was more sedate. A man of slight stature,Gowon was trim, dapper and polished. He radiated little ofthe fire and exhibited none of the clever intelligence of hisadversary; but Gowon was stable, serious and determined. Hehad the talents to hold together and orchestrate the wartimeadministration of the emerging power engaged in a bittercivil war. This General Gowon did under the intensivescrutiny and criticism of the international media, yet hedisplayed insight that tinged his leadership withLincolnesque qualities.(1) His moderation is regarded aspossibly the greatest single asset that he brought to thewar.(2) There was no panic in his headquarters, and Gowonlet his field commanders run their operations with little intervention. In fact, his visits to the fronts werevirtually nonexistant; he depended on radio and telephonecontact for information.(3)Gowon was sensitive to the fear of genocide in the Iboand to the necessity of rebuilding the country when the warended. He issued a code of conduct for the military. Herefused to authorize any awards for the conduct of the CivilWar. Finally, General Gowon invited a team of internationalobservers to the front to appraise the conduct of Federalsoldiers.(4)Gowon balanced his understanding of the long termaspects of his policies with a resolve which demonstrated hiscomprehension of the short range needs of Nigeria to conductwar. He gradually built up his forces and arms rather thanimmediately acquiring armaments and munitions in bulk, thusavoiding morgaging his country's furture.(5) Additionally,once he decided that siege warfare was the best method tosecure victory, he applied the blockade and did not waiverunder the intense international pressure to allow mass reliefoperations into Biafra. Regardless of whether his positionwas morally right or wrong (considering the people who diedof starvation), Gowon maintained the commitment necessary todirect his country througout the war and the insight toreunite it when peace arrived.1 Division Operations. The unit that most reflectedGowon's cautious resolve was 1 Division which fought in thenorth of the Eastern Region. Containing the bulk of theremaining Nigerian regular prewar army, the division appliedrenewed pressure around Enugu after the Midwest offensive.Enugu's importance went beyond the fact that it was the Biafran capital: it was a coal mining and steel town whichlay on the only railroad into the Eastern Region. As a captial, the city had symbolic value; but as an industrialcenter, it represented a major asset to the Biafran warmachine.Characteristic of 1 Division, detailed planning andpreparation went into the operational concept for the Enuguassault. 1 Brigade was tasked with capturing Enuku; it hadseven battalions (1000 men each) with another 1000 menavailable as individual replacements. The first brigade wastasked with capturing Enuku. The plan called for a two axesadvance from Nsukka to Nine Mile Corner and Eka, followed bya single axis movement to Enugu.(6)On September 10, 1967 the Rebels launched a pre-emptivecounter-attack in which they introduced their own armoredpersonnel carriers, pre-World War II French vehicles called"Red Devils." Slow and bulky, the "Red Devils" were particularly vulnerable to antitank weapons, and the attackquickly stalled.(7) Two days later the Federal attackrenewed. It was a deliberate process as the Federals met thetypical Rebel rear guard delaying action. Obstacles werecreated using craters, trenches and debris, and progress wasfuther hampered by well planned covering fires on theobstacles.The shelling of Enugu commenced on September 26th andcontinued sporatically, but in volume, until the city wastaken on October 4th.(8) The serious fighting occurred onOctober 1st when Nine Mile Corner was captured by theNigerians. The dominant high ground, Millikin Hill, wascontrolled after weak resistance as the Biafran support basefled from Enugu and the soldiers, isolated, soon followed.(9)The Federals had clearly demonstrated their superiorfirepower with the capture of Enugu. The relativelyextensive artillery preparation was the key to capturing thecity. However, the psychological damage done by, andresources diverted to, the loss in the Midwest (which wascleared at the end of September by the Nigerians) can not beoverlooked as factors in the defeat at Enugu. Additionally,Lieutenant Colonel Banjo and three others held responsiblefor the Midwest debacle were executed by the Biafrans onSeptember 24th, feeding the suspicion of the Biafran populaceregarding "saboteurs."The fall of Enugu highlights several problems which wereto haunt the Biafrans throughout the war:a. The tremendous shortages of food and materiel wereexacerbated by the support base which the Biafrans developed.Administrative directorates, completely civilianized, wereresponsible for providing services to military units. Forinstance, the food directorate set up kitchens behind thelines. These cookhouses prepared food which was moved to thetroops for consumption. Throughout the war, as at Enugu,when the Army was forced to withdraw, the kitchens weredisassembled and reestablished several days later in a saferlocation. Meanwhile, the troops were without food for daysas they continued to fight.(10) By the end of 1967 the Armyformed the Biafran Army Service Corps (BASC) to help withfood distribution and other support requirements, but theBASC often engaged in petty arguments with the directoratesover control of resources. Many of these disputes requiredpersonal intervention by Ojukuwu and clearly showed a lack oflogistics awareness and unity of purpose in the Biafra wareffort.b. Disorganization is also apparent in the way thatreserves were thrown pell mell into battle when the situationwas desperate. Time and again, the Federals would attack andoverwhelm their objective; thus, the Biafrans wouldfrantically mobilize every available resource and try toreverse an already lost cause. At Enugu, it was theformation and deployment of the "S" Brigade, raised torecapture the city from the Federals. This brigade continuedresistance at Enugu for weeks until it was outflanked andforced to withdraw. The lesson here is that the Biafranleadership did not fully consider its operational problems.Fighting a defensive war, the superficial, obviouspreparations for battle were made. Defensive fortificationswith concrete bunkers, alternate positions and preplannedambushes were planned and emplaced. Yet the leadership didnot plan for the worst case. Consequently, hectic scramblingoccurred to regain lost positions when some degree ofrealistic foresight and planning might have saved preciousresources and ensured more successes.c. Perhaps the reason that the Biafrans did notconsider the worst was because discussion of such cases wouldhave cast suspicion on the planner as being a "saboteur." Paranoia was rampant throughout Biafra. Even in officialchannels, the truth, if disastrous, was avoided. After thefall of Enugu, Biafran documents, books and press releaseswere identified as originating from "Enugu." Umuahia, wherethe govenment moved from Enugu, was called the "Administra-tive Center," a euphemism for capital, and Port Harcourtlater was said to be "disturbed" instead of captured.(11)Ultimately, the air of suspicion and the lack of reality inthe precautions of the government hindered the militarycapacity and caused thousands of civilian deaths.The Federals also demonstrated patterns which were tofollow them through the rest of the war.a.Their long lines of communications, dependence onartillery bombardment (which required massive resupplyefforts) and reliance of armored personnel carriers to lead combat formations, initially tied them to over-the-roadmovements. This was especially true since they started thewar in the rainy season. Soon their supply lines wereoverextended. This may have been a major factor for thedeliberateness of 1 Division operations. After theircautious movement during combat, they took six months toresupply and reorganize before their next operations.b.The Federals did not capitalize on the use ofinfantry tactics. Systemic is the word one author used todefine every Federal operation. The saturation shelling whichpreceeded Federal assaults left the soldiers with little todo other than walk-in and mop-up the various objectives.(12)This meant that the inexperienced troops gained minimallyfrom each successive operation. It also allowed for greatercivilian casualties, especially as the war continued, and theBiafrans were squeezed into smaller and smaller areas.c.Lastly, Enugu once more pointed out shortcomings inthe Federal intelligence capabilities. At the outbreak ofthe war, the Federals had inaccurately predicted the Biafrancapacity to wage war and had planned a short "police action."The Midwest Invasion had caught them by surprise, and whenretaking Benin, Federal forces barraged the city even thoughthe Biafrans had vacated the premises days before.(13) AtEnugu, 1 Division did not realize in their caution thatpursuit of the disorganized, retreating Biafrans, and thedestruction of the Rebel force which was then possible, might have brought a rapid conclusion to the civil war.(14)2 Division Operations. Things were not all one-sided onthe northern front. At Onitsha, the Federal 2 Division wasbogged down. Its continuous setbacks there were one of themajor failures of the Nigerian Army in the war. The green,untrained and poorly led 2 Division offered a marked contrastto 1 Division.Thrown together in the heat of the Midwest Invasion, 2Division got a false sense of its own and Biafrancapabilities as the Rebel forces melted away in theMidwestern Region under slight pressure. Securing the Regionby the end of September, the Division Commander, then ColonelMurtala Mohammed, prepared for his next operation--thecapture of Onitsha on the Biafra side of the Niger River.Onitsha was important because it was a commercial center withthe largest market in West Africa. Denial of access to theseresources would seriously reduce Biafran logisticalcapabilities. Additionally, securing a bridgehead on theeast bank of the Niger at Onitsha would shorten Nigerianlines of communications with Lagos. Even with the NigerRiver Bridge down, waterborne movement from the main road onthe western side would greatly reduce transit time forreplacements and supplies into the Eastern Region. Finally,Onitsha marked the route into the Ibo heartland and thereforewould take the war to traditional tribal home. Thepossible psychological gain was great. All available ferry boats in the country were collectedat Asaba on the western side of the river, and limitedspecial training was conducted on river crossing operations.The Army and Supreme Headquarters advised against the opposedriver crossing, recommending instead that 2 Division shouldtransit the Niger unopposed, north at Idah and then attackoverland to Onitsha. Both staffs realized how complicatedthis operation was for inexperienced troops with inadequateequipment. The General Officer Commanding (GOC), ColonelMohammed, had his way. Onitsha was attacked with mortars andartillery in preparation for the assault. On the night ofOctober 12, the Federals crossed in strength, established abridgehead and fanned out into the city with two armoredpersonnel carriers in the lead. Here, the conduct of theoperation faltered.The undisciplined soldiers became obsessed withransacking Onitsha for spoils, forgetting the need forsecuring the bridgehead. The Biafrans, under Colonel JoeAchuzie, counter-attacked; the Federals were surprised, outof position and routed. Driven back to the river's edge, thesoldiers discovered that expected reinforcements and supplieshad not arrived because of the mechanical failure of thefollow-on support vessel. The 1000-man assault battalion wasdecimated in their disorganization under the Rebel fire. Inthis and other crossing attempts, drownings accounted for anexcessive number of losses, pinpointing the lack of detailedtraining/rehearsals for the crossings.(15)The second crossing was tried on September 28. It failed when the Biafrans machinegunned the boats in the water. By the time the third attempt came, demoralized 2Division troops were on the verge of mutiny and chaos.(16)The Division Commander then abandoned further river assaultsand executed the plan originally recommended by his higherheadquarters. He crossed the Niger unopposed at Idah whichwas under Federal control and moved slowly to Onitsha in 1Division territory. Planning and operational security werepoor, but the Rebels were overextended and could not redeployin sufficient numbers to counter the 2 Division attack.(17)At the end of March 1968, six months after the firstabortive river crossing, Onitsha fell to a two-prongedattack, one brigade closing from the north and anotherconducting a river crossing over the Niger (near the originalsites). The battle only lasted five hours (18), belying thedifficulty the Federals experienced at Onitsha. The victorywas pyrrhic. 2 Division was demoralized and largelyineffective as a combat orgainzation. It had difficultymoving beyond Onitsha and clearing its sector. The roadbetween Onitsha and Enugu where 1 Division maintained itsheadquarters was closed by Rebel activity until the last daysof the war. The Division later had to return elements to the Midwest to counter recurring Rebel guerrilla activities inthat region. One strong Rebel raiding expedition in April1968 took Asaba and briefly closed direct supply across theNiger.(19) Such harassment with its drain on manpowerconstantly degraded 2 Division capabilities on the easternside of the Niger.Two final events starkly characterized 2 Division duringthis period. First, soldiers of the Division massacred,without apparent provocation, 300 Ibo men, women and childrenwho had gathered in Onitsha Cathedral to pray during thecity's seige. This brutal act typified the lack of leadership, discipline and professionalism in 2 Division.Such incidents solidified sentiments that the Federals wantedto exterminate the Ibo, thus hardening the Ibo resolve tofight on.(20)The second incident occurred during resupply operations for the battle at Onitsha. A division convoy of over 100 trucks, led by two armored cars, was ambushed by ColonelAchuzie's forces at Abagana, a few miles northeast ofOnitsha. The armored vehicles sped away from the convoy whenit was ambushed, while the packed column provided aspectacular target when a petroleum tanker went up in flames.The fire swiftly spread through the convoy which was lost inits entirety, including almost all the drivers andescorts.(21) Once more poor planning, training and discipline haunted 2 Division, as the whole supply column wasdestroyed in one lucky ambush.3 Marine Commando Division Operations. The war in thesouth took on a different nature. Colonel Benjamin Adekunlehad obtained permission to redesignate his 3 InfantryDivision as 3 Marine Commando Division. This was based onthe unique role the unit had played up to that point in thewar, first with the amphibious assault at Bonny and then withriverine operations to help clear the Midwestern Region. Thenew division took on the special qualities of its GOC.Colonel Adekunle, Age 29, was diminuative and aggressive,known to be more daring than the other division commanders.A staunch disciplinarian, Adekunle carried a golf club shaftor bat which he used to prod soldiers under fire. ColonelAdekunle apparently was able to get away with this because ofthe universally accepted belief that he was fearless. He wasnoted for personally leading his brigades into battle.(22)Adekunle was dynamic and innovative in his plans andoperations. In early October 1967, he put these traits touse as 3 Marine Commando Division finalized preparations foran amphibious assault of Calabar. Calabar was the easternmost port on the Biafra coastline. Through it, smallquantities of materiel were still shipped into the region.Calabar also lay on the remaining passible road to theCameroons. By capturing Calabar, the Federals wouldinterdict all land routes into Biafra and control the entirecoast, thus cutting off the secessionists from the rest of the world except by air and telex.A garrison of 1000 men was left at Bonny to defend theisland, whiel the rest of the division, six battalions of 500men each, loaded out naval shipping for the assault ofCalabar. It is important to note that this operation tookall of the Federal naval force, leaving Bonny weaklysupported. The Rebels later attacked and overwhelmed theFederal garrison which was pushed to a perimeter on thewaterline before adequate relief arrived in early 1968.Adekunle and the headquarters at Lagos had been willing totake this risk, because of the additional front opening atCalabar. The total of five fronts (Bonny, Onitsha, Enugu,the Northeast, and Calabar) significantly overextended thealready strained resources of the weaker Biafrans. By thisreasoning and their comprehension of the import of the navalblockade, the Federal leadership demonstrated its superiorgrasp of strategic issues.One battalion of Biafran infantry was defending bothCalabar, to the east of the Cross River inlet, and Oron tothe west of the inlet.(23) Adekunle ignored the company-sized Oron contingent and attacked near Calabar to seize thatcity. After a naval bombardment interspersed with aerialbombing and strafing, the Federal's lone tank landing ship,the NNS Lokoja, debarked one battalion in late morning.Resistance in the form of small arms fire was soon overcome.The Lokoja embarked another battalion which it delivered toan adjacent beach head that afternoon. The two battalionsproceeded on separate axes into Calabar. Fighting wasspirited and confused by pro-Federal snipers. Severalsources stated that Federal troops were infiltrated intoCalabar disquished as fishermen and later created havoc.(24)Hand-to-hand fighting occurred in the streets and heavycivilian casualties resulted. The defending battalion (-)was reduced to 350 men by the end of the first day and 200men on the second day (25) when the Federals landed a thirdbattalion. The old slave port fell to the Nigerians on October 19, as the Biafrans were simply overwhelmed by a superior force.The capture of Calabar was followed by a one monthconsolidation period as 3 Marine Commando Division found howdifficult reorganization and resupply of an amphibious beach-head were to accomplish. At night Rebel snipers engagedFederal targets, and the lone Biafran B-25 attacked Federalactivity during the day.(26)Meanwhile, white mercenaries were introduced to theground battle on the Biafran side. Led by a Frenchman, RogerFaulques, a contingent of about 50 foreigners saw action atthe Dunlop Rubber Plantation just north of Calabar. Theysoon discovered the situation in Nigeria was unlike theirCongolese experiences. They lost several comrades and theirtaste for fighting quickly. Faulques recommended retreat tothe western side of the Cross River, and the remnants of theBiafran battalion soon set up riverline defensive positionson the other side. The surviving mercenaries soon leftBiafra for safer environs.(27)With resistance gone, the Federals linked up withFederal elements from Ikom to seal off the Cameroon borderand complete the encirclement of Biafra.The Calabar operation showed the diverse capabilities ofthe Federal forces. Even moreso, it put the spotlight on theimaginative and dynamic Colonel Adekunle. He proved skillfuland courageous in the assault of the town, landing on thefirst day to lead the forward units. His operational conceptwas pertinent and gave a quick foothold to the Federals.Unfortunately, the offensive bogged down as the Federalsconsolidated. They allowed the surviving Biafrans toestablish themselves on the western banks of the Cross Riverand grow from battalion size into a brigade and later a taskforce division.(28) Since the heavily forested southeasternregion severely limited mobility and dictated river crossingpoints, this was a serious mistake. The predictability of options reduced the potential for surprise or success andresulted in heavy Federal losses as early attempts atcrossing failed.(29) Making the same mistakes in the east asat Onitsha, the Federals found that the riverline defensegreatly favored the Biafrans in opposed encounters,especially when proper equipment and well trained troops wereunavailable. Later the Federals gained a foothold using acanoe-borne assault and a fording operation furtherdown-river. After consolidating, they rapidly pushed theRebels back.(30)On the Biafran side, they learned how flexible theFederals could be, as they were once again surprised by an amphibious landing. They also were subjected to thepossibility that the minority tribes in their territory werenot firmly on their side. They had earlier suspected this,but the sniping and open-armed acceptance of the Federals bythe residents of Calabar further confirmed this suspicion.Lastly, the Biafrans received an object lesson in the factthat mercenaries would not be their salvation. They didemploy many for their airlift, but only a few, most notablyRolf Steiner, who was responsible for forming 4 CommandoBrigade, were used for ground operations.Both sides turned their attention to the tighteningpressure. The Biafrans were fighting a desperate defensivewar, while the Federals looked to the offensive. Their nextmajor target was Port Harcourt. The Rebel losses of Enugu,Calabar, and later Onitsha, left Port Harcourt, with itsairport, oil processing facilities and businesses (includingdepartment stores), as the only remaining Biafran major urbancenter, and the sole link to the outside world for theRebels.Adekunle had started planning for the attack on PortHarcourt while his division was still clearing htesoutheastern state. His plan called for a three-prongedattack from the Cross River to Port Harcourt. Materiels andmen were built up at Opobo on the coast to support theoperation. Before the division was ready, an abortiveamphibious assault was attempted by 15 Brigade, the unitformed around the garrison that Adelunke had left at Bonny.The Brigade proved too weak to challenger the Port Harcourtdefense and was crushed. the Biafrans cut off futureamphibious attempts by pumping crude oil into the BonnyChannel and setting it on fire.The Rebels frantically watched the unchecked advance ofFederal columns from the west. Colonel Joe Achuzie, whoenjoyed some success at Onitsha, moved to Port Harcourt toorganize the defense. He was unable to rally the dispiritedRebels as the Federals moved through the surrounding mangroveswamps and brush to isolate the city. On May 16, 1968, theartillery and mortar bombardment began.The shelling of Port Harcourt saw a first in the civilwar. Colonel Adekunle allowed a corridor through whichcivilians could escape the seige. Whether his intent washumanitarian or not is unknown, but within a few hours of thebombardment's start, traffic was backed up 15 miles.(31). Thedefense of Port Harcourt was just as disorganized andhaphazard as the evacuation.The occupation of Port Harcourt was anti-climatic. ByMay 18 it had fallen, and the Federals continued on. Firstthey secured the local sector with riverline operations andthen drove north to Owerri and Aba. By September 16 both hadbeen captured, and Biafra was reduced to one fourth of itsoriginal size.The war was now confined to the Ibo heartland. Air-lifted supplies were temporarily halted with the loss of thePort Harcourt Airport until alternate fields became opera-tional. Peace talks, an on again, off again phenomenonthroughout the war, slowed down as a surrender announcementwar expected.(32) The Biafran Navy and Air Force ceased toexist for the moment. The militia was disbanded.The Federals sensed the war was almost over. The desireto reduce friendly casualties was shown in the pattern ofheavy artillery preparations that characterized the advancefrom Port Harcourt to Aba. The relative superior firepowerwas used the "soften up" the Biafrans who were forced to movefrom their defenses under intense bombardments. The Federalsthen moved slowly into the vacated positions, occasionally"...leaving ojectives(s) empty as a sort of no-man's land forseveral days."(33)But the war would not end in 1968. The Federals nevertruly understood the fear that embraced the Ibo; equallyimportant, they did not realize that Charles deGaulle wouldchose Biafra as a surrogate to challenge the level ofBritain's influence in Western Africa. Thus the war continued.CHAPTER 5 OJUKWU'S BIAFRAUnderstanding the nature of the Nigerian Civil Warrequires review of the special qualities that allowed theBiafrans to wage war for two and a half years even thoughthey were outnumbered, outgunned and isolated from the worldexcept by a tenuous airlift. On reflection, the character isnot all positive, but it still bears examination.Much of the national character of the Biafrans isrevealed through the actions of their leader Major GeneralChukuwuemeka ("Emeka") Odumegwu Ojukwu. Intelligent,ambitious and resolute, Ojukwu displayed the traits commonlyattributed to the Ibo as a tribe. An Ibo born in 1933,Ojukwu was the son of one of Nigeria's most wealthyentrepreneurs, a man who converted a few used trucks into agiant transport business. His family's position made itpossible for Ojukwu to be educated in England, first at EpsonCollege for secondary school and then Lincoln College,Oxford, for a bachelors degree in modern history. But whenhe returned to Nigeria, Ojukwu forsook the family businessand went into the civil service. In 1957 Ojukwu entered themilitary and was caught in the rapid Nigerianization. He waspromoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1964 and was serving as the5 Battalion Commander at Kano in January 1966 when the firstcoup occurred.Although no military officer in Nigeria was completelyuntouched by the politization that occupied the Army afterindependence, Ojukwu managed to avoid open involvement in thecoups. He remained loyal to General Ironsi after the firstcoup attempt and shortly thereafter was rewarded with anappointment as Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria. In thisposition, Ojukwu emerged as the leader of the Ibo. Said aformer Secretary in the Biafra Govenment, Raph Uwechue, "Itis sad but instructive irony that Lieutenant Colonel OdumegwuOjukwa, one of Africa's one-time most brilliant politicalpromises, was the man that led his own people with such alack of ingenuity into what was clearly a foreseeabledisaster."(1)The tragedy was built on Ojukwu's inflexibility and theresultant inability to effect compromise on the politicalside. He fueled the disaster with his ambition, desire andability to control the situation in Biafra. Ojukwu wasfighting a war within the Civil War, as he struggled to keepand consolidate his position of leadership. And the tragedywas prolonged and insured by the divisive actions Ojukwu usedto maintain his position of power. These methods hadparticular impact on the capabilities of the Biafran Army.Based on his military training and experience, Ojukwu should have understood the complexity and difficulty ofestablishing a cohesive fighting force in the Eastern Region.Instead he alienated the military and rendered the leadershipineffective through a series of intimidating acts andwitchhunts to find "the guilty" after tactical failures. Theformer is best seen in how Ojukwu handled his first ArmyCommander, Lieutenant Colonel Hilary Njoku who returned toEastern Nigeria with other native Easterners after the July1966 Coup. Soon Njoku and the other Army leadership weredistressed at the lack of policy direction in the region.Either efforts were needed to negotiate the peace, orpreparations for war had to begin. These officers met withOjukwu, but their fears were not allayed by Ojukwu'sarguments. He demonstrated his ruthlessness and his modusoperandi in the way he preempted the potential threat to hispower by these military officers.In a few hours during the evening, he had the parents and relatives of Lt. Col. Njoku brought toEnugu. He also sent for leading personalities, menand women carefully selected, as well as bishopsand chiefs. Before them he blandly accused Njokuof plotting to overthrow him by force. Not that hecared about himself, he said with emotion, but onlyfor the disaster and tragedy that such a move wouldbring to the people of Eastern Nigeria, particu-larly the Ibos, for whom he was fighting! Womenbegan to weep and invoke everything against anyperson concealing such an evil idea. The bishopsbegan to pray solemnly. Njoku was bereft of words.Activity continued during the whole night and thefollowing day, mainly by bishops and some selectedleaders. Njoku had to give promises and under-takings, both orally and in writing, never to doanything to disrupt the government. But the Governor could not take chances. With Njoku in thecountry and about, he could not feel comfortable orsafe. He therefore decided that Njoku must leave.An excuse for this was not difficult to find.Njoku had been with the former Supreme Commander inIbadan when the latter was abducted by the army.He was wounded but managed to escape. His bonesneeded treatment and this was a good enough reasonfor sending him to Britain. Immediately Njoku hadgone, the Governor reorganised the army bysplitting Njoku's former responsibilities andmaking himself the over-all commander. In order tocreate rivalry among the senior officers hepromoted Imo, Njoku and Effiong to the rank ofBrigadier with the same seniority. By accident ordesign, Njoku returned to Eastern Nigeria about thevery day on which the civil war started. He wasgiven charge of the fighting but under the over-allcontrol of the Military Governor. Even thus, hewas not to last very long.(2)Njoku did not last long because of the paranoia thatpermeated the Ibo mentality. At once this mindset was thekey to the strength of the Biafran defense and simultaneouslya factor in destroying the secession from within. The Ibowere so driven to protect themselves that they developed theattitude that they could not lose. They perceived the threatof extermination of the tribe as so real that any weakness orflaws in the defense of the Eastern Region was unthinkable.When military setbacks occurred, scapegoats had to be andwere found. Instead of realizing obvious facts--that menarmed only with rifles could be overwhelmed by armoredcolumns; that the Federals had superiority in terms ofmanpower and firepower--the Biafran's believed that"saboteurs" caused military reverses. This phenomenon, begunwhen Ojukwu as Governor warned the Easterners in late 1966 tobe on the vigil for traitors, infiltrators and even theindifferent, (3) caused the downfall of Njoku and othermilitary officers.The loyalty of every officer, save Ojukwu, was question-able, a situation that seemed to stem also from a distrustgenerated of those officers who initiated the first coup.Once the first blood flowed, all Nigerians became suspicious,and they lost confidence in the Officer Corps. The list ofexamples of the result is endless. Here are a few: a. With the early loss of Opi Junction in theNorth, Colonel Okon, the local commander was demoted andremoved from the Army (he was reinstated later).(4)b. When the town of Oron fell, the defending brigadecommander, Colonel I.N. Aniebo, was identified as thescapegoat and disgraced.(5)c. As the Federals shelled the capital of Enugu,remaining civilians were adamant in their belief that BiafranArmy "saboteurs" were firing the rounds. Soldiers had to besent from the lines to check the stories so Nioku'sreplacement, Colonel A.A. Madiebo, would not be thought acollaborator.(6) Madiebo also tells of having the brief everycivilian who came to his headquarters with questions to avoidthe start of rumors that he was concealing information.(7)d. At the loss of the critical airport and oilfacilities at Port Harcourt, Colonel O. Kalu was accused ofcollaboration with the enemy.(8)e. Captain Nweka, 53 Battalion Commander, returned froma reconnaisance at Amadim and was executed for sabotage afterbeing accused of collaborating with the enemy.(9)The last example is the extreme case. Usually, officerswere beaten, imprisoned and had their heads shaved whenaccused of sabotage. This was not a practice limited to themilitary, but it had grave effects on the Army's ability tofunction. The constant turnover of officers resulted in acontinual drain of experience and a failure to developcohesion and unit integrity. Ojukwu found other ways to make the Army impotent as arival to his power. These further diluted the unifieddirection of his armed forces. Ojukwu played the civiliansoff against the military. He formed special units whichreported directly to him, usurping the role of his militarycommanders. Moveover, Ojukwu established directorates tocontrol the logistical aspects of the war efforts, thuscreating a rivalry not only with the military but also withthe existing civil service.There is also evidence that most Biafrans consideredtheir men as "fighters" instead of "soldiers" because theyviewed warfare naively as inter-village free-for-alls.(10)Because of this, Ojukwu was able to pit the civilians againstthe military. As he stated:It has all along been my conviction that it is thecivilians who will fight and win this war and notthe soldiers. From all that has happened already,it would be foolish to expect the soldiers tosatisfy the aspirations of this new republic.(11)These words to his strategic committee prefaced later actionswhich contradicted his military training, especially con-sidering the British influence on his development. Ojukwuhad called on volunteers to come and defend Enugu. As theBiafran leader commented:Nothing can frighten professional soldiers morethan the sight of civilian masses confront them.They will kill them no doubt, but will soon betired. That is the tactics adopted in the Asiancountries. China for instance. I have got broughtdown to Enugu thousands of civilians from all overthe Republic. The aim is to throw them in inmasses against the enemy who would thereby beconfused and frightened by the prospect of mowingdown thousands of civilians and incurring worldcondemnation.(12)Armed primarily with machetes (and a few shotguns)Ojukwu's "fighters" were trucked to the front and reformed.They marched off into the night chanting war songs andscreaming. After a brief advance, the Federals unleashed agreat volley of shells. All activity stopped, and theformation melted into the night.(13) Ojukwu never repeatedsuch a move.He did, however, form special purpose military units.The first was the "S" (for special) Brigade. This brigadewas organized from volunteer militia to retake Enugu.Lacking experienced leadership and poorly organized, the "S"Brigade was not able to reverse the loss of the capital bybolstering the regular forces. It was retained afterward asthe Governor's special unit and was given his personalattention as well as a higher priority of support. As withmany "elite" forces, its existence and priority createdjealousy in the regular forces. Eventually, Ojukwu had tomerge the "S" Brigade into the regular army to eliminate thecommand and control problems that its special status created.The same problem existed later with 4 Commando Brigade.Commanded by Rolf Steiner, an ex-Hitler youth, ex-FrenchForeign Legion mercenary, the Commando Brigade was originallyorganized to conduct guerrilla warfare operations behindFederal lines. As with the "S" Brigade, Ojukwu gave theCommando's special attention and priority supply support.When the Commando Brigade proved successful in guerrillaoperations, it was expanded. Despite protests, Ojukwu laterpressed it into service in a conventional role. Its losseswere excessively heavy, and it lost its previous effective-ness. Jealousies which had developed in the Regular Forcefound the opportunity to be vented, and Steiner was forcedout of command. He was escorted to Uli Airfield and flownout of the country.Despite the existence of a civil service, at the startof the war Ojukwu created administrative directorates ascaretakers of the civilian population and the militaryefforts. These directorates controlled civil defense, themilitias, propaganda, military intelligence, food distri-bution, food production, fuel, medical supplies, transport,requisition and supply, and clothing.(14) Their directorssupplanted the ministers and departments of government,further dividing the war effort. The civil service wassubordinated and embarrassed. Likewise, when the supply andtransport organization was added to the mlitary inventory, itopenly battled the directorates for control of importantresources. Often these "turf battles" had to be resolved byOjukwu, and the predictability of his decisions made thedirectors powerful men in the Biafran ruling structure.The cumulative effect of these special units andextra-organizational control groups divided the direction ofthe war effort. They took authority away from those mostresponsible for fighting the war--the military--andinstitutionalized Ojukwu's actions to mitigate any potentialpolitical opposition by producing a fragmented powerstructure that answered only to him. This resulted in aninefficient support system that barely capitalized onBiafra's interior lines of communication when the Federaleffort lacked coordination. Once the Nigerian Federalsfinally coordinated their three pronged attack, the Biafrandisorganization was incapable of response, and thesecessionists were crushed. But the Federals took anotheryear to realize this potential, and the war slowly followedits course.CHAPTER 6TO THE END OF THE WAR (September 1968-January 1970)September 1968 was a dark time for Biafra. Federalpressure continued on every front. The Rebels were cut offfrom their major food producing areas, and the loss of PortHarcourt forced them to rely on resupply through makeshiftair fields. At this stage of the war, Ojukwu announced a newphase of the Biafran effort--guerrilla warfare. But thechange was half-hearted because promised French assistancesoon began in earnest with an average of over 20 tons of warmateriels arriving each night from French sources viaairlift.(1) This infusion of military aid buoyed Rebel hopesand resulted in a renewed belief that they could still winthe civil war (or more accurately, legitimately establish theBiafra Nation) through conventional means.The Federals had captured the airstrip at Obilagwu andon October 1, 1968 occupied Okigwi in the north with 1Division units. 3 Marine Commando Division was spread acrossa front of more than 100 miles in the south. The linestretched from the Niger River on the west over the CrossRiver on the east. Besides capturing Owerrri and Aba, theDivision continued pressure toward Umuahia, "TheAdministrative Center," and Oguta which was only 10 miles orso from the strategic Uli air strip. Federal operations, asalways, were preceded by relatively intensive artilleypreparations. Several days were taken to position everyavailable weapon, so that all could be fired together in adisplay that the flamboyant Adekunle called, "...my ownspecial thunder."(2)The French support altered the balance of power. Theadditional small arms, plus artillery, anti-armor weapons andneeded ammunition greatly bolstered the Biafrans. Theystopped the drive to Umuahia from the south and put theFederals on the defensive at Onitsha.An aggressive, brigade-sized riverine attack on Ogutatested the Rebels on September 10. The Federal 15 Brigadelanded within 12 miles of Uli air strip and created a panicamong the Rebels. Emphasizing the criticality of thesituation, Ojukwu personally led the counter-attack to securethe town and relieve pressure on Uli.(3) The Federalattackers, faced with encirclement, withdrew back down theriver.The Rebels reverted to a frantic counter-offensive. By the end of September, they had recaptured Ikot Ekpene andwere moving on Aba and Owerri at Christmas of 1968. TheBiafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) was operatingthroughout the region and in the Midwest, conductingquerrilla-type operations behind Federal lines; but theirsuccesses were minimal. Fola Oyewole, a Biafran staffofficer, noted that by this time most Biafrans weredisillusioned with the struggle. The result was that manywho joined the BOFF were not committed to the cause and thatoften Biafrans (Ibo) who remained in Federally occupied areasdid not cooperate with the BOFF.(4) The BOFF nonetheless hadthe Federal's attention and the highly motivated regularRebel units (5) produced important changes in Federalattitudes over the year and a half of war. They no longertook midday siesta hours, and the war of ambush resulted indisaster when vigilence faltered.(6)French assistance did not completely alter the Rebel situation. In December 1968 the International Committee ofthe Red Cross estimated that 14,000 people were dying eachday in Biafra.(7) The December offensive against Owerricontinued and developed into a seige of the Federal 16Brigade within the city. For at least six weeks the brigadehad to be resupplied by air, but large quantities of materiellanded in enemy hands. The seige tightened until April 25,1969 when the beleaguered Federal remnant successfullyexecuted a night withdrawal under pressure by slippingthrough the Biafran lines.The recapture of Owerri proved a major setback for theFederals, second only to the repeated failures in crossingthe Niger River to take Onitsha. The loss damaged thereputation of 3 Marine Commando Division and its aggressiveleader, Colonel Adekunle. The Federals also were dispiritedby the indiscriminate bombing tactics of their Air Forcewhich attacked non-military targets throughout Biafra.In January and February 1969, the Nigerians stepped-uptheir air strikes, especially on Umuahia; this signaled a renewed offensive. Foreign correspondents personallyverified attacks on civilian targets and presented theirfindings in the world-wide media. Such incidents rekindledthe fear of extermination among the Ibo people and damagedFederal prestige abroad.The April 25 loss of Owerri overshadowed the 1 Division triumph in capturing the Rebel capital of Umuahia on April22, 1969. The Federal advance, as normal along the roads,had been difficult since the Rebels effectively deployedFrench Panhard armored vehicles to menace the column.(8) Butthe methodical traits of 1 Division again proved successfulas Umuahia fell, marking the final phase of the war. The Biafrans were further disorganized as administrative elementshad to be spread around the country. No suitable singleplace remained in which to establish a functional capital,though Owerri became the new Administrative Center. Despitethe degradation of the Biafran infrastructure, the Federalswere unable to exploit the situation. They had problems oftheir own.Federal morale was low as political infighting among thedivision commanders and staffs expanded. The lack of unityof command had created problems of insufficient coordinationand inadequate logistical support. Colonel (later MajorGeneral) Olusegun Obasanjo described the situation in hismemoir of the war:The Federal victory in capturing Umuahia, thenext rebel administrative headquarters after Enugu,was almost immediately effectively nullified by theloss of Owerri to the rebels. The rebels,strengthened and emboldened by their recapture ofOwerri, swiftly advanced southwards to threatenIgritta, a distance of fifteen miles north of PortHarcourt on the Owerri road. The federalfinger-tip hold on Aba was considerable weakened.The morale of the soldiers at least of 3 MarineCommando Division was at its lowest ebb. Desertionand absence from duty without leave was rife in theDivision. The despondence and general lack of willto fight in the soldiers was glaringly manifest inthe large number of cases of self-inflictedinjuries throughout the formation. Some officerstacitly encouraged these malpractices andunsoldierly conduct by condoning such acts orwithdrawing their own kith or kin or fellowtribesmen to do guard durties in the rear and in theofficers' own houses. Distrust and lack ofconfidence plagues the ranks of the officer corps.Operations were unhealthily competitive in anunmilitary fashion and officers openly rejoiced ateach other's misfortunes. With the restrictionsimposed by the Federal Military Government on manyitems of imported goods and the country in the gripof inflation, the civilian population began to showsigns of impatience with a war which appeared tothem unending. In fact, some highly placedNigerians started to suggest that the FederalGovernment should sue for peace at all cost toprevent the disaster that would befall it and itssupporters if rebel victory seemed imminent.(9)Gowon heeded complaints and countercharges that staffofficers in Lagos were unresponsive to the field commandersand that the field commanders had lost their initiative anddrive. He thus transferred all three division commanders tostaff positions, replaced them and redefined the missions ofthe three divisions. On May 12, 1969 the changes wereannounced. 2 Division withdrew from Onitsha and moved backinto the Midwestern Region to provide internal defense thereagainst BOFF guerrilla activity and defend on the west bankof the Niger River. 1 Division took over the defense ofOnitsha and now had responsibility for the entire northernsector, while 3 Marine Commando Division remained responsiblefor the southern campaign in Eastern Nigeria.By May 30, 1969, the tide again turned. Ojukwu hadtaken personal command of all Biafra units, but the Rebelswere pushed back into an area of roughly 2000 square miles.The Federal forces began coordinating their actions; however,the rainy season and the first air attacks by Count VonRosen's Minicons (see the next chapter) slowed the Federaladvance. Even so, the war was virtually over. The arrivalof Soviet 122mm howitzers greatly improved Nigerian artilleryrange and accuracy. Biafran desertions increased as the willto resist diminished in the face of more disciplined FederalAir Force bombing and strafing. The crumbling of the Biafraninfrastructure continued. After two years of war and shortages of spare parts, vehicles were wearing out with a resultant loss of transit capability. Even when resupplyoccurred, distributing materiels to the front proveddifficult.Corruption by self-serving administrative officialssapped the furor from the Biafran war effort, but one agencystood apart even in this final part of the war. The researchand production (RAP) directorate was an innovative andresourceful agency without which the Biafrans could not haveprosecuted the war. Composed of scientists and engineerseducated in Britain and the U.S., the RAP devised and builtportable oil refineries which produced gasoline with the heatof wood fires, mortars from oil drilling equipment, and soap,matches, and gin from available resources.(10) Theydeveloped ground-to-ground and ground-to-air rockets whichproved useful at Calabar and Onitsha. The rockets wereelectronically fired, area munitions launched fromespecially-built stands; however, they sometimes wobbled inflight and boomeranged, coming back to the fires.(11)The most important weapon built was the Ogbunigwe (Ibofor "destroyers of all"). These devices were also known as"Ojukwu's kettles" and were the keystone of the Rebeldefense. They were made from available cooking pots filledwith locally-produced explosives and miscellaneous metalproducts--nails, scrap iron or whatever else was on hand.The Ogbunigwe were planted in the ground (or in road beds) orabutted against trees and camouflaged. When suitable targetsarrived, the mines were command detonated. They produced a tremendous explosion and proved immensely effective. Theiruse alone often created enough damage to rout Federalattacks.The ingenuity of the RAP was not enough to overcome thesuperior might of the Federals. They reorganized theirdivisions internally and applied pressure from both north andsouth. The Federals gained steadily until November 1969 whenthe Nigerian Army Chief of Staff ordered his forces "toliberate what was left of the Rebel held areas."(12) AroundChristmas of 1969, powerful probes cut into Rebel heldterritory. Instead of stopping to consolidate gains, theFederals drove on, surprising and overwhelming the Biafrans.Ojukwu flew out of Uli Air Strip in the early morning ofJaunuary 11, 1970 after he and his staff decided not to revertto guerrilla warfare. The war had ended by January 15, 1970 when Colonel Philip Effiong, who was left in charge,announced the surrender. The end was so rapid and theBiafrans so demoralized that further resistance did notmaterialize. The end was anti-climatic. The Biafrans were exhaustedby hunger and had few medical facilities. They lacked theclothing and individual equipment to combat the superiorweapons of their opponent. Most importantly, the Federalsbenefited from personnel changes which produced bettergeneralship in the three divisions and brought the war to arapid close in the fashion expected when the war started.(13)But the "quick kill in slow motion"(14) was expensive.Estimates on the total number of deaths from the war rangefrom 500,000 to 2,000,000. There is no way of knowing withcertainty the exact number. The vast majority of fatalities,however, were starvation casualties among Biafran civilians.The Federals estimated in 1970 that the war cost them$840 million.(15) Their economy slowed down but neverreached zero growth and regained momentum after the war.Loss of oil revenue caused the stagnant economic condition.However, the Federals rapidly transferred their oilproduction emphasis to the Midwest and soon equalled theirpre-war volume.The Biafrans were constantly in need of money for tworeasons. First, they lost their oil revenue (two thirds ofthe total Nigerian production) early in the war,; hence, theywere denied the revenue to finance the war. The other reasonfor their monetary shortage was that Nigeria converted hercurrency during the war. The Biafrans confiscated millionsin Nigerian currency, but were unable to get most of itexchanged during the brief conversion period. This rapidreduction in capital in 1968 limited Biafra's ability topurchase arms overseas. Beyond occasional purchases andFrench aid, she depended on what she captured and what shecould invent. The industry and imaginations of her peoplenever matched the firepower of the Federals.CHAPTER 7 THE AIR WARThe two most significant technological advancesintroduced in the Nigerian Civil War were the extensive useof modern artillery, particularly by the Federals, and theimpact of aviation on a disorganized, relatively unsophisti-cated battlefield. The numbers of aircraft were slight incomparison to what the United States used in Vietnam, and thetactics were generally limited to interdictory bombing andstrafing with some close air support. Air-to-air combatconsisted essentially of attacks on bulky, outdated cargoplanes delivering relief supplies and armaments to Biafra.Nonetheless, aircraft played a major role in making this conflict a "modern" war. Both sides experienced theintroduction of an advanced degree of sophistication andkilling power and the immense psychological effect thataerial bombing and strafing produced. We will look at theBiafran side first.The Rebel Air Force. The Biafrans had the firstaircraft used for offensive purposes. A World War IIvintage, American made B-26 bomber was obtained in Europe,manned by a European crew, and flown from Lisbon to Enugu andthen on operational missions. The plane carried machine gunsand rockets which were outfitted on the plane in Enugu byformer Nigerian Air Force armorers.(1) It was initially usedto bomb and strafe attacking Nigerian formations, but soonthe Rebels took the war to the Federal heartland to showtheir strength and determination.With the B-26 and othe airplanes their agents in Lisbonhad procurred, the Biafrans turned to air raids on Lagos andother towns. These seemed to have no specific target otherthan inducing panic in the civilians; these attacks resultedin haphazard patterns which primarily produced the desiredpanic in the Nigerians. Several such raids caused a smallamount of property damage and a few civilian casualities; butlike the Midwest ground offensive, they served to awaken theNigerians from their lethargy and incensed the population.Because the Federals did not immediately respond to the earlybombing raids, the Rebels misread their capabilities andresolve. The lack of reaction reinforced the Rebel belief(based on their knowledge of Federal military strength) thatthe war would quickly end.The small Biafran Air Force was overworked and soon woreout. When a Fokker F-27 passenger plane equipped to dropbombs was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over Lagos in earlyOctober 1967, Biafran offensive air operations wereessentially ended until the last year of the war. Anothernoteworthy fact appeared; at least four of the crew of eightwho were killed in the crash of the Fokker were whitemercenaries.(2) It was in the air conflict that mercenarieshad their greatest impact in the Nigerian Civil War.On the Biafran side, they helped prolong the war as theydelivered arms, ammunition and relief supplies to thebeseiged Biafrans. The first Biafran mercenary was HankWharton. He operated the most famous of the companies whichran charter airplanes into Biafra (the Biafrans alsopurchased some older planes) and typified the "entrepreneurs"who flew this dangerous route. The German-American Whartonowned a tired fleet of Superconstellations and DC-7's. Asnoted by mercenary Bruce Hilton, "Wharton's planes wereavailable to anyone who could afford to charter them, whichmeant that a crew might take in rifle ammunitions for theBiafran Army one night and medical supplies for the WorldCouncil of Churches the next..."(3) The flights were alsoused by the Catholic relief organization, Caritas, and theInternational Red Cross with round trips costing up to$25,000.(4)Under these circumstances, the Federals accused therelief agencies of concealing arms shipments with theirhumanitarian flights. This highlights the most controversialaspect of the war, the effectiveness of the Federal blockadeas an offensive weapon and the resulting starvation ofhundreds of thousands of Biafrans. At the same time, itpoints out Ojukwu's obstinate unwillingness to sue for peacedespite the horrific suffering of his people. Instead, headvertised it to gain sympathy for Biafra. He was successfulin his efforts becauses the relief organizations convertedsympathy into political support for Biafra, but with littleultimate effect on the outcome of the war. Saving Biafransbacame synonymous with saving Biafra.(5) Concurrently, therelief organizations wanted a ceasefire so they couldconcentrate on moving food into the country. This wasdesirable to Ojukwu since he knew that if the fightingstopped, it would be difficult to restart. In the stalemate,Biafra would gain time and might survive. The tragedy of thewar was that such political finagling, by both sides,resulted in so many additional tragic deaths in the prolongedwar.The mercenary pilots experienced a temporary halt intheir airlift when Federals captured Port Harcourt Airfield.Fortunately for the Biafrans, they had foreseen thepossibility of losing their fixed air facilities and preparedalternate sites. The most famous was the Uli Air Strip.Code-named Annabelle, the Uli Strip was in fact a stretch ofstraight road between Onitsha and Owerri which was widenedfor miles. Vehicles mounted with communications equipmentserved as a mobile control tower so that the actual landingsite could be shifted back and forth along the stretch ofroad. All operations occurred at night; relief planes madetheir final approaches based on tower instructions; andlanding lights were turned on for 15-30 seconds to facilitatetouchdown. Other similar strips were prepared, as well asbush sites, but Uli survived to the last day of the war andwas an important symbol of resistance for the Biafrans.Initially Portugual, the last colonial power in Africa,provided most of the staging bases for the relief andresupply of Biafra. Later the French gave major support tothe Rebel cause. At first, night trips were made from Lisbonwith small arms and ammunition that was bought in Spain,France or Switzerland through private dealers. Aircraft wererefueled in Portuguese Guinea Bissau and the PortugueseIsland of Sao Tome. Pilots landed at Harcourt Airfield or ona stretch of highway between Orlu and Owerri.(6) Another route of entry reportedly began in South Africa,with flights two or three times a week from Petersburg in theTransvaal to a rendevous point in the Kalahari Desert inBotswana. South African DC-7's, charted to Biafra, thencarried the cargo to Uli by way of Angola and Sao Tome.(7)Other staging points were Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Librevillein Gabon and the Island of Fernando Po where much of the relief supplies were marshalled.From the relief pilots Biafra got its most potentoffensive air capability. Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, theSwede who commanded the Ethiopian Air Force in the 1930's,was appalled at the indiscriminate bombing and strafing ofnon-military targets by the Nigerian Air Force and pledged togive the Biafrans an Air Force to interdict Nigerian efforts.The arrival of his Minicon fleet, mentioned earlier, wastimely. In late May 1969 Biafra was less than a tenth of itsoriginal size. The rainy season had slowed the Federaloffensive and their bombing, but also had reduced reliefefforts.Von Rosen brought three Swedish pilots and two groundcrewmen with the first five Minicons. They were to both flythe planes and train Biafran air and ground crews. He alsoused two Biafrans as pilots on the first aircraft.(8) TheRebels had several ex-Nigerian Air Force pilots trained bythe West Germans and a group of aviators partially qualifiedin Portugual to fly various aging aircraft purchased inEurope that never arrived in Biafra.The Minicons immediately boosted morale. The singleengine trainers were too small to deliver iron bombs, so theywere outfitted with 76mm rocket pods. Flying below radarcoverage and surprising anti-aircraft gunners, the Miniconsswooped in on targets in lightning fast raids. They targetedon-the-ground aviation assets and oil facilities and wereextremely successful. Attacks covered the air fields atBenin, Enugu and Port Harcourt, reducing Federal interferencewith relief flights. In the first month of use, von Rosenclaimed destruction of four MIG's, and Ilyushin bomber, twoCanberras, a Heron and a control tower.(9)By September 1969, von Rosen had 19 minicons in Biafrawith a total of five Swedish pilots. There also were twoDanish explosive experts who trained infiltrators.(10) Theports at Sapele and Port Harcourt were targets as werethe oil installations. They cut oil exports from theMidwestern Region to a trickle with attacks on the justcompleted Shell-BP facility at Forcadoes.Von Rosen then had bigger plans. He wanted to bombNigeria's major port at Apapa, near Lagos, but the longerranged equipment he needed did not arrive before the warended in January 1970. This may have occurred because vonRosen's tactics caused the opposite of what he intended.Instead of handcuffing the materially superior Federals, hemay have once again awakened them from their doldrums andforced an increase in war activity that quickly ended thewar.(11)The Federal Air Force. The Federals introduced a moretechnogically advanced level of aviation to the war. It isparadoxical that the Rebels believed the failure of theFederals to immediately retaliate for their early bombingswas a sign of weakness or a lack of resolve. They shouldhave taken a more pragmatic view. The Federals were planningfor a police action, but instead became involved in anall-out war. Responding as they would throughout the war,they methodically obtained the right tools for the task. TheFederals used the first jet aircraft in early August 1967 tohelp clear the Midwest; and shortly thereafter theirmercenary pilots were indiscriminately bombing and strafing awide range of targets.The Biafrans quickly reassessed the resolve of theiropponent. The verdict was that the unrestrained aerialattacks on undefended hospitals and markets, especially withnapalm, and the tightening blockade were further evidence ofthe Federal desire to commit genocide, i.e., the eradicationof the Ibo population. The seeming validity of theseaccusations often embarrassed the Nigerians throughout thehostilities. International observers would conclude that noorderly, planned policy existed for extermination of the Ibopeople; however, there was irrefutable evidence of repeatedattacks on defenseless civilians which again and again fedthe Biafran propaganda machine.The Federals used mercenary pilots in a different waythan the Biafrans. A British mercenary, John Peters, washired in July 1967 to recruit pilots to fly converted DC-3'sand 4's with Nigerian crews since there were only a fewNigerian pilots. Paid between $2,000 and $3,000 per monthplus living expenses in Nigera, the Federals usually had 12to 20 pilots available, primarily British, Rhodesians andSouth Africans. When Egyptian pilots proved ineffective, themercenaries were trained on the MIG-15's and then theMIG-17's.(12)By the time the mercenary pilots were trained on theMIG's, their efforts were concentrated on stopping thegun-running into Biafra. But along with the indiscriminatebombing and strafing of civilan targets, the inability tostop the night flights into Biafra demonstrated the grossinefficiency of the Federal Air Force. While the war stillprogressed, historian Neville Brown pointed out severalreasons why the gun-running continued.a. The short range and electronic deficiencies of theMIG-17's.b. Lack of skill and motivation of the Egyptian pilotsc. Reluctance of the Federals to let foreigners play alarge part in their success.(13)John De St. Jorre, another historian, went a stepfarther. He noted that the MIG's and Ilyushins were thewrong aircraft to use against the make-shift airstrips likeUli. Their high speed and armaments made effective nightattacks on the narrow, unlit runways difficult. He believeda smaller, relatively slower plane with cannons, light bombsand machine guns would have been more effective. He alsoargues that he mercenaries did not destroy Uli because itwould have been the end of a well paid job.(14)The Federals engaged in minimal close air support, butused their jet aircraft with artillery to prepare theirground objectives in major offensives. In fact the increaseof air support by the Federals in early 1968 and early 1969were clear indicators to the Biafrans that extensive majormoves were in the offing.(15)For both sides aircraft represented a new escalation ofpower, capable of temporarily terrorizing the population orsustaining it. Neither side possessed the capability to useaviation to its fullest advantage, but each saw thebattlefield reduced in size, the responsiveness of airsupport, and the horror that the airplane could inflict onboth the civilian population and military formations.Heretofore isolated enclaves became accessible to thedestructive dimensions of modern warfare through aviation.CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONSThe Nigerian Civil War was the first modern warconducted in Independent Black Africa. The lessons of thewar were not new or unique. They merely reinforced what hasbeen learned over and over again. However, their context wasunique, since the bush warfare of the Congo transitioned totechnologically sophisticated 20th Century warfare. The military, though unsuited for the role, became the leadinginstitiution in Nigeria. The causes of the war were complex,based upon tribal, political and economic factors inheritedfrom the colonial period. A military institiution,subordinated through British traditions, took political formin the post-colonial era and initiated a blood letting thatled to the Civil War. Though segments of the military hadthe capacity to disrupt and overthrow the civiliangovenment, the military was not sufficiently unified orlarge enough to adequately govern the country.The coups of 1966 provided the immediate catalyst to theeconomic, political and social unrest. Once the horror wasunleashed, the military inherited responsibility for findinga solution. The war requried the formation of a large,fighting force, which became the dominant institution inNigeria. To this day, the political course of the country istied to the desires and decisions of the military leadership.Once the precedent was set, getting the military out of powerbecame virtually impossible given the divisiveness of thecountry.Neither side was prepared for war. As the facade ofcivilization crumbled under the weight of riots and pogroms,Ibo tribesmen fled oppression and sought refuge in theirhomeland. Despite the evidence of the hatred that drove theIbo out of other areas and the fear of extermination whichpermeated the consciousness of those in the Eastern Region,military leaders were unable to fully mobilize theircountries for the coming war.The Federal Government announced its expectation that a"police action" would bring the secessionists back into thefold in a brief time. Available units were assembled on thenorthern boundaries of the Eastern Region, ready for thequick thrust and capture of the Rebel capital. Civil defenseexercises were conducted in the North, but the capital,Lagos, remained unmoved by the threat of war. This unconcerned attitude, as well as the incorrect reading of theforce requied, revealed the poor intelligence capabilitythat would hamper Federal efforts throughout the war.The Rebels likewise failed to comprehend the potentialfor violence. Probably due to ego, they did not believe theFederals had the capability or resolve to defeat them. TheBiafrans felt they would win because their struggle was just,and moral courage and perseverence would win the day forthem. As order broke down in Nigeria, the Rebels did startbuilding defensive positions and training militias and civildefense personnel; but they were hesitant to invest theirlimited monies to outfit and prepare an armed force. Again,they believed this was unnecessary because right was on theirside. Consequently their soldiers received only superficialtraining, and there were not enough weapons to arm units.Officers were scarce and often went into battle before theycompleted their training. This helped keep officer attritionrates high, which consequently debased unit stability andwith other factors seriously damaged unit cohesion andintegrity.The Federals experienced similar problems with the rapidexpansion of their forces. Junior leaders could not betrained fast enough to fill the enlarged army. Inexperi-enced, poorly trained and ineptly led soldiers manifestedtheir lack of professionalism and indiscipline by massacresof innocent civilians and a failure to effectivley executeinfantry tactics.The Federals were overly cautious and dependent onartillery in their advances. They would saturate objectiveswith artillery fire, then move up on to the objective andconsolidate their force. Further movement to shell the nextobjective. 1 Division was especially noteworthy in thecautiousness in its operations. The division would preparefor a mission for six months, gathering resources andtraining. The offensive would take place, but as soon as theobjective was seized, the division would consolidate itsgains and take another six months to prepare for the nextoperation.Had they pursued their successes, there were severaltimes when more aggressive actions might have brought theFederals immediate victory. Examples are the first shellingof Onitsha, the fall of Enugu and the capture of PortHarcourt. Instead, delays allowed the Rebels to recoup fromsetbacks and establish new defensive positions.This tactical shortcoming stands in contrast to astrategic strength given to the Federals by their leader,Major General Jack Gowon. Conservative and unflappable,Gowon gave stability to the Federals. When the police actionstrategy proved inadequate, he orchestrated a methodical,forceful strategy which resulted in a blockade of Biafra andher subsequent inability to continue the war.The implications of seige warfare were heightened by the introduction of modern media to the battlefield. Whilestarvation was probably the factor which ultimately causedBiafra to fall, it was also a factor in obtaining world-widesupport for the Rebels and gave false hope to its leaders andinitially prolonged the war. Both the morality of the seigeand the exploitation of the media were key issues of he war.Far more than Gowon's character permeated Federalthought and action, Major General Emeka Ojukwu's personalitydominated Rebel activity. He was the single unifying figurein the Biafra story. Ojukwu was able to motivate and directthe Rebels to incredible accomplishments in the face of neverending shortages and constant defeats. He adeptly achievedtactical successes, but he failed to implement a strategicplan that could bring victory.a. He accurately saw the potential of the MidwestInvasion and introduced bombers to the war, but he failed tocomprehend the long term effects of both actions.b. He capitalized on airlift to sustain Biafra afterlosing his sea lines of communcations.c. He realized the tactical deficiencies of the FederalArmy but ignored those of his own army, and he failed toresort to all out guerrilla warfare while his people stillhad the means and will to resist.d. Finally, he hoped that if he held Biafra longenough, the Federals would become frustrated and give up.Unfortunately, Ojukwu underestimated the Federal reslove inrelation to Biafra's ability to hold out. The Federallearning curve caught up with him when the Nigerian Army tookadvantage of their successes without consolidating theirgains from November 1969 to January 1970. Ojukwu failed tounderstand that obstinancy on both sides meant the war wouldbe resolved on the battlefield and not by other means such asnegotiations.This last point highlights a shortfall for both sides,unity of command or purpose. On the Federal side, the threedivisions operated independently, competing among themselvesfor men and materiels. This allowed the Rebels to use theirinterior position to advantage. Ojukwu shifted resourcesfrom front to front based on the most urgent threat. Thisworked well until the Federals launched their finalcoordinated attack.On the Rebel side, unity of command was lost because ofthe fear and suspicion that seized Biafra. While fightingthe Federals, Ojukwu also had to maintain his position. Todo this, he set the military and civilian leaders againsteach other. By making each weaker, he solidified his hold onpower, but the resulting political infighting greatlydetracted from the war effort.A major lesson of the Nigerian Civil War was thattechnology must fit the situation. The airplane hadsignificant importance in Nigeria. Jet aircraft representedtremendous psychological and destructive capacities not seenbefore in Black Africa. Yet the MIG's and Ilyushin's couldnot stop the gunrunners or close Uli Air Strip. On the otherhand, the use of reconnaissance helicopters forced a halt tomilitary activities, and Count von Rosen's Minicons virtuallycut off oil from the Midwestern Region in the later stages ofthe war.In the same way, French support in 1968 showed how theright materiels (in this case small arms, ammunition andanti-tank weapons) could turn the war into a stalemate andtemporarily alter the balance of power, so that the Biafranswent on the offensive. The French support also demonstratedhow (by Western standards) relatively small amounts of warmateriels could still critically affect the battlefieldequilibrium in the wars of developing nations.In closing, one point needs to be reviewed. TheBiafrans fought for more than two and a half years against anumerically and materielly superior force. During that time,shortages of critical items abounded, mass starvationoccurred, Federal incursions reduced Biafra to one tenth ofits original size, and paranoid fear of extermination wasrampant. Corruption and political infighting grew. Thegravity of the situation seems incomprehensible, yet theRebels fought on with what was generally regarded as highermorale than their adversaries. In the end the mostsignificant lesson of the Nigerian Civil War may be thestrength and flexibility of the indomitable human spirit. END NOTES INTRODUCTION1.Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story, (Baltimore: PenquinBooks, 1969) p. 7. CHAPTER 11.Colin Legum and John Drysdale, Africa ContemporaryRecord 1968-1969 (London: Africa Research Limited,1969), p. 2.2.Ibid., p. 3.3. John Hatch, Nigeria: Seeds of Disaster, (Chicago: HenryRegnery Company, 1970), pp. 141-3.4.John R. Sullivan, Breadless Biafra, (Dayton: PflaumPress, 1969), p. 86.5.Legum, op. cit., p. 46. Ibid., p. 5.7.Ibid., p. 5.8.Ibid., p. 5-6.9.General Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, (London:Heinemann, 1980), p. xi.10.Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order:Politics and Crisis in Nigeria, (Ibadan: IbadanUniversity Press, 1973), p. 88.11.Zdenek Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970,(Frankfurt: Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen,1971), p. 131.12.Dudley, op. cit., p. 88.13.Harold D. Nelson, Ed., Nigeria: A Country Study, 4thEd., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982)p. 243.14.Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, WorldHandbook of Political and Social Indicators, (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1972), pp, 34-47. In a compilation of various indicators, this work shows howlittle Nigeria stressed its military in 1965. Examples:Click here to view image15.Nelson, op. cit., p. 243.16. Cervenka, op. cit., p. 134.17. Ibid., p. 133.18.Ibid., p. 138.19. Quoted by Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military,(Cambridge: University Press, 1971), pp. 32-33.20. Cervenka, op. cit., p. 134.21. Time, October 14, 1966. pp. 44-47.CHAPTER 21. Cervenka, op. cit., p. 138.2.Neville Brown, "The Nigerian Civil War," MilitaryReview, vol. 48, October 1968, p. 27.3. Ibid., p. 28.4.A. A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the BiafranWar, (Enugu: Fourth Division Publishers, 1980), p. 9.5. Brown, op. cit., p. 27.6. Cervenka, op. cit., p. 139.7.Ibid., p. 139.8.Ibid., p. 139.9.Joseph Okpaku (Ed.), Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, (New York: The Third Press, 1972), pp. 293-294.10.Sir Robert Thompson (Ed.), War in Peace, (New York:Harmony Books, 1982), p. 159.11.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 139.12. John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, (London:Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), pp. 150-151.13.Brown, op. cit., p. 25.14.Ibid., p. 26.15. Cervenka, op. cit., p. 140.16. Time, January 26, 1970, p. 18.17.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 118.18. Time, August 2, 1968, p. 25.19.Rolf Steiner, The Last Adventurer, (Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1978), p. 87.20.Brown, op. cit., p. 26.21.Raph Uwechue, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War,(New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971), p. 8.22. De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 151.23. Sir Rex Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970,(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), p. 132.CHAPTER 31.Colonel R. A. Adebayo quoted by Fola Oyewole, ReluctantRebel, (London: Rex Collings, 1975), Introduction.2.Obasanjo, op. cit., pp. 14-15.3.Ojukwu quoted by A. A. Madiebo, op cit., p. 19.4.Story related by Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 12.5.Madiebo, op. cit., pp. 149-151.6.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 30.7.Obasanjo, op. cit., pp. 16-17.8.New York Times, August 1, 1967, p. 7, col. 1.9.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 51.10.New York Times, June 29, 1967, p. 1, col. 3.11.Quoted by Jimoh Lawal, "Nigeria--Class Struggle and theNational Question," Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, (NewYork: The Third Press, 1972), p. 281.12.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 127. At the start of thewar, two thirds of the oil production and virtually allthe oil processing facilities were in the secessionistEastern Region.13.John De St. Jorre and Fola Oyewole, among others, reportthe routine travel of senior Nigerian military officers(Ibo) from Benin to the East immediately before theattack. The presumption is clandestine preparations forthe assault.14.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 169.15.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 157.16.Niven, op. cit., p. 116.17.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 169.18.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 158.19.Oyewole, op. cit., pp.42-44.20.Time, September 1, 1967, p. 20.21.New York Times, September 20, 1967, p. 6, col. 3.22.Elechi Amadi, Sunset in Biafra, (London: Heinemann,1973), p. 48.23.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 77.24.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 172.CHAPTER 41.Gowon reportedly maintained a copy of Carl Sandburg'sLincoln biography, The War Years, on his desk later inthe war. Time, August 23, 1968, p. 27.2.Raph Uwechue, op. cit., p. 197.3.Time, January 26, 1970, p. 22.4.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 273.5.Even when they went to the Russians for capitalequipment, the Nigerians paid cash.6.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 19.7.Ibid., p. 19.8.New York Times, September 28, 1967, p. 12, col. 3;September 30, 1967, p. 21, col. 7; October 1, 1967, p.8, col. 1.9.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 20.10.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 175.11.Bruce Hilton, Highly Irregular, (London, The MacmillanCompany, 1969), p. 127. Oyewole (op. cit. p. 128) notesthat when Umuahia was later captured by the Federals,the Biafrans spoke of the govenment as "decentralized."12.Michael A. Samueli (Ed.), The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict,(Washington: The Center for Strategy and InternationalStudies, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 19.13.New York Times, September 23, 1967, p. 10, col. 4.14.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 20.15.Forsyth, op. cit., p. 123.16.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 43.17.Brown, op. cit., p. 30.18.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 61.19.Brown, op. cit., p. 31.20.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 188.21.Ibid., pp. 188-189.22.Time, October 4, 1968, p. 36.23.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 47.24.New York Times, October 9, 1967, p. 11, col. 1. LesterA. Sobel (Ed.), Facts on File Yearbook, (New York: Factson File, Inc., 1968), p. 507.25. Madiebo, op. cit., pp. 191-192.26.New York Times, November 3, 1967, p. 11, col. 1.27. Madiebo, op. cit., p. 196.28.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 85.29.Niven, op. cit., p. 123.30.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 50.31. Time, May 31, 1968, p. 31. Sir Rex Niven, op. cit., p.127, points out that Adekunle may have wanted to add tothe supply and health problems the Rebels were alreadyexperiencing.32.The London Times among other sources declared that thewar was militarily won.33.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 257.CHAPTER 51.Uwechue, op. cit., p. 133.2.Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Succession1966-1970. (London: Frank Cass, 2nd Edition, 1976), p.25-26.3.Ibid., p. 92.4.Ibid., p. 92-93.5.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 126.6.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 174.7.Ibid., p. 171.8.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 127.9.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 210.10.Amadi, op. cit., p. 143. A. A. Madiebo argued that thisconceptually is the reason the Biafrans were sounprepared for war. They did not want to take on theexpensive process of outfitting their army because theyfelt that "determination" and "will power" were all thatwere needed to secure their just cause. Madiebo, op.cit., p. 108.11.Quoted by Akpan, op. cit., p. 95.12. Ibid., p. 95-95.13.Madiebo, op. cit., p. 173.14. Akpan, op. cit., pp. 98-100.CHAPTER 61.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 271.2.Time, October 4, 1968, p. 36.3.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 64.4.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 64.5.This morale was based in large measure on the beliefthat extermination was the alternative to the fight forsurvival for the Rebels. Biafran units were oftenformed on short notice, decimated and deactivated orincorporated into other units constituted for a newemergency. That the Biafrans were successful in theincredible disorganization can only be attributed totheir intense motivation and front line leadership.Note:a) The Biafrans commissioned 10,000 officers during thewar of which about 3,000 were killed (Oyewole, op. cit.,Introduction, page unnumbered). Even with this highincidence of officer casualties, the Rebels displayedthe suspicious distrust of their officer corps noted earlier.b) Morale was high in front line units in spite of largenumber of casualties. In its first six months ofexistence, 4 Commando Brigade (led during that time bythe mercenary Rolf Steiner) sustained 8,400 killed,wounded and missing in action in a unit with an averagestrength of 5,000 soldiers (Steiner, op. cit., p. 119).6.Michael Mok, Biafra Journal, (New York: Time-Life Books,1969), p. 64.7.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 54.8.Obasanjo, op. cit., p. 24.9.Ibid., pp. 56-57.10.Hilton, op. cit., p. 125.11.Oyewole, op. cit., p. 87.12.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 79.13. Akpan, op. cit., p. 191. Ojukwu noted these issues in amemorandum to the president of the Ivory Coast, but heclaimed the improved leadership was due to an infusionof foreign officers to direct the Nigerian forces.14.A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria,vol. II, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.112.15.Peter Schwab (Ed.), Biafra, (New York: Facts on File,Inc., 1971), p. 118. CHAPTER 71.New York Times, July 10, 1967, p. 1, col. 4.2.New York Times, October 8, 1967, p. 5, col. 1.3.Hilton, op. cit., p. 74.4.Time, August 23, 1968, p. 28.5.Cervenka, op. cit., p. 154.6.Brown, op. cit., p. 26.7.Schwab, op. cit., p. 113.8.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 336-337.9.Time, June 6, 1969, p. 38.10.Schwab, op. cit., p. 79.11.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 338. De St. Jorre notes thatvon Rosen's air force accomplished the opposite of hisintension. The Federals increased their bombing and thepace of the war.12.Ibid., pp. 315-316.13. Brown, op. cit., p. 26.14.De St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 318.15. Madiebo, op. cit., p. 284.SELECTED BIBILIGRAPHYA.Books and Special ReportsAdemoyega, Adewale. Why We Struck. Ibadan: Evans Brothers(Nigergia Publishers) Limited, 1981. Expanation andhistory of the coup attempt in January 1966 by one ofthe key participants. This book gives a feel for thedynamics that led to the coup, the personalities andmotivations of the plotters, and the naivete whichdoomed the plot from its beginning. Used for backgroundinformation, this work is heavily biased, almost acomplete defense of the plotters.Akpan, Ntieyoug U. The Struggle For Succession 1966-1970.2nd Ed. London: Frank Cass, 1976. Author was chiefsecretary of the government and head of the CivilService of Eastern Nigeria (later "Biafra") from1966-1970. This book provided an insider's view of theoperations of the Biafran government. Used as aprincipal source.Alade, R. B. The Broken Bridge. Ibadan: The Caxton Press,1975. Background reading only.Amadi, Elechi. Sunset in Biafra. London: HeinemannEducational Books, Limited, 1973. An autobiography by anoted Nigerian novelist. The easy, direct style madethis book enjoyable to read. The work was used toverify certain concepts or conclusions through thereview of specific events detailed in the book.Excellent source of information on reestablishingcontrol of former Rebel areas.Balogun, Ola. The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis1966-1970. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.1973. Review of Civil War years; used as back-up sourcefor this paper.Cervenka, Zdenek. The Nigerian War 1967-1970. Frankfurt:Bernard and Graefe Verlag fur Wherwesen, 1971.Comprehensive research document on the Civil War,published shortly after the conclusion. This work isobjective and an appropriate starting point forresearchers. It contains an excellent bibliography andwas published in English.Collis, Robert. Nigeria in Conflict. London: Secker andWarburg, 1970. A pro-Federal account of the war, thisbook is sketchy and greatly biased. Used forcomparison.Critchley, Julian. Crisis Paper No. 7: the Nigerian CivilWar: The Defeat of Biafra. London: AtlanticInformation Centre for Teachers, 1970. This pamphletoutlines the events of the Civil War providing achronology with brief accompanying analyses. Includedare a wide selection of editorial quotes on the fall ofBiafra from newspapers around the world.De St. Jorre, John. The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodderand Stoughton, 1972. Thorough, readable book byjounalist who spent extensive time in Nigeria before,during and after the war. He was objectives in hispronouncements and his detailed research was reflectedin his well substantiated conclusions. Heavily usedthis reference.Dudley, Billy J. Instability and Political Order: Politicsand Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan UniversityPress, 1973.Forsyth, Frederick. The Biafra Story. Baltimore: Penguinbooks, 1969. Interesting, but biased. Written whilethe war was in progress to tell the Biafra side.Gold, Herbert. Biafra Goodbye. San Francisco: TwoWindowsPress, 1970. Short book recounting the author'spersonal involvement with Biafra. Polished work whichoften slips to stream of consciousness.Hatch, John. Nigeria: Seeds of Disaster. Chicago: HenryRegnery Company, 1970. Review of factors leading to theCivil War. Excellent recapitualtion of causes forserious researcher.Higham, Robin. ed. Civil Wars in th 20th Century.Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972.Established context for the war in Nigeria in light ofvarious aspects of civil warfare in this centruy.Hilton, Bruce. Highly Irregular. London: The MacmillanCompany, 1968. Biography of the mercy missions,including proposed airlift by author. Concisebackground to the causes of conflict. Documents thesuspicious nature of Biafran officials.Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., ed. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria. 2vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.Comprehensive collection of source documents on theNigerian Civil War. Important reference due toselection of texts and profound analysis in bothvolumes.Legum, Colin, and Drysdale, John, ed. Africa ContemporaryRecord 1968-1969. London: Africa Research Limited,1969. Best synopsis of factors leading to the CivilWar.. Africa Contemporary Record 1969-1970. London:Africa Research Limited, 1970.Luckham, Robin. The Nigerian Military. Cambridge:University Press, 1971. Detailed analysis of thedevelopment of the Nigerian military during the period1960 to 1967. Luckham outlined the factors which putthe military in a position to seize power, examined bothcoups and studied the military as a social system andpolitical entity. Exceptional research work.Madiebo, A.A. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980. MajorGeneral Madiebo was commander of the Biafran Army fromSeptember 1967 to January 1970. He offered a unique,knowledgeable perspective characterized by candor andreason. His insider's view made this a major source.Mok, Michael. Biafra Journal. New York: Time-Life Books,1969. Popular literature by a photo journalist whocovered the Biafran side of the war. Admittedly biased,yet moving account of life in the horror of the war inBiafra.Nelson, Harold D., et. al. Nigeria: A Country Study.Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.Outstanding reference work.Niven, Sir Rex. The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970.Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971.Relatively objective overview despite pro-Federalorientation of book.Nwankwo, Arthur Agwunch and Ifejika, Samuel Udolhukwu.Biafra: The Making of A Nation. New York: PraegerPublishers, 1970. Text provides a development of eventsleading up to the Civil War and a justification for theexistence of Biafra.Obasanjo, Olusegun. My Command. London: Heinemann, 1980.Key figure in the post-independence history of Nigeria(Division Commander in war and later military ruler whoturned government over to civilian leadership.)Outlines causes of Civil War and its early stages.Obasanjo details events that occurred after he assumeddivision command until the end of the war. One of the major works about the conflict.Obe, Peter. Nigeria: A Decade of Crises in Pictures.Apapa: Times Press Limited, 1971. Basic picture bookwith pro-Nigeria (Federal) cant by long timephotographer for Lagos Daily Times.Ojukwu, C.O. Biafra. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Row,1969. Selected speeches by the Biafra head of state.Okpaku, Joseph, ed. Negeria: Dilemma of Nationhood. NewYork: The Third Press, 1972.Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed. Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule 1966-1979. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.Oyewole, Fola. Reluctant Rebel. London: Rex Collings,1975. Autobiography of Civil War experience by aBiafran staff officer. This work has significancebecause of its first hand insights into the conduct ofthe war in Biafra. Major source for this paper.Oyewole was released from prison to fight in the war.He returned to prison at the end. A thoughtfullyobjective account of the Biafran regime and its militaryoperations.Samuels, Michael A., ed. The Nigeria-Biafra Conflict.Washington: The Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, Georgetown University, 1969. Minutes from a one-day conference. Highlights the critical concerns ofthe day.Schabouvka, Henry Ka and Himmelstrand, Ulf. Africa Reportson the Nigerian Crisis. Uppsala, Sweden: TheScandianavian Institute of African Studies, 1978.Primarily tangential information. Study of pressresponses and attitudes to Nigerian Civil War.Schwab, Peter, ed. Biafra. New York: Facts on File, Inc.,1971. Factual reference work recapping media accountsof war.Sobel, Lester A., ed. Facts on File Yearbook 1967. Vol.XXVII. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1969.Steiner, Rolf. The Last Adventurer. Boston: Little, Brownand Company, 1978. Authobiographical account of notedmercenary's experiences in Biafra, as well as Algeriaand the Sudan.Stremlau, John J. The International Politics of the NigerianCivil War 1967-1970. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1973. Salient work on the topic.Sullivan, John R. Breadless Biafra. Dayton: Pflaum Press,1969, Pro-Biafran publication by jounalist who visitedRebels in 1969. Concise, easy-to-read account of chainof events leading up to war.Taylor, Charles Lewis and Hudson, Michael C. World Handbookof Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1972.Thompson, Sir Robert. War in Peace. New York: HarmonyBooks, 1982. Establishes context of conflicts since theSecond World War.Uwechue, Raph. Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War. NewYork: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971. Primarilypolitico-social analysis of Civil War. Objectiveconclusions about the war considering pro-Biafrareference of author.B. PeriodicalsBrown, Neville. "The Nigerian Civil War." Military Review,October 1968, pp. 20-31.Grinaldi, J.S. Major, "The Effect of Political Geography onNigeria's Solidarity." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1969,pp. 50-51.New York Times, 15 January 1966-15 February 1970.Sterling, Claire. "The Self-Defeating Civil War in Nigeria."The Reporter, 10 August 1967, pp. 23-30.Time, 14 October 1966; 1 September 1967; 31 May 1968; 23August 1968; 4 October 1968; 6 June 1969; 26 January1970.C. InterviewsBecka, Mary, Major, USA. Research Analyst for WesternAfrica, Defense Intelligence Agency. Arlington.Virginia, March 8, 1984.Hubard, William, Lieutenant Colonel, USA. Current Analyst,Africa Branch, Defense Intelligence Agency. Washington,D.C., October 21, 1983.Isom, William G., Lieutenant Colonel. Director, AfricanStudies, National War College. Washington, D.C., March9, 1984.Stoakley, William, Dr. (Ph.D., History). Research Analystfor Western Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency.Arlington, Virginia, March 8, 1984.Click here to view image
