A man can distinguish different textures of cloth byfeeling; but not immediately, for he requires to move his fingersover the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare thesensations of one instant with those of another.

The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity of thesuccession of the vibrations which reach the ear. Each of thosevibrations produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a single suchimpulse be made upon the ear, and we know, experimentally, that itis perceived. There is, therefore, good reason to believe thateach of the impulses forming a tone is perceived. Nor is there anyreason to the contrary. So that this is the only admissiblesupposition. Therefore, the pitch of a tone depends upon therapidity with which certain impressions are successively conveyedto the mind. These impressions must exist previously to any tone;hence, the sensation of pitch is determined by previouscognitions. Nevertheless, this would never have been discovered bythe mere contemplation of that feeling.

A similar argument may be urged in reference to theperception of two dimensions of space. This appears to be animmediate intuition. But if we were to see immediately an extendedsurface, ourretinas must be spread out in an extendedsurface. Instead of that, the retina consists of innumerableneedles pointing towards the light, and whose distances from oneanother are decidedly greater than theminimum visibile. Supposeeach of those nerve-points conveys the sensation of a littlecolored surface. Still, what we immediately see must even then be,not a continuous surface, but a collection of spots. Who coulddiscover this by mere intuition? But all the analogies of thenervous system are against the supposition that the excitation ofa single nerve can produce an idea as complicated as that of aspace, however small. If the excitation of no one of these nervepoints can immediately convey the impression of space, theexcitation of all cannot do so. For, the excitation of eachproduces some impression (according to the analogies of thenervous system), hence, the sum of these impressions is anecessary condition of any perception produced by the excitationof all; or, in other terms, a perception produced by theexcitation of all is determined by the mental impressions producedby the excitation of every one. This argument is confirmed by thefact that the existence of the perception of space can be fullyaccounted for by the action of faculties known to exist, withoutsupposing it to be an immediate impression. For this purpose, wemust bear in mind the following facts of physio-psychology: 1. Theexcitation of a nerve does not of itself inform us where theextremity of it is situated. If, by a surgical operation, certainnerves are displaced, our sensations from those nerves do notinform us of the displacement. 2. A single sensation does notinform us how many nerves or nerve-points are excited. 3. We candistinguish between the impressions produced by the excitations ofdifferent nerve-points. 4. The differences of impressions producedby different excitations of similar nerve-points are similar. Leta momentary image be made upon the retina. By No. 2, theimpression thereby produced will be indistinguishable from whatmight be produced by the excitation of some conceivable singlenerve. It is not conceivable that the momentary excitation of asingle nerve should give the sensation of space. Therefore, themomentary excitation of all the nerve-points of the retina cannot,immediately or mediately, produce the sensation of space. The sameargument would apply to any unchanging image on the retina.Suppose, however, that the image moves over the retina. Then thepeculiar excitation which at one instant affects one nerve-point,at a later instant will affect another. These will conveyimpressions which are very similar by 4, and yet which aredistinguishable by 3. Hence, the conditions for therecognition of a relation between these impressions are present.There being, however, a very great number of nerve-points affectedby a very great number of successive excitations, the relations ofthe resulting impressions will be almost inconceivablycomplicated. Now, it is a known law of mind, that when phenomenaof an extreme complexity are presented, which yet would be reducedtoorder or mediate simplicity by the application of a certainconception, that conception sooner or later arises in applicationto those phenomena. In the case under consideration, theconception of extension would reduce the phenomena to unity, and,therefore, its genesis is fully accounted for. It remains only toexplain why the previous cognitions which determine it are notmore clearly apprehended. For this explanation, I shall refer to a paper[3] upon a new list of categories, Section 5, merely addingthat just as we are able to recognize our friends by certainappearances, although we cannot possibly say what thoseappearances are and are quite unconscious of any process ofreasoning, so in any case when the reasoning is easy and naturalto us, however complex may be the premisses, they sink intoinsignificance and oblivion proportionately to thesatisfactoriness of the theory based upon them. This theory ofspace is confirmed by the circumstance that an exactly similartheory is imperatively demanded by the facts in reference to time.That the course of time should be immediately felt is obviouslyimpossible. For, in that case, there must be an element of thisfeeling at each instant. But in an instant there is no durationand hence no immediate feeling of duration. Hence, no one of theseelementary feelings is an immediate feeling of duration; and,hence the sum of all is not. On the other hand, the impressions ofany moment are very complicated -- containing all the images (orthe elements of the images) of sense and memory, which complexityis reducible to mediate simplicity by means of the conception oftime.[4]

We have, therefore, a variety of facts, all of whichare most readily explained on the supposition that we have nointuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediatecognitions. Some arbitrary hypothesis may otherwise explain anyone of these facts; this is the only theory which brings them tosupport one another. Moreover, no facts require the supposition ofthe faculty in question. Whoever has studied the nature of proofwill see, then, that there are here very strong reasons fordisbelieving the existence of this faculty. These will becomestill stronger when the consequences of rejecting it have, in thispaper and in a following one, been more fully traced out.

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Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to bedistinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internalsense, and from pure apperception. Any cognition is aconsciousness of the object as represented; by self-consciousnessis meant a knowledge of ourselves. Not a mere feeling of subjective conditions of consciousness, but of our personalselves. Pure apperception is the self-assertion of THEego; theself-consciousness here meant is the recognition of myprivateself. I know thatI (not merelythe I) exist. The question is, howdo I know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determinedby previous cognitions?

Now, it is not self-evident that we have such an intuitive faculty, for it has just been shown that we have no intuitivepower of distinguishing an intuition from a cognition determinedby others. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of this poweris to be determined upon evidence, and the question is whetherself-consciousness can be explained by the action of knownfaculties under conditions known to exist, or whether it isnecessary to suppose an unknown cause for this cognition, and, inthe latter case, whether an intuitive faculty ofself-consciousness is the most probable cause which can besupposed.

It is first to be observed that there is no knownself-consciousness to be accounted for in extremely youngchildren. It has already been pointed out by Kant[5] that the lateuse of the very common word "I" with children indicates animperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so faras it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion in regard to themental state of those who are still younger, it must be againstthe existence of any self-consciousness in them.

On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought muchearlier. Indeed, it is almost impossible to assign a period atwhich children do not already exhibit decided intellectualactivity in directions in which thought is indispensable to theirwell-being. The complicated trigonometry of vision, and thedelicate adjustments of coordinated movement, are plainly masteredvery early. There is no reason to question a similar degree ofthought in reference to themselves.

A very young child may always be observed to watch its ownbody with great attention. There is every reason why this shouldbe so, for from the child's point of view this body is the mostimportant thing in the universe. Only what it touches has anyactual and present feeling; only what it faces has any actualcolor; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste.

No one questions that, when a sound is heard by a child, hethinks, not of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other objectas sounding.How when he wills to move a table? Does he then think of himself as desiring, or only of the table as fit to bemoved? That he has the latter thought, is beyond question; that hehas the former, must, until the existence of an intuitiveself-consciousness is proved, remain an arbitrary and baselesssupposition. There is no good reason for thinking that he is lessignorant of his own peculiar condition than the angry adult whodenies that he is in a passion.

The child, however, must soon discover by observation thatthings which are thus fit to be changed are apt actually toundergo this change, after a contact with that peculiarlyimportant body called Willy or Johnny. This consideration makesthis body still more important and central, since it establishes aconnection between the fitness of a thing to be changed and atendency in this body to touch it before it is changed.

The child learns to understand the language; that is tosay, a connection between certain sounds and certain facts becomesestablished in his mind. He has previously noticed the connectionbetween these sounds and the motions of the lips of bodiessomewhat similar to the central one, and has tried the experimentof putting his hand on those lips and has found the sound in thatcase to be smothered. He thus connects that language with bodiessomewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so unenergeticthat they should be called rather instinctive, perhaps, thantentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins toconverse.

It must be about this time that he begins to find that whatthese people about him say is the very best evidence of fact. Somuch so, that testimony is even a stronger mark of fact thanthefacts themselves, or rather than what must now be thought of astheappearances themselves. (I may remark, by the way, that thisremains so through life; testimony will convince a man that hehimself is mad.) A child hears it said that the stove is hot. Butit is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touchingit, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it,and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, hebecomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose aselfin which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the firstdawning of self-consciousness.

But, further, although usually appearances are either onlyconfirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is acertain remarkable class of appearances which are continually con-tradicted by testimony. These are those predicates whichwe know to be emotional, but whichhe distinguishes by their connection with the movements of that central person, himself(that the table wants moving, etc.) These judgments are generallydenied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others,also, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest.Thus, he adds to the conception of appearance as the actualizationof fact, the conception of it as somethingprivate and valid onlyfor one body. In short,error appears, and it can be explainedonly by supposing aself which is fallible.

Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absoluteego of pure apperception.

Now, the theory which, for the sake of perspicuity, hasthus been stated in a specific form, may be summed up as follows:At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we knowthat they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we knowthem to possess at that age powers of understanding sufficient toenable them to infer from ignorance and error their own existence.Thus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions knownto exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The only essentialdefect in this account of the matter is, that while we know thatchildren exerciseas much understanding as is here supposed, we donot know that they exercise it in precisely this way. Still thesupposition that they do so is infinitely more supported by facts,than the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind.

The only argument worth noticing for the existence of anintuitive self-consciousness is this. We are more certain of ourown existence than of any other fact; a premiss cannot determine aconclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our ownexistence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The firstpremiss must be admitted, but the second premiss is founded on anexploded theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain thanthat some one of the facts which support it is true, but it mayeasily be more certain than any one of those facts. Let ussuppose, for example, that a dozen witnesses testify to anoccurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on the beliefthat each of those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yetthe fact testified to is made more certain than that any one ofthose men is generally to be believed. In the same way, to thedeveloped mind of man, his own existence is supported byevery other fact, and is, therefore, incomparably more certainthan any one of these facts. But it cannot be said to be morecertain than that there is another fact, since there is no doubtperceptible in either case.

It is to be concluded, then, that there is no necessity of supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness m ay easily be the result of inference.

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Every cognition involves something represented, or that ofwhich we are conscious, and some action or passion of the selfwhereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed theobjective, the latter the subjective, element of the cognition.The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element,which may therefore be called, also, the immediate object. Thesubjective element is not necessarily immediately known, but it ispossible that such an intuition of the subjective element of acognition of its character, whether that of dreaming, imagining,conceiving, believing, etc., should accompany every cognition. Thequestion is whether this is so.

It would appear, at first sight, that there is anoverwhelming array of evidence in favor of the existence of such apower. The difference between seeing a color and imagining it isimmense. There is a vast difference between the most vivid dreamand reality. And if we had no intuitive power of distinguishingbetween what we believe and what we merely conceive, we never, itwould seem, could in any way distinguish them; since if we did soby reasoning, the question would arise whether the argument itselfwas believed or conceived, and this must be answered before theconclusion could have any force. And thus there would be aregressus ad infinitum. Besides, if we do not know that webelieve, then, from the nature of the case, we do not believe.

But be it noted that we do not intuitively know theexistence of this faculty. For it is an intuitive one, and wecannot intuitively know that a cognition is intuitive. Thequestion is, therefore, whether it is necessary to suppose theexistence of this faculty, or whether then the facts can beexplained without this supposition.

In the first place, then, the difference between what is/imagined or dreamed and what is actually experienced, is noargument in favor of the existence of such a faculty. For it isnot questioned that there are distinctionsin what is present to the mind, but the question is, whether independently of anysuch distinctions in the immediateobjects of consciousness, wehave any immediate power of distinguishing different modes ofconsciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense difference in theimmediate objects of sense and imagination, sufficiently accountsfor our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of being anargument in favor of the existence of an intuitive power ofdistinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, it is apowerful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction ofsense and imagination is concerned.

Passing to the distinction of belief and conception, we meet the statement that the knowledge of belief is essential toits existence. Now, we can unquestionably distinguish a belieffrom a conception, in most cases, by means of a peculiar feelingof conviction; and it is a mere question of words whether wedefine belief as that judgment which is accompanied by thisfeeling, or as that judgment from which a man will act. We mayconveniently call the formersensational, the latteractive,belief. That neither of these necessarily involves the other, willsurely be admitted without any recital of facts. Taking belief inthe sensational sense, the intuitive power of reorganizing it willamount simply to the capacity for the sensation which accompaniesthe judgment. This sensation, like any other, is an object ofconsciousness; and therefore the capacity for it implies nointuitive recognition of subjective elements of consciousness. Ifbelief is taken in the active sense, it may be discovered by theobservation of external facts and by inference from the sensationof conviction which usually accompanies it.

Thus, the arguments in favor of this peculiar power ofconsciousness disappear, and the presumption is again against sucha hypothesis. Moreover, as the immediate objects of any twofaculties must be admitted to be different, the facts do notrender such a supposition in any degree necessary.

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It is not intended here to assume the reality of theexternal world. Only, there is a certain set of facts which areordinarily regarded as external, while others are regarded asinternal. The question is whether the latter are known otherwisethan by inference from theformer. Byintrospection, I mean a direct perception of the internal world, but not necessarily aperception of itas internal. Nor do I mean to limit thesignification of the word to intuition, but would extend it to anyknowledge of the internal world not derived from externalobservation.

There is one sense in which any perception has an internal object, namely,that every sensation is partly determined byinternal conditions. Thus, the sensation of redness is as it is,owing to the constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is asensation of something internal. Hence, we may derive a knowledgeof the mind from a consideration of this sensation, but thatknowledge would, in fact, be an inference from redness as apredicate of something external. On the other hand, there arecertain other feelings -- the emotions, for example -- whichappear to arise in the first place, not as predicates at all, andto be referable to the mind alone. It would seem, then, that bymeans of these, a knowledge of the mind may be obtained, which isnot inferred from any character of outward things. The question iswhether this is really so.

.Although introspection is not necessarily intuitive, it isnot self-evident that we possess this capacity; for we have nointuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective modes ofconsciousness. The power, if it exists, must be known by thecircumstance that the facts cannot be explained without it.

In reference to the above argument from the emotions, itmust be admitted that if a man is angry, his anger implies, ingeneral, no determinate and constant character in its object. But,on the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is somerelative character in the outward thing which makes him angry, anda little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists inhis saying to himself, "this thing is vile, abominable, etc." andthat it is rather a mark of returning reason to say, "I am angry."In the same way any emotion is a predication concerning someobject, and the chief difference between this and an objectiveintellectual judgment is that while the latter is relative tohuman nature or to mind in general, the former is relative to theparticular circumstances and disposition of a particular man at aparticular time. What is here said of emotions in general, is truein particular of the sense of beauty and of the moral sense. Goodand bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, andtherefore are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined bypreviouscognitions (there being no intuitive power ofdistinguishing subjective elements of consciousness).

It remains, then, only to inquire whether it is necessaryto suppose a particular power of introspection for the sake ofaccounting for the sense of willing. Now, volition, asdistinguished from desire, is nothing but the power ofconcentrating the attention, of abstracting. Hence, the knowledgeof the power of abstracting may be inferred from abstract objects,just as the knowledge of the power of seeing is inferred fromcolored objects.

It appears, therefore, that there is no reason forsupposing a power of introspection; and, consequently, the onlyway of investigating a psychological question is by inference fromexternal facts.

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This is a familiar question, but there is, to this day, nobetter argument in the affirmative than that thought must precedeevery sign. This assumes the impossibility of an infinite series.But Achilles, as a fact, will overtake the tortoise.How thishappens, is a question not necessary to be answered at present, aslong as it certainly does happen.

.If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases ofthought which we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, noother thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seenthat only by external facts can thought be known at all. The onlythought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in signs.But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought,therefore, must necessarily be in signs.

A man says to himself, "Aristotle is a man;therefore, heis fallible." Has he not, then, thought what he has not said tohimself, that all men are fallible? The answer is, that he hasdone so, so far as this is said in histherefore. According tothis, our question does not relate tofact, but is a mere askingfor distinctness of thought.

From the proposition that every thought is a sign, itfollows that every thought must address itself to some other, mustdetermine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This,after all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that inintuition, i.e., in the immediate present, there is no thought,or, that all which is reflected upon has past.Hinc loquor indeest. That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, hasits analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there musthave been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, thatthought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is butanother way of saying that every thought must be interpreted inanother, or that all thought is in signs.

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It would seem that it can, and that universal andhypothetical propositions are instances of it. Thus, the universalproposition, "all ruminants are cloven-hoofed," speaks of apossible infinity of animals, and no matter how many ruminants mayhave been examined, the possibility must remain that there areothers which have not been examined. In the case of a hypotheticalproposition, the same thing is still more manifest; for such aproposition speaks not merely of the actual state of things, butof every possible state of things, all of which are not knowable,inasmuch as only one can so much as exist.

On the other hand, all our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring injudgments of experience. Accordingly, there can be no conceptionof the absolutely incognizable, since nothing of that sort occursin experience. But the meaning of a term is the conception whichit conveys. Hence, a term can have no such meaning.

If it be said that the incognizable is a concept compoundedof the conceptnot andcognizable, it may be replied thatnot is amere syncategorematic term and not a concept by itself.

If I think "white," I will not go so far asBerkeley and say that I think of a person seeing, but I will say that what Ithink is of the nature of a cognition, and so of anything elsewhich can be experienced. Consequently, the highest concept whichcan be reached by abstractions from judgments of experience -- andtherefore, the highest concept which can be reached at all -- isthe concept of something of the nature of a cognition.Not, then,orwhat is other than, if a concept, is a concept of thecognizable. Hence, not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept ofthe form "A, not-A," and is, at least, self-contradictory. Thus,ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a realknowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions.Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowablereality; but over against all possible cognition, there is onlythe self-contradictory. In short,cognizability (in its widestsense) andbeing are not merely metaphysically the same, but aresynonymous terms.

To the argument from universal and hypotheticalpropositions,the reply is, that though their truth cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may be probably known by induction.

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It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are in possession of cognitions, which are all determined by previousones, and these by cognitions earlier still, there must have beenafirst in this series or else our state of cognition at any timeis completely determined, according to logical laws, by our stateat any previous time. But there are many facts against the lastsupposition, and therefore in favor of intuitive cognitions.

On the other hand, since it is impossible to knowintuitively that a given cognition is not determined by a previousone, the only way in which this can be known is by hypotheticinference from observed facts. But to adduce the cognition bywhich a given cognition has been determined is to explain thedeterminations of that cognition. And it is the only way ofexplaining them. For something entirely out of consciousness whichmay be supposed to determine it, can, as such, only be known andonly adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So, that tosuppose that a cognition is determined solely by somethingabsolutely external, is to suppose its determinations incapable ofexplanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under nocircumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for ahypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they areexplained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable isself-contradictory.

If it be objected that the peculiar character ofred is not determined by any previous cognition, I reply that that characteris not a character of red as a cognition; for if there be a man towhom red things look as blue ones do to me andvice versa, thatman's eyes teach him the same facts that they would if he werelike me.

Moreover, we know of no power by which an intuition couldbe known. For, as the cognition is beginning, and therefore in astate of change, at only the first instant would it be intuition.And, therefore, the apprehension of it must take place in no timeand be an event occupying no time.6 Besides, all the cognitivefaculties we know of are relative, and consequently their productsare relations. But thecognition of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previouscognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then, first,because it is absolutely incognizable, and second, because acognition only exists so far as it is known.

The reply to the argument that theremust be a first is as follows: In retracing our way from conclusions topremisses, or from determined cognitions to those which determine them, wefinally reach, in all cases, a point beyond which theconsciousness in the determined cognition is more lively than inthe cognition which determines it. We have a less livelyconsciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition ofthe third dimension than in the latter cognition itself; a lesslively consciousness in the cognition which determines ourcognition of a continuous surface (without a blind spot) than inthis latter cognition itself; and a less lively consciousness ofthe impressions which determine the sensation of tone than of thatsensation itself. Indeed, when we get near enough to the externalthis is the universal rule. Now let any horizontal line representa cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (soto speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. Apoint, having no length, will, on this principle, represent anobject quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line belowanother represent a cognition which determines the cognitionrepresented by that other and which has the same object as thelatter. Let the finite distance between two such lines representthat they are two different cognitions. With this aid to thinking,let us see whether "there must be a first." Suppose an invertedtriangle to be gradually dipped into water. At any date orinstant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line acrossthat triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequentdate, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle.This represents another cognition of the same object determined bythe former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of thetriangle represents the object external to the mind whichdetermines both these cognitions. The state of the triangle beforeit reaches the water, represents a state of cognition whichcontains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. Tosay, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which allsubsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined,there must subsequently be some cognition of that object notdetermined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to saythat when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be asectional line made by the surface of the water lower than whichno surface line had been made in thatway.But draw the horizontal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as youplease can be assigned at finite distances below it and below oneanother. For any such section is at some distance above the apex,otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance bea. Then therehave been similar sections at the distances 1/2a, 1/4a, 1/8a,1/16a, above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that itis not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logicaldifficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of theAchilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result,as long as your principles are fully applied to the particularcase of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion, if itseems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determinationof one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines arefictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgmentsare fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or thatlogical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognitionarises by aprocess of beginning, as any other change comes topass.

In a subsequent paper, I shall trace the consequences ofthese principles, in reference to the questions of reality, ofindividuality, and of the validity of the laws of logic.

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[2]The proposition of Berengarius is contained in the following quotation from hisDe Sacra Coena: "Maximi plane cordisest, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad eam adrationem est confugere, quo qui non confugit, cum secundumrationem sit factus ad imaginem dei, suum honorem reliquit, necpotest renovari de die in diem ad imaginem dei." ["Clearly it is characteristic of a great soul to take refuge in dialectic in all circumstances, because to take refuge in it is to take refuge in reason, and whoever does not take refuge there, since it is in respect of reason that he is made in the image of God, gives up his honor; nor can he be renewed from day to day in the image of God."] The most strikingcharacteristic of medieval reasoning, in general, is the perpetualresort to authority. When Fredigisus and others wish to prove thatdarkness is a thing, although they have evidently derived theopinion from nominalistic-Platonistic meditations, they argue thematter thus: "God called the darkness, night;" then, certainly, itis a thing, for otherwise before it had a name, there would havebeen nothing, not even a fiction to name. [According to the editors of the chronological edition of CSP's work, "Peirce read this in Prantl,Geschichte, 2:17-19. Fredegisus (d. 834) was an English monk and Alcuin's successor at the court of Charlemagne; his best-known work isDe nihilo et tenebris.,"Writings2.525].Abelard [Ouvrages Inedits, p. 179] thinks it worth while to cite Boethius, when he says that space has three dimensions, and when he saysthat an individual cannot be in two places at once. The author ofDe Generibus et Speciebus [ibid., p. 517], a work of a superior order, in arguing against a Platonic doctrine, says that ifwhatever is universal is eternal, theform and matter of Socrates,being severally universal, are both eternal, and that, therefore,Socrates was not created by God, but only put together, "quodquantum a vero deviet, palam est." The authority is the finalcourt of appeal. The same author, where in one place he doubts astatement of Boethius [ibid., p. 535f], finds it necessary toassign a special reason why in this case it is not absurd to doso.Exceptio probat regulam in casibus non exceptis. Recognizedauthorities were certainly sometimes disputed in the twelfthcentury; their mutual contradictions insured that; and theauthority of philosophers was regarded as inferior to that oftheologians. Still, it would be impossible to find a passage wherethe authority of Aristotle is directly denied upon any logicalquestion. "Sunt et multi errores eius," says John of Salisbury[Metalogicon, Lib. IV, cap. XXVIII], "qui in scripturis tam ethnicis, quam fidelibus poterunt inveniri; verum in logica paremhabuisse non legitur." ["Although there are many mistakes in Aristotle, as is evident from the writings of Christians and pagans alike, his equal in logic has yet to be found."] "Sed nihil adversus Aristotelem," ["But nothing against Aristotle,"] saysAbelard, and in another place, "Sed si Aristotelem Peripateticorumprincipem culpare possumus, quam amplius in hacarte recepimus?" [But if we can find fault with Aristotle the prince of the Peripatetics, what can we trust in this art?"]The idea of going without an authority, or of subordinatingauthority to reason, does not occur to him.

[3]Proceedings of the American Academy, May 14, 1867.

process -- the "Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung." (SeeCritik d. Reinen Vernunft. Ed. 1781, pp. 98 et seq.) My theory is merely an account of this synthesis.

The gist of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is contained intwo principles. First, that universal and necessary propositionsare not given in experience. Second, that universal and necessaryfacts are determined by the conditions of experience in general.By a universal proposition is meant merely, one which assertssomething ofall of a sphere -- not necessarily one which all menbelieve. By a necessary proposition, is meant one which assertswhat it does, not merely of the actual condition of things, but ofevery possible state of things; it is not meant that theproposition is one which we cannot help believing. Experience, inKant's first principle, cannot be used for a product of theobjective understanding, but must be taken for the firstimpressions of sense with consciousness conjoined and worked up bythe imagination into images, together with all which is logicallydeducible therefrom. In this sense, it may be admitted thatuniversal and necessary propositions are not given in experience.But, in that case, neither are any inductive conclusions whichmight be drawn from experience, given in it. In fact, it is thepeculiar function of induction to produce universal and necessarypropositions. Kant points out, indeed, that the universality andnecessity of scientific inductions are but the analogues ofphilosophic universality and necessity; and this is true, in sofar as it is never allowable to accept a scientific conclusionwithout a certain indefinite drawback. But this is owing to theinsufficiency in the number of the instances; and wheneverinstances may be had in as large numbers as we please,adinfinitum, a truly universal and necessary proposition isinferable. As for Kant's second principle, that the truth ofuniversal and necessary propositions is dependent upon theconditions of the general experience, it is no more nor less thanthe principle of Induction. I go to a fair and draw from the"grab-bag" twelve packages. Upon opening them, I find that everyone contains a red ball. Here is a universal fact. It depends,then, on the condition of the experience. What is the condition ofthe experience? It is solely that the balls are the contents ofpackages drawn from that bag, that is, the only thing whichdetermined the experience, was the drawing from the bag. I infer,then, according to the principle of Kant, that what is drawn fromthe bag will contain a red ball. This is induction. Applyinduction not to any limited experience but to all humanexperience and you have the Kantian philosophy, so far as it iscorrectly developed.

Kant's successors, however, have not been content with hisdoctrine. Nor ought they to have been. For, there is this thirdprinciple: "Absolutely universal propositions must be analytic."For whatever is absolutely universal is devoid of all content ordetermination, for all determination is by negation. The problem,therefore, is not how universal propositions can be synthetical,but how universal propositions appearing to be synthetical can beevolved by thought alone from the purely indeterminate.

[5]Werke, vii (2), 11.

[6]This argument, however, only covers a part of the question. It does not go to show that there is no cognition undetermined except by another like it.