We accept 3,664 (rounded to 3,500+) as an estimate of the number of Iraqicivilians killed in the 1991 Gulf War. Regarding military personnel, weestimate that between 20,000 and 26,000 were killed in the conflict.

1.Iraqi civilian fatalities in the 1991 Gulf War

The estimate for civilian deaths is based on a study conducted by BethOsborne Daponte, a former Census Bureau analyst and currently a seniorresearch scientist at Carnegie Mellon University (Daponte 1993). With regardto civilian casualties directly attributable to the war, the study buildson earlier research conducted by Humans Rights Watch shortly after thewar (HRW 1991). The HRW estimate of 2,500 to 3,000 Iraqi civilians killedin the war was based on eyewitness reports, although no claim was madethat the survey was comprehensive. From this source Daponte compiled adatabase of 2,665 deaths, after removing duplicate reports. Subsequently,she checked this on a province by province basis against the official Iraqirecords of 2,278 civilian deaths from the war. Overall it appeared thatthe Iraqi government hadundercounted the civilian death toll, althoughthis was not systematic. In some governorates (provinces), the officialcount was higher -- and in these cases Daponte added the "excess" casesto the total. The combined total was 3,664.

Turning to Iraqi military casualties in the 1990-1991 Gulf War: we concludethat between 20,000 and 26,000 were killed. These resolve into severalcategories: ground troops killed in the air war, other military personnelkilled at fixed military installations, personnel killed in the air orat sea, and personnel killed during the ground war and after the cease-fire.

2.Iraqi military personnel killed during the air war

Estimates for the casualties imposed by coalition air power on Iraqidivisions in the theater of operations are based on interviews with capturedIraqi officers, which found average unit losses of 2.5 percent (Aspin andDickinson 1992; Keaney and Eliot Cohen 1993; Gordon and Trainor 1995, pp.351-352).Using 360,000 as a baseline for the number of Iraqi troopsactually in the theater, we accept an estimate of 9,000 Iraqi field troopskilled during the air war(which is the figure that the Aspin/Dickinsonreport suggests).

Apart from field units, however, air power also struck at numerous othermilitary targets: airfields, military bases and depots, air defense sitesthroughout Iraq, and command and control facilities. All told, more than2,000 such fixed targets existed and they absorbed between 8,000 and 9,000strikes. Almost one-third of these targets were airfields and these absorbedabout 30 percent of the strikes flown against fixed military targets. Alsonumerous were small air defense installations. How many casualties thiscategory of strikes produced is unknown. Attacks on airfields, per se,and on small air defense sites may have produced relatively few. Returnvisits to sites already bombed may have produced none. However, the sitestargeted could have housed or employed 150,000 personnel all together.Here, we assume an average number of fatalities per target ranging between1.5 and 3 personnel, which yields between 3,000 and 6,000 additional militaryfatalities.

During the war Iraq lost 41 combat aircraft and helicopters in flight.It also lost approximately 60 naval vessels, although most of these werein dock.We conservatively assume that less than 100 fatalities wereassociated with aircraft in flight and ships at sea. (Losses of airdefense personnel and of other air force and navy personnel at bases areincluded in the previous estimate).

3.Iraqi military personnel killed during the ground war

We conclude that between 8,000 and 10,500 were killed in ground forceoperations, while theGulf War Air Power Survey concluded thatthe ground war "total could easily have been as high as 10,000" (Keanyand Cohen, GWAPS, 1993, p. 249, ft. 19).

Our estimate of Iraqi casualties in the ground war comprises severalsubordinate estimates:

• As many as 250 Iraqis were killed in probing attacks and artillery exchangesbefore the start of the ground war;

• More than 200 were killed in the 29 January - 1 February "Battle of Kafji"(including action against three Iraqi brigades);

• Between 800 and 1,250 were killed in preparatory artillery barrages andbreaching operations at the start of the ground war (including 250-500buried alive in their trenches);


• Between 800 and 1,000 were killed in the 25-27 February "highway of death"incidents (which are addressed separately in an Appendix to this report);


• 700 or more were likely killed in the controversial post-war attack ona military caravan of 600+ vehicles near the Rumaila oilfields; and
• 5,500-7,000 were killed in other battles and engagements -- the "groundwar" proper -- conducted by the USMC and Army XVIII and VII corps (in conjunctionwith allied forces).

Ground operations conducted between 24 and 28 February included 8 substantialbattles between US coalition forces and Iraqi units of battalion-size orlarger offering stiff resistance (Press 2001; Biddle 1996). Numerous smallerengagements occurred as well. With regard to these battles and engagements,our estimates of Iraqi personnel losses are based on data from severalbattles that have been carefully reconstructed by the US Army and independentmilitary analysts and -- extrapolating from these to other cases -- onthe size of the Iraqi units engaged, the extent of equipment destructionthey suffered while engaged in battle, and the observations of US commandersand Iraqi POWs recorded in US military historical documents. A carefuland detailed Army reconstruction of the Battle of 73 Easting, for instance,found that 590 Iraqis had been killed in an engagement between a battalion-sizedUS unit and a brigade-sized Iraqi one (Biddle 1996, Burns 1991). Also,coalition artillery ammunition expenditure rates were sufficient to killbetween 3,000 and 7,000 personnel, assuming that Iraqi forces were relativelywell dug-in at the start of the ground war, fairly dispersed, and alreadysubstantially depleted by air interdiction and desertion. Some of theseartillery deaths (between 1,000 and 1,500) would have occurred before coalitionground forces crossed the border in strength; others would have been countedamong the losses associated with individual battles.

Among the estimates made above, several may be controversial. Previousestimates of the numbers killed in the "highway of death" incident(s) outsideKuwait City range from 200-300 to "tens of thousands". Our choice of 800-1000is explained in a subsequent section. Also controversial are estimatesof the number of Iraqis buried alive by bulldozers of the US 1^stInfantry Division during breeching operations on the first day of the GulfWar. Previous estimates range from less than 100 to "thousands". By contrast,we have accepted 250-500 as a range that best reconciles the availabletestimony and evidence.

4.Buried alive: 1^st Division breeching operations

The higher end estimates for the numbers of Iraqi combatants buriedalive derive from an off-the-cuff statement by the commander of one ofthe two brigades who said that "thousands" might have been buried "forall I know." The commander of the other brigade made different estimatesat different times: 80-250 and 650 buried. The division commander, Maj.Gen. Thomas Rhames, told a press conference that as many as 400 might havebeen buried. Significantly, none of the officers interviewed seemed especiallydefensive about the operation. However, a captain who ordered part of theassault (and was quite distraught in its aftermath) estimated later thathe could have killed hundreds (Zmirak 2002). A similarly distraught sargent,still troubled ten years later by dreams of being buried alive, thoughtthousands might have been entombed (Berstein 2001).

A classified (secret) log made by division officers at the time of theincident noted that only 150 enemy soldiers had been buried (Gordon andTrainor 1995, p. 383 and ft. 18-6.). (The log also stated that the divisiontook only 500 prisoners on the day of the assault, although others mighthave been taken by a neighboring British division.)

Some Iraqis were able to flee the area -- a significant fact in itself(O'Kane 1995). One Iraqi who did retreat and witness the bulldozing froma safe distance estimated that 300 of his comrades must have been buriedalong the immediate section of the trench line -- probably constitutinga battalion position (or 11 percent of the total). (As we will see, theIraqi's numerical estimate might actually have reflected the total numberof Iraqi troops still alive and present in the area when the assault began.)The Iraqi also claimed that the plows cut down some troops who had exitedthe trenches and were attempting to surrender. As is made clear in an interviewwith a sargent who drove one of the plows (either a tank with plow attachedor a combat earth mover ), those driving the equipment could see littleof what was immediately in front of them (O'Kane 1995).

High-end estimates often also make reference to the fact that the authorizedstrength of the Iraqi unit under attack (the 26^th Infantry Division)was 8,000 and that less than 2,000 Iraqis had surrendered (some from neighboringdivisions). However, few if any Iraqi units in the theater actually deployedat full strength and all subsequently lost a fair portion of their personnelto desertion and aerial bombardment.

The average deployed strength of Iraqi ground units in the theater wasonly 66 percent of authorized strength; average loss to desertion was 42percent of deployed strength; average loss to aerial bombardment was 2.5percent of deployed strength (Aspin and Dickinson 1992). In some casesdesertions were as high as 50 percent and fatalities due to air power were6 percent. Those personnel injured by air power comprised as much as 16percent of deployed personnel in extreme cases -- and, early in the airwar, many of these would have been evacuated.

Those Iraqi units in trench lines along the Saudi border were amongthe ones most heavily depleted by air power. At the time of the groundassault, the Iraqi 26^th division was judged by CENTCOM to havelost more than 25 percent of its initial fighting effectiveness to aerialbombardment, although this does not translate directly into troop strength;it is mostly a measure of equipment loss. At any rate, on the eve of theground war, frontline units were subjected to napalm bombardment and heavyartillery barrages.

These factors combine to make it unlikely that there were more than3,000 soldiers remaining alive and present in the Iraqi 26^thDivision when the breeching operation began. Subsequently, more than 500of these -- and perhaps as many as 2,000 -- were taken prisoner. Some numberalso escaped the area. Also, it would have been unlikely that more thantwo-thirds of the available division personnel would have been in the forwardtrenches at any one time. Others would have been fulfilling vital functionsin the division's rear area. These considerations support the hypothesisthat hundreds -- not thousands -- were entombed by 1^st divisionplows. Some of these Iraqis would have been in fighting shape; others dazed,confused, or injured from recent napalm and artillery assaults. Due tofear of chemical attack and the demanding pace of the planned offensive,the US 1^st Division did not make loudspeaker appeals for surrender.

Low end estimates of the numbers buried alive derive from an Iraqi reportof having recovered only 44 bodies in October 1991 (AP, October1991). Although this number subsequently echoed for years in the US mediaand policy community (PBS 1996, Heidenrich 1993), the Iraqis hadclaimed to find more bodies by the end of 1991 -- 400 in all (Xinhua1991). Some of these probably came from other sites, however (AP,November 1991). The official Iraqi version today is that "hundreds" wereburied alive by the US 1^st Division breeching operation, andthis estimate is reflected in an Iraqi docudrama about the event (BBC2000,AFP 2000).

Most of the informed estimates of the numbers buried alive during thebreeching operation fall in the range of 150-650 Iraqis. However, herewe accept a somewhat narrower range -- 250-500 -- because it better integratesofficial Iraqi claims and better represents a situation that could giverise both to a semi-official log of 150 buried and to multiple impressionsthat "hundreds" had been buried along different subsections of the line(which led some observers to infer that "thousands" must have been buriedalong the entire line).

5.The "Highway(s) of Death"

During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, 42 days of coalition air attack on dispersedand dug-in Iraqi ground forces produced an average fatality rate of approximately2.5 percent, according to interviews with captured Iraqi officers (Aspinand Dickenson 1992). The baseline for this rate is 360,000 Iraqi troopsactually deployed in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations -- and notthe assigned personnel of Iraqi units, which were significantly understrength.If desertions during the air war (150,000) are taken into account (whichgradually further reduced the number of Iraqis exposed to air attack),the rate of fatalities is more on the order of 3 percent. Much higher rateswere achieved against forces when they concentrated or moved, which exposedthem to efficient air attack. One example from the Gulf War is the attackon Iraqi convoys along the "highway of death" at the conflict's end. Herewe estimate that the personnel under attack suffered at least 6 to 10 percentfatalities in a 24 hour period, assuming that 10,000 Iraqis rode in thecolumns.

The "highway of death" attacks targeted Iraqi convoys leaving Kuwaitas coalition forces closed on Kuwait City on 25-26 February 1991. Mostnewspaper coverage of the incidents cite the number of vehicles that wereunder attack as approximately 1,400 on the main highway north of Al Jahraand as many as 400 on the coastal road to Basra. The great majority ofvehicles on the main road were civilian types -- including cars, buses,milk trucks, tractors, ambulances, and fire trucks -- commandeered by Iraqis.Indeed, only 28 were later identified from photographs by the CIA as beingarmored vehicles (CIA, 1993). On the coastal road, however, the majorityof vehicles were military.

On the main highway, much of the destruction was concentrated alonga two mile strip, although journalists reported seeing smoldering wreckageand bodies all the way from 5 miles outside Kuwait City to just short ofthe Iraq border -- a distance of more than 50 miles. Along the coastalroad, destruction stretched intermittently for 50-60 miles. Although therewere fewer wrecks along the coastal road than along the main, the extentof their destruction was greater.

How many Iraqis died in the attacks remains controversial. One high-endestimate asserts that "tens of thousands" of Iraqi soldiers were killed(Chediac 1991). Seemingly, this estimate was based on the low number ofreported prisoners (450-500) and an estimation of how many Iraqis wereriding in the convoys. Given approximately 1,800 vehicles, it is not unreasonableto assume that 10,000 Iraqis came under attack -- although the number ofvehicles and the average number of riders could have been less.Ipsofacto this would preclude the possibility that tens of thousandswere killed. Moreover, simple subtraction -- riders minus prisoners --cannot yield a reliable estimate of fatalities because many Iraqis werewitnessed fleeing the scene by Kuwaitis living in the area. At any rate,there was little reported evidence of vehicles having been filled to capacitywith people. For instance: among those cases in which journalists reportedfinding corpses still in their vehicles, only a small fraction containedmore than two.

The low-end estimate of the numbers killed in the attack is 200-300.This seems to originate with aWashington Post article (Coll andBranigin 1991) that asserted the source of the figure was reporters whohad visited the scene. Subsequently, thePost estimate was citedin the officialGulf War Air Power Survey (Summary Report,page 113, ft. 110), and by this route it gained quasi-official status.However, the estimate comports with the major news articles cited belowonly in the sense that two journalists report seeing hundreds of deadwhilethey were on the scene -- two days after the engagement occurred. Whileconsistent with the possibility that only a few hundred total were killed,these statements when taken in context actually suggest a higher total(as argued below).

In theBoston Globe, Elizabeth Neuffer wrote that "mile afterwreckage-jammed mile of highway appeared as if frozen in mid-battle....And all along the way, allied soldiers worked, burying hundreds of deadin shallow graves." Neuffer also quotes an Army private at the main siteof wreckage as saying that "there were simply hundreds of bodies". Relevantto burial activities is a photograph from another source that shows Iraqisbeing dumped in a group grave by means of a front-loader -- a scoop fixedto a truck (Turnley 2002).

Robert Fisk of the Independent claimed to have "lost count ofthe Iraqi corpses crammed into the smouldering wreckage or slumped facedown in the sand" at the main site of wreckage. Traveling the main roadalmost all the way to the Iraqi border, he claimed to see "hundreds ofmutilated corpses lining its route..."

Both Fisk and Neufer also quote British officers of the 1^stBattalion, Staffirdshire Regiment, as saying that they had found and buriedwomen and children at the site.

Gordon Airs of the UKPress Association wrote of seeing 40 bodiesoutside the Mutla police station, along the main road at the point whereseveral hundred of the vehicles in the convoy had become ensnared in aquarter-mile long traffic jam. He quotes a US officer as saying, "We havetaken out about 80 bodies from this tangled mess so far - but God knowshow many are still in there." Airs further observes:

The few who managed to get north of the bottle-neck trap did not lastlong either. All along the highway lay wrecked and burned out militaryvehicles and civilian cars, most of which had been abandoned during theattacks. With even more bodies lying alongside the road. (Airs 1991)

Nearly two years after the event, aWashington Post reporterinterviewed an Iraqi named Khaldoun who lived through the attack:

There were hundreds of cars destroyed, soldiers screaming,"he said.... It was nighttime as the bombs fell, lighting up charred cars,bodies on the side of the road and soldiers sprawled on the ground, hitby cluster bombs as they tried to escape from their vehicles. I saw hundredsof soldiers like this, but my main target was to reach Basra. We arrivedon foot. (Boustany 1993)

All of these are only partial, impressionistic snapshots. The journalists'direct observations reflect an only fleeting engagement with the destruction,two days after it occurred. While two report seeing hundreds of bodiesalong the causeway, there would also have been bodies still in the wrecks-- "God knows how many" -- as well as bodies already buried. A fourth categorywould have been wounded who left the scene only to die elsewhere -- perhapsin the nearby swamps where some Iraqis had been taken prisoner. At onespot of concentrated destruction -- the head of the quarter-mile-long pileupnear the Al-Mutla police station -- an officer reports having extracted80 bodies from the wrecks "so far" and a private reports there being "hundreds"of dead. Perhaps one-third or one-fourth of the crashed and abandoned vehicleswere at this bottle-neck; photographic evidence shows more than 300 hundredvehicles piled there (out of the 1,400 estimated total).

While theWashington Post estimate of 200-300 dead might fitthe reports of bodiesactually seen by reporters, it seems too lowto also encompass the other categories of dead: those already buried, thoseunseen in the wreckage, and those who left to die elsewhere. Aminimumtoll of 500-600 dead is more plausible in accounting for all of what thejournalists heard and saw.At any rate, these reports concern only oneof the two "highway of death" incidents.

The other incident occurred to the east of the main one, along the smallerhighway that passes northeast from Jahrah, past Sabiyah, and then northto Basra. Reporting on this engagement has been sparse and did not beginto emerge until 12 days after the events.

A group of journalists (including Michael Kelly who died tragicallywhile covering the recent Iraq war) visited the site on 10 March. Theyrecorded similar impressions: more than 400 vehicles -- mostly militaryin type -- destroyed in clusters of 10 to 15 spread along a 50 mile stretchof highway. Kelly reports seeing 37 bodies; aWashingtonPostteam, "more than three dozen" (Branigin and Claiborne,WP, 11 March1991). Bob Drogin of theLA Times reported, "scores of soldiers...inand around the vehicles, mangled and bloated in the drifting desert sands."

The vehicles themselves were "strafed, smashed, and burned beyond belief,"according to Drogin. The team from thePost wrote that "T-55 tankslay blown apart like Chinese firecrackers, their turrets and main gun barrelsthrown 50 feet away and their hulking steel bodies disintegrated into piecesof shrapnel small enough to pick up with one hand." Kelley surmised that"the heat of the blasts had inspired secondary explosions in the ammunition.Some fires had been fierce enough to melt windshield glass into globs ofsilicone."

Unlike the attack on the main road, no vehicles seemed to escape destructionalong the second highway of death. Drogin reported that every truck was"riddled with shrapnel." Kelley observed that:

[T]hose who had driven alone, or even off the road and intothe desert, had been hunted down too. Of the several hundred wrecks I saw,not one had crashed in panic; all bore the marks of having been bombedor shot. (Kelley, 1991)

That such a scene should yield only three dozen or even "scores" of deadseems unlikely -- although any subset of several of the clusters mightreveal this many when examined closely. And, of course, the reporters wereviewing the damage almost two weeks after it had occurred.

What distinguished the second attack from the first was the dispersionof vehicles in clusters spread across 50 miles. These might have been attackedone after the other without a generalized panic quickly communicating throughoutthe whole group. Not caught in a long traffic jam, as were their comradesto the west, the Iraqis appeared to have stayed with their vehicles andcontinued their flight -- only to be attacked in small clusters. Underattack, vehicles would break formation and drive off the road, only tobe hunted down individually. Just as this form of dedicated attack produceda greater degree of vehicle destruction than was the case along the mainhighway, it would have generated a higher rate of casualties. (It was alongthis second highway of death that photojournalist Peter Turnley recordedone of the more gruesome images of the Gulf War: eight charred corpsesfrozen in death postures on the bed of a truck that had been hauling ahowitzer. Two more incinerated corpses sat in the cab.)

An attack of the sort described above could easily have claimed 300-400dead or even more from among a force of 2,000 -- a fatality rate of 15to 20+ percent. (Using cluster munitions, the Israelis had achieved a comparablerate against a road-marching brigade of the Syrian 3^rd Divisionduring their 1982 war.) But the results on the second highway of deathwould have been spread across 20 or more vehicle clusters along 50 milesof road. Furthermore, in the 12 days that lapsed between the attack andthe journalists' visit, many of the dead might have been buried or takenaway to mortuaries. Also, many of those left behind would have been pulledapart by wild dogs -- a process that was still underway when the reportersvisited (as described by both Kelly and theWashington Post team).

In the attack on the main road convoy of 1,500 vehicles, destructionwas first concentrated on the lead vehicles in order to block the convoys'progress. Among these lead vehicles, the fatality rate would have beenhigher than it was farther down the line. Subsequently, the rest of theconvoy, which stalled along the road, was attacked in repeated passes byaircraft over a number of hours -- perhaps as many as ten. But occupantswould have likely fled these vehicle early in the attack, as panic spreaddown the line. Some survivors of the air attack were later engaged by directfire from coalition ground units. Those vehicles that managed to evadethe traffic jam and continue on the road north were interdicted individually.As a result, a sporadic line of destruction continued past the road jamand all the way to the border with Iraq (as reported by theIndependent.)Assuming that 7,500 people rode in the main caravan, the hypothesized tollof at least 500 dead would reflect an average fatality rate of only 7 percent.Many of these would have been concentrated at the head and rear of thecolumn.

Compared to theWashington Post's estimate of 200-300 killedin the highway of death incidents, the above analysis suggests that a combinedminimum of 800-1000 dead better reconciles the available evidence -- notably:the various overlapping reports of hundreds of observed dead at the mainattack site and the extent and character of destruction at the second.

As for the higher-end estimates of 10,000 or more killed during theincidents: such estimates are simply not consonant with the observed andreported numbers of dead -- even given the fact that reporters' observationswere only partial in their coverage and somewhat late. For there to havebeen even 8,000 dead in the two incidents, there would have had to be atleast 6,000 dead at the main incident, where journalists arrived two daysafter the engagement ended. But none claimed to see even five percent ofthis number of bodies or to hear or see indications that anything approachingthis many had been found, buried, or moved. At any rate, there were notenough military personnel on the scene to have completed in less than twodays the enormous task of extracting, collecting, and burying most of 6,000bodies -- while also securing the area and processing prisoners. Only atthe site of the second incident would there have been sufficient time to"police" the dead before journalists arrived.

Sources

Civilian Casualties in the 1991 Gulf War:

Beth Osborne Daponte, "A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from Warand Its Aftermath: The 1991 Persian Gulf War,"Medicine & GlobalSurvival, Vol 3, Number 2 (1993); and,

Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the AirCampaign and Violations of the Laws of War (New York: Human RightsWatch, 1991).

Air interdiction and ground war overview:

Les Aspin and William Dickinson,Defense for A New Era: Lessons ofthe Persian Gulf War, Interim Report of the Committee on Armed Services,House of Representatives (Washington DC: HCAS, 30 March 1992);

Robert Burns, "Amid Battlefield Chaos, Lessons in Emotions of War,"Associated Press, 12 June 1991;

Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us Aboutthe Future of Conflict,"International Security (Fall 1996);

Lt. Col. Charles H. Cureton,U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991:With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (WashingtonDC: HDQ USMC, 1993);

Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, The General's War: The InsideStory of the Conflict in the Gulf(Boston: Little, Brown, & Company,1995);

Seymour Hersh, "Overwhelming Force: What Happened in the Final Daysof the Gulf War,"New Yorker, 22 May 2000;

Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen,Gulf War Air Power Survey: SummaryReport (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993), p.109-110;

Maj. Lewis D. Hill, Doris Cook, and Aron PinkerGulf War Air PowerSurvey: Statistical Compendium (Washington DC: Department of the AirForce, 1993), p.109-110;

Lt. Col. Dennis P. Mroczkowski,U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm(Washington DC: HDQ USMC, 1993);

Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and theFuture of Warfare,"International Security (Fall 2001);

Col. Charles J. Quilter II,U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991:With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm(Washington DC: HDQ USMC, 1993);

General Robert Scales, Jr., Director, Desert Storm Study Project,Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War(Washington DC: Officeof the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993); and,

Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds.,The Whirlwind War:The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm(Washington DC: Center for Military History, 1995).

Sources on the battle of Khafji:

Major Daniel R. Clevenger, Study Director, Battle of Khafji: AirPower Effectiveness In The Desert, Volume 1 (Washington DC: Air ForceStudies and Analyses Agency, July 1996)

Norman Friedman, "The Test: Khafji,"Desert Victory: The War forKuwait (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), Chapter 10, pp. 197-204;

Rebecca Grant, "The Epic Little Battle of Khafji,"Air Force Magazine(February 1998);

Richard P. Hallion, "Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War" (WashingtonDC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), pp. 219-223;

Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen,Gulf War Air Power Survey SummaryReport (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993), p.109-110;and,

Major John F. Newell III,Airpower and the Battle of Khafji: Settingthe Record Straight (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of AdvancedAirpower Studies, Air University, June 1998).

1^st Infantry Division breeching operation:

"Iraq's view of the Gulf War,"BBC Online, 5 August 2000;

"Appendix: Iraqi Death Toll," The Gulf War: An indepth examinationof the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, PBS Frontline, 9 January 1996;available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf;

"Iraq steps up search for soldiers allegedly buried alive,"XinhuaNews Service, 11 December 1991;

"Iraq Says 40 More Soldiers Found Buried Alive,"Associated Press,4 November 1991;

"Iraqis Find 44 Soldiers Buried Alive in Gulf War,"Associated Press,29 October 1991;

Dennis Bernstein, Interview with Phil Rios and Victoria Gamburg,Flashpoints News Radio, KPFA 94.1 FM, 19 November 2001, available at:www.flashpoints.net/index-2001-11-13to20.html;

Farouk Choukri, "Iraq to make first film on Gulf War 'massacre',"AgenceFrance Presse,12 April 2000;

Barton Gellman, "Reaction to Tactic They Invented Baffles 1st DivisionMembers; Iraqi Soldiers Buried in Their Trenches at Beginning of GroundWar,"Washington Post, 13 September 1991, p. 21.

Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor,The General's War: The InsideStory of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company,1995);

John Heidenrich, "The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?",Foreign Policy(Spring 1993);

Maggie O'Kane, "Bloodless Words, Bloody War,"Guardian, 16 December1995, p. T12;

General Robert Scales, Jr., Director, Desert Storm Study Project,Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War(Washington DC: Officeof the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993), pp. 224-232, with maps and photographs;

Susanne M. Schafer, "Pentagon: Some Iraqi Trench Defenders Buried InAttack,"Associated Press, 12 September 1991;

Eric Schmitt, "US Army Buried Iraqi Soldiers Alive in Gulf War,NewYork Times, 15 September 1991, p. 10;

Patrick J. Sloyan, "Buried Alive,"Newsday, 12 September 1991;

Patrick J. Sloyan, "What Bodies?,"Digital Journalist(November2002); and

J.P. Zmirak, "Into Temptation,"National Catholic Register (8-14December 2002).

"Highway of Death" incidents:

Gordon Airs, "Kuwait's Highway of Horror,"Press Association(UK), 2 March 1991;

R. W. Apple Jr, "Death Stalks Desert Despite Cease-Fire,"New YorkTimes,2 March 1991, p. 6;

Les Aspin and William Dickinson,Defense for A New Era: Lessons ofthe Persian Gulf War, Interim Report of the Committee on Armed Services,House of Representatives (Washington DC: HCAS, 30 March 1992);

Nora Boustany, "In Postwar Iraq, Bridges Rebuilt but Not the Nation'sSpirit,"Washington Post, 9 February 1993, p. 1;

William Branigin and William Claiborne, "Deathly Quiet Shrouds Siteof 2nd Convoy Hit by Jets,"Washington Post, 11 March 1991, p. 14;

Central Intelligence Agency,Operation Desert Storm: A Snapshot ofthe Battlefield (Washington, DC: CIA, September 1993);

Joyce Chediac,The Massacre of Withdrawing Soldiers on 'The Highwayof Death', presentation before the Commission of Inquiry for the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal, New York, 11 May 1991;

William Claiborne and Caryle Murphy, "Retreat Down Highway of Doom;US Warplanes Turned Iraqis' Escape Route Into Deathtrap,"WashingtonPost, 2 March 1991, p. 1;

Steve Coll and William Branigin, "US Scrambled to Shape View of 'Highwayof Death',"Washington Post,11 March 1991, p. 1;

Bob Drogin, "On Forgotten Kuwait Road, 60 Miles of Wounds of War," LosAngeles Times, 10 March 1991, p. 1;

Robert Fisk, "Horror, destruction and shame along Saddam's road to ruin,"The Independent, 2 March 1991, p. 1;

Michael Kelly, "Carnage on a forgotten road: A highway that was notcleared after the ceasefire,"Guardian, 11 April 1991;

Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen,Gulf War Air Power Survey SummaryReport (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1993), p.113-114;

Donatella Lorch, "7 Miles of Carnage Mark Road Iraqis Used to Flee,"New York Times, 3 March 1991, p. 17;

Elizabeth Neuffer "Kuwaiti nightmare's deadly end; Iraqis fled to ahell at al-Mutlaa Ridge,"Boston Globe, 2 March 1991, p. 1;

Stacy R. Obenhaus, "The Highway to Basra and the Ethics of Pursuit,"Parameters (March-April 2000);

Colin Smith, "'What occurred here was undoubtedly one of the most terribleharassments of a retreating army from the air in the history of warfare',"The Observer,3 March 1991, p. 49; and

Peter Turnley,The Unseen Gulf War, The Digital Journalist (December2002).

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