Theemergence of China's new J-XX [J-20] stealth fighter will have aprofound strategic impact, for both the United States and itsnumerous Pacific Rim allies. There can be no doubt that it is proofpositive of the absolute and complete failure of the current OSDdriven plan for recapitalisation of the United States tacticalfighter fleet, and the fleets of its allies. Like the Russian T-50PAK-FA, the J-XX [J-20] is a “game changer” in the sense that thelarge scale deployment of operational production examples of theseaircraft invalidates all of the key assumptions central to UnitedStates and allied air power and force structure planning anddevelopment, since the early 1990sⁱ.

Whetherthe J-XX [J-20] is a proof of concept demonstrator, or a prototypefor a volume production combat type, what the design demonstrates isthat Chinese engineers have mastered advanced stealth shapingtechniques. The design displays repeated application of United Statesdeveloped shaping design rules used previously in the F-22 Raptordesign, and in some portions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter design.An observer unfamiliar with the background of the J-XX [J-20] couldbe forgiven for mistaking the type for a Lockheed-Martin developedproductⁱⁱ.

Theaccuracy with which the Chengdu engineers replicated key shapingfeatures could be explained by their reverse engineering the designrules from high resolution imagery of US aircraft. However, it alsobegs some very good questions as to whether this engineering wasdirectly or indirectly aided by less overt means. Exploitation ofengineering data acquired by the alleged penetration of United Statescontractor computer networks would provide equally good or bettertechnical resultsⁱⁱⁱ.

Airframeshaping is absolutely critical in stealth design, and determines thebounds on the achievable Radar Cross Section performance of anydesign. If shaping is done poorly, the aft and lower fuselage designof the F-35 being a cardinal example, no amount of radar absorbentmaterial or coating compatible with the weight and volume needs offighter design will overcome the resulting performance problems.Conversely, if shaping is done right, the cardinal example being theB-2A Spirit, then progressive upgrades of the radar absorbentmaterials and/or coatings over the life of the design can be used tofurther improve its stealth^iv.

Bycleverly exploiting contemporary United States developed stealthfighter shaping design rules, Chengdu engineers were able to rapidlyget an excellent basic shaping design with a minimum of risk andcost, and significant long term stealth performance growth potential,as Chinese absorbent material and coating, frequency selectiveradome, low signature antenna and engine nozzle technology matureover time. A derivative of the J-XX [J-20] built in 2025 would thushave a much lower radar signature than a 2015 build of the sameairframe.

TheCapability Potential of the J-XX [J-20] Stealth Fighter

While theintroduction of robust stealth shaping is an unprecedented designfeature for an indigenous Chinese fighter, another first is anairframe evidently designed for efficient supersonic cruise at highaltitudes – the delta-canard configuration is not unlike thatadopted by the Russians in the cancelled supercruising MiG MFIdesign. Supersonic cruise not only kinematically defeats most legacyfighters and Surface to Air Missiles, but confers additional launchrange to Air-Air Missiles and smart bombs, provides an energyadvantage when merging into close combat, and in a larger design likethe J-XX [J-20], yields important productivity gains due to theability to supercruise to and from targets. The latter can in manycircumstances double the effective sortie rate of a bomber^vvi.

In termsof gross sizing the J-XX [J-20] most closely resembles the smallerconfigurations proposed for the FB-22A “theatre bomber”, whichwas to be a dedicated bomber and ISR airframe, intended tosupercruise to targets at combat radii in excess of 1,000 nauticalmiles, a niche occupied by the TAC/SAC GD F/FB-111 family of aircraftduring the Cold War. Claims that the Chengdu design is a “Sino-F-22A”make little sense, if the latter were true the aircraft would beconsiderably smaller. Unlike the FB-22 proposals, the J-XX [J-20] isclearly intended for air combat and using a canard-deltaconfiguration will provide both efficient supersonic cruise, and goodsupersonic and transonic manoeuvre performance if fitted with enginesof sufficient thrust rating^vii.

Intechnological strategy terms the combination of stealth andsupercruise yields high lethality and survivability, supercruiseyields high per-sortie productivity, and the sizing and thus combatradius of the airframe provide a basic design with the flexibility tobe used effectively across the spectrum of roles covered by the ColdWar design F/FB-111 and proposed FB-22 families of aircraft. Thecanard-delta airframe configuration if fully exploited yieldssufficient agility to serve effectively in the spectrum of rolescovered by the F-15C and F-22A.

Thisdesign therefore provides the PLA-AF with an airframe which could beemployed, subject to suitable avionic and weapons fit, across a rangeof strategically important roles:

• Long Range / Persistent Interceptor:in this rolethe J-XX [J-20] would be employed to deny access to the airspace withinthe footprint of the Second Island Chain, attacking opposing strikeaircraft and their fighter escorts;
• Long Range Air Combat and Escort Fighter: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would beemployed offensively, to punch holes through opposing air defences byengaging and destroying defending fighter Combat Air Patrols,AWACS/AEW&C aircraft, and supporting aerial refuelling tankers;
• Theatre Strike Fighter: in this role the J-XX [J-20] wouldattack surface targets, in the manner performed by the F/FB-111, F-15Eand proposed FB-22, using guided conventional munitions or free fallnuclear bombs; the size of the aircraft would permit weapon bays largeenough to carry 3,000 lb or larger bombs;
• Long Range Theatre Reconnaissance Aircraft:in this role the J-XX [J-20] would beemployed to collect radar, imagery and electronic intelligence,emulating aircraft such as the RF-111C/D, the RA-5C, and F-14/TARPS butwith the advantage of stealth absent in legacy theatre reconnaissancetypes;
• Electronic Attack Platform: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would beemployed to suppress opposing radar and communications, using weaponbay carried support jamming equipment, in the manner of the EF-111ARaven;
• Anti-Satellite Weapon Launch Platform: in this role the J-XX [J-20] would beemployed to lift and loft an ASAT missile against an LEO SV, in themanner the US Air Force employed the F-15A and the Vought ASM-135A ASATduring the mid 1980s.

The airframe self-evidently has the potential to be used in each ofthese niches, albeit with some niches occupied by specialisedvariants or subtypes. A single multirole variant could be employedacross the first three roles without difficulty. The aircraft's sizemakes it a natural candidate for “lateral evolution” into otherroles^viii.



In terms of sizing, combat radius and exceptionalsurvivability, the J-XX [J-20] occupies the same niche as the GDF/FB-111 family of aircraft did, presenting potential for evolutionacross a wide range of roles. Depicted FB-111A nuclear strategicbomber,EF-111A electronic attack aircraft and F-111B long range interceptor(US DoD images).



To what extent the PLA-AF and PLA-N air arm opt to exploit thepotential of this design, or a derivative design, remains to be seen.Prudent strategic analysis however cannot rely on the notion that thePLA-AF and PLA-N air arm will not make full use of a potentialcapability the development of which has consumed without doubtconsiderable national treasure.

TheStrategic Impact of the J-XX [J-20] Stealth Fighter

At this time there is no air defence system in Asia, includingtheorganic capabilities of the US Navy CVBGs, which can reliably stop amature long range supercruising stealth fighter, be it an F-22ARaptor, or a mature production export T-50 PAK-FA, or J-XX [J-20].

Western built Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) rely primarily onS-band, and to a lesser extent, L-band and UHF-band acquisitionradars for land based, and shipboard use.

Airborne Early Warning capabilities are similarly constrained, theE-3/E-767/APY-2 AWACS (US Air Force, Japan) operating in the S-band,the E-737 Wedgetail/MESA (South Korea, Australia) and G.550 CAEW /EL/M-2075 (Singapore) the L-band, and the E-2C/APS-145 (US Navy,Japan, Singapore) and E-2D/APY-9 (US Navy) in the UHF-band.

Whilethe L-band MESA and EL/M-2075, and UHF-band APY-9 will havesignificantly better detection performance against a J-XX [J-20]compared to an S-band radar such as the APY-2 or SPY-1 Aegis, it willbe very much lower than that achievable against a non-stealthyconventional aerial target^ix.

As a result of the introduction of robust stealth capability, thecoverage footprint of United States and allied IADS in the WestPacwill be severely reduced, no differently than that of the Warsaw PactIADS when confronted by the F-117A Nighthawk from 1985 onward. Theresult of this will be large holes in IADS coverage, or to use thecolourful late Cold War description, “the gaps between fencepickets become very wide”.