* The Harrier emerged from the P.1127 / Kestrel by a complicated andmore-or-less lucky sequence of events. The aircraft that resulted, thoughsuffering from a number of limitations in performance, range, and warload,proved extremely useful, and became an important front-line asset for boththe RAF and the US Marine Corps (USMC).
Another complicated and more-or-less lucky sequence of events led to themodification of the RAF Harrier for Royal Navy use as the "Sea Harrier",which proved critical to British victory in the Falklands War in 1982, andwhich was given major extensions in capability after the war. This chapteroutlines the development and careers of the "first-generation Harriers".
* Hawker's John Fozzard was put in charge of the development of the HarrierGR.1. While the new aircraft was derived from the Kestrel and unmistakeablyresembled it, in engineering terms the Harrier GR.1 was a complete redesign,with only about 7% of its engineering drawings identical to those used forthe Kestrel. One of the two Kestrels retained by the UK was used for enginedevelopment trials.
Initial flight of the Harrier GR.1 was on 31 August 1966. Six preproductionaircraft were built, which were all used for test and evaluation and neverentered operational service. The first production Harrier GR.1 was flown on28 December 1967. It began its military career almost exactly a year later,on 1 January 1969, with the Harrier Conversion Team formed at Wittering, andwas fielded with RAF Number 1 Squadron in October of that year in the attackrole. Unfortunately, Sydney Camm had died on a golf course in 1966, andnever saw the Harrier in operation.
The Harrier was a unique aircraft that offered capabilities and challenges nocombat pilot had ever been given before, and so a two-seat conversion trainerversion, the "Harrier T Mark 2", was ordered in 1967 in order to assist newpilots in adjusting to the type.
* The GR.1 and T.2 provide a baseline configuration for later Harriers. Bothaircraft were powered by the "Pegasus 6 Mark 101" engine, with 84.6 kN (8,620kgp / 19,000 lbf) thrust. Water injection provided incremental boost thrustover the Kestrel's Pegasus 5. Very importantly, the Pegasus 6 was much morereliable than the Pegasus 5, with an operating time between overhauls of 300hours, as opposed to only 50 hours for the Pegasus 5.
The general configuration of the Harrier was a directed evolution of that ofthe P.1127 and Kestrel. As noted, the Pegasus engine had to be placed at thecenter of gravity, and the wing had to be raised high to clear the fourrotating exhausts, leading to the bicycle-style tandem landing gear. Forlow-speed flight, engine bleed air was routed to puffers in the nose, tail,and wingtips to allow maneuvering, and the forward fan and compressor spoolin the Pegasus contra-rotated to nullify the effects of angular momentum thatcould make such maneuvers more difficult.
The Harrier had the big "elephant ears" intakes to feed the forward fan, withthe cockpit squeezed in between them. There were eight small doors aroundeach intake to allow greater air input when required. The big intake hid thefour rotating exhaust nozzles from the airstream.
Although Hawker engineers had been puzzled on how to arrange the cockpitcontrols for VTOL flight when they first began work on the P.1127, theirexperiments resulted in a simple and logical, if not very convenient, scheme.The cockpit layout provided the pilot with three levers on his left, fromfarthest to nearest:
Adjusting the nozzle angle lever moved the four nozzles in unison, directedby a yoke under the Pegasus engine and rotated via a chain drive by a motoroperating off engine bleed air.
The GR.1's wing was entirely new. It was optimized for subsonic flight, withmaximum rated speed of 1,185 KPH (736 MPH). The wing was small, in order toreduce buffeting in low-level operations, with an area of 18.67 square meters(201 square feet). The wing was built as a single piece and had to beremoved for an engine change. Optional "ferry tips", each 69 centimeters(27.2 inches) long, could be attached to the wing tips to provide about a 9%increase in range, at the expense of speed. A midair refueling probe couldalso be bolted on to the left side of the aircraft, just behind the intake,for ferry flights. The tail was conventional, similar to that of the HawkerHunter, but included a small ventral fin, featuring a bumper to protect theaircraft in a rough landing. The pop-up ram-air turbine emergency powergenerator system in front of the tail that had been introduced with theP.1127 was retained.
The flight control system was based on a traditional wheel-and-pulley scheme,with an interesting variation in that the tail (yaw) and wingtip (roll)thrusters for hovering flight were slaved to the appropriate controlsurfaces. There was also a pitch thruster in the nose. The pilot controlledthe thrusters in exactly the same way that he controlled the normal flightcontrol surfaces. The thrusters were activated when the nozzles were moved20 degrees down from the horizontal, and were driven by engine bleed pressureof up to about 12 atmospheres at 400 degrees Celsius, resulting in a thrusterexhaust velocity of over 2,700 KPH (1,680 MPH)!
The GR.1's cockpit was somewhat cramped and squeezed between the two bigintakes, resulting in no rearward visibility. It was also said to bevery noisy, pilots claiming it seemed the engine was actually in the cockpitwith them. The GR.1's flight avionics were simple, consisting of:
No radar was fitted, having been judged unnecessary for the daylight closeair support role. The GR.1 also had an interesting feature useful forlow-speed hovering flight: a little "weathervane" in front of the canopythat served as a yaw sensor. The windscreen was "hardened" to resistbirdstrikes, a serious threat in low-level operations. The windscreen couldwithstand the impact of a 4.5-kilogram (11-pound) bird at an impact velocityof 1,100 KPH (680 MPH).
The GR.1 was fitted with a Martin Baker Mark 9 rocket-boosted "zero-zero"(zero speed, zero altitude) ejection seat. Instead of blasting off thecanopy, the GR.1 had a string of "miniature detonating cord (MDC)" ribbonedaround the top of the canopy. Before ejecting, the detcord would blast thetop of the canopy into fragments, and the pilot would eject through the hole.Although this is a fairly common measure now, the Harrier was one of thefirst aircraft to incorporate the scheme because, in hovering mode, blastingoff the canopy would have thrown it straight up, and the ejecting pilotcouldn't miss it.
The GR.1 had five stores pylons, one under the fuselage and two under eachwing. Typical external warload was about 2,270 kilograms (5,000 pounds) andcould include:
Two Aden Mark 4 30-millimeter revolver-type cannon pods could be attached tothe belly. Each cannon carried 100 rounds and had a rate of fire of about1,200 rounds per minute. The gun pods also helped improve hoveringcharacteristics by trapping backblast when in ground effect; and reducedexhaust-to-intake gas ingestion problems, a common difficulty with VTOL jets.If the pods were removed, a pair of strakes were installed in their placeto maintain hovering flight characteristics.
* The first of two T.2 prototypes performed its initial flight in 1969. TheT.2 featured a stretched fuselage to accommodate the two seats in a tandemfashion. The stepped-up canopy was hinged on the side, not backwards-slidingas with the GR.1, and the back seat was stepped up to give the instructoran excellent forward field of view. To compensate for the extended nose thetail was also extended, and both the tailfin and ventral fins were increasedin size. The T.2 was completely combat-capable, able to carry a full load offuel and weapons.
The Harrier was not truly a VTOL aircraft; a GR.1 couldn't take offvertically with a full combat load. In practice, the nozzles were angleddown to about 55 degrees below level, and the aircraft would blast off afteran astonishingly short take-off run. It would be more appropriate to callthe machine a "short take-off / vertical landing (STOVL)" aircraft.Actually, although landings could be performed vertically if stores had beenexpended, Harrier pilots often preferred a short landing roll. This was auseful practice in field environments since it avoided sucking dust anddebris into the engine. On a rolling landing, the nozzles could be pointed8.5 degrees forward of vertical to reduce landing roll. That also allowedthe aircraft to be flown backward, though that was almost never done asanything but an airshow stunt.
Pilots found the aircraft generally straightforward to fly once in normalflight, but take-offs and landings could be tricky and dangerous. Having todeal with the stick, throttle, and nozzle angle lever required "three hands",increasing pilot workload on take-offs when the workload is maximized in thefirst place. The first person killed in Harrier, USAF Major Charles R.Roberg, died in 1970 when he tried to turn during the transition period andwent out of control. There would be a fairly large attrition among Harriersin operation, but that would also be due to the demanding nature of low-leveloperations. The Harrier was not regarded as "bad" aircraft, just a "unique"one because of its unique capabilities; it was generally flown by the mostexperienced pilots who were given extensive training to convert to the type.
Combat radius of the GR.1 was about 370 kilometers. That was only about halfthe range of a Jaguar strike fighter but was regarded as acceptable, sincethe aircraft was intended to be based near forward combat areas to providequick-response strikes. A total of 61 GR.1s and 10 T.2s was built, notcounting the two T.2 prototypes and a single "Mark 52" two-seat Harrier,which had the tailcode "G-VTOL"; it was retained by Hawker Siddeley for testpurposes.
BACK_TO_TOP* Further tweaking of the Pegasus engine resulted, in 1969, in the "Pegasus10 Mark 102", with 91.2 kN (9,300 kgp / 20,500 lbf) thrust, as compared withthe 81.0 kN (8,620 kgp / 19,000 lbf) thrust of the Pegasus 6 Mark 101.Harriers produced with the new engine were "GR.1As", with 17 built, and"T.2As", with four built. Surviving GR.1s and T.2s were re-engined to theGR.1A and T2.A specification.
Pegasus development didn't stop there. The next major revision was thedefinitive "Pegasus 11 Mark 103", which provided 95.6 kN (9,750 kgp / 21,500lbf) thrust with a modified fan, combustion chamber, fuel control system, andhigher operating temperature. A new Pegasus variant led to a new Harriervariant, the "GR.3", which incorporated some avionics upgrades. There wasalso a corresponding trainer version, the "T.4". A total of 40 GR.3snew-build GR.3s was manufactured, as well as 11 T.4s.
The most visible change to the GR.3 relative to the GR.1 was the addition ofan elongated nose "thimble", to house a Ferranti 106 "laser ranger & markedtarget seeker (LRMTS)". This instrument could either be locked onto a targetto provide continuous updates on position and rate of closure via laserrangefinder, with the result displayed on the cockpit HUD; or could be usedas what is now known as a "laser spot tracker", locking onto a target beingilluminated by ground troops or whoever with a laser target designator.
The LRMTS gave the GR.3 a "Pinnochio nose", or as the RAF called it, a"Snoopy nose", appearance, after the famous long-nosed beagle in the globallypopular American PEANUTS comic strip. The nose did not affect the aircraft'sflight characteristics, and so no aerodynamic adjustments were required tothe airframe. The LRMTS was also refitted to older GR.1As still in service.In addition, the GR.3s were fitted with a camera shooting out the left sideto give them a basic reconnaissance capability. Another visible change was aMarconi ARI-18223 radar warning receiver (RWR), whose forward aerial appearedas a tab breaking up the smooth forward curve of the tailfin. The rearwardaerial was placed less obtrusively on the tailcone. The new avionicsdemanded more electrical power, and so the twin 4 kVA alternators of earlierHarriers were replaced by a single 12 kVA alternator.
___________________________________________________________________ HAWKER HARRIER GR.3: ___________________________________________________________________ wingspan: 7.7 meters (25 feet 3 inches) wing area: 18.67 sq_meters (201 sq_feet) length: 14.27 meters (46 feet 10 inches) height: 3.63 meters (11 feet 11 inches) empty weight: 6,140 kilograms (13,535 pounds) loaded weight: 11,430 kilograms (25,200 pounds) max speed, low level: 1,175 KPH (730 MPH / 635 KT) service ceiling: 16,800 meters (55,000 feet) combat radius: 670 kilometers (415 MI / 360 NMI) ___________________________________________________________________
The T.4 featured similar kit, including the LRMTS.
* Four RAF squadrons and an operational conversion unit (OCU) were equippedwith the Harrier. Number 1 Squadron was based at RAF Wittering in the UK,along with the OCU. Three squadrons -- Number 3, 4, and 20 -- were set up atWildenrath, Germany, near the Dutch border, in 1970 and 1971. In 1977,Number 20 Squadron was disbanded and its aircraft absorbed into its twosister squadrons. These two squadrons were moved to RAF Guetersloh, east ofthe Rhine.
The primary mission of the RAF Harrier was to provide combat support forBritish I Corps Germany. In tactical exercises, the Harrier squadrons brokeinto three flights each and dispersed to the countryside, where they wentinto hiding among the trees under camouflage nets, with rubberized fuelstorage tanks set up some distance away. Take-offs were performed on a180-meter (590-foot) stretch of aluminum planking, though in actual combatoperations any reasonable roadway would have done just as well. From thesehidden forward sites, pilots remained on station in the cockpit to await acall for fire support from a forward air controller through a "Forward WingOperations Centre". Typically the Harriers would take 20 minutes to performthe strike and then, munitions expended, return to their base site to refueland re-arm. A Harrier pilot could easily fly six sorties in a single day.
* In the mid-1970s, Guatemala began to threaten the neighboringCentral-American country of Belize, which had formerly been the colony ofBritish Honduras. Since Belize had only one runway capable of supportingmost combat jets, and since in any conflict that runway would be an excellenttarget, six Harriers from Number 1 Squadron were transported to Belize andestablished as RAF Number 1417 Flight as a permanent presence.
In the spring of 1977, Hawker Siddeley was absorbed into the initiallynationalized British Aerospace (BAE) group, and the "Hawker Siddeley Harrier"then became the "BAE Harrier".
BACK_TO_TOP* Although the US Marine Corps had a strong interest in VTOL aircraft, asnoted, the USMC did not participate in the Tripartite Evaluation Squadron.However, when the US took ownership of six Kestrels from the TES, some ofthem also ended up at the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland,where the Marines performed flight evaluations with them. In April 1966, theMarines operated a Kestrel off the commando assault ship RALEIGH and wereimpressed with the aircraft. The exercise was strictly a demonstration: theKestrel had no combat capability and was useless to the Marines as it was,and there matters stood until the Farnborough Air Show in the UK in September1968.
Two USMC officers attended the Farnborough show at the invitation of HawkerSiddeley, and were given flights in the Harrier. They felt the Harrier waswhat they were looking for. What the Marines required was a strike aircraftthat could support landing forces. Fleet carriers had to be kept well at seafor their own safety, but Harriers could fly from smaller assault ships justoffshore, or from rough landing sites behind the battle lines, to providequick-response strikes for ground troops.
The main obstacle was that the Harrier was a British machine, and the USarmed forces traditionally had a strong preference to "buy American". Thesolution was for Hawker Siddeley to license the aircraft to McDonnell Douglas(MDD) for sale to the USMC "AV-8A". Rolls-Royce, which had bought outBristol in the interim, similarly made an arrangement to allow Pratt &Whitney (P&W) to build the Pegasus under license, which then became a P&W"F402-RR". These collaborations were to be crucial to the future of theHarrier.
In practice, although the original agreement envisioned that MDD wouldactually build Harriers themselves, the AV-8As, or "Mark 50 Harriers" asHawker designated them, were not actually made in the US, since opening asecond assembly line was judged uneconomical. They were built in the UK,shipped as airfreight overseas, and delivered by MDD, with MDD presumablyperforming final fit of USMC-specific kit. The first few AV-8As used thePegasus 10, but all following production used the Pegasus 11.
The Marines traditionally worked through US Naval Air Systems Command fortheir aircraft acquisitions -- but the Navy had no interest in the Harrier.Some Marine Harrier enthusiasts judged NAVAIR was downright hostile to theHarrier; that may have been over-reacting, but the bottom line was that theMarines were on their own with the Harrier, having to perform their ownevaluation, training, and doctrine development. The British performedtraining initially.
102 AV-8As and 8 "TAV-8A" or "Mark 54" trainers -- generally similar to aHarrier T.4, but with different avionics fit to match that of the AV-8A --were built in the early 1970s, giving the USMC a potent STOVL strikecapability. The first combat squadron was formed up in 1971. MarineHarriers operated off fleet carriers, helicopter assault ships, and any otherconvenient vessels.
The USMC Harrier was externally identical to the Harrier GR.1. The MartinBaker ejection seat was replaced by a US-made Stencel SIIIS-3 seat, andUS-built IFF and radio gear were incorporated. A Smiths Industries HUD and amultimode weapons aiming system replaced the British equivalents. The AV-8Aswere also cleared to carry a pair of large 1,135-liter (300 US gallon) droptanks. Originally, the Marines had wanted to replace the 30-millimeter Adencannon pods, but they were retained, even though no other Marine weapons usedtheir ammunition. It appears that the USMC did not want to escalate costs byre-specifying a new cannon, and believed the Aden cannon could do the job.
The Marines did of course qualify US-made stores, such as 70-millimeter(2.75-inch) or 12.7-centimeter (5-inch / Zuni) unguided rocket pods andRockeye cluster bombs. Although the British did not seriously contemplateusing the Harrier for air-to-air combat, the US Marines -- always inclined tothe aggressive -- wanted to give it the ability to fight back if attacked byadversary fighters. Accordingly, the outer stores pylons were wired to carrySidewinder air-to-air missiles (AAM), an innovation that would later provesignificant.
* The Marines found the Harrier a remarkable machine, very rugged and withexcellent handling in conventional flight -- it was almost impossible to spinit. The early Marine Harrier pilots were fast-jet aviators, and adapted toit readily, but later helicopter pilots were brought into the program, andsome found it a dangerous challenge. The big problem with the AV-8A was anunsatisfactory warload; that led to a next-generation Harrier designdeveloped by the US, the "AV-8B Harrier II". That's a subject for later.However, the decision to acquire a second-generation Harrier led the USMC toconsider improving their existing Harrier fleet as an interim measure untilthe AV-8B became available. The result was the "AV-8C". 47 surviving AV-8Aswere upgraded to this standard between 1979 and 1984.
The changes included:
The side-mounted camera fitted in the AV-8A was deleted.
* In 1973, the Spanish Navy placed an order for 6 AV-8As and 2 TAV-8As fortheir naval air service, the "Arma Aerea de la Armada". They were given theUS designation of "AV-8S" and "TAV-8S". BAE gave the AV-8S a designation of"Mark 53" and apparently referred to the TAV-8S as the "Mark 56". In SpanishNavy service they were designated the "VA-1" (single-seat) and "VAE-1"(tandem-seat) and officially known as "Matadors" -- though for some reason thepilots never liked or used the name. The Spanish bought five more AV-8SHarriers in 1980, and though these were little different from the firstbatch, for some reason BAE Systems assigned them a new designation of "Mark55".
The order for the first batch was funneled through the US Navy, withassemblies shipped from Britain and put together by McDonnell Douglas, sinceSpain was under a Rightist government at the time and arm sales to them wouldhave been embarrassing to the British government. The second batch wassupplied directly, which was apparently the reason for the different marknumber.
The Spanish Harriers were initially operated off land bases and the lightcarrier DEDALO, which had been built in 1943 as the "jeep" carrier USS CABOT.The DEDALO was an antique with a wooden deck, and metal sheathing had to belaid down on the rear of the deck to allow Harrier landings. The DEDALO wasretired in 1988, to be replaced in service by the modern light carrierPRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS, which then became the "floating home" of the SpanishHarriers. The PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS could accommodate 8 Harriers and 14helicopters.
The Spanish Harriers were fitted with Marconi Sky Guardian RWRs beginning in1987. The Sky Guardian, unlike the earlier Marconi ARI-18223 RWR, was not asimple radar detector, but could actually identify the type of threat bycomparing the radar signal with a stored library of 200 radar signatures.
* The Spaniards really liked their Harriers and replaced them with theupdated Harrier IIs in 1997, selling off the surviving 7 AV-8S and 2 TAV-8Sto Thailand. The old aircraft were all refurbished by the Spanish CASA firmbefore delivery; the Thais disregarded the little-used Spanish name of"Matador", and referred to them as "Harriers". However, the Thais were never able to operate the complicated Harriers effectively, and finallywithdrew them from service in 2006.
* The USMC's provision for Sidewinder missiles on the AV-8A led the serviceto devise an interesting new dogfighting tactic, named "vectoring in forwardflight (VIFF)". Experiments performed by the USMC with VIFF demonstratedthat it had some extraordinary qualities. The Marine pilot who performed thefirst evaluations on VIFF in 1970, Captain Harry Blot, fully reversed thenozzles while flying at high speed on his first test flight. He reportedthat he "decelerated rapidly" -- but he couldn't determine just how rapidly,since he was wrapped around the stick with his nose stuck on the gunsight.
Although the Harrier with its short wings had a poor turning radius, VIFFgave it some unusual maneuvering options, allowing it to perform strongbanking turns, tight loops, and quick braking to allow a pursuer toovershoot. There was a lively debate over the merits of VIFF. It wasclearly not a miraculous tactic, but the Marines were so impressed with itthat they requested, and got, changes to the Pegasus engine to support it.The changes included strengthened nozzles, an uprated nozzle drive motor, anda capability to redline the engine for 2.5 minutes. The Marines establishedVIFF as an operational doctrine.
BACK_TO_TOP* The Royal Navy's waffling on the P.1154 quickly came back to haunt theservice. In 1966, the British Labour government decided to give the axe toall of Her Majesty's fleet carriers; the Phantoms on which much money hadbeen lavished now could only operate off of land bases. However, in 1968 thegovernment decided that helicopter carriers were still affordable and useful,though they were given the entirely baffling name of "through-deck cruisers"for the sake of political correctness. Royal Navy jokers renamed them"see-through cruisers".
The Harrier was an obvious fit for such vessels. As noted, the P.1127 hadoperated off the deck of a carrier back in 1963, and during the 1960s and1970s Harriers were flown without difficulty off a number of vessels, some ofthem very small. The desireability of a naval Harrier wasn't obvious toeveryone, however; there was still the prejudice that Mach 2 was an absolutenecessity, and the Harrier was only supersonic in a dive. Still, half a loafwas better than none, and in August 1972 -- after fanatical lobbying byconcerned Royal Navy air staff to overcome a seemingly endless series ofbureaucratic obstacles -- development was begun on a naval Harrier, to bederived in as minimal a fashion as possible from the GR.3, for operation offlight carriers.
After further near-brushes with death, the first "P.1184 / Sea HarrierFighter-Reconnaissance-Strike Mark 1 (FRS.1)" flew on 20 August 1978. It wasvery similar to a GR.3 from the air intakes back, but the cockpit and nosewere largely redesigned.
The Sea Harrier, as its "FRS" designation implied, was intended to be amultirole aircraft, suited for air combat, with the capability of carrying aSidewinder on each outer wing pylon, as well as for attack andreconnaissance. Since its primary air adversary was expected to be SovietBear-class turboprop reconnaissance and missile-carrier aircraft, the SeaHarrier's subsonic speed was not regarded as a major limitation.
The mission did, however, require that an air-intercept radar be added, andthe Ferranti "Blue Fox" radar was selected. The Blue Fox was a derivative ofthe "Sea Spray" radar developed for navalized Westland Lynx helicopters, andhad four operational modes, including "Search", "Air-To-Air Attack","Air-To-Surface Attack", and "Boresight". It was relatively simple comparedto other contemporary fighter-aircraft radars, in particular lacking alook-down capability, but it was compact, light, affordable, and met missionrequirements.
A new nav-attack kit was fitted as well, consisting of a Ferranti attitudereference and heading system, linked to a Decca 72 Doppler radar. The newsystem was provided because the Ferranti FE541 system used on the RAFHarriers had to be aligned while the aircraft was dead motionless on theground, a difficult condition to achieve on an aircraft carrier on the opensea.
The pilot needed more display area on the control panel to deal with the newavionics. This demanded that the cockpit be raised 28 centimeters (11inches). Raising the cockpit also fixed one of the major disadvantages ofthe GR.3 in air combat: the poor rearward and sideways view for the pilot.The Sea Harrier's canopy was bulged to improve the view forward and downward.The height of the tailfin was increased by 10 centimeters (4 inches) tocompensate aerodynamically for the raised cockpit.
___________________________________________________________________ BAE SEA HARRIER FRS.1: ___________________________________________________________________ wingspan: 7.7 meters (25 feet 3 inches) wing area: 18.67 sq_meters (201 sq_feet) length: 14.5 meters (44 feet 7 inches) height: 3.71 meters (12 feet 2 inches) empty weight: 5,942 kilograms (13,100 pounds) max loaded weight: 11,884 kilograms (26,200 pounds) maximum speed: 1,190 KPH (740 MPH / 645 KT) service ceiling: 15,000 meters (50,000 feet) operational radius: 750 kilometers (465 MI / 405 NMI) ___________________________________________________________________
An improved autopilot was added to help the pilot deal with the increasedworkload. With all the new avionics, the cockpit of the Sea Harrier was anentire redesign of that of the GR.3. A new Martin-Baker Mark 10H zero-zeroejection seat was also added. Other minor changes were made:
For training, the Royal Navy initially obtained a single new-build T.4A,calling it a "T.4AN", and later obtained seven hand-me-down T.4As from theRAF, also redesignating them T.4ANs. The navy then acquired three new-build"T-4Ns", which were minor navalized modifications of the standard T.4, withthe Pegasus 104 engine and a basic subset of FRS.1 avionics. Since the T.4Nsin particular lacked the Blue Fox radar of the FRS.1, the Royal Navy alsoobtained three Hawker Hunter T.8M trainers fitted with the Blue Fox as radartrainers. Two of the Hunter T.8Ms had been used in development of the radar.
The T.4N was combat-capable, but was too long to fit on the elevators onBritish carriers and could not be stowed below deck. The FRS.1 itself wouldfit on an elevator if its nose cone were hinged back.
* The first production FRS.1 was handed over to Royal Navy service inmid-June 1979. The Sea Harrier was a welcome arrival for the Royal Navy'scombat aircraft pilots, since the RN's last fixed-wing combat aircraft, theBAE Buccaneer and their Spey-powered Phantoms, had been retired the previousDecember.
The Sea Harriers, or "Shars" as they were sometimes called, were slated foroperations off the three "command cruisers" (as the "through-deck cruisers"had been somewhat more rationally renamed) HMS INVINCIBLE, ILLUSTRIOUS, andARK ROYAL, the last of which was in planning at the time, with a normalcomplement of six Sea Harriers along with helicopters. Carrier operation ofthe Sea Harrier was greatly enhanced by an elegantly simple idea, devised byRoyal Navy Lieutenant Commander Douglas Taylor: the ski-jump take-off ramp.
Taylor calculated that simply modifying the deck so that it curved up at theend would throw the fighter up into the air, allowing it to carry morewarload with a shorter take-off run, as well as give a Royal Navy pilot moretime to eject if it became apparent his aircraft was going to splash. Taylorproposed the idea in the early 1970s, but it wasn't until 1976 that Hawkerreceived funding to perform land-based tests of the ski jump take-off. Thetests clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the concept. Resistance tothe ski jump concept was so stubborn in some quarters that advocates of theidea collectively referred to the critics as the "Flat Deck PreservationSociety". The advocates prevailed, and the ski jump was adopted for carrieroperations. Ski jump take-offs were apparently very spectacular to watch,though pilots described them as "cake".
HMS INVINCIBLE and ILLUSTRIOUS were both originally fitted with a 7-degreeski jump, while the ARK ROYAL featured a 12-degree ski jump when it wascommissioned in 1985. Both the INVINCIBLE and ILLUSTRIOUS were laterrefitted with a 13-degree ramp. The Spanish light carrier DEDALO was notfitted with a ski jump, but the modern Spanish PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS and ThaiCHAKRI NARUEBET both had 12-degree ski jumps.
BACK_TO_TOP* The Sea Harrier proved its worth not long after its operationalintroduction, when a tottering junta in Argentina seized the Falkland Islandsin 1982. The British response in April 1982 was Operation CORPORATE, inwhich a naval force was assembled to carry out an amphibious landing on theislands. Air support was initially provided by 28 Sea Harriers operating offthe command carriers HMS HERMES and HMS INVINCIBLE.
To provide more air power, on 3 May 1982, 14 Harrier GR.3s of the RAF Number1 Squadron flew nonstop some 6,400 kilometers (4,000 miles) from the UK toAscension Island in the South Atlantic. The Harriers made the trip in ninehours and refueled in mid-air five times.
Ascension was the most forward available base for CORPORATE, though it wasalmost exactly halfway between the UK and the Falklands, leaving the GR.3sanother 6,400 kilometers from the combat zone. Most of the GR.3s made therest of the trip on container ships and then jumped to the carriers, but fourof them flew the rest of the way on their own.
The GR.3s were armed with SNEB rockets, BL755 cluster bombs, and laser-guidedbombs for ground strikes. Although they didn't have a laser targetdesignator themselves, they could hit targets designated by ground forces.The GR.3s were also hastily wired for Sidewinders and US-built Shrikeanti-radar missiles, but didn't actually carry such weapons.
The Sea Harriers had been just as hastily fitted with countermeasures for aircombat. A pair of chaff/flare dispensers were tacked on behind theunderfuselage airbrake. This was done in such a hurry that the chaff-flaredispensers actually had to be air-dropped to the task force while it wasunderway by an RAF C-130 Hercules transport. In addition, an effort was madeto cram the Marconi "Sky Shadow" jammer pod, used on the Tornado, into theshell of a 30-millimeter cannon pod, to be fitted in place of one of theguns. This improvisation was named the "Blue Eric" ECM pod and a smallnumber were built, though it is unclear if they actually saw service in theFalklands campaign.
The Sea Harriers generally operated in the air defense role, while the GR.3sfocused on ground attack. Since the GR.3's Ferranti FE541 nav-attack systemcould not be aligned on board ship, Sea Harriers accompanied GR.3s on strikemissions to provide navigation until a land base was obtained. RAF GR.3pilots were somewhat frustrated at being stuck with the "mudfighting" role.While they had never been trained for air-to-air combat, the fact that theopportunity was there made them feel like they were missing out on the glory.Three GR.3s were lost in combat to ground fire.
* Superficially, it might have seemed like the RAF had got the better part ofthe deal. The Sea Harriers operated under a number of disadvantages in aircombat that on the face of things would have suggested they were outmatched:
However, Sea Harriers still scored 22 kills against Argentine aircraft, andalso shot down a helicopter, with no air combat loss to themselves. Althoughthe Argentines were operating at the limit of their combat radius,restricting their use of afterburner if they hoped to get back home, that wasstill an impressive achievement. The Sea Harriers were greatly aided intheir success by the new third-generation AIM-9L Sidewinders they carried.The AIM-9Ls were "all-aspect" weapons, meaning they didn't have to beboresighted on the target's exhaust, and were much superior to earlierSidewinder variants. They had been supplied in haste to the Royal Navy bythe Americans when the war broke out.
Out of the 28 Sea Harriers used in the operation, six were lost. Two wereshot down by Argentine ground fire; one was lost with its pilot in take-off;one simply fell off the deck while taxiing forward for take-off in icyconditions, with the pilot ejecting, to be picked out of the frigid sea; andtwo abruptly vanished without a trace in bad weather, apparently due to amid-air collision. Over 2,000 sorties were flown, and aircraft availabilitywas never less than 95% at the beginning of each day. Without the foresightof the naval planners who had stubbornly fought for the Sea Harrier, theFalklands might well have been given up to the Argentines without a fight.
* Aside from three prototypes, 54 FRS.1s were built up to 1988. In additionto the six lost in the Falklands, five more were lost in accidents. Asdiscussed later, FRS.1s were given a modest set of updates during the 1980s.
The FRS.1 also served in the Balkan Wars, performing air patrols over Bosniaas part of international peace-keeping efforts -- beginning in early 1993 andcontinuing into the fall of 1995, when the FRS.1 went out of service. Theaircraft carried new kit, including an improved IFF, expendable radar decoysthat could be fired from the chaff-flare dispensers, a handheld Garmin 100GPS navigation receiver mounted in the cockpit, and the latest AIM-9MSidewinders.
One Sea Harrier was shot down on 16 April 1993. The pilot, Royal NavyLieutenant Nick Richardson, ejected and was picked up by a British SpecialAir Service (SAS) rescue team. The SAS commandos led Richardson throughenemy lines, and the group was then picked up by a French helicopter.
* In 1983:1984, India obtained a batch of six "Sea Harrier Mark 51s" and twotandem-seat "T.60s" for use off their carrier INS VIKRANT. The Mark 51s werebasically FRS.1s, the differences being that they used a gaseous instead of aliquid oxygen system; had a modified radar system and Indian-specified radiosand IFF; and were wired for the French Matra Magic missile, instead of theSidewinder. The Mark 60s were essentially RAF T.4 trainers, with some minorchanges in avionics.
Ten more Mark 51s plus a T.60 were ordered in 1985 and delivered in the1989:1991 timeframe, with another batch of seven Mark 51s and a fourth T.60obtained after that -- for a total of 23 Mark 51s and four T.60s. Two moreT.60s, which were modified from RAF surplus T.4s, were obtained in the 1990sas attrition replacements, bringing that sum to 6.
The Indian Sea Harriers operated off both the VIKRANT and the INS VIRAAT,previously the HMS HERMES. The VIKRANT was refitted with a 9.45-degree skijump in 1991, which forced the retirement of the carrier's French BreguetAlize maritime patrol aircraft. The VIKRANT was retired in 1996 but theVIRAAT, with a 12-degree ski jump, remained in service. In 2005, afterseeking funding for several years, the Indian Navy began a program to update15 of their Mark 51s. The upgrade featured Israeli kit, including the EltaEL/M-2032 multimode radar, provisions for the Elbit DASH helmet-mountedsight, and carriage of the Rafael Derby BVR air-to-air missile. The VIRAATwas finally decommissioned in 2016, with the Indian Shar fleet then beingretired. They were replaced by MiG-29K naval fighters, operating off the newcarrier INS VIKRANT (2).
BACK_TO_TOP* Despite the success of the Sea Harrier in the Falklands, many Royal Navyofficers realized they had been lucky, since the Shar had taken on a task ithadn't really been designed for, and much of the type's success was due tothe highly effective AIM-9L missile. The war demonstrated specificdeficiencies with the Sea Harrier: it couldn't stay in the air long enough;two Sidewinders weren't enough; the Sidewinder didn't have "stand-off" range;and, to no great surprise, the Blue Fox radar had not been quite up to thejob, particularly because of its lack of "look down" capability.
An interim "Phase I Update" was implemented immediately after the war, withrefits beginning in the summer of 1982 and ending in 1987. This involved twostraightforward enhancements, in the form of a new 854-liter (225 US gallon)drop tank to replace the existing 455-liter (120 US gallon) drop tank, and alaunch rack to allow carriage of two Sidewinders on each outer pylon,doubling the Sea Harrier's missile capacity to four.
Other small changes were added in the Phase I Update. One was a scheme knownas "nozzle inching" or "nozzle nudging" that allowed a Sea Harrier pilot toperform limited adjustment of the nozzle position using the airbrake switchon top of the throttle, reducing the "three-hand" workload in STOVL flight.Although the technique only could change the nozzle position by a maximum often degrees, it proved very useful in allowing the pilot to fine-tune hisflight condition. Another modification was the addition of an advancedinstrument landing system designated "Microwave Aircraft Digital GuidanceEquipment (MADGE)" to help in carrier landings in bad weather.
In addition, the FRS.1 was fitted with a backup power generator system. Thepop-up ram-air turbine emergency power generator was deleted. It had alwaysbeen a little dubious, since it was to be used if the engine flamed out. AnyShar pilot in his right mind who couldn't get a relight after a flameoutwould simply eject, since the idea of dead-stick landing a Sea Harrier, withits tiny wings and 3:1 glide slope, onto a carrier was absurd, and dicey evenon a long shore-based strip.
One change had been in process before the Falklands War: fit andqualification of the Sea Harrier for launching the BAE "Sea Eagle" long-rangeturbojet-powered antiship missile. The Sea Eagle went into service in 1987.A Sea Harrier FRS.1 could carry two Sea Eagles. Although the FRS.1 didn'thave the radar systems to perform its own targeting for the Sea Eagle, theaircraft could receive targeting cues from other platforms, such as a BAENimrod maritime patrol aircraft. The Sea Eagle was designed for open-oceancombat and was not suited to the "littoral" (offshore) naval warfareenvironment that came to be the norm in the 1990s, and so they were retired.The missile remains in service with India.
* The other limitations required more work, and a "Phase II Update" programto the existing FRS.1 fleet was put in motion in 1983, with a contract issuedto BAE in 1985. The upgraded Sea Harrier, which was also the basis for newproduction, was designated the "Fighter Reconnaissance Strike Mark 2 (FRS.2)"and first flew on 19 September 1988. The FRS.2 began trials with anoperational evaluation unit in the early summer of 1993, with the first onegoing to a full operational unit in September of that year.
The main enhancements were replacement of the Blue Fox radar with theFerranti "Blue Vixen" radar, and the ability to carry up to four American"AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles (AMRAAM)".
The Blue Vixen was far superior to the older Blue Fox, with 11 operatingmodes; greater range; a "look down" capability; a "track while scan"capability that allowed the radar to follow a target while scanning the skyfor new targets; and some degree of "low probability of intercept (LPI)"capability that allowed the radar to detect targets without alerting thetarget's RWR. Blue Vixen was also much "smarter" and easier to operate thanthe Blue Fox, with one Sea Harrier pilot saying that with Blue Vixenperforming an intercept was "down to selecting 'air to air', pointing theaircraft in roughly the right direction, and leaving the radar to it." Itwas regarded as a state of the art fighter radar.
AMRAAM is essentially a much-improved AIM-7 Sparrow derivative, with higherspeed; a greater range of about 48 kilometers (30 miles); less smokesignature; and a fully-active radar guidance system that gives it a degree of"fire and forget" capability.
The Blue Vixen radar and the AMRAAM gave the FRS.2 a formidable capability toengage and destroy intruders at "beyond visual range (BVR)", and atrelatively short ranges a Shar pilot could even fire all four missilessimultaneously to attack four separate targets. The FRS.2 was the firstEuropean aircraft to be qualified for the AMRAAM. While once Sea Harrierpilots felt themselves at a disadvantage against other modern fighters, theFRS.2 with its formidable armament and radar did much to level the playingfield in air combat. The FRS.2 could carry two AMRAAMS on the outer pylons,and two on pylons attached to the belly in place of the cannon. In fact, thecannon were not generally fitted for most missions, though they stillremained available when needed. Alternatively, the FRS.2 could carry twoAMRAAMS and four Sidewinders.
Discounting the nose probe on the FRS.1 -- the probe was relocated to thetailfin on the FRS.2 -- the FRS.2 was about 35 centimeters (13.75 inches)longer than the FRS.1, to accommodate the new avionics and the new radar,which were housed in a distinctive longer and more cylindrical nose. Wingtipextensions were originally considered to compensate for the aerodynamiceffects of carrying the AMRAAM, but proved unnecessary; however, minoraerodynamic changes to the wings were implemented. A new Pegasus variant,the "Pegasus 106", a rebuild and refinement of the navalized Pegasus 104, wasfitted as the powerplant.
The cockpit was reworked (again) to provide such niceties as multi-functiondisplays and a "hands on throttle and stick (HOTAS)" control system. Abetter nav/attack system was added, as well as the Marconi Sky Guardian RWR.The updated aircraft also featured a MIL-STD-1553B databus. GPS navigationcapability was eventually added through the simple expedient of mounting aGarmin 100 handheld GPS receiver in the cockpit and wiring it to an antennafitted behind the ejection seat.
33 FRS.1s were converted them to FRS.2 spec, with the last FRS.1 going in forconversion in 1995 and the final "rebuild" FRS.2 delivered in 1997. 18 newFRS.2s were ordered and delivered from 1995 into 1998, with the last of thebatch, delivered on 24 December 1998 as a "Christmas present" to the RoyalNavy, being the final "all British" Harrier built. It was photographedalongside one of the surviving P.1127s as a publicity stunt.
In addition, the Royal Navy obtained seven "T Mark 8" trainers, all of whichwere conversions from existing Royal Navy and RAF two-seaters. The T.8 wassimilar to the T.4N, but featured updated avionics and cockpit layout bettermatching the Sea Harrier FRS.2. The T.8 was not fitted with Blue Vixenradar. Initial flight of the first T.8 was in 1994 with initial delivery in1995.
* The FRS.2 upgrade and procurement program gave the Royal Navy a respectablefleet of 51 Sea Harriers. The FRS-2 took the place of the FRS.1 in Balkanpatrols, having begun operational evaluation flights there in 1994.
In the mid-1990s, the FRS.2 was redesignated the "FA.2" where "FA" stands for"Fighter Attack". The "R" for reconnaissance was dropped as the Sea Harrierhad never really been used or fitted for that mission, the Royal Navy havingnever bothered to obtain a reconnaissance pod for the type. The "S" for"Strike" was changed to "A" for "Attack" apparently because the Sea Harrier'snuclear strike mission was mothballed in 1991 as part of the general drawdownof Western tactical nuclear forces. Actually, to be nitpicky about it, theoriginal new designation was "F/A.2" but the "/" was dropped a year after thechange, possibly because it aped American designation schemes too much.
Plans had been in place to keep the Sea Harrier in FAA service until 2012 atleast, when the F-35B STOVL version of the Lockheed Martin "Joint StrikeFighter (JSF)" was expected to take over. Britain had been a majorcontributor to the JSF program, and saw it as the future. However, in early2002 the Ministry of Defense stated that withdrawal would begin in 2004; thelast Royal Navy Shars were withdrawn from frontline service in 2006.
One ended up in private hands, the buyer being an American real-estatemagnate and pilot, to be refurbished for the airshow circuit. Indiaconsidered buying up some surplus Royal Navy FA.2s, but the decision was madethat refit and upgrade would be too expensive. Ironically, the F-35 programwas delayed, leaving the FAA with a capability gap.
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