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1. While this may seem obvious, it is arguable that some accounts thatare put forward are in danger of losing sight of this imporatntfact.

2. Wright points out that “it is of the essence of asserting thatone seeks to transfer information which can beactedon” (1984 [1993: 389]), the implication being thatindefeasibility is not required for action.

3. While knowledge of my own mind is direct, it is only perceptual in ametaphorical or extended or sense.

4. Some think this because they hold that mind is not the sort of thingto be known about in this way (cf. Berkeley 1710), others because theysee an obstacle in the way of acquiring knowledge of another’smind by this means (cf. Cassam 2007).

5. Duddington, the daughter of the Russian writer Alexander Ertel, was apupil of Dawes Hickes at University College London. For a discussionof Duddingham’s critical realism and its relation to the work ofthe Russian intuitionist philosopher Nikolay Lossky, see H.J. Moore2023.

6. An important feature of McDowell’s disjunctive approach here isthat there is nothing that may be taken to be in common (nohighest common factor) between the veridical and thedeceptive cases. According to McDowell, it is this thought that leadsto thinking about behavior as “psychologically neutralinformation” (see McDowell 1982: 467).

7. Dretske (1971) associates satisfaction of a strong reliabilitycondition with having what he calls “conclusive reasons”.For the full analysis of epistemic seeing see Dretske 1966, ch.III.

8. Some insist that knowledge here entails that solipsism is false byappeal to the Principle of Epistemic Closure (see Luper 2016).Dretske, however, rejects this Principle (Dretske 2005; for a responseto Dretske here, see Hawthorne 2005).

9. The terms “sympathy” and “empathy” areunderstood differently in different writers. For a good discussion ofthe use of these terms see Zahavi (2014).

10. Zahavi (2014: 131–2 & ch. 12) defends Scheler againstStein’s accusation here.

11. It is interesting to note that Dretske does not address the questionof asymmetry in his work.

12. Malcolm links 302 with 350, where Wittgenstein considers thepossibility of saying that others feel the same as I do and offers thecomparison with saying that “it is 5 o’clock” meansthe same here and on the sun (Malcolm 1954 [1966: 75ff.])

13. Strawson admits in a footnote that his point is a “purelylogical one” (1959: 99).

14. Call and Tomasello (2008) suggest the evidence does not support theconclusion that chimpanzees are able to “go beneath thesurface” to an understanding of what guides actions, but shouldbe taken to show that chimpanzees are capable of appreciating thegoals and intentions of others.

15. The findings were replicated with children with Down’sSyndrome, but the work by Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie, and Uta Frith(1985) showed that children with autism only passed the test at alater age.

16. For a discussion of the history of this issue see Avramides(2001).

17. The passage in Descartes’ work that is most often quoted inconnection with a problem of other minds comes in theSecondMeditation where Descartes writes, “But if I look from mywindow and see men crossing the street … I normally say that Isee men themselves…. Yet do I see more than hats and coatswhich could conceal automatic machines?”

18. Malebranche considers sensations and thoughts separately. He holdsthat conjectures about another man’s thoughts are more certainthan conjectures about his sensations.

19. In Tsouna (1998b) she discusses the science of physiognomy as aresponse to the ‘thin’ sceptical problem of other minds.In holding that the ancients were concerned with a ‘thin’sceptical problem here both Tsouna and Avramides are influenced by thework of Myles Burnyeat.