Mysticism

First published Thu Nov 11, 2004; substantive revision Wed Jun 29, 2022

Under the influence of William James’Varieties of ReligiousExperience, philosophical interest in mysticism has heavilyfocused on distinctive, allegedly knowledge-granting“mystical experiences.” Philosophers have dealt with suchtopics as the classification of mystical experiences, their nature, towhat extent mystical experiences are conditioned by a mystic’slanguage and culture, and whether mystical experiences furnishevidence for the truth of mystical claims. Some philosophers haverecently questioned the emphasis on experience in favor of examiningbroader mystical phenomena. Indeed, “mysticism” is bestthought of as a constellation of distinctive practices, discourses,texts, institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at humantransformation, variously defined. But this entry willconcentrate on the topics philosophers have discussed concerningmystical experiences.

1. Mystical Experiences

Because of its variable meanings, a definition of “mysticalexperience” must be partly stipulative. It is common amongphilosophers to refer to “mystical experience” in anarrow sense: a purportedly nonsensory orextrovertiveunitive experience by a subject of anobject granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs thatare of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensorymodalities, or standard introspection. A unitive experienceinvolves the eradication of a sense of multiple discrete entities,and the cognitive significance of the experience is deemed to lieprecisely in that phenomenological feature. Examples are experiencesof “union with God,” the realization that one is identical to thebeing shared with God or that one is identical to theBrahman of Advaita Vedanta (i.e., that the self/soul is identicalwith the one eternal, absolute reality), experiencing a onenessto all of nature, and the Buddhist unconstructed extrovertiveexperience devoid of a sense of any multiplicity ofrealities (see Smart 1958, 1978; Wainwright 1981, chap. 1).However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, few classicalmystics refer to their experiences as theunion oftwo realities: there is no literal “merging” or“absorption” of one reality into another resulting in onlyone entity. Excluded from the narrow definition are, for example,experiences of “contact” with God in which the subject andGod remain ontologically distinct, even if there is a lessening ofboundaries, or a Jewish Kabbalistic experience of a singlesupernalsefirah.

A more inclusive definition of “mystical experience” is:

A purportedly nonsensory awareness or a nonstructuredsensory experience granting acquaintance of realities or statesof affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of ordinarysense-perception structured by mental conceptions, somatosensorymodalities, or standard introspection.

“Experience,” “consciousness,” and “awareness” arenotoriously difficult to define and will be left unanalyzed here, butthe other key terms in the definition can be understood asfollows:

“Purportedly” allows the definition to be accepted withoutnecessarily accepting that mystics ever really do experience realitiesor states of affairs in the way they described.
“Nonsenory awareness” includes content of a kind not appropriateto sense-perception, somatosensory modalities (including the means forsensing pain and body temperature, and internally sensing body, limb,organ, and visceral positions and states), or standard introspection.Some mystics have referred to a distinct “spiritual” means ofknowing appropriate only to a non-physical realm (nous,intellectus,buddhi). A super sense-perceptual modeof experience may accompany sense-perception as in the cases of“nature mysticism” or “cosmic consciousness” (Bucke 1901),as when, for example, a person has an awareness of God whilewatching a setting sun.
“Nonstructured sensory experience” consists of phenomenologicalsensory content but lacks the conceptualization normallystructuring sense-perception.
“Acquaintance” of realities in mystical experiences means thesubject is putatively aware of one ormore realities in a way that overcomes the normal subject/objectduality: the “acquaintance” is “knowledge byparticipation” or “knowledge by identity” (Forman 1990,Introduction). Mystical experiences are allegedly“direct,” “unmediated” insights in that sense.
“States of affairs” include the impermanence of all reality andthat God is the ground of the self. “Acquaintance” of states ofaffairs comes in two forms. In one, a subject is aware of either(one or more) realities on which (one or more) states of affairssupervene. An example would be an awareness of God (a reality)affording an awareness of one’s utter dependence on God (a stateof affairs). In its second form, acquaintance of states of affairsinvolves an insight directly, without supervening on acquaintance, ofany reality. An example is coming to “see” theimpermanence of all that exists in the phenomenal world.

Hereafter “mystical experience” will be used in the broadersense, unless otherwise noted, not merely for unitiveexperiences. Correspondingly, the term “mysticism” will refer topractices, discourse, texts, institutions, and traditions associatedwith these experiences. The definition excludes paranormalexperiences such as visions, voices, out-of-body experiences,and powers such as telepathy. All of these are“dualistic” acquaintance of subjects with objects or qualities ofa kind accessible to the senses or to ordinary introspection.

The subject may not have the mental separationat the time of theexperienceby which she could tell herself, as it were, whatrealities or state of affairs were then being disclosed to her. Therealization may arise following the experience.

Mystical experiences occur within all world religions andprobably all primal religions. In some traditions, the experiences areallegedly of a supersensory reality, such as God or Brahman. ManyBuddhist traditions, however, make no claim for an experience of asupersensory reality but instead cultivate an experience of“unconstructed awareness” involving an awareness of the world ona completely or partially non-conceptual level (seeGriffiths 1993). The non-conceptual experience is thought togrant knowledge of the true nature of phenomenal reality, suchas the impermanent nature of all things. Prajnaparamita andMadhyamaka Buddhists refer to this as the experience of the“thusness” (tathata) or“thatness” (tattva) of reality thatis accessible only in the absence of ordinarysense-perceptual cognition that is structured by culturalconceptions.

It should be emphasized that mystics value achievingenduringstates of consciousness overtransientexperiences — in particular, they valuethe personal transformation leading to the enlightened state free of asense of a phenomenal “self” in which they are aligned with the waythings really are (as defined by their tradition). Mysticism is amatter of practices and ways of life, not episodic experiences.

Care should also be taken not to confuse “mystical experience” with“religious experience.” The latter refers to any experiencehaving significance appropriate to a religious context. This includesmany instances of mystical experiences but also religious visionsand voices, and various religious feelings, such as religious aweand sublimity. Also included is what Friedrich Schleiermacheridentified as the fundamental religious experience: the feeling of“absolute dependence” (Schleiermacher 1963). RudolfOtto reserved the term “numinous” (from Latin “numen”meaning “divine” or “spirit”) for experiences allegedly of a realityperceived of as “wholly other” than the subject, producing areaction of dread and fascination before an incomprehensible mystery(Otto 1957). In the sense of “mystical” used here,Otto’s numinous experience is a dualistic experienceand not thus mystical. Your garden-variety sense of God’s“presence” would count as a numinous experience. A“secular” mysticism is also possible (see Section 12).

2. Classifying Mystical Experiences

Mystical experiences can be classified through variousdichotomies. (See Wainwright 1981, 33–40 and Jones 2016, 31–34for detailed typologies.) The most common are these:

2.1 Extrovertive and Introvertive

Walter Stace (1960) fixed the distinction between“extrovertive” and “introvertive” mystical experiences inphilosophy of mysticism (also see Otto 1932, 57–72). Whenan experience includes sense-perception, it is an “extrovertive”experience. Mystical extrovertive experiences include consciousness ofthe unity of nature overlaid onto one’s sense-perception of theworld, as well as non-unitive extrovertive experiences such as“cosmic consciousness.” When not extrovertive, an experience is“introvertive.” Examples include the experience of“nothingness” — an awareness lacking alldifferentiated content — and an awareness of Godlacking sense-experiences.

Extrovertive mystical experiences are not merely stuntedintrovertive ones but complete experiences in their own right(see Jones 2016; contra Stace 1960). Paul Marshall (2005) hasdeveloped a detailed phenomenology of these experiences.

2.2 Dualistic and Monistic

A favorite distinction of Western philosophers is between dualisticand monistic experiences. A dualistic experience maintainssome distinction, however tenuous, between the subject and whatis disclosed. Thus, theistic mystical experiences typically aredualistic, retaining, at some level, a distinction between God and themystic. Monistic experiences are the extreme of unitiveexperiences in that they dissolve all duality (Merkur 1999). Theyare either experiences of the absolute ontological oneness ofeverything, free of our conceptual distinctions, or are pureconsciousness experiences.

2.2.1 Union with God

Classical mystics did not usually speak of a true “union withGod.” The term “unio mystica” was devised in thethirteenth century, but few Christian mystics used that term beforethe modern era (McGinn 2001, 132; Jantzen 1995) — onlyin the modern study of mysticism hasunio mystica received acentral place (McGinn 2006, 427). When Abrahamic mysticsdo use the language of union, it involves a falling away of theseparation between a person and God short of identity: theidea is more of “communion” with God than union.“Deification” means becoming God-like. All mysticalexperiences involve overcoming a sense of “self,” but usually nota sense of becoming another reality. In theisms, this is analignment of spirits, not an ontological union of different substancesthat were once distinct. Christian mystics used various metaphors.Henry Suso (1295–1366) likened union with God to a drop ofwater falling into wine, taking on the taste and color of the wine(Suso 1953, 185); Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293–1381)described union as “iron within the fire and the fire within theiron;” Teresa of Avila (1515–1882) likened the soulthat absorbs and is saturated with God to a sponge andwater. (See Pike 1992,chap. 2; Mommaers 2009.) A “spiritual marriage” ofthe soul (the bride) and Christ (the bridegroom) is common. Bernard ofClairvaux (1090–1153) described unification as “mutualityof love.” Overall, classical Christian mystics usuallytreated “becoming one with God” as a loving union of willswith God’s or even a fusion of the mind with God’s (McGinn2006, 427–429). Medieval Christian mystics generally interpreted thebiblical claim that “it is no longer I who lives but Christ wholives in me” (Galatians 2:20) to mean the HolySpirit was filling their mind or spirit resulting in acomplete alignment of one’s will with God’s. In Sufism, whenone’s sense of self passes away (fana), one is filled withthe presence of Allah (baqa), although the orthodox Sufisinsist that the soul does not cease to exist but only that one isunaware of it in the blinding light of the presence of Allah(Schimmel 1975).

2.2.2 Identity with God

Theistic mystics sometimes speak as though they have the awareness ofbeing fully absorbed into God or even becoming identicalto God. Examples are the Islamic Sufi mystic al-Husayn al-Hallaj(858–922) proclaiming “I am the Real” (seeSchimmel 1975, chap. 2) and the Jewish Kabbalist Isaac ofAcre (b. 1291?) who wrote of the soul being completely absorbedinto God “as a jug of water into a runningwell” (Idel 1988, 67). The Hasidic masterRabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1745–1812) wrote of aperson as a drop of water in the ocean of the Infinite with anillusory sense of individual “dropness.” The Christianmystic Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1327/8) claimed that we andGod share the same being (esse) supplied by atranscendent Godhead (Eckhart 2009, 109). It is still controversial,however, as to when such declarations are to be taken as assertions oftrue identity and when they are hyperbolic variations on descriptionsof union-type experiences. Shankara’s Advaita gives a nontheisticexample: our “essence” (atman) is identical to the onlyreality there is (Brahman) — there is a nonduality(a-dvaita) of all essences.

2.3 Theurgic and Non-Theurgic Mysticism

In theurgic (from the Greek “theourgia”) mysticism a mysticintends to activate the divine (e.g., God’s grace) in a mysticalexperience (Shaw 1995, 4). Nonetheless, theisticmystics typically claim that experiences of God’s activity donot result from their own endeavors. So too, most mystics are notinvolved in theurgic activity. The Jewish Kabbalah is the mostprominent form of theurgic mysticism. In it, the mystic aims to bringabout a modification in the inner life of the Godhead (seeIdel 1988).

2.4 Apophatic and Kataphatic Mysticism

Apophatic mysticism (from theGreek “apophasis,” meaning negation or“saying away”) is contrasted with kataphatic mysticism (from theGreek “kataphasis,” meaning affirmation or“saying with”). Apophatic mystics claim that nothing positive canbe said about objects or states of affairs that they experience. Theseare absolutely indescribable, or “ineffable.” Thus,apophatic theology typically will be negative theology — that wecan say only what God is not. Kataphatic mysticism does make claimsabout what a mystic experiences. Pertaining to God, this meansthat God can be described by positive terms. Analytic philosophers ofmysticism have mainly dealt with kataphatic conceptions. (For anexception see Alston 2005 in the Other Internet Resources.)

Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta is apophatic: nothing describing phenomenalfeatures can be applied to Brahman. Even discussing Brahman withoutqualities (nirguna-brahman) is still a form of the formlessBrahman (Brahma-sutra-bhasya III.2.14). So too, Plotinusstated that no name applies to the One (Enneads IV.9.5).In a remark echoed by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas about God, hewrote that we can only state what the One is not, not what it is(Enneads V.3.14).

The two approaches can represent two stages in mystical contemplationwith the apophatic approach usually treated as higher. Theologiansalso may utilize the apophatic approach (and ineffability) in contextsunrelated to mystical experiences. Even the theologian who introducedthevia negativa to Christianity, Pseudo-Dionysius theAreopagite (c. 500), also wrote works in the affirmativekataphatic approach on religious symbolism and the names of God,while still stressing that God cannot be fully captured by anyname.

3. The Attributes of Mystical Experience

Three purported features of mystical experiences are of specialinterest to philosophers:

3.1 Noetic Quality

Mystical experiences, both introvertive and extrovertive, arealleged to be “noetic,” i.e., giving knowledge of what a subjectapprehends (see James 1958). As Chris Letheby puts it: “Noeticquality refers to a strong sense of gaining a genuine and unmediatedinsight, or of encountering ultimate reality; the mystical experience,by definition, is felt to be ‘more real than real’” (Letheby 2021,25). To what extent this knowledge could come from the experiencesalone will be discussed in Section 9.

3.2 Ineffability

When classical mystics invoke “ineffability,” it is typically toaffirm that there is more to what was experienced that can beexpressed in any language, not to deny anything can be said about thatreality. But William James (1958, 292–93) deemed absoluteineffability or indescribability to be an essential mark ofmysticism. Even indirect depictions of what is experienced throughanalogies, metaphors, and art turn it into something like aphenomenal object and thus must ultimately be denied. Moreover, it isnot always clear whether it is the experience or its allegedobject or both that is considered ineffable by a givenmystic.

A logical problem with ineffability was noted long ago by Augustine:God should not be said to be ineffable, for to say thatX isineffable is to saysomething aboutX, whichcontravenes ineffability (Augustine 1958, 10–11). Thisproblem has been raised by Alvin Plantinga (1980, 23–25) andKeith Yandell (1975).

Several responses to this problem are possible. One is to avoid speechaltogether and remain silent about what is revealed in experience.Mystics, however, have not been very good at this. A second is todistinguish first-order from second-order attributions, where“ineffability” is a second-order term solely about allfirst-order phenomenal descriptive terms (Jones 2016, 204–208).That is, to say that something is ineffable would be to assertthat it could not be described by any first-order terms, including“ineffable.” A third possibility is to say that “X isineffable” is really a statement about theterm “X,” saying about it that it fails torefer to any describable entity.

A fourth possibility lies in the ongoing negation of whatever issaid aboutXad infinitum in an infinite“unsaying” or taking back of what has been said (Sells 1994,chap. 1). An example of unsaying can be found in the endless negationsin some Zen Buddhist meditative exercises. Since the truth aboutreality “as it is” lies outside of our conceptualizations of it,we cannotsay that truth, onlyexperience it. Hence,when we say, “Reality is not reality” (i.e., that reality asit is differs from what we take it to be conceptually), we must alsosay that “Reality is not not-reality” to counter an affirmationof its nature as not-reality. We must then negate the latter by saying“Reality is neither not-reality nor not-not-reality.” And so on. (SeeNhat Hanh, 1994, chap. 5.) But classical mystics typically affirmed,as Shankara did with Brahman, that a reality lay behind allnegations. So too, Eckhart prayed to God to make him free of God(Eckhart 2009, 424, 531) — it is not a denial of God but anattempt to get to the Godhead behind God and creation.

William Alston (1991) offers a fifth possibility: when mysticstalk about “indescribability,” they refer only to the difficultyof describing in literal terms rather than by metaphor, analogy,and symbols.

A sixth solution comes from Richard Gale and Ninian Smart each ofwhom have argued that “ineffability” is merely an honorifictitle marking the value and intensity of an experience a mysticconsiders profound (Gale 1960; Smart 1958, 69).

As another possibility, Wayne Proudfoot (1985, 125–27)argues that invoking ineffability is not todescribe but to prescribe that no language shall beapplicable, and so serves to create and maintain a protective sense ofmystery. However, experiences of ineffability occur in artand music (Gallope 2017) and in everyday experience. Think of theimpossibility of describing the taste of coffee to someone who hasnever tasted it (King 1988). This diminishes the “protectivestrategies” argument.

Some philosophers think that a stress on ineffability signifies anattempt to consign mysticism to the irrational, thus excluding itfrom more sensible human pursuits, or consign them to the realm of theemotions (Jantzen 1995, 344). Others have staunchly defended therationality of mysticism against charges of irrationalism(Staal 1975; Jones 2016, chap. 7).

3.3 Paradoxicality

Scholars of mysticism sometimes stress the alleged“paradoxical” nature of mystical experiences. Four senses of“paradoxical” are relevant. (1) According to its etymology,“paradoxical” refers to what is surprising or “contrary toexpectation.” (2) Language can be intentionally“paradoxical” in using a logically improper form of words toconvey what is not intended to be logically absurd. This may be forrhetorical effect or because of difficulty in conveying a thoughtwithout resort to linguistic tricks. (3) A “paradox” can involvean unexpected logical contradiction, as in the “LiarParadox.” (4) “Paradoxicality” may be anintended logical contradiction. Walter Stace sees this as auniversal feature of mystical experiences (Stace 1960,212).

Insofar as mystical experiences are out of the ordinary, and theunitive quality strange to most of us, reports of them may very wellbe surprising or contrary to expectation. Hence, they may beparadoxical in sense (1). Reports of mystical experiences may beparadoxical also in sense (2) because at times mystical languagedoes assume logically offensive forms when actual absurdity maynot be intended. Frits Staal argued that paradoxical mystical languagehas been used systematically to make logically respectable claims(Staal 1975). However, paradox in this sense occurs lessfrequently in first-hand reports of mystical experiences and more insecond-order mystical systems of thought (Moore 1973).

There is no good reason for thinking that reports of mysticalexperience must imply logical absurdity, as in (3) or (4). As notedabove, while there do occur forms of expression that arecontradictory, the contradiction is often removed by the device of“unsaying” or canceling out that propels the discourse intoa non-discursive realm.

The attempt to designate mystical experiences as paradoxical in senses(3) and (4) may result from being too eager to take logically deviantlanguage literally. For example, Zen Buddhists speak ofreaching a state of mind beyond both thought and “no-thought” andperception and “no-perception” — i.e., having thoughts butnot projecting our conceptual distinctions onto reality, therebyavoiding the fabrication of a false world of discreteobjects. Labeling mental activity ceases. No logicalabsurdity infects this description. While mystics use much literallanguage in describing their experiences (see Alston 1992,80–102), the literality need not extend to paradox in senses (3)or (4).

But paradox is only natural in mystical discourse: mystics want toaffirm something of the nature of what they experienced, but they mustutilize language originally designed for phenomenal realities andso must then deny the ascriptions as not actually applicable. Thus,the paradox of affirming something and then denying it is notirrational or nonsense. But we would need to have a mysticalexperience to see why the features were affirmed and why they aredenied as not truly applicable.

4. Pure Consciousness Events

Is the content of mystical experiences “given” toa mystic, or is it constructed by the mystic in accordancewith the mystical, religious, and cultural tradition in which he orshe is embedded? First consider the possibility of “pureconsciousness events” (PCEs) — mental eventsthat allegedly involve an “emptying out” by a subject ofall phenomenological qualities and content (including concepts,thoughts, sense-perception, and sensuous images) and yet remainingawake, thereby leaving only unconditioned consciousness. Do suchevents occur? And if they do, how significant are they inmysticism?

4.1 Defenders of Pure Consciousness Events

Defenders of PCEs depend on alleged references to pure consciousnessin the mystical literature. One example is the Buddhistphilosopher Paramaartha (499–569) who statedexplicitly that all of our cognitions were “conditioned”by our concepts save for the“unconditioned” experience of the emptiness ofphenomena (Forman 1989). Another example is Meister Eckhartwho described a “forgetting” that abandons concepts andsense-experience to sink into a mystical“oblivion” (Forman 1990, 121–159). In addition, RobertForman has testified to a PCE he himself underwent (Forman 1990,Introduction).

4.2 Denial of Pure Consciousness Events

Criticisms of the possibility of PCEs include: (1) Reportsof PCEs found in the literature may not be decisive in establishingthe occurrence of PCEs. We should suspect an“idealization” in these reports in which an ideal goal ispresented as achieved when in fact it wasn’t. Mysticsthereby remember an experience with contentas pureconsciousness only because of a “confirmation bias” of whatwas expected. (2) Reports of “emptying out” and“forgetting” may refer only to an emptying of ordinaryexperiential content, thereby making room for an extraordinarycontent. This accords well with the conception ofayin(nothingness) in Jewish mysticism, which is positively saturated withdivine reality (Matt 1997). For a theist such as Eckhart,emptying the mind by “unknowing” is to empty the mind of allcontent other than the being that we share with God (Eckhart2009, 34–36, 42–43), not an absolute emptiness of content.(3) Even if a subject honestly reports on a pure consciousnessepisode, there may have been conceptual events the subject eitherrepressed or experienced in a nebulous way (Wainwright 1981,117–119). The latter simply do not remain for memory. (4)Some argue that because of the way our brain has evolved for oursurvival, all experience or awareness is necessarilyintentional. Consciousness is always consciousnessof something to a subject and hence necessarily contains somedualistic content. Thus, because of our nature, there can be noexperiences free of any content (Katz 1978). Defenders of thepossibility of PCEs reply that it is theinterpretation ofthe experience’s content a mystic gives after the experiencethat reflects cultural ideas, but theexperienceitself is only a pure consciousness.

But even if PCEs occur, PCE defenders may be exaggerating thecentrality in mysticism of complete emptying out. The goal ofclassical mysticisms is to align oneself with reality (as defined byone’s tradition) — e.g., attaining the selflessness of nirvanaor aligning one’s will with God’s. It is questionable if a PCE iscentral in mainstream theistic mysticisms where a mystic forgetsall else usually only to better contemplate God. Typical is theChristian mystic Jan Ruysbroeck who wrote that emptying oneself is buta prelude to the mystical life of contemplating God through an act ofdivine grace (Zaehner 1957, 170–171). Likewise, the“shedding of corporeality” in early Hasidism was meant toenable the mystic to contemplate the unified supernal structure of thedivinesefirot. And the Zen master Dogen(1200–1253) wrote about “wrongly thinking that the natureof things will appear when the whole world we perceive isobliterated” (Dogen 1986, 39).

5. Essentialism

“Essentialists” claim that there is a “common core” to allmystical experiences independent of culture. That is, the commonlow-ramified accounts of mystical experiences in different culturesand eras reveal that a universal mystical consciousness— the PCE — grounds all the different culturalexpressions. Alternatively, at least there is a sharedcommonality of certain phenomenological features in all mysticalexperiences that is invariant from culture to culture and era to eraeven if all mystical experiences are constructed and so each mysticalexperience is flavored differently by a particularculture. This universal state of consciousness isindependent of any religion or culture and produces somecommon phenomenological features in all types of mystical experiences.The common core is always culturally mediated in theexpressions of each mystic’s culture, but this does not erasethe experiential uniformity since experience and interpretation can bedistinguished.

Thus, essentialists argue there is only one type ofmystical experience or that all types of mystical experiencesshare common phenomenological features. For many essentialiststoday, the common physiology or neurology of all people regardless ofculture is responsible for this commonality, not any allegedobjects of mystical experiences.

Stace’s essentialism has generated much discussion(Stace 1960). He proposes two mystical experiences found “in allcultures, religions, periods, and social conditions.” First,he identifies a universal extrovertive experience that apprehendsthe One or the Oneness of all in or through the multiplicity of thephenomenal world that is the inner life or consciousness of theworld. The Oneness is experienced as a sacred objectivereality in a feeling of “bliss” or “joy.” This universalextrovertive experience (or the experienced reality, it is not alwaysclear which) is paradoxical, and possibly ineffable (Stace 1960,79). Second, Stace identifies auniversal monistic introvertive experience that “looksinward into the mind” to achieve “pure consciousness” —i.e., an experience phenomenologically not of anything butconsciousness (Stace 1960, 86) — i.e, a PCE. Stace callsthis the “unitary consciousness” or the “void and empty unity”that is left when all empirical content is excluded (Stace 1960,110). Like his extrovertive experience, Stace’s universalintrovertive experience involves a blissful sense of sacredobjectivity and is paradoxical and possibly ineffable. Staceconsiders the universal introvertive experience to be a ripening ofmystical awareness beyond the halfway house of the universalextrovertive consciousness.

Stace assimilates theistic mystical experiences to the PCE bydistinguishing between experience and interpretation: theistic mysticsare conditioned (perhaps subconsciously) by their surroundings toput a theistic interpretation on their empty introvertive experiences.Ninian Smart (1965) concurs: descriptions of theistic mysticalexperiences reflect an interpretive overlay upon an experiential basecommon to both theistic and non-theistic experiences.

The psychologist Ralph Hood (2006 and 2017)argues that psychometric studies provide “strong empiricalsupport” for the common core thesis. Does the fact thatneuroscientists have found different patterns in the brain fordifferent types of mystical experiences and meditative practices (seeSection 9.7) mean that the experiences must be different? Even ifthere is a common neural basis to all mystical experiences, does itmean that the phenomenology of the experiences must be identical?

Stace has been strongly criticized for simplifying or distortingmystical reports (see Moore 1973 for a summary) and for failingto properly articulate the differences between extrovertive andintrovertive experiences (e.g., Almond 1982, chap. 4). NelsonPike (1992, chap. 5) criticized the Stace-Smart positionbecause in Christian mysticism union with God is divided intodiscernible phases, which finds no basis in Christian theology. Thus,these phases plausibly reflect experience, not a culturally-controlledinterpretation.

In contrast to Stace and essentialism in general, R. C. Zaehneridentified three distinct types of mystical consciousness: (1) a“panenhenic” extrovertive experience in whichone experiences the oneness of nature, one’s selfincluded; (2) a “monistic” experience of an undifferentiated unitytranscending space and time; and (3) the “theistic” experiencewhere there is a duality between the subject and the object of theexperience (Zaehner 1957). Zaehner thought that theisticexperiences are an advance over the monistic since the latter, hethought, express a self-centered interest of the mystic to beincluded in the ultimate. But in his typology he had to tellBuddhists what their experiences really were (type 2) despite theirexplicit rejection of that position. He later admitted that Zenmystical experiences did not fit his typology.

6. Perennialism

Essentialists make a claim about mysticalexperiences, notdoctrines. The term “perennial philosophy” has been amatter of doctrines since Leibniz. In the twentieth century,philosophers dubbed “perennial philosophers” or “perennialists”claimed that there are universal mystical doctrines about what isallegedly experienced that transcend all cultures and religions— a common core of esoteric doctrines that are expresseddifferently in different religions and cultures (Huxley1945; Schuon 1975; Smith 1976 and 1987). That is,perennialists argued for a universalism of“esoteric” mystical doctrines lying beneath the “exoteric”expressions of each salvific religion, not of mystical experiences.Scholars today who are labelled the “new perennialists” such asKenneth Rose (2016) and Steve Taylor (2017) are more properly labelled“essentialists.” (Constructivists unnecessarily confusephilosophical issues by mislabeling essentialism as perennialism [seeJones 2020].)

7. Constructivism

The approach that opposes both essentialism and perennialism is“contextualism.” Under this approach, all mystical phenomena,including the mystics’ own understanding of their experiencesand of what they experienced, must be understood in term of eachparticular mystic’s culture and era.“Constructivists” assert the conceptual“construction” of mystical experiences by cultural influences— i.e., beliefs, memories, expectations shaped by a mystic’scultural structure the experiences. There are cultural, social,psychological, and linguistic influences. Thus, contextpenetrates mystical experiences themselves and not merely thepost-experiential understanding given by mystics. There is no way toseparate mystical experiences completely from theirinterpretations since our conceptual apparatus shapes our veryexperience. (See Jones 1909, introduction; Katz 1978and 1983; for criticism, see Evans 1989; Forman 1990and 1999; Stoeber 1992).

“Soft constructivism” is the view that there are no mysticalexperiences without at least some structuring from theconceptualizations provided by the mystic’s culture. “Hardconstructivism” is the view that a mystic’s specificcultural background completely determines the alleged cognitive contentof all mystical experiences, not merely shapes or influences anindependent experiential element. On the assumption that mysticaltraditions are widely divergent, hard constructivism entails thedenial of both essentialism and perennialism. Soft constructivismis consistent with essentialism, however, since it is consistent withthere being some transcultural mystical experiences involvingconceptualizations common across mystical traditions.“Nonconstructivism” is the view that some or all mystical experiencesare in fact free of any cultural influence, and the divergence inunderstanding their content comes from post-experientialinterpretations.

Constructivism is based on prevailing philosophical theories of thenature of consciousness. Nonconstructivists, as noted below, caninvoke some suggestive work in neuroscience. But the principaldifficulty in resolving the issue of constructivism is that we onlyhave mystics’ post-experiential accounts, which all parties agree areshaped by a mystic’s culture — we can never get to theexperiences themselves to see if they are constructed or not.

7.1 Soft Constructivist Arguments Against Pure Consciousness Events

Both soft and hard constructivist arguments have been mobilizedagainst the possibility of PCEs. Here is a sampling of softconstructivist arguments:

PCEs are impossible because of the “kind of beings” that we are(Katz 1978, 59). It is a fact about being human that we canexperience only with the aid of memory, language, expectations, andconceptualizations. Thus, we cannot have a“pure” awareness empty of all content. (Also seeSection 4.2).
We should distinguish an “experience” from an “event”(Proudfoot 1985, chap. 4; Bagger 1999, chap. 4). ThatX has an experienceE entails thatXconceptualizesE during the event. Hence, even if pureconsciousness events happen to occur, they do not count as“experiences” until the subject conceptualizes them, andat that moment they cease to be “pureconsciousness.”
A survey of mystical literature shows that mystical experiences alwayshave conceptual content and thus are not empty ofconceptualizations.
Subjects could not know they had undergone a PCE if theexperience were truly empty of all conceptual content(Bagger 1999, 102–103) since there would be nothing toobserve while it is going on, and hence nothing to retain later. Norcould a subject surmise that a PCE had transpired by remembering a“before” and an “after” with an unaccounted for middle. Thiswould fail to distinguish a PCE from plain unconsciousness.
Suppose a PCE has occurred and that a subject somehow knows that.Still, there is a problem of the relationship of a PCE to thesubsequent claims to knowledge: if a PCE were empty of allexperiential content, the experiencers could not claim to havehad acquaintance of anything (Bagger 1999,102–103). Nothing could be retained from the experience toshape a mystic’s beliefs or values.
So too, if PCEs were empty of everything but a featurelessconsciousness, they could not have an impact on the life of amystic, and yet the experiences do have an impact.Thus, the state must have some differentiated content.

7.2 Criticism of Soft Constructivism

Several objections can be raised against soft constructivism:

While our cultural sets shape our ordinary experience, there is nogood reason to believe that we could not enjoy experiences on apre-conceptual level of awareness, especially through a regimen oftraining. The constructivist Steven Katz notes our “mostbrutish, infantile, and sensate levels” of experience when wewere infants (Katz 1988, 755). It is hard to see why in principlewe could not retrieve such an unconceptualized level ofexperience.
It makes little difference whether a PCE is called an“experience” or an “event.” A PCE occurs within a widerexperience of the subject, including the subject’s coming out ofthe PCE and assigning it meaning. Let this wider experience be the“experience” under discussion, rather than the PCE alone.
Neuropsychological studies of mystical experience point to thepossibility of a state of pure consciousness. For example,a theory by Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg (1999)accounts for PCEs by reference to occurrences in the brain that cutoff ordinary brain activity from consciousness. (Also see Hood 2006and Section 9.7 below.)
There may be no problem about mystics knowing they had PCEs. Ifwe accept a reliabilist account of knowledge, a belief is knowledge ifproduced by a reliable cognitive mechanism (perhaps with some furtherconditions). In order to have knowledge, a person does not have to beaware of and judge evidence, nor be cognizant of the reliability ofthe mechanism that produces the knowledge. Hence, “awakening” fromwhat is in fact a PCE, if it produces the belief that one has“awakened” from a PCE, could be a reliable cognitive mechanismsufficient for knowing one had had a PCE. If we stick to anevidentialist conception of knowledge, mystics might be able to haveevidence they had undergone a PCE, though not at the time of itsoccurrence, since a conscious event can have elements that onedoes not note at the time but recalls afterward. This isespecially possible when the recall immediately follows the event.That is, some content was retained and the experience was not trulyempty, even if the content is only a nondual consciousness.Therefore, it should be possible for a mystic who undergoes a PCE torecall immediately afterward the awareness that was present in thePCE, even though that awareness was not an object of consciousness atthe time of the PCE.
Defenders of PCEs can champion their epistemological significance,although PCEs are not experiencesof anything. Thenoetic quality of a mystical experience can come from an acquaintanceof states of affairs involving an insight directly, withoutsupervening on acquaintance of any reality. Nor need the insight besimultaneous with the occurrence of the experience but may ariselater. Hence, a person could undergo a PCE that granted acquaintanceof states of affairs by a direct insight. The PCE plus the insightwould constitute a complex mystical experience that afforded awarenessof a state of affairs not otherwise accessible.

7.3 Hard Constructivism Against Essentialism

Hard constructivism’s main argument against essentialism andPCEs is as follows (Katz 1978):

Premise A: The conceptual scheme a mystic possesses completelydetermines the nature and content of the mystical experience.
Premise B: Mystics from different mystical traditions possesspervasively different conceptual schemes.
Conclusion: Therefore, there cannot be a common experience acrosscultural traditions. That is, essentialism is false.

Regarding Premise B, Katz (2013) has edited a massive volume onmysticism with the aim of displaying the stark differences betweenmystical experiences of different traditions, due to linguistic,cultural, religious, and sociological factors.

So too, theistic experiences are theory-laden and even theirinterpretation as theistic is the result of being embedded in apropensity to think theistically. That is why, allegedly, suchexperiences are rarely reported by those not already theists or intheistic communities. Such experiences, then, are “polluted” bytheory (Oppy 2006, 350).

7.4 Criticism of Hard Constructivism

Some objections to hard constructivism are not objections to softconstructivism:

It seems quite possible for subjects in the first instance to apply“thin” descriptions to experiences, involving only a smallpart of their conceptual schemes. Perhaps only on second thought willthey elaborate on their experience in terms of the richness of theirhome culture. This would be like a physician with a headache, whoexperiences pain in the first instance just like ordinary folk andonly subsequently applies medical terminology to the headache (compareKing 1988). If so, there is a possibility of commonfirst-instance mystical experiences across cultures, contrary toPremise A.
Premise A is thrown into further doubt by expressions of surprise bymystics-in-training about what they experience (Gellman1997, 145–146 and Barnard 1997, 127–130).So too, constructivists have trouble accounting for why some mysticsbecome heretics (Stoeber 1992, 112–113) — underconstructivism, their mystical experiences shouldreinforcetheir orthodoxy. These illustrate the possibility of getting out fromunder one’s cultural background to have new experiences.Likewise, hard constructivism’s inherently conservative take onmysticism will struggle to explain transformations within mysticaltraditions, and cannot easily account for innovative geniuses withinmystical traditions.
Two people walk together down the street and see an approaching dog.One experiences the dog as “Jones’s pet blackterrier” while the other experiences it as “a stray mutt that thedog-catchers should take away.” Because of the excessiveconceptual differences in their experiencing, constructivist mustinsist that there was no worthwhile sense in which both observers hadthe same experience. However, there is a valuable sense in whichthey are having the same experience: seeing that black dog at thatplace and time. Similarly, there might exist avaluable commonality of experiences across mystical traditionsdespite conceptual disparity. The conceptual differences might not besufficient to deny this important commonality (Wainwright 1981,25).
Cultural conditioning does not influence everyone to the same degreeand in the same way. Individuals have rich and varied personalhistories that influence their experiences in their lives inwidely differing ways. Some accept cultural restraintsgladly, others rebel against them, others are blessed with acreative spirit, and so on.
Mystical traditions characteristically involve disciplines aimed atloosening the hold of one’s conceptual scheme on subsequentexperience. Meditative techniques promote a pronounced inhibitionof ordinary cognitive processes — what Arthur Deikman (1980)labelled “deautomization.” This plausibly restricts the influenceof one’s cultural background on one’s mysticalexperiences, in turn making possible identical experiences acrossmystical traditions to the extent that our neurology is the same inrelevant respects.
Hard constructivists also fail to account well for widelydiffering mystical understandings of the same religious text. Forexample, the metaphysics of the Upanishads andBrahmaSutra is an absolute nondualism for Shankara (c.eighth century CE), a “qualified dualism” for Ramanuja (c.1055–1137), and a strict dualism for Madhva(1199–1278). (See Radhakrishnan 1968,introduction.) Likewise, the teaching of emptiness in theBuddhistHeart Sutra receives disparate unpacking indifferent streams of Buddhism. It is plausible to conclude thatdistinct mystical experiences were responsible, at least in part, forthese differences. If so, the experience control the mystics’understanding of their basic scriptures rather thanviceversa.
More generally, hard constructivists overemphasize the influenceof pre-mystical religious teaching on the mystic’s experience.Mystical experiences can cause a mystic to reinvent the meaning ofdoctrines. An example is the Jewish Kabbalistic transformation of thenotion ofmitzvah (“commandment”) to that of“joining” or “connection” with God. Startingwith “commandment,” the mystic ends up with“clinging” (devekut) to God.

8. Inherentists and Attributionists

“Inherentists” believe that there are experiences that areinherently religious or mystical. “Attributionists” believe that thereare no inherently religious or mystical experiences (see Proudfoot1985) — experiences are onlydeemed religious bythe subject or a group. Ann Taves contends that people orgroups have experiences of what afterward strikes themas “special.” Only then, depending on various factors, willthey attribute a religious or mystical meaning tothem (Taves 2009). Some neuropsychologicalresearch seems to support this position (Azari etal. 2001). Taves also rejects constructivism: constructivistssee religious or mystical experiences to be constituted from thevery start by cultural conditioning, but attributionistsdeny this in favor of a tiered or“block-building” approach from experiencing something“special” to a religious or mystical conclusion.

William Forgie (1984 and 1994) argues, as would anattributionist, that there could not be an “experience of God” ifwe understand “experience of God” to mean that it isphenomenologically given in the experience itself thatan experience is in fact of God. He argues that phenomenologicalcontent can consist only of general features and not featuresspecifically identifying God as the object of experience. He comparesthis to seeing one of two identical twins. Which one of the two youperceive cannot be a phenomenological given. Likewise, thatsomeone experiences precisely God and not something else cannotbe aphenomenological datum. Pike (1992, chap. 7) argues,against Forgie, that the individuation of an object can be a componentof the phenomenological content of an experience, drawing on examplesfrom sense-perception.

We can distinguish “inherently religious” from “inherentlymystical.” Today it is increasingly becoming apparent thatmystical experiences are real: there is evidence of distinctiveconfigurations of brain activity uniquely associated with mysticalexperiences (e.g., Newberg, d’Aquili, and Rause2001, 143; Yaden et al. 2017, 60). However, by“real,” neuroscientists mean only that mystical experiencesinvolve distinct neurological events and are not merely ordinaryexperiences interpreted as mystical or products of the imagination,not that they are necessarily cognitive. If unique patterns ofbrain activity do underlie different mystical experiences,then it may be that there are some experiences that are inherentlymystical even though their significance variesbetween different religious and nonreligious experiencers andthus these experiences are not inherentlyreligious.

9. Epistemology

William James asked: “Do mystical states establish the truthof those theological affections in which the saintly life has itsroots?” (1958, 415). This question can be divided into two: (Q1)Is a mystic warranted in thinking that his or her experiences areveridical or have evidential value? A mystical experience may bepsychologically compelling for the person who had it, but is it alsocognitively authoritative? And (Q2), are those who have notundergone any mystical experience, upon examining the evidencepresented by mystics, warranted in thinking them veridical or endowedwith evidential value? The major philosophical reply in theaffirmative to Q1 is called the “Doxastic Practice Approach.” Themajor defense of an affirmative reply to Q2 is called the“Argument from Experience.”

9.1 The Doxastic Practice Approach

William Alston has defended the beliefs thatpeople form from their mystical and numinous experiences,specifically of a theistic kind, based on their “doxasticpractice.” He defines a “doxastic practice” as consisting ofsocially established ways of forming and epistemically evaluatingbeliefs (the “output”) from a certain kind of content from variousinputs, such as cognitive and perceptual ones (Alston 1991, 100;also see Alston 2005, chap. 9–11). The practice is beholden toan “over-rider system” which is a background system of beliefsagainst which beliefs supported by the practice are checked forpossible over-riders. The practice of forming physical-object beliefsbased on sense-perception is an example of a doxastic practice;drawing deductive conclusions from premises is another. Alston (1993)argues that the justification of every doxastic practice is“epistemically circular” — i.e., its reliability cannot beestablished in any way independent of the practice itself. Thisincludes sense-perception practice. However, we cannot avoidengaging in doxastic practices. Therefore, Alston contends, it isa matter ofpractical rationality to engage in the doxasticpractices we do engage in providing there is no good reason to thinkthey areunreliable.

There are also doxastic practices consisting of forming beliefs aboutGod, God’s purposes for us, and the like, grounded on religiousand mystical experiences such as “God is now appearing tome.” The Christian doxastic practice has an over-ridersystem consisting of scriptures, Christian dogma, and guidelinesresulting from the past history of the mystical Christian doxasticpractice. It follows from Alston’s argument that it is rationalfor a person engaged in such a practice to take its beliefoutputs as true unless the practice is shown to be unreliable. Thus wehave an affirmative answer to question Q1.

Most objections to Alston are equally objections to the Argument fromExperience or come from general epistemological complaints.Objections that apply specifically to Alston include JonathanKvanvig’s (1994) faulting of Alston for a loose employment of“rationality.” He argues that no one meaning of that term can dothe work Alston does with it. Another objection is that Alston movesfrom “It is practically rational to engage in a Christian doxasticpractice” to “It is rational for me to believe the Christiandoxastic practice isreliable.” Others argue that there is aproblem with the construction of the over-rider system of theChristian mystical practice since the guidelines gleaned from thehistory of the practice, so it is argued, were compromised byandrocentric bias and outdated scientific beliefs. (See Section 10.)These detract from the practice’s epistemic legitimacy(Gellman 2011).

It is also a question whether the Christian doxastic practice approachis able to justify conversion experiences since in such experiencesthe subject is not yet Christian and cannot employ the Christianover-rider system when becoming convinced to accept the Christianpractice and its over-rider system.

9.2 The Argument from Experience

Various philosophers have defended the evidential value, to one degreeor another, of some religious and mystical experiences, principallywith regard to experiences of God (see Baillie 1939,Broad 1953, Davis 1989, Gellman 1997 and 2001a,Gutting 1982, Swinburne 1991 and 1996, Wainwright 1981,Yandell 1993). These philosophers have stressed the“perceptual” nature of experiences of God. This approach can besummarized as follows:

Experiences of God have a subject/object structure with aphenomenological content allegedly representing the object of theexperience. Subjects are also moved to make truth claims based on suchexperiences. Furthermore, there are mystical procedures for gettinginto position for a mystical experience of God (see Underhill 1911 [1945,90–94]), and others can take up a suitable mystical path to tryto check on the subject’s claims (see Bergson 1977, 210). In allthese ways, experiences of God are perceptual in nature.
Such experiences count as at least some evidence in favor oftheir own validity. That a person seems to experience some object issome reason to think he or she really does have experiential contactwith it. Thus, experiences of God count as at least some evidencein favor of their own validity.
Agreement between experiences of people in different places, times,and traditions enhances the evidence in favor of their validity(see Broad 1953). Hence, agreement about experiences of God indiverse circumstances enhances the evidence in their favor. (But seeSection 9.6.)
Further enhancement of the validity of a mystical experience can comefrom appropriate consequences in the life of the person who had theexperience, such as increased saintliness (see Wainwright 1981,83–88). William James proposed a pragmatic“fruit” test for determining true mystical doctrines (James1958, 368): if a mystical experience produces positive results inhow one leads one’s life, then the experience is authentic andthe way of life one follows is vindicated, and so the teachingsleading to the positive life are correct. In short, the“truth” of one’s beliefs are shown by one’slife as a whole. (But what is considered positive fruit in onemystical tradition may not be considered so in another.)

(1)–(4) yield initial evidence in favor of the validity of(some) experiences of God.

Kai-Man Kwan has developed this type of argument further by specifyingtheistic experience, in particular, as a “well-established typeof experience.” The tokens of such a type of experience occur tomany people and on repeated occasions, have a common ontology, and arecommunicable in a coherent conceptual framework. This strengthens anargument from experience for theistic experience (Kwan 2011,511).

Kwan (2011 and 2013) has also significantly expanded the Argument fromExperience in a way that avoids focusing only on experientialepisodes. He argues for what he calls a “holisticempiricism” that considers an array of dimensions of humanexperience: the noetic (consisting of epistemic seemings), thequalitative (the feel of what it is like to have theexperience), and the volitional (action, choice, deliberation,and the like). Kwan argues that when judging the credentials ofreligious experience we should take into account the followingexperiences, in addition to narrowly selected religious experiences:experiences of the natural world and of the self, existentialexperience, interpersonal experience, moral experience, aestheticexperience, and intellectual experience. Kwan argues that theintegration, in the appropriate way, of these types of experiencecoherently and fruitfully constitutes a defeasible justification forrelying on the product of religious belief. Kwan argues in this wayfor theistic belief in particular. A similar argument can be presentedfor judging narrowly construed mystical experience. The unit ofjustification of believing a proposition when having had a mysticalexperience would be the entire holistic complex of all of themystic’s experiences. Going beyond, but including, discretemystical episodes, the mystic is able to fashion a cumulative case formystical conclusions.

Kwan’s argument avoids the objection based on dissimilaritiesbetween mystical experiences and sense-experience. The unit ofjustification then encompasses far more than the mystical experienceitself. Kwan’s argument also neutralizes objections based onneuroscience against the validity of mystical experiences: belief inthe import of mystical experience will seek justification far beyondwhat can be possibly identified as a brain stateaccompanying a mystical experience.

Whether any experiences of God are veridical in the end will depend onthe strength of the initial evidential case, on other favorableevidence, and on the power of counter-considerations against validity.Defenders of the Argument from Experience differ over the strength ofthe initial evidential case and have defended the Argumentagainst counter-evidence to varying degrees.

9.3 Disanalogies to Sense-Experience

Several philosophers have argued against either the Doxastic PracticeApproach or the Argument from Experience, or both (see Bagger1999; Fales 1996a, 1996b, and 2001; Gale 1991,1994, and 1995; C.B. Martin1955; M. Martin 1990; Proudfoot 1985; Rowe 1982). Philosophershave disputed the Argument from Experience on the grounds of allegeddisanalogies between experiences of God and sense-perception. Twoissues must be examined: whether the disanalogies exist, and ifthey do exist, whether they are epistemologically significant.

9.3.1 Lack of Checkability

The analogy allegedly breaks down over the lack of appropriatecross-checking procedures for experiences of God. Withsense-perception, we can cross-check by employing inductive methods todetermine causally relevant antecedent conditions; we can“triangulate” an event by correlating it with othereffects of the same purported cause; and we can discover causalmechanisms connecting a cause to its effects. These are not availablefor checking on experiences of God. Evan Fales (2001 and 2010)argues that cross-checkability is an integral part of anysuccessful perceptual epistemic practice. Therefore, the perceptualepistemic practice in which mystical experiences of God are embeddedis severely defective. Moreover, Richard Gale (1991) argues thatin experiences of God there is missing agreement between perceivers aswell as missing the possibility of checking whether the perceiver wasin the “right” position and psychological andphysiological state for a veridical experience. For similar reasons,C.B. Martin (1955) concludes that claims to have experienced God are“very close” to subjective claims like “I seem tosee a piece of paper” rather than to objective claims like “Isee a piece of paper.”

William Rowe (1982) observes that God may choose to reveal himself toone person and not to another. Thus, unlike with sense-perception, thefailure of others to have an experience of God under conditionssimilar to those in which one person did, does not impugn the validityof the experience. Therefore, we have no way of determining when anexperience of God is delusory. If so, neither can we credit anexperience as authentic.

9.3.2 God’s Lack of Space-Time Coordinates

Some philosophers have argued that there could never be evidence forthinking a person had perceived God (Gale 1994 and1995; Byrne 2001). For there to be evidence that a personexperienced an object O, and did not merely have an“O-ish-impression,” it would have to be possible for thereto be evidence that O was the common object of different perceptions.In turn, this would be possible only if it were possible todistinguish perceptions of O specifically from possibleperceptions of other objects that might be perceptually similar to O.This latter requirement is possible only if O exists in both space andtime. Only space-time coordinates make it possible to distinguish Ofrom objects of similar appearance existing in other space-timecoordinates. God, however, does not exist in space and time.Therefore, there could never be evidence that a person had experiencedGod.

9.4 Evaluation of the Disanalogy Arguments

Although Alston defends the perceptual character of mysticalexperiences of God for his Doxastic Practice Approach, there is norestriction that the experiential input of a doxasticpractice must be perceptual in nature. Any cognitive input will do.Hence, disanalogies between experiences of God and sense-perception,even if great, would not be directly harmful to this approach(Alston 1994).

Regarding the bearing of the alleged disanalogies on the Argument fromExperience, the disanalogists take the evidential credentials ofsense-perception as paradigmatic for epistemology. They equateconfirming and disconfirming evidence only when evidence stronglyanalogous to the kind for sensory perception is available. However,the evidential requirement should be only “confirmingexperiential evidence,” be what it may. If God-sightings haveconfirming evidence, even if different from the kind available fordualistic sense-perception, they will then be evidentiallystrengthened. If God-sightings do not have much confirming empiricalevidence, be it what it may, they will remain unjustified for thatreason, and not because they lack cross-checks appropriate tosense-perception.

Perhaps the justification of physical-object claims should not beour evidential standard since our ordinary physical-objectbeliefs are far over-supported by confirming evidence. We haveextremely large constellations of confirming networks there.Hence, it does not follow that were mystical claims justified to alesser degree than that, or not by similar procedures, that they wouldbe unjustified at all.

A problem with the argument from God’s lack of dimensionality isthat the practice of identifying physical objects proceeds by way ofan interplay between qualitative features and relative positions todetermine both location and identity. The judgments we make reflect aholistic practice of making identifications of place and identitytogether. There is no obvious reason why the identification of Godcannot take place within its own holistic practice, with its owncriteria of identification, not beholden to the holistic practiceinvolved in identifying physical objects. (See Gellman 2001a,chap. 3.)

9.5 The Argument from Experience as Dependent on the Doxastic Practice Approach

In the end, the Argument from Experience might have to yield to theDoxastic Practice Approach (Gellman 2010). One reason is that it isdoubtful if many experiencers of God make truth claims solely on thebasis of their mystical experiences, rather than within a doxasticpractice. For example, Teresa of Avila said that one can tell if anexperience comes from God or from the Devil by its fruits in actionsand personality, the vividness of the memory of the experience,conformity to Christian scripture, and confirmation by churchsuperiors. Mystical experiences as such were given no specialauthority. Classical mystics in general did not take their mysticalexperiences as verifying the doctrines of their basic scriptures butvice versa— the fundamental scriptures vouchedfor the validity of genuine mystical experiences.

In addition, if identification of God takes place ina holistic practice (see Sections 9.2, 9.4), then quite plausiblythis is a social practice in which one judges one’s mysticalexperiences to beof God.

Finally, it is an open question to what extent alleged God-experiencesare sufficiently detailed to provide grounds to the subject that theyareof God. Hence, a subject’s judgment that aparticular encounter is with God might well be a matter ofassimilating the event into a larger social practice.

9.6 The Problem of Religious Diversity

Essentialists and others often rely on the alleged uniformity ofclaims of mystics around the world. In William James’s words,there is an alleged “eternal unanimity” among mystics(James 1958, 321). But as he also realized, “if we take thelarger mass as seriously as religious mysticism has historically takenitself, we find that the supposed unanimity largelydisappears” (James 1958, 325). Constructivists in particularemphasize the diversity of mystical experiences, indeed forthem each mystical experience is utterly unique.

Diversity of claims, and especially any genuinely conflicting claims,would impact the Argument from Experience for the epistemic value ofmystical experiences. In the history of religions, we find innumerablegods, with different characteristics. Shall we say they all exist? Canbelief in all of them be rational? In addition, there are experiencesof non-personal ultimate realities, such as the Brahman of AdvaitaVedanta. Brahman cannot be an ultimate reality if God is(Hick 1984, 234–235) since it is devoid of all personalfeatures. Furthermore, different theistic faiths claim experience ofthe one and only God, ostensibly justifying beliefs that are incontradiction with one another (see Flew 1966, 126). If theisticmystical experiences lead to such contradictory results,they cannot provide evidence in favor of their validityas experiences of God.

Conflicting mystical claims thus lead to the issue of thereliability of mystical experiences as a source ofknowledge: whatever the correct understanding of each type of mysticalexperience is, many (perhaps most) mystics havemisunderstood their own experiences. Mystical experiences may putmystics in contact with a previously unrealized reality, butmystics’ diverse and conflicting understandings of that realitydamaged their claim to have gained actual knowledge. Once mystics areaware of competing claims, whether the experiences can beauthoritative even for the experiencers themselves, as James believed(James 1958, 324, 414), becomes an issue.

In reply, many discount experiences of polytheistic gods straight awaybecause of their being embedded in settings we today take to bebizarre, and because of the relative paucity of reports of actualexperiences of such beings. Regarding clashing experiences withintheistic settings, Richard Swinburne (1991, 266) has proposed anascent to generality as a harmonizing mechanism. He believes thatconflicting descriptions of the objects of religious experience pose achallenge only to detailed doctrinal claims, not to general claims ofhaving experienced a supernal being.

Philosophers and theologians may rank different types of mysticalexperiences according to their cognitive importance. For example,Michael Stoeber ranks theistic experiences occurring after a mysticalexperience empty of all differentiated content to be higher inimportance, calling them “theo-monistic” experiences (Stoeber1994). But Advaitins would discount all theisticexperiences as instances in which the mind is not yet clear ofillusory content.

John Hick (1984, chap. 14) has proposed a pluralistichypothesis to deal with the problem. According to thishypothesis, the great world faiths embody different perceptions andconceptions of one reality that Hick christens “the Real.” TheReal itself is indescribable and is never experienceddirectly but has “masks” or “faces” that depend onhow a particular culture or religion thinks of the Real that areexperienced. The Real itself is, therefore, neither personal nornonpersonal, these categories being imposed upon the Real by differentcultural contexts. Hence, the typical experiences of the major faithsare to be taken as validly of the Real through mediation by thelocal face of the Real.

Hick has been criticized for infidelity to the world’s religioustraditions (d’Costa 1987). However, Hick is providinga second-order philosophicaltheory about the nature ofreligions rather than an exposition of religions themselves thatmembers necessarily would endorse.

Some propose harmonizing some conflicting experiences by reference toGod’s “inexhaustible fullness” (Gellman 1997, chap.4). In at least some mystical experiences of God, a subjectexperiences what is presented as proceeding from an intimation ofinfinite plenitude. Given this feature, a claim to experience apersonal ultimate (God) can be squared with an experience of anonpersonal ultimate (e.g., the “unspeakable” Dao): the same onereality can be experienced in its personal attributes or in itsnonpersonal attributes from out of its inexhaustible plenitude— e.g., nontheists experience the sheer being of the realitywhile theists experience its personal nature.

Whether any of these solutions succeed, the body of experiential datais too large to simply scrap on the grounds of contradictoryclaims. We should endeavor to retain as much of the conflicting dataas possible by seeking some means of conciliation.

But it must be noted that religious theorists are just as willingas naturalists to tell mystics that they are mistaken about thecontent of their experiences. For example, Caroline Franks Davis hasto twist the Advaitins’ and Buddhists’ accounts to showthat mystical experiences really support a “broad theism” —i.e., Shankara was really experiencing God although he explicitlyargued that the nonpersonal and non-loving Brahman alone is real, andthe Buddha was totally unaware that he was experiencing a god. Sheclaims that all mystics, despite what they say, really experience “aloving presence . . . with whom individuals can have a personalrelationship” (Franks Davis 1989, 191). That is just whatone would expect someone raised a Christian to see as the true“common core” of all mystical experiences. But the sameprocess, mutatis mutandis, would be available for nontheistsraised in other traditions for their claims.

As things stand, the diversity problem raises the issue of how much isgiven in mystical experiences and how much is a matter ofinterpretation based on a tradition’s beliefs. This limits how muchactual knowledge mystics can claim.

9.7 Scientific Studies: Meditation and Psychedelics

Various psychological explanations of mystical experiences, both theirnature and their causes, have been offered. These includepathological conditions such as hyper-suggestibility, severedeprivation, severe sexual frustration, intense fear of death,infantile regression, pronounced maladjustment, and mental illness, aswell as non-pathological conditions, including the inordinateinfluence of a religious mental “set” (seeWulff 2000). In addition, some have advanced a sociologicalexplanation for some mysticism in terms of the socio-politicalpower available to an accomplished mystic (Fales 1996aand 1996b).

In the 1990’s, interest revived in studying meditation and psychedelicdrugs to see what they may reveal about how the brain works. Differentmeditative techniques (especially mindfulness meditations) are nowbeing studied through neuroimaging to gain data on the brain activityoccurring during these experiences and practices. (For an overview,see Schjoedt 2009.) Losing a sense of a phenomenal “self”necessarily alters our ordinary ego-driven state of consciousness.(See Millière et al. 2018 for an overview on different sensesof “loss of self” and their phenomenologicaldifferences.) Thus, the phenomenology of mysticalexperiences also has become an important subject for thestudy of consciousness. As noted in Section 8, neuroscientists arefinding unique patterns of brain activity during mysticalexperiences. Different neurophysiological effects and uniquepatterns of brain activity have also been detected in mindfulnesspractices and in introvertive concentration practices (Hood 1997and 2001; Dunn, Hartigan, and Mikulas 1999). Theneurological effects of concentration differ from thoseof mindfulness meditation (Valentine and Sweet 1999). Thissuggests as strongly as neuroscience can that themystical experiences enabled by meditation differ from moreordinary experiences and our normal waking state of consciousness andthat the effects of different types of meditations aredistinguishable. Possible neural correlates of different mysticalfeatures — a loss of a sense of self, a sense of connectednessto others, a feeling of certainty, feeling the experience has greatsignificance, loss of a sense of time — have been identified.For example, a loss of a sense of self is correlated to the decreaseof activity in the brain connected to a sense of self and a sense ofseparation from the world.

The study of the mystical experiences enabled by psychedelics (inparticular, psilocybin and LSD) is now also a major topic (Barlett andGriffiths 2018). Psychedelics are reported to occasion some of themost spiritually significant experiences in the life of theparticipants (Doblin 1991). There is also the clinical study ofpsychedelics in therapy for such conditions as depressionand addiction that are resistant to more conventional forms oftherapy. An important issue is whether the positive effects of apsychedelic drug on a patient’s well-being are the result solely ofthe chemical effect of the drug on the brain or whether themystical experiences enabled by the drugs are also a necessary part ofthe treatment.

This research leads to philosophical issues. Does brain activityalone cause these experiences, or does meditation or apsychedelic drug merely disrupt our normal state ofconsciousness thereby enabling new experiences to arise thatare not caused by brain activity itself? If the former, can thealleged cognitive content of mystical experiences be discountedbecause mystical experiences are reduced to “merely brain events”? Ifthe latter, does the same brain state underlie differentmeditation and psychedelic-enabled experiences? If so, thesituation is the opposite of the “multiple realization” problem inphilosophy of mind: multiple experiences are connected to the samebrain state. So too, the question remains of whetherneuroscientists are actually studying mystical experiences at all bystudying neural activity correlated with them. (See Jones 2018, 2016,chap. 9.) Concerning psychedelics, the mostimportant question is whether the mystical experiencesenabled by psychedelics are mere hallucinations that are no morecognitive than the LSD-induced distortions of perception.Another important question is whether the experiences enabled bythe drugs are the same as “natural” mystical experiencesor only pale copies. And does the fact that such experiences canbe touched off fairly consistently by drugs with the proper dosage anda conducive “set and setting” for the participantmean that the experiences are only products of the brain? Ordo the drugs only set up new conditions in the brainenabling new experiences to occur that are not caused by brainactivity? (See Smith 1964 and 2005; Letheby 2021;Jones 2019.)

9.8 A Critique of Naturalist Explanations

Bertrand Russell (1935, 188) once quipped that “We can make nodistinction between the man who eats little and sees heaven and theman who drinks much and sees snakes. Each is in an abnormal physicalcondition, and therefore has abnormal perceptions.” C.D. Broad (1935,164) wrote, to the contrary, “One might need to be slightly‘cracked’ in order to have some peep-holes into thesuper-sensible world.” Thus, the issue is engaged whether we canexplain away religious and mystical experiences by reference tonatural causes. Can science “explain away” mysticalexperiences by showing that “It’s all in the head”?

If all mystics had a demonstrable pathology or brain-defect, anaturalist explanation would carry great weight. However, that isnot the case. Naturalist proposals often exaggerate the scope andinfluence of the cited factors, sometimes choosing to highlight whatis eye-catching at the expense of the more commonoccurrences.

For an example of the overreach and problem of simple reductiveexplanations, consider a popular pathological explanation: temporallobe epileptic seizures (e.g., Persinger 1987, 111).However, ecstatic experiences of well-being, self-transcendence, andcertainty from temporal lobe epileptic seizures are very rare (1% to2% of patients) (Devinsky and Lai 2008). That may besignificantly less common than in the general population. Nor are allmystical experiences “ecstatic” in the emotional sense —serenity and calm characterize many mystical experiences. Theepileptic experiences usually last only a few seconds out of a largerepisode and usually are not a matter of joy but fear and anxiety(Kelly and Grosso 2007, 531–534). If seizures were the cause,why the vast majority of patients do not have mystical experienceswould have to be explained. Moreover, visions and voices are morecommon than mystical experiences for these patients. Mysticalexperiences have a different phenomenological content, but studiesaligned with the temporolimbic model truncate and misrepresent the“felt” phenomenological features of mystical experiences (Bradford2013, 113).

Nor can we simply assume that mystics in the past must have had somepathology despite their lack of observable symptoms —a study of medieval Christian mystics and ascetics did not turnup evidence of any major forms of mental illness such as schizophreniaor manic-depressive disorder (Kroll and Bachrach 2005).Today mystical experiences have been correlated with healthyindices of personality and adjustment (Hood and Byrom 2010, Griffithset al. 2011). Mystical experiences also more often correlate withpositive changes in family life, reduced fear of death, better health,and a greater sense of purpose, although some patients do requiretherapeutic care, than do pathological experiences (Yaden et al.2017, 59). The loss of a sense of self outside of mystical experiencesis associated with maladaptive outcomes such as a sense ofdisconnection to other people and a loss of empathy (Yaden et al.2017, 59). The pathology model does not explain any of this. It alsomakes emotion, rather than cognition, the central feature of mysticalexperiences, and this does not jibe with the historical record(Bradford 2013).

In sum, these pathologies may be one possible trigger, but they arenot a total explanation. Secondly, at least some of the proposals areperfectly compatible with the validity of claims that mysticsexperience a transcendent reality. For example, a person’sreligious mental set can just as well be a condition for enjoying andbeing capable of recognizing an experience of God as it canbe a cause of delusion. However, there might benaturalist explanations that would make it implausible that Godwould appear in just certain ways.

9.8.1 Evaluation of Neuropsychological Explanations

In principle, neuroscience can give as complete an account of brainactivity during a mystical experience as it can for any consciousevent or state. But a neuropsychological theory can do no morethan relate what happens in the brain when a mystical experienceoccurs, and merely identifying the activity does not discreditmystical claims any more than a neurological account of perceptiondiscredits sense-experience as cognitive — all humanexperiences have some grounding in neural activity.Neurology cannot tell us that the ultimate cause of brain eventsis altogether internal to the organism. True, there may notbe “God-receptors” in the body, analogous to thosefor sensory perception, and this might reinforce a suspicion thatit’s all in the head. However, such receptors are neither to beexpected nor required with non-physical stimuli, as in mysticalexperiences. For example, God, Brahman, or the Dao would notexist at a physical distance from the brain. Thus, God could actdirectly upon the brain to bring about the relevant processes for asubject to perceive God or otherwise use a natural medium(see Wainwright 1981, chap. 2). In sum, simply identifying andexplaining what is occurring in the brain while a mystical experienceis occurring is neutral to whether that is all there is to producingthe experience.

Plausible natural explanations would tend to discredit religiousexplanations of mystical experiences only if people with pathologiesor negative psychological conditions had mystical experiences.But as noted in the last section, that is not thecase. Nevertheless, plausible natural explanations doweaken the religious case by offering areasonablealternative — there is competition for the best explanationwhere before there was none.

9.8.2 The Claimed Superiority of Naturalist Explanation

Some philosophers have argued that because the “moderninquirer” assumes everything is ultimately explicable innaturalist terms, we should in principle reject any supernaturalexplanation of mystical experience (see Bagger 1999). InvokingGod to explain mystical experiences is like invoking miracles toexplain natural phenomena. We should match our elimination of miraclesfrom our explanatory vocabulary with an elimination of a supernaturalexplanation of mystical experiences of God. Hence, we do not have towait until we discover a live alternative explanation to the theisticexplanation of mystical experiences of God. We should resist anytheistic explanation in the name of our epistemic standards.

This argument raises the important question of the relationshipbetween theistic explanation and a naturalist program ofexplanation. Arguments have been presented for the compatibility ofreligion and natural science (e.g., Swinburne 1989 and Plantinga2011). Of course, a person for whom supernatural explanationsare not a live option would have reason to reject the Argumentfrom Experience and refuse to engage in a doxastic practice ofidentifying valid God-experiences. However, most defenders of theArgument from Experience advance it as at best a defensible line ofreasoning rather than as a proof of valid experiences of God thatshould convince anyone, and the Doxastic Practice Approach is notmeant to convince everybody to participate in a theistic doxasticpractice (see Gellman 2001b). The bar is lowered from advancingassent-compellingproofs to establishing merely therationality of participation in a doxastic practice thatwould justify belief.

10. Gender and the Study of Mysticism

Some feminist philosophers have criticized what they perceive as theandrocentric bias of male philosophers of mysticism. There are threemain objections:

Contemporary male philosophers treat mysticism as centeredon private psychological episodes of a solitary person. Theybelieve these private experiences reveal the meaning and value ofmysticism (Jantzen 1994 and 1995; also see Turner 1996). Instead,philosophers should be studying the socio-cultural dimensions ofmysticism, including its patriarchal failings. Sarah Coakley (2009)maintains that the focus of mysticism should be on the ongoingcontemplative practice and all that entails.
At times. scholars of mysticism have systematically ignored ormarginalized much of women’s mysticism. Closer attention towomen would reveal the androcentric bias in mysticalstudies (Jantzen 1995). Nancy Caciola (2000 and 2003)argues that the criteria the Christian church developed for authenticmystical experiences curtailed the power of women in the church. Forexample, on the basis of theories about female physiology, women weredeemed more vulnerable to devil possession than men and so theirexperiences were more suspect. Coakley (2009) also notes that whilesome analytic philosophers attend to the mysticism of Teresa of Avila,they do not do justice to the full content of her mystical writings,picking out experiences only.
The traditional male construction of God has determined the way malephilosophers think of theistic experiences. Thus, theistic experiencesare conditioned from the outset by patriarchal conceptualizationsand values, and by sex-role differentiation in the practice ofreligion (Raphael 1994).

Under this view, men typically understand theisticexperience as a human subject encountering a being wholly distinct,distant, and overpowering. A paradigm of this approach is the numinousexperience of a “wholly other” reality that is unfathomableand overpowering, engendering a sense of dread and fascination inwhich the mystic is “submerged and overwhelmed” by his ownnothingness (Otto 1957). Otto claims that this is thefoundational experience of religion. This approach, it is claimed, ismediated by the androcentrism of Otto’s worldview, entrapped inissues of domination, atomicity, and submission. Some feministthinkers deny the dichotomy between the holy and the creaturely thatmakes Otto’s analysis possible(Daly 1973, Goldenberg 1979). Feminist theologiansstress the immanent nature of the object of theistic experiences, andbring to prominence women’s experience of the holy in theirfleshly embodiment, denigrated by androcentric attitudes.

Feminists have also supported the constructivist position in thename of anti-essentialism and diversity of experience(Lanzetta 2005, chap. 1). Thinking that there is acommon unconstructed essence to mystical experience has workedagainst the recognition of women’s experiences as properlymystical.

The feminist critique poses a valuable corrective to unperceivedandrocentric biases in mysticism and mystical studies. This critiqueshould help neutralize the conception of mysticism and mysticalexperience as completely private, introduced to philosophy largely byWilliam James. Objection (2) has begun to produce scholarshipdedicated to women’s mysticism and its significance (e.g.,Hurcombe 1987, Brunn and Epiney-Burgard 1989,Beer 1993, Borchert 1994, Hollywood 2002). Severalcollections on women mystics have helped change the over-emphasis onmale mystics (in particular, Furlong 2013). Regarding (3):the rich variegation of religious and mystical experienceamong men throughout history must also be considered. Thisincludes men’s experiences of God’s immanent closeness aswell as mystical “union” with God, unlike Otto’s dualisticnuminous experiences.

The principal impact of the feminist critique on philosophy ofmysticism would be to give more reasons to expand the consideration ofmysticism to more than episodic experiences.

11. Mysticism and Morality

Some scholars maintain that there is an intrinsic connection betweenmysticism and moral behavior, or even that mystical experiences arethe source and only justification of a moral concern for others. Thisis because mystical experiences blur or erase thedistinction between the subject and others (Stace 1960) and soremove the barrier to moral motivation, or because one’s sense ofa “self” disappears entirely. Several scholars have argued, to thecontrary, that at least some mystical doctrines areincompatible with morality (Danto 1987, Kripal 2002). Monisticmystical metaphysics eliminates all distinctions between one personand others — all is one — and so there is no recognitionof real persons distinct from oneself toward whom one can exercise amoral concern. Hence, monistic mysticism precludes morality. Moralitymust be between “independently real persons” (Wainwright1983, 211–212). David Loy (2002) argues that even if monisticmorality is not incompatible with morality, it fails to reveal thebest way to help people with compassion. Others argue that moralitycan get off the ground with the ability to conceptualize “thewelfare of others” without the need to recognize others asontologically distinct beings (Zelinski 2007).

Others maintain that there is no intrinsic connection between mysticalexperience and moral behavior: one can empty oneself of allself-centeredness and self-interest without necessarily adopting aconcern for others. Enlightened mystics may no longer beself-centered, but they can be either moral or indifferent to others(Jones 2016, chap. 9). We need look no further than to Christiancomplaints about mystical antinomian excesses of the “FreeSpirits,” the Mahayana Buddhist rejection of the allegedselfishness of the Arhat ideal in Theravada Buddhism, or the moralscandals of some Eastern mysticism in the West today (Kripal 2002). Ifmoral behavior is part of a mystical way of life, it does not issuefrom mystical experiences but from a mystic’s culturalbackground and training. The normative behavioral standards of thegroup are not derivable from mystical experiences. Mysticalexperiences, so the claim goes, in themselves are nonmoral. Thus,much will depend on the moral or nonmoral orientation of the mysticalpractices meant to lead to mystical experiences. The resultingbehavior will be a consequence of both the practices undertaken toreach mystical experience and the resulting detachment of the selflessmystical state (Jones 2004).

12. Secular Mysticism

The new scientific interest in meditation (especially mindfulness),the new cultural interest in meditating for limited psychological orphysiological benefits rather than transforming one’s entirecharacter, and the utilization of psychedelics in psychotherapy havegiven rise today to a new phenomenon — “secular mysticism.” Aweand wonder at nature is prominent, but this mysticism is not a matterof “nature mysticism” or of aesthetic experiences as possibletriggers of mystical experiences. Rather, the interest is in thepsycho-physiological effects of meditation and psychedelics, withmystical experiences understood within a naturalist framework.Neuroscience appears to validate the positive effects of meditationand psychedelics on our well-being. Secular forms of meditation forlimited benefits, such as Jon Kabat-Zinn’smindfulness-based stress reduction program. Secularists can disconnecttraditional practices from a mystical tradition (e.g.,Batchelor’s “secular Buddhism” [2015]) or focus only onlimited practices (e.g., Harris 2014, Letheby 2017).

Mysticism becomes “naturalized.” It is reduced from a full way of lifeto eliciting mystical experiences for limited benefits or as mererecreation. Mystical experiences break the sense of a narrow“self’” and makes one feel connected to others and the rest ofthe world, and secularists see this in terms of the natural worldalone. This naturalist spirituality appears more tied to mysticalexperiences than other psychedelic experiences (Letheby 2021, 200).Patients often attach great spiritual importance to mysticalexperiences even if their metaphysics remains naturalist (seeGriffiths 2011). Mystical experiences often touch off awe and wonderat the universe and being alive and also an interest in the “bigquestions” of philosophy and science even if the experiencesthemselves are not taken to be cognitive. That mysticalexperiences may involve transcendent realities or may give knowledgeof reality is either denied in favor of a naturalist metaphysics,or the issue is simply ignored. In fact, while mystical experiencesare normally seen in terms of transcendent realities, theseexperiences may lead those inclined toward naturalism to becomingconvinced that there is no god or life after death and to abandoningreligion entirely (Newberg and Waldman 2016, 60, 67–81).

Secular mysticism raises three central philosophical questions. First,it impacts the epistemological question of whether mysticalexperiences give any insight into reality or other knowledge. If theexperiences do not necessarily lead to cognitive claims, we have toask whether mystics’ knowledge-claims come only from theirtradition and ask what role mystical experiences actually play. Theissue of whether mystical experiences have any epistemic orontological implications becomes clearer. Second, it highlightsthe issue of the role of cultural interpretation in understandingmystical experiences and the constructivist claim that culturalinfluences penetrate some or all mystical experiences. Third, can theeffect of mystical experiences lead to a meaningful or purposeful lifewithout reference to transcendent realities?

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