Karl Marx (1818–1883) is often treated as a revolutionary, anactivist rather than a philosopher, whose works inspired thefoundation of many communist regimes in the twentieth century. It iscertainly hard to find many thinkers who can be said to have hadcomparable influence in the creation of the modern world. However,Marx was trained as a philosopher, and although often portrayed asmoving away from philosophy in his mid-twenties—perhaps towardshistory and the social sciences—there are many points of contactwith modern philosophical debates throughout his writings.

The themes picked out here include Marx’s philosophicalanthropology, his theory of history, his economic analysis, hiscritical engagement with contemporary capitalist society (raisingissues about morality, ideology, and politics), and his prediction ofa communist future.

Marx’s early writings are dominated by an understanding ofalienation, a distinct type of social ill whose diagnosis looks torest on a controversial account of human nature and its flourishing.He subsequently developed an influential theory of history—oftencalled historical materialism—centred around the idea that formsof society rise and fall as they further and then impede thedevelopment of human productive power. Marx increasingly becamepreoccupied with an attempt to understand the contemporary capitalistmode of production, as driven by a remorseless pursuit of profit,whose origins are found in the extraction of surplus value from theexploited proletariat. The precise role of morality and moralcriticism in Marx’s critique of contemporary capitalist societyis much discussed, and there is no settled scholarly consensus onthese issues. His understanding of morality may be related to hisaccount of ideology, and his reflection on the extent to which certainwidely-shared misunderstandings might help explain the stability ofclass-divided societies. In the context of his radical journalism,Marx also developed his controversial account of the character androle of the modern state, and more generally of the relation betweenpolitical and economic life. Marx sees the historical process asproceeding through a series of modes of production, characterised by(more or less explicit) class struggle, and driving humankind towardscommunism. However, Marx is famously reluctant to say much about thedetailed arrangements of the communist alternative that he sought tobring into being, arguing that it would arise through historicalprocesses, and was not the realisation of a pre-determined plan orblueprint.

• 1. Life and Writings
  • 1.1 Early Years
  • 1.2 Paris
  • 1.3 Brussels
  • 1.4 London
• 2. Alienation and Human Flourishing
  • 2.1 The Basic Idea
  • 2.2 Religion and Work
  • 2.3 Alienation and Capitalism
  • 2.4 Political Emancipation
  • 2.5 Remaining Questions
• 3. Theory of History
  • 3.1 Sources
  • 3.2 Early Formulations
  • 3.3 1859 Preface
  • 3.4 Functional Explanation
  • 3.5 Rationality
  • 3.6 Alternative Interpretations
• 4. Economics
  • 4.1 ReadingCapital
  • 4.2 Labour Theory of Value
  • 4.3 Exploitation
• 5. Morality
  • 5.1 Unpacking Issues
  • 5.2 The “Injustice” of Capitalism
  • 5.3 Communism and “Justice”
• 6. Ideology
  • 6.1 A Critical Account
  • 6.2 Ideology and Stability
  • 6.3 Characteristics
• 7. State and Politics
  • 7.1 The State in Capitalist Society
  • 7.2. The Fate of the State in Communist Society
• 8. Utopianism
  • 8.1 Utopian Socialism
  • 8.2 Marx’s Utopophobia
• 9. Marx’s Legacy
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Writings

1.1 Early Years

Karl Marx was born in 1818, one of nine children. The family lived inthe Rhineland region of Prussia, previously under French rule. Both ofhis parents came from Jewish families with distinguished rabbinicallineages. Marx’s father was a lawyer who converted toChristianity when it became necessary for him to do so if he was tocontinue his legal career.

Following an unexceptional school career, Marx studied law andphilosophy at the universities of Bonn and Berlin. His doctoral thesiswas in ancient philosophy, comparing the philosophies of nature ofDemocritus (c.460–370 BCE) and Epicurus (341–270 BCE).From early 1842, he embarked on a career as a radical journalist,contributing to, and then editing, theRheinische Zeitung,until the paper was closed by the Prussian authorities in April1843.

Marx married Jenny von Westphalen (1814–1881), his childhoodsweetheart, in June 1843. They would spend their lives together andhave seven children, of whom just three daughters—Jenny(1844–1883), Laura (1845–1911), and Eleanor(1855–1898)—survived to adulthood. Marx is also widelythought to have fathered a child—Frederick Demuth(1851–1929)—with Helene Demuth (1820–1890),housekeeper and friend of the Marx family.

Marx’s adult life combined independent scholarship, politicalactivity, and financial insecurity, in fluctuating proportions.Political conditions were such, that, in order to associate and writeas he wished, he had to live outside of Germany for most of this time.Marx spent three successive periods of exile in the capital cities ofFrance, Belgium, and England.

1.2 Paris

Between late 1843 and early 1845, Marx lived in Paris, a cosmopolitancity full of émigrés and radical artisans. He wassubsequently expelled by the French government following Prussianpressure. In his last months in Germany and during this Paris exile,Marx produced a series of “early writings”, many notintended for publication, which significantly altered interpretationsof his thought when they were published collectively in the twentiethcentury. Papers that actually saw publication during this periodinclude: “On the Jewish Question” (1843) in which Marxdefends Jewish Emancipation against Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), butalso emphasises the limitations of “political” as against“human” emancipation; and the “Critique ofHegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction” (1844) whichcontains a critical account of religion, together with some prescientremarks about the emancipatory potential of the proletariat. The mostsignificant works that Marx wrote for self-clarification rather thanpublication in his Paris years are the so-called “1844Manuscripts” (1844) which provide a suggestive account ofalienation, especially of alienation in work; and the “Theses onFeuerbach” (1845), a set of epigrammatic but rich remarksincluding reflections on the nature of philosophy.

1.3 Brussels

Between early 1845 and early 1848, Marx lived in Brussels, the capitalof a rapidly industrialising Belgium. A condition of his residency wasto refrain from publishing on contemporary politics, and he waseventually expelled after political demonstrations involving foreignnationals took place. In Brussels, Marx publishedThe HolyFamily (1845), which includes contributions from his new friendand close collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), continuingthe attack on Bruno Bauer and his followers. Marx also worked, withEngels, on a series of manuscripts now usually known asThe GermanIdeology (1845–46), a substantial section of whichcriticises the work of Max Stirner (1806–1856). Marx also wroteand publishedThe Poverty of Philosophy (1847) whichdisparages the social theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon(1809–1865). All these publications characteristically show Marxdeveloping and promoting his own views through fierce critical attackson contemporaries, often better-known and more established thanhimself.

Marx was politically active throughout his adult life, although theevents of 1848—during which time he returned to Paris andCologne—inspired the first of two periods of especially intenseactivity. Two important texts here areThe CommunistManifesto (1848) which Marx and Engels published just before theFebruary Revolution, and, following his move to London,The ClassStruggles in France (1850) in which Marx examined the subsequentfailure of 1848 in France. Between these two dates, Marx commented on,and intervened in, the revolution in Germany through theNeueRheinische Zeitung (1848–49), the paper he helped toestablish and edit in Cologne.

1.4 London

For well over half of his adult life—from late 1849 until hisdeath in 1883—Marx lived in London, a city providing a securehaven for political exiles and a superb vantage point from which tostudy the world’s most advanced capitalist economy. This thirdand longest exile was dominated by an intellectual and personalstruggle to complete his critique of political economy, but histheoretical output extended far beyond that project.

Marx’s initial attempt to make sense of Napoleon III’srise to power in contemporary France is contained inTheEighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). Between 1852 and1862 Marx also wrote well over three hundred articles for theNewYork Daily Tribune; sometimes unfairly disparaged as merelyincome-generating journalism, they frequently contain illuminatingattempts to explain contemporary European society and politics(including European interventions in India and China) to an Americanaudience (helpfully) presumed to know little about them.

The second of Marx’s two especially intense periods of politicalactivity—after the revolutions of 1848—centred on hisinvolvement in the International Working Men’s Associationbetween 1864 and 1874, and the events of the Paris Commune (1871), inparticular. The character and lessons of the Commune—theshort-lived, and violently suppressed, municipal rebellion thatcontrolled Paris for several months in the aftermath of theFranco-Prussian war—are discussed inThe Civil War inFrance (1871). Also politically important was Marx’s“Critique of the Gotha Programme” (1875), in which hecriticises the theoretical influence of Ferdinand Lassalle(1825–1864) on the German labour movement, and portrays thehigher stage of a future communist society as endorsing distributionaccording to “the needs principle”.

Marx’s critique of political economy remains controversial. Henever succeeded in fixing and realising the wider project that heenvisaged. Volume One ofCapital, published in 1867, was theonly significant part of the project published in his own lifetime,and even here he was unable to resist heavily reworking subsequenteditions (especially the French version of 1872–75). What we nowknow as Volume Two and Volume Three ofCapital were puttogether from Marx’s raw materials by Engels and published in1885 and 1894, respectively, and Marx’s own drafts were writtenbefore the publication of Volume One and barely touched by him in theremaining fifteen years of his life. An additional three supplementaryvolumes planned by Engels, and subsequently calledTheories ofSurplus Value (or, more colloquially, the “fourth volume ofCapital”) were assembled from remaining notes by KarlKautsky (1854–1938), and published between 1905 and 1910. (Thesection of the “new MEGA”—see below—concernedwithCapital-related texts contains fifteen thick volumes,and provides some sense of the extent and character of these latereditorial interventions.) In addition, the publication in 1953—aprevious two-volume edition (1939 and 1941) had only a highlyrestricted circulation—of the so-calledGrundrisse(written in 1857–58) was also important. Whether this text istreated as a freestanding work or as a preparatory step towardsCapital, it raises many questions about Marx’s method,his relation to G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), and the evolution ofMarx’s thought. In contrast, the work of political economy thatMarx did publish in this period—A Contribution to a Critiqueof Political Economy (1859)—was largely ignored by bothcontemporaries and later commentators, except for the, much reprintedand discussed, summary sketch of his theory of history that Marxoffered in the so-called “1859 Preface” to thatvolume.

Marx’s later years (after the Paris Commune) are the subject ofmuch interpretative disagreement. His inability to deliver the latervolumes ofCapital is often seen as emblematic of a wider andmore systematic intellectual failure (Stedman Jones 2016). However,others have stressed Marx’s continued intellectual creativity inthis period, as he variously rethought his views about: the core andperiphery of the international economic system; the scope of histheory of history; social anthropology; and the economic and politicalevolution of Russia (Shanin 1983; K. Anderson 2010).

After the death of his wife, in 1881, Marx’s life was dominatedby illness, and travel aimed at improving his health (convalescentdestinations including the Isle of Wight, Karlsbad, Jersey, andAlgiers). Marx died in March 1883, two months after the death of hiseldest daughter. His estate was valued at £250.

Engels’s wider role in the evolution of, and, more especiallythe reception and interpretation of, Marx’s work is muchdisputed. The truth here is complex, and Engels is not alwayswell-treated in the literature. Marx and Engels are sometimesportrayed as if they were a single entity, of one mind on all matters,whose individual views on any topic can be found simply by consultingthe other. Others present Engels as the distorter and manipulator ofMarx’s thought, responsible for any element of Marxian theorywith which the relevant commentator might disagree. Despite theirfamiliarity, neither caricature seems plausible or fair. Thebest-known jointly authored texts areThe HolyFamily, the “German Ideology” manuscripts, andThe Communist Manifesto, but there are nearly two hundredshorter items that they both contributed to (Draper 1985:2–19).

Many of Marx’s best-known writings remained unpublished beforehis death. The attempt to establish a reliable collected edition hasproved lengthy and fraught. The authoritativeMarx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, the so-called “newMEGA” (1975–), is still a work in progress, begununder Soviet auspices but since 1990 under the guidance of the“International Marx-Engels Stiftung” (IMES). In itscurrent form—much scaled-down from its originalambitions—the edition will contain some 114 volumes (well over ahalf of which are published at the time of writing). In addition tohis various published and unpublished works, it includes Marx’sjournalism, correspondence, drafts, and (some) notebooks. Texts arepublished in their original language (variously German, English, andFrench). For those needing to utilise English-language resources, thefifty volumeMarx Engels Collected Works (1975–2004)can be recommended. (References to Marx and Engels quotations here areto theseMECW volumes.) There are also several useful singlevolume selections of Marx and Engels writings in English (includingMarx 2000).

2. Alienation and Human Flourishing

2.1 The Basic Idea

Alienation is a concept especially, but not uniquely, associated withMarx’s work, and the intellectual tradition that he helpedfound. It identifies a distinct kind of social ill, involving aseparation between a subject and an object that properly belongtogether. The subject here is typically an individual or a group,while the object is usually an “entity” which variously isnot itself a subject, is another subject(s), or is the originalsubject (that is, the relation here can be reflexive). And therelation between the relevant subject and object is one of problematicseparation. Both elements of that characterisation are important. Notall social ills, of course, involve separations; for instance, beingoverly integrated into some object might be dysfunctional, but it isnot characteristic of alienation. Moreover, not all separations areproblematic, and accounts of alienation typically appeal to somebaseline unity or harmony that is frustrated or violated by theseparation in question.

Theories of alienation vary considerably, but frequently: first,identify a subset of these problematic separations as being ofparticular importance; second, include an account (sometimes implicit)of what makes the relevant separations problematic; and, third,propound some explanatory claims about the extent of, and prognosisfor, alienation, so understood.

2.2 Religion and Work

Marx’s ideas concerning alienation were greatly influenced bythe critical writings on religion of Ludwig Feuerbach(1804–1872), and especially hisThe Essence ofChristianity (1841). One key text in this respect is Marx’s“Contribution of Hegel’s Critique of Right:Introduction” (1843). This work is home to Marx’snotorious remark that religion is the “opium of thepeople,” a harmful, illusion-generating painkiller(MECW 3: 175). It is here that Marx sets out his account ofreligion in most detail.

While traditional Christian theology asserts that God created man inGod’s own image, Marx fully accepted Feuerbach’s inversionof this picture, proposing that human beings had invented God in theirown image; indeed a view that long pre-dated Feuerbach.Feuerbach’s distinctive contribution was to argue thatworshipping God diverted human beings from enjoying their own humanpowers. In their imagination humans raise their own powers to aninfinite level and project them on to an abstract object. Hencereligion is a form of alienation, for it separates human beings fromtheir “species essence.” Marx accepted much ofFeuerbach’s account but argues that Feuerbach failed tounderstand why people fall into religious alienation, and so is unableto explain how it can be transcended. Feuerbach’s view appearsto be that belief in religion is purely an intellectual error and canbe corrected by persuasion. Marx’s explanation is that religionis a response to alienation in material life, and therefore cannot beremoved until human material life is emancipated, at which pointreligion will wither away.

Precisely what it is about material life that creates religion is notset out with complete clarity. However, it seems that at least twoaspects of alienation are responsible. One is alienated labour, whichwill be explored shortly. A second is the need for human beings toassert their communal essence. Whether or not we explicitly recogniseit, human beings exist as a community, and what makes human lifepossible is our mutual dependence on the vast network of social andeconomic relations which engulf us all, even though this is rarelyacknowledged in our day-to-day life. Marx’s view appears to bethat we must, somehow or other, acknowledge our communal existence inour institutions. At first it is “deviously acknowledged”by religion, which creates a false idea of a community in which we areall equal in the eyes of God. After the post-Reformation fragmentationof religion, where religion is no longer able to play the role even ofa fake community of equals, the modern state fills this need byoffering us the illusion of a community of citizens, all equal in theeyes of the law. Interestingly, the political or liberal state, whichis needed to manage the politics of religious diversity, takes on therole offered by religion in earlier times of providing a form ofillusory community. But the political state and religion will both betranscended when a genuine community of social and economic equals iscreated.

Although Marx was greatly inspired by thinking about religiousalienation, much more of his attention was devoted to exploringalienation in work. In a much-discussed passage from the1844Manuscripts, Marx identifies four dimensions of alienated labourin contemporary capitalist society (MECW 3: 270–282).First, immediate producers are separated from the product of theirlabour; they create a product that they neither own nor control,indeed, which comes to dominate them. (Note that this idea of“fetishism”—where human creations escape ourcontrol, achieve the appearance of independence, and come to oppressus—is not to be equated with alienation as such, but is ratherone form that it can take.) Second, immediate producers are separatedfrom their productive activity; in particular, they are forced to workin ways which are mentally and/or physically debilitating. Third,immediate producers are separated from other individuals; contemporaryeconomic relations socialise individuals to view others as merelymeans to their own particular ends. Fourth, and finally, immediateproducers are separated from their own human nature; for instance, thehuman capacities for community and for free, conscious, and creative,work, are both frustrated by contemporary capitalist relations.

Note that these claims about alienation are distinct from other,perhaps more familiar, complaints about work in capitalist society.For instance, alienated labour, as understood here, couldbe—even if it is often not—highly remunerated, limited induration, and relatively secure.

Marx holds that work has the potential to be something creative andfulfilling. He consequently rejects the view of work as a necessaryevil, denying that the negative character of work is part of our fate,a universal fact about the human condition that no amount of socialchange could remedy. Indeed, productive activity, on Marx’saccount, is a central element in what it is to be a human being, andself-realisation through work is a vital component of humanflourishing. That he thinks that work—in a different form ofsociety—could be creative and fulfilling, perhaps explains theintensity and scale of Marx’s condemnation of contemporaryeconomic arrangements and their transformation of workers intodeformed and “dehumanised” beings (MECW 3:284).

It was suggested above that alienation consists of dysfunctionalseparations—separations between entities that properly belongtogether—and that theories of alienation typically presupposesome baseline condition whose frustration or violation by the relevantseparation identifies the latter as dysfunctional. For Marx, thatbaseline seems to be provided by an account of human flourishing,which he conceptualises in terms of self-realisation (understood hereas the development and deployment of our essential human capacities).Labour in capitalism, we can say, is alienated because it embodiesseparations preventing the self-realisation of producers; because itis organised in a way that frustrates the human need for free,conscious, and creative work.

So understood, and returning to the four separations said tocharacterise alienated labour, we can see that it is the implicitclaim about human nature (the fourth separation) which identifies theother three separations as dysfunctional. If one subscribed to thesame formal model of alienation and self-realisation, but held adifferent account of the substance of human nature, very differentclaims about work in capitalist society might result. Imagine atheorist who held that human beings were solitary, egoistic creatures,by nature. That theorist could accept that work in capitalist societyencouraged isolation and selfishness, but deny that such results werealienating, because those results would not frustrate their baselineaccount of what it is to be a human being (indeed, they would ratherfacilitate those characteristics).

2.3 Alienation and Capitalism

Marx seems to hold various views about the historical location andcomparative extent of alienation. These include: that some systematicforms of alienation—presumably including religiousalienation—existed in pre-capitalist societies; that systematicforms of alienation—including alienation in work—are onlya feature of class divided societies; that systematic forms ofalienation are greater in contemporary capitalist societies than inpre-capitalist societies; and that not all human societies are scarredby class division, in particular, that a future classless society(communism) will not contain systematic forms of alienation.

Marx maintains that alienation flows from capitalist social relations,and not from the kind of technological advances that capitalistsociety contains. His disapproval of capitalism is reserved for itssocial arrangements and not its material accomplishments. He hadlittle time for what is sometimes called the “romantic critiqueof capitalism”, which sees industry and technology as the realvillains, responsible for devastating the purportedly communitarianidyll of pre-capitalist relations. In contrast, Marx celebrates thebourgeoisie’s destruction of feudal relations, and seestechnological growth and human liberation as (at least, in time)progressing hand-in-hand. Industry and technology are understood aspart of the solution to, and not the source of, social problems.

There are many opportunities for scepticism here. In the presentcontext, many struggle to see how the kind of large-scale industrialproduction that would presumably characterise communistsociety—communism purportedly being more productive thancapitalism—would avoid alienation in work. Interesting responsesto such concerns have been put forward, but they have typically comefrom commentators rather than from Marx himself (Kandiyali 2018). Thisis a point at which Marx’s self-denying ordinance concerning thedetailed description of communist society prevents him from engagingdirectly with significant concerns about the direction of socialchange.

2.4 Political Emancipation

In the text “On The Jewish Question” (1843) Marx begins tomake clear the distance between himself and his radical liberalcolleagues among the Young Hegelians; in particular Bruno Bauer. Bauerhad recently written against Jewish emancipation, from an atheistperspective, arguing that the religion of both Jews and Christians wasa barrier to emancipation. In responding to Bauer, Marx makes one ofthe most enduring arguments from his early writings, by means ofintroducing a distinction between politicalemancipation—essentially the grant of liberal rights andliberties—and human emancipation. Marx’s reply to Bauer isthat political emancipation is perfectly compatible with the continuedexistence of religion, as the contemporary example of the UnitedStates demonstrates. However, pushing matters deeper, in an argumentreinvented by innumerable critics of liberalism, Marx argues that notonly is political emancipation insufficient to bring about humanemancipation, it is in some sense also a barrier. Liberal rights andideas of justice are premised on the idea that each of us needsprotection from other human beings who are a threat to our liberty andsecurity. Therefore, liberal rights are rights of separation, designedto protect us from such perceived threats. Freedom on such a view, isfreedom from interference. What this view overlooks is thepossibility—for Marx, the fact—that real freedom is to befound positively in our relations with other people. It is to be foundin human community, not in isolation. Accordingly, insisting on aregime of liberal rights encourages us to view each other in ways thatundermine the possibility of the real freedom we may find in humanemancipation. Now we should be clear that Marx does not opposepolitical emancipation, for he sees that liberalism is a greatimprovement on the systems of feudalism and religious prejudice anddiscrimination which existed in the Germany of his day. Nevertheless,such politically emancipated liberalism must be transcended on theroute to genuine human emancipation. Unfortunately, Marx never tellsus what human emancipation is, although it is clear that it is closelyrelated to the ideas of non-alienated labour and meaningfulcommunity.

2.5 Remaining Questions

Even with these elaborations, many additional questions remain aboutMarx’s account. Three concerns are briefly addressed here.

First, one might worry about the place of alienation in the evolutionof Marx’s thought. The once-popular suggestion that Marx onlywrote about alienation in his early writings—his published andunpublished works from the early 1840s—is not sustained by thetextual evidence. However, the theoretical role that the concept ofalienation plays in his writings might still be said to evolve. Forexample, it has been suggested that alienation in the early writingsis intended to play an “explanatory role”, whereas in hislater work it comes to have a more “descriptive ordiagnostic” function (Wood 1981 [2004: 7]).

A second concern is the role of human nature in the interpretation ofalienation offered here. In one exegetical variant of this worry, thesuggestion is that this account of alienation rests on a model ofuniversal human nature which Marx’s (later) understanding ofhistorical specificity and change prevents him from endorsing.However, there is much evidence against this purported later rejectionof human nature (see Geras 1983). Indeed, the “mature”Marx explicitly affirms that human nature has both constant andmutable elements; that human beings are characterised by universalqualities, constant across history and culture, and variablequalities, reflecting historical and cultural diversity (McMurtry1978: 19–53). One systematic, rather than exegetical, variant ofthe present worry suggests that we should not endorse accounts ofalienation which depend on “thick” and inevitablycontroversial accounts of human nature (Jaeggi 2016). Whatever view wetake of that claim about our endorsement, there seems little doubtabout the “thickness” of Marx’s own account of humanflourishing. To provide for the latter, a society must satisfy notonly basic needs (for sustenance, warmth and shelter, certain climaticconditions, physical exercise, basic hygiene, procreation and sexualactivity), but also less basic needs, both those that are not alwaysappreciated to be part of his account (for recreation, culture,intellectual stimulation, artistic expression, emotional satisfaction,and aesthetic pleasure), and those that Marx is more often associatedwith (for fulfilling work and meaningful community) (Leopold 2007:227–245).

Third, we may ask about Marx’s attitude towards the distinctionsometimes made between subjective and objective alienation. These twoforms of alienation can be exemplified separately or conjointly in thelives of particular individuals or societies (Hardimon 1994:119–122). Alienation is “subjective” when it ischaracterised in terms of the presence (or absence) of certain beliefsor feelings; for example, when individuals are said to be alienatedbecause they feel estranged from the world. Alienation is“objective” when it is characterised in terms which makeno reference to the beliefs or feelings of individuals; for example,when individuals are said to be alienated because they fail to developand deploy their essential human characteristics, whether or not theyexperience that lack of self-realisation as a loss. Marx seems toallow that these two forms of alienation are conceptually distinct,but assumes that in capitalist societies they are typically foundtogether. Indeed, he often appears to think of subjective alienationas tracking the objective variant. That said, Marx does allow thatthey can come apart sociologically. At least, that is one way ofreading a passage inThe Holy Family where he recognises thatcapitalists do not get to engage in self-realising activities of theright kind (and hence are objectively alienated), butthat—unlike the proletariat—they arecontent intheir estrangement (and hence are lacking subjective alienation),feeling “at ease” in, and even “strengthened”by, it (MECW 4: 36).

3. Theory of History

3.1 Sources

Marx did not set out his theory of history in great detail.Accordingly, it has to be constructed from a variety of texts, boththose where he attempts to apply a theoretical analysis to past andfuture historical events, and those of a more purely theoreticalnature. Of the latter, the “1859 Preface” toACritique of Political Economy has achieved canonical status.However, the manuscripts collected together asThe GermanIdeology, co-written with Engels in 1845-46, are also a much usedearly source. We shall briefly outline both texts, and then look atthe reconstruction of Marx’s theory of history in the hands ofhis philosophically most influential recent exponent, G.A. Cohen(Cohen 1978 [2001], 1988), who builds on the interpretation of theearly Russian Marxist Georgi Plekhanov (1856–1918)(Plekhanov 1895 [1947]).

We should, however, be aware that Cohen’s interpretation is farfrom universally accepted. Cohen provided his reconstruction of Marxpartly because he was frustrated with existing Hegelian-inspired“dialectical” interpretations of Marx, and what heconsidered to be the vagueness of the influential works of LouisAlthusser (1918–1990), neither of which, he felt, provided arigorous account of Marx’s views. However, some scholars believethat the interpretation that we shall focus on is faulty precisely forits insistence on a mechanical model and its lack of attention to thedialectic. One aspect of this criticism is that Cohen’sunderstanding has a surprisingly small role for the concept of classstruggle, which is often felt to be central to Marx’s theory ofhistory. Cohen’s explanation for this is that the “1859Preface”, on which his interpretation is based, does not give aprominent role to class struggle, and indeed it is not explicitlymentioned. Yet this reasoning is problematic for it is possible thatMarx did not want to write in a manner that would engage the concernsof the police censor, and, indeed, a reader aware of the context maybe able to detect an implicit reference to class struggle through theinclusion of such phrases as “then begins an era of socialrevolution,” and “the ideological forms in which menbecome conscious of this conflict and fight it out”. Hence itdoes not follow that Marx himself thought that the concept of classstruggle was relatively unimportant. Furthermore, whenA Critiqueof Political Economy was replaced byCapital, Marx madeno attempt to keep the1859 Preface in print, and its contentis reproduced just as a very much abridged footnote inCapital. Nevertheless, we shall concentrate here onCohen’s interpretation as no other account has been set out withcomparable rigour, precision and detail.

3.2 Early Formulations

In his “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845) Marx providesa background to what would become his theory of history by stating hisobjections to “all hitherto existing” materialism andidealism, understood as types of philosophical theories. Materialismis complimented for understanding the physical reality of the world,but is criticised for ignoring the active role of the human subject increating the world we perceive. Idealism, at least as developed byHegel, understands the active nature of the human subject, butconfines it to thought or contemplation: the world is created throughthe categories we impose upon it. Marx combines the insights of bothtraditions to propose a view in which human beings do indeed create—or at least transform—the world they find themselves in,but this transformation happens not in thought but through actualmaterial activity; not through the imposition of sublime concepts butthrough the sweat of their brow, with picks and shovels. Thishistorical version of materialism, which, according to Marx,transcends and thus rejects all existing philosophical thought, is thefoundation of Marx’s later theory of history. As Marx puts it inthe “1844 Manuscripts”, “Industry is the actualhistorical relationship of nature … to man”(MECW 3: 303). This thought, derived from reflection on thehistory of philosophy, together with his experience of social andeconomic realities, as a journalist, sets the agenda for allMarx’s future work.

InThe German Ideology manuscripts, Marx and Engels contrasttheir new materialist method with the idealism that had characterisedprevious German thought. Accordingly, they take pains to set out the“premises of the materialist method”. They start, theysay, from “real human beings”, emphasising that humanbeings are essentially productive, in that they must produce theirmeans of subsistence in order to satisfy their material needs. Thesatisfaction of needs engenders new needs of both a material andsocial kind, and forms of society arise corresponding to the state ofdevelopment of human productive forces. Material life determines, orat least “conditions” social life, and so the primarydirection of social explanation is from material production to socialforms, and thence to forms of consciousness. As the material means ofproduction develop, “modes of co-operation” or economicstructures rise and fall, and eventually communism will become a realpossibility once the plight of the workers and their awareness of analternative motivates them sufficiently to become revolutionaries.

3.3 1859 Preface

In the sketch ofThe German Ideology, many of the keyelements of historical materialism are present, even if theterminology is not yet that of Marx’s more mature writings.Marx’s statement in the “1859 Preface” renderssomething of the same view in sharper form. Cohen’sreconstruction of Marx’s view in the Preface begins from whatCohen calls the Development Thesis, which is pre-supposed, rather thanexplicitly stated in the Preface (Cohen 1978 [2001]: 134–174).This is the thesis that the productive forces tend to develop, in thesense of becoming more powerful, over time. The productive forces arethe means of production, together with productively applicableknowledge: technology, in other words. The development thesis statesnot that the productive forces always do develop, but that there is atendency for them to do so. The next thesis is the primacy thesis,which has two aspects. The first states that the nature of asociety’s economic structure is explained by the level ofdevelopment of its productive forces, and the second that the natureof the superstructure—the political and legal institutions ofsociety—is explained by the nature of the economic structure.The nature of a society’s ideology, which is to say certainreligious, artistic, moral and philosophical beliefs contained withinsociety, is also explained in terms of its economic structure,although this receives less emphasis in Cohen’s interpretation.Indeed, many activities may well combine aspects of both thesuperstructure and ideology: a religion is constituted by bothinstitutions and a set of beliefs.

Revolution and epoch change is understood as the consequence of aneconomic structure no longer being able to continue to develop theforces of production. At this point the development of the productiveforces is said to be fettered, and, according to the theory, once aneconomic structure fetters development it will berevolutionised—“burst asunder” (MECW 6:489)—and eventually replaced with an economic structure bettersuited to preside over the continued development of the forces ofproduction.

In outline, then, the theory has a pleasing simplicity and power. Itseems plausible that human productive power develops over time, andplausible too that economic structures exist for as long as theydevelop the productive forces, but will be replaced when they are nolonger capable of doing this. Yet severe problems emerge when weattempt to put more flesh on these bones.

3.4 Functional Explanation

Prior to Cohen’s work, historical materialism had not beenregarded as a coherent view within English-language politicalphilosophy. The antipathy is well summed up with the closing words ofH.B. Acton’sThe Illusion of the Epoch: “Marxismis a philosophical farrago” (1955: 271). One difficulty takenparticularly seriously by Cohen is an alleged inconsistency betweenthe explanatory primacy of the forces of production, and certainclaims made elsewhere by Marx which appear to give the economicstructure primacy in explaining the development of the productiveforces. For example, inThe Communist Manifesto Marx andEngels state that: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist withoutconstantly revolutionising the instruments of production”(MECW 6: 487). This appears to give causal and explanatoryprimacy to the economic structure—capitalism—which bringsabout the development of the forces of production. Cohen accepts that,on the surface at least, this generates a contradiction. Both theeconomic structure and the development of the productive forces seemto have explanatory priority over each other. Unsatisfied by suchvague resolutions as “determination in the last instance”,or the idea of “dialectical” connections, Cohenself-consciously attempts to apply the standards of clarity and rigourof analytic philosophy to provide a reconstructed version ofhistorical materialism.

The key theoretical innovation is to appeal to the notion offunctional explanation, also sometimes called “consequenceexplanation” (Cohen 1978 [2001]: 249–296). Theessential move is cheerfully to admit that the economic structure,such as capitalism, does indeed develop the productive forces, but toadd that this, according to the theory, is precisely why we havecapitalism (when we do). That is, if capitalism failed to develop theproductive forces it would disappear. And, indeed, this fitsbeautifully with historical materialism. For Marx asserts that when aneconomic structure fails to develop the productive forces—whenit “fetters” the productive forces—it will berevolutionised and the epoch will change. So the idea of“fettering” becomes the counterpart to the theory offunctional explanation. Essentially fettering is what happens when theeconomic structure becomes dysfunctional.

Now it is apparent that this renders historical materialismconsistent. Yet there is a question as to whether it is at too high aprice. For we must ask whether functional explanation is a coherentmethodological device. The problem is that we can ask what it is thatmakes it the case that an economic structure will only persist for aslong as it develops the productive forces. Jon Elster has pressed thiscriticism against Cohen very hard (Elster 1985: 27–35). If we wereto argue that there is an agent guiding history who has the purposethat the productive forces should be developed as much as possiblethen it would make sense that such an agent would intervene in historyto carry out this purpose by selecting the economic structures whichdo the best job. However, it is clear that Marx makes no suchmetaphysical assumptions. Elster is very critical—sometimes ofMarx, sometimes of Cohen—of the idea of appealing to“purposes” in history without those being the purposes ofanyone.

Indeed Elster’s criticism was anticipated in fascinating termsby Simone Weil (1909–1943), who links Marx’s appeal tohistory’s purposes to the influence of Hegel on his thought:

We must remember the Hegelian origins of Marxist thought. Hegelbelieved in a hidden mind at work in the universe, and that thehistory of the world is simply the history of this world mind, which,as in the case of everything spiritual, tends indefinitely towardsperfection. Marx claimed to “put back on its feet” theHegelian dialectic, which he accused of being “upsidedown”, by substituting matter for mind as the motive power ofhistory; but by an extraordinary paradox, he conceived history,starting from this rectification, as though he attributed to matterwhat is the very essence of mind—an unceasing aspiration towardsthe best. (Weil 1955 [1958: 43])

Cohen is well aware of the difficulty of appealing to purposes inhistory, but defends the use of functional explanation by comparingits use in historical materialism with its use in evolutionarybiology. In contemporary biology it is commonplace to explain theexistence of the stripes of a tiger, or the hollow bones of a bird, bypointing to the function of these features. Here we have apparentpurposes which are not the purposes of anyone. The obvious counter,however, is that in evolutionary biology we can provide a causal storyto underpin these functional explanations; a story involving chancevariation and survival of the fittest. Therefore these functionalexplanations are sustained by a complex causal feedback loop in whichdysfunctional elements tend to be filtered out in competition withbetter functioning elements. Cohen calls such background accounts“elaborations” and he concedes that functionalexplanations are in need of elaborations. But he points out thatstandard causal explanations are equally in need of elaborations. Wemight, for example, be satisfied with the explanation that the vasebroke because it was dropped on the floor, but a great deal of furtherinformation is needed to explain why this explanation works.

Consequently, Cohen claims that we can be justified in offering afunctional explanation even when we are in ignorance of itselaboration. Indeed, even in biology detailed causal elaborations offunctional explanations have been available only relatively recently.Prior to Charles Darwin (1809–1882), or arguably Jean-BaptisteLamarck (1744–1829), the only candidate causal elaboration wasto appeal to God’s purposes. Darwin outlined a very plausiblemechanism, but having no genetic theory was not able to elaborate itinto a detailed account. Our knowledge remains incomplete in somerespects to this day. Nevertheless, it seems perfectly reasonable tosay that birds have hollow bones in order to facilitate flight.Cohen’s point is that the weight of evidence that organisms areadapted to their environment would permit even a pre-Darwinian atheistto assert this functional explanation with justification. Hence onecan be justified in offering a functional explanation even in theabsence of a candidate elaboration: if there is sufficient weight ofinductive evidence.

At this point the issue, then, divides into a theoretical question andan empirical one. The empirical question is whether or not there isevidence that forms of society exist only for as long as they advanceproductive power, and are replaced by revolution when they fail. Here,one must admit, the empirical record is patchy at best, and thereappear to have been long periods of stagnation, even regression, whendysfunctional economic structures were not revolutionised.

The theoretical issue is whether a plausible elaborating explanationis available to underpin Marxist functional explanations. Here thereis something of a dilemma. In the first instance it is tempting to tryto mimic the elaboration given in the Darwinian story, and appeal tochance variations and survival of the fittest. In this case“fittest” would mean “most able to preside over thedevelopment of the productive forces”. Chance variation would bea matter of people trying out new types of economic relations. On thisaccount new economic structures begin through experiment, but thriveand persist through their success in developing the productive forces.However the problem is that such an account would seem to introduce alarger element of contingency than Marx seeks, for it is essential toMarx’s thought that one should be able to predict the eventualarrival of communism. Within Darwinian theory there is no warrant forlong-term predictions, for everything depends on the contingencies ofparticular situations. A similar heavy element of contingency would beinherited by a form of historical materialism developed by analogywith evolutionary biology. The dilemma, then, is that the best modelfor developing the theory makes predictions based on the theoryunsound, yet the whole point of the theory is predictive. Hence onemust either look for an alternative means of producing elaboratingexplanation, or give up the predictive ambitions of the theory.

3.5 Rationality

The driving force of history, in Cohen’s reconstruction of Marx,is the development of the productive forces, the most important ofwhich is technology. But what is it that drives such development?Ultimately, in Cohen’s account, it is human rationality. Humanbeings have the ingenuity to apply themselves to develop means toaddress the scarcity they find. This on the face of it seems veryreasonable. Yet there are difficulties. As Cohen himself acknowledges,societies do not always do what would be rational for an individual todo. Co-ordination problems may stand in our way, and there may bestructural barriers. Furthermore, it is relatively rare for those whointroduce new technologies to be motivated by the need to addressscarcity. Rather, under capitalism, the profit motive is the key. Ofcourse it might be argued that this is the social form that thematerial need to address scarcity takes under capitalism. But stillone may raise the question whether the need to address scarcity alwayshas the influence that it appears to have taken on in modern times.For example, a ruling class’s absolute determination to hold onto power may have led to economically stagnant societies.Alternatively, it might be thought that a society may put religion orthe protection of traditional ways of life ahead of economic needs.This goes to the heart of Marx’s theory that man is anessentially productive being and that the locus of interaction withthe world is industry. As Cohen himself later argued in essays such as“Reconsidering Historical Materialism” (1988), theemphasis on production may appear one-sided, and ignore other powerfulelements in human nature. Such a criticism chimes with a criticismfrom the previous section; that the historical record may not, infact, display the tendency to growth in the productive forces assumedby the theory.

3.6 Alternative Interpretations

Many defenders of Marx will argue that the problems stated areproblems for Cohen’s interpretation of Marx, rather than forMarx himself. It is possible to argue, for example, that Marx did nothave a general theory of history, but rather was a social scientistobserving and encouraging the transformation of capitalism intocommunism as a singular event. And it is certainly true that when Marxanalyses a particular historical episode, as he does in the18thBrumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852), any idea of fitting eventsinto a fixed pattern of history seems very far from Marx’s mind.On other views Marx did have a general theory of history but it is farmore flexible and less determinate than Cohen insists (Miller 1984).And finally, as noted, there are critics who believe thatCohen’s interpretation is entirely wrong-headed owing to itsdismissive attitude to dialectical reasoning (Sayers 1984 [1990]).

4. Economics

4.1 ReadingCapital

How to read Marx’s economic writings, and especially hismasterpieceCapital Volume 1, remains a matter ofcontroversy. An orthodox reading is that Marx’s essential taskis to contribute to economic theory, based on a modified form of thelabour theory of value. Others warn against such a narrowinterpretation, pointing out that the character of Marx’swriting and presentation is very far from what one would expect in astandard economic text. Hence William Clare Roberts (2017), forexample, argues thatCapital Volume 1 is fundamentally a workof political theory, rather than economics. Be that as it may,nevertheless, the work does contain substantial presentation of aneconomic analysis of capitalism, and it is on this that we will focushere.

4.2 Labour Theory of Value

Capital Volume 1 begins with an analysis of the idea ofcommodity production. A commodity is defined as a useful externalobject, produced for exchange on a market. Thus, two necessaryconditions for commodity production are: the existence of a market, inwhich exchange can take place; and a social division of labour, inwhich different people produce different products, without which therewould be no motivation for exchange. Marx suggests that commoditieshave both use-value—a use, in other words—and anexchange-value—initially to be understood as their price. Usevalue can easily be understood, so Marx says, but he insists thatexchange value is a puzzling phenomenon, and relative exchange valuesneed to be explained. Why does a quantity of one commodity exchangefor a given quantity of another commodity? His explanation is in termsof the labour input required to produce the commodity, or rather, thesocially necessary labour, which is labour exerted at the averagelevel of intensity and productivity for that branch of activity withinthe economy. Thus the labour theory of value asserts that the value ofa commodity is determined by the quantity of socially necessary labourtime required to produce it.

Marx provides a two-stage argument for the labour theory of value. Thefirst stage is to argue that if two objects can be compared in thesense of being put on either side of an equals sign, then there mustbe a “third thing of identical magnitude in both of them”to which they are both reducible. As commodities can be exchangedagainst each other, there must, Marx argues, be a third thing thatthey have in common. This then motivates the second stage, which is asearch for the appropriate “third thing”, which is labourin Marx’s view, as the only plausible common element. Both stepsof the argument are, of course, highly contestable.

Capitalism can be distinguished from other forms of commodityexchange, Marx argues, in that it involves not merely the exchange ofcommodities, but the advancement of capital, in the form of money,with the purpose of generating profit through the purchase ofcommodities and their transformation into other commodities which cancommand a higher price, and thus yield a profit. Marx claims that noprevious theorist has been able adequately to explain how capitalismas a whole can make a profit. Marx’s own solution relies on theidea of exploitation of the worker. In setting up conditions ofproduction the capitalist purchases the worker’s labourpower—his or her ability to labour—for the day. The costof this commodity is determined in the same way as the cost of everyother; that is, in terms of the amount of socially necessary labourpower required to produce it. In this case the value of a day’slabour power is the value of the commodities necessary to keep theworker alive for a day. Suppose that such commodities take four hoursto produce. Accordingly the first four hours of the working day isspent on producing value equivalent to the value of the wages theworker will be paid. This is known as necessary labour. Any work theworker does above this is known as surplus labour, producing surplusvalue for the capitalist. Surplus value, according to Marx, is thesource of all profit. In Marx’s analysis labour power is theonly commodity which can produce more value than it is worth, and forthis reason it is known as variable capital. Other commodities simplypass their value on to the finished commodities, but do not create anyextra value. They are known as constant capital. Profit, then, is theresult of the labour performed by the worker beyond that necessary tocreate the value of his or her wages. This is the surplus value theoryof profit.

It appears to follow from this analysis that as industry becomes moremechanised, using more constant capital and less variable capital, therate of profit ought to fall. For as a proportion less capital will beadvanced on labour, and only labour can create value. InCapital Volume 3 Marx does indeed make the prediction thatthe rate of profit will fall over time, and this is one of the factorswhich leads to the downfall of capitalism. (However, as pointed out byPaul Sweezy inThe Theory of Capitalist Development (1942),the analysis is problematic.) A further consequence of this analysisis a difficulty for the theory that Marx did recognise, and tried,albeit unsuccessfully, to meet also in the manuscripts that make upCapital Volume 3. It follows from the analysis so far thatlabour-intensive industries ought to have a higher rate of profit thanthose which use less labour. Not only is this empirically false, it istheoretically unacceptable. Accordingly, Marx argued that in realeconomic life prices vary in a systematic way from values. Providingthe mathematics to explain this is known as the transformationproblem, and Marx’s own attempt suffers from technicaldifficulties. Although there are sophisticated known techniques forsolving this problem now there is a question about the degree to whichthey do rescue Marx’s project. If it is thought that the labourtheory of value was initially motivated as an intuitively plausibletheory of price then when the connection between price and value isrendered as indirect as it is in the final theory, the intuitivemotivation of the theory drains away. Others consider this to be asuperficial reading of Marx, and that his general approach allows usto see through the appearances of capitalism to understand itsunderlying basis, which need not coincide with appearances. HowMarx’s theory of capitalism should be read remains an activearea of scholarly debate (Heinrich 2012).

A further objection is that Marx’s assertion that only labourcan create surplus value is unsupported by any argument or analysis,and can be argued to be merely an artefact of the nature of hispresentation. Any commodity can be picked to play a similar role.Consequently, with equal justification one could set out a corn theoryof value, arguing that corn has the unique power of creating morevalue than it costs. Formally this would be identical to the labourtheory of value (Roemer 1982). Nevertheless, the claims that somehowlabour is responsible for the creation of value, and that profit isthe consequence of exploitation, remain intuitively powerful, even ifthey are difficult to establish in detail.

However, even if the labour theory of value is considered discredited,there are elements of his theory that remain of worth. The Cambridgeeconomist Joan Robinson, inAn Essay on Marxian Economics(1942), picked out two aspects of particular note. First, Marx’srefusal to accept that capitalism involves a harmony of interestsbetween worker and capitalist, replacing this with a class-basedanalysis of the worker’s struggle for better wages andconditions of work, versus the capitalist’s drive for evergreater profits. Second, Marx’s denial that there is anylong-run tendency to equilibrium in the market, and his descriptionsof mechanisms which underlie the trade-cycle of boom and bust. Bothprovide a salutary corrective to aspects of orthodox economictheory.

4.3 Exploitation

As noted, traditionally Marx’s definition of exploitation isgiven in terms of the theory of surplus value, which in turn is takento depend on the labour theory of value: the theory that the value ofany commodity is proportional to the amount of “sociallynecessary” labour embodied in it. However, the question arisesof whether the basic idea of exploitation should be so dependent on aparticular theory of value. For if it is, the notion of exploitationbecomes vulnerable to Robert Nozick’s objection: that if thelabour theory of value can be shown to be faulty, the Marxist theoryof exploitation collapses too (Nozick 1974).

Others have felt that it is possible to restore the intuitive core ofa Marxist theory of exploitation independent of the labour theory ofvalue (cf. Cohen 1979, Wolff 1999, Vrousalis 2013). John Roemer, totake one leading case, states:

Marxian exploitation is defined as the unequal exchange of labor forgoods: the exchange is unequal when the amount of labor embodied inthe goods which the worker can purchase with his income … isless than the amount of labor he expended to earn that income.(Roemer1985: 30)

Suppose I work eight hours to earn my wages. With this perhaps thebest thing I can buy is a coat. But imagine that the coat took only atotal of four hours to make. Therefore I have exchanged my eight hourswork for only four hours of other people’s work, and thereby, onthis view, I am exploited.

The definition requires some refinement. For example, if I am taxedfor the benefit of those unable to work, I will be exploited by theabove definition, but this is not what the definition of exploitationwas intended to capture. Worse still, if there is one person exploitedmuch more gravely than anyone else in the economy, then it may turnout that no-one else is exploited. Nevertheless, it should not bedifficult to adjust the definition to take account of thesedifficulties, and as noted several other accounts of Marx-inspiredaccounts of exploitation have been offered that are independent of thelabour theory of value.

Many of these alternative definitions add a notion of unfreedom ordomination to unequal exchange of labour and goods (Vrousalis 2013).The exploited person is forced to accept a situation in which he orshe just never gets back what they put into the labour process. Nowthere may be, in particular cases, a great deal to be said about whythis is perfectly acceptable from a moral point of view. However, onthe face of it such exploitation appears to be unjust. Nevertheless,we will see in the next section why attributing such a position toMarx himself is fraught with difficulty.

5. Morality

5.1 Unpacking Issues

The issue of Marx and morality poses a conundrum. On readingMarx’s works at all periods of his life, there appears to be thestrongest possible distaste towards bourgeois capitalist society, andan undoubted endorsement of future communist society. Yet the terms ofthis antipathy and endorsement are far from clear. Despiteexpectations, Marx never directly says that capitalism is unjust.Neither does he directly say that communism would be a just form ofsociety. In fact he frequently takes pains to distance himself fromthose who engage in a discourse of justice, and makes a consciousattempt to exclude direct moral commentary in his own works. Thepuzzle is why this should be, given the weight of indirect moralcommentary one also finds in his writings.

There are, initially, separate questions concerning Marx’sattitude to capitalism and to communism. There are also separatequestions concerning his attitude to ideas of justice, and to ideas ofmorality more broadly concerned. This, then, generates four questions:(a) Did Marx think capitalism unjust?; (b) did he think thatcapitalism could be morally criticised on other grounds?; (c) did hethink that communism would be just? (d) did he think it could bemorally approved of on other grounds? These are some of the questionswe consider in this section.

5.2 The “Injustice” of Capitalism

The initial argument that Marx must have thought that capitalism isunjust is based on the observation that Marx argued that allcapitalist profit is ultimately derived from the exploitation of theworker. Capitalism’s dirty secret is that it is not a realm ofharmony and mutual benefit but a system in which one classsystematically extracts profit from another. How could this fail to beunjust? Yet it is notable that Marx never explicitly draws such aconclusion, and inCapital he goes as far as to say that suchexchange is “by no means an injury to the seller” (MECW35: 204), which some commentators have taken as evidence that Marx didnot think that capitalism was unjust, although other readings arepossible.

Allen Wood (1972) is perhaps the leading advocate of the view thatMarx did not believe that capitalism is unjust. Wood argues that Marxtakes this approach because his general theoretical approach excludesany trans-epochal standpoint from which one can comment on the justiceof an economic system. Even though it is acceptable to criticiseparticular behaviour from within an economic structure as unjust (andtheft under capitalism would be an example) it is not possible tocriticise capitalism as a whole. This is a consequence of Marx’sanalysis of the role of ideas of justice from within historicalmaterialism. Marx claims that juridical institutions are part of thesuperstructure, and that ideas of justice areideological. Accordingly, the role of both the superstructure andideology, in the functionalist reading of historical materialismadopted here, is to stabilise the economic structure. Consequently, tostate that something is just under capitalism is simply a judgementthat it will tend to have the effect of advancing capitalism.According to Marx, in any society the ruling ideas are those of theruling class; the core of the theory of ideology.

Ziyad Husami (1978) however, argues that Wood is mistaken,ignoring the fact that for Marx ideas undergo a double determination.We need to differentiate not just by economic system, but also byeconomic class within the system. Therefore the ideas of thenon-ruling class may be very different from those of the ruling class.Of course, it is the ideas of the ruling class that receive attentionand implementation, but this does not mean that other ideas do notexist. Husami goes as far as to argue that members of the proletariatunder capitalism have an account of justice that matches communism.From this privileged standpoint of the proletariat, which is alsoMarx’s standpoint, capitalism is unjust, and so it follows thatMarx thought capitalism unjust.

Plausible though it may sound, Husami’s argument fails toaccount for two related points. First, it cannot explain why Marxnever explicitly described capitalism as unjust, and second, itoverlooks the distance Marx wanted to place between his own scientificsocialism, and that of other socialists who argued for the injusticeof capitalism. Hence one cannot avoid the conclusion that the“official” view of Marx is that capitalism is notunjust.

Nevertheless, this leaves us with a puzzle. Much of Marx’sdescription of capitalism—his use of the words“embezzlement”, “robbery” and“exploitation”—belie the official account. Arguably,the only satisfactory way of understanding this issue is, once more,from G.A. Cohen, who proposes that Marx believed that capitalism wasunjust, but did not believe that he believed it was unjust (Cohen1983). In other words, Marx, like so many of us, did not have perfectknowledge of his own mind. In his explicit reflections on the justiceof capitalism he was able to maintain his official view. But in lessguarded moments his real view slips out, even if never in explicitlanguage. Such an interpretation is bound to be controversial, but itmakes good sense of the texts.

Whatever one concludes on the question of whether Marx thoughtcapitalism unjust, it is, nevertheless, obvious that Marx thought thatcapitalism was not the best way for human beings to live. Points madein his early writings remain present throughout his writings, if nolonger connected to an explicit theory of alienation. The worker findswork a torment, suffers poverty, overwork and lack of fulfilment andfreedom. People do not relate to each other as humans should. Doesthis amount to a moral criticism of capitalism or not? In the absenceof any special reason to argue otherwise, it simply seems obvious thatMarx’s critique is a moral one. Capitalism impedes humanflourishing. It is hard to disagree with the judgement that Marx

thinks that the capitalist exploitation of labor power is a wrong thathas horrendous consequences for the laborers. (Roberts 2017: 129)

Marx, though, once more refrained from making this explicit; he seemedto show no interest in locating his criticism of capitalism in any ofthe traditions of moral philosophy, or explaining how he wasgenerating a new tradition. There may have been two reasons for hiscaution. The first was that while there were bad things aboutcapitalism, there is, from a world historical point of view, much goodabout it too. For without capitalism, communism would not be possible.Capitalism is to be transcended, not abolished, and this may bedifficult to convey in the terms of moral philosophy.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, we need to return to thecontrast between Marxian and other forms of socialism. Manynon-Marxian socialists appealed to universal ideas of truth andjustice to defend their proposed schemes, and their theory oftransition was based on the idea that appealing to moral sensibilitieswould be the best, perhaps only, way of bringing about the new chosensociety. Marx wanted to distance himself from these other socialisttraditions, and a key point of distinction was to argue that the routeto understanding the possibilities of human emancipation lay in theanalysis of historical and social forces, not in morality. Hence, forMarx, any appeal to morality was theoretically a backward step.

5.3 Communism and “Justice”

This leads us now to Marx’s assessment of communism. Wouldcommunism be a just society? In considering Marx’s attitude tocommunism and justice there are really only two viable possibilities:either he thought that communism would be a just society or he thoughtthat the concept of justice would not apply: that communism wouldtranscend justice.

Communism is described by Marx, in theCritique of the GothaProgramme, as a society in which each person should contributeaccording to their ability and receive according to their need. Thiscertainly sounds like a theory of justice, and could be adopted assuch (Gilabert 2015). However, many will hold that it is truer toMarx’s thought to say that this is part of an account in whichcommunism transcends justice, as Lukes has argued (Lukes 1987).

If we start with the idea that the point of ideas of justice is toresolve disputes, then a society without disputes would have no needor place for justice. We can see this by reflecting upon the idea ofthe circumstances of justice in the work of David Hume(1711–1776). Hume argued that if there was enormous materialabundance—if everyone could have whatever they wanted withoutinvading another’s share—we would never have devised rulesof justice. And, of course, there are suggestions in Marx’swritings that communism would be a society of such abundance. But Humealso suggested that justice would not be needed in othercircumstances; if there were complete fellow-feeling between all humanbeings, there would be no conflict and no need for justice. Of course,one can argue whether either material abundance or humanfellow-feeling to this degree would be possible, but the point is thatboth arguments give a clear sense in which communism transcendsjustice.

Nevertheless, we remain with the question of whether Marx thought thatcommunism could be commended on other moral grounds. On a broadunderstanding, in which morality, or perhaps better to say ethics, isconcerned with the idea of living well, it seems that communism can beassessed favourably in this light. One compelling argument is thatMarx’s career simply makes no sense unless we can attribute sucha belief to him. But beyond this we can be brief in that theconsiderations adduced inSection 2 above apply again. Communism clearly advances human flourishing, inMarx’s view. The only reason for denying that, in Marx’svision, it would amount to a good society is a theoretical antipathyto the word “good”. And here the main point is that, inMarx’s view, communism would not be brought about by high-mindedbenefactors of humanity. Quite possibly his determination to retainthis point of difference between himself and other socialists led himto disparage the importance of morality to a degree that goes beyondthe call of theoretical necessity.

6. Ideology

6.1 A Critical Account

The account of ideology contained in Marx’s writings isregularly portrayed as a crucial element of his intellectual legacy.It has been identified as among his “most influential”ideas (Elster 1986: 168), and acclaimed as “the mostfertile” part of his social and political theory (Leiter 2004:84). Not least, these views on ideology are said to constituteMarx’s claim to a place—alongside Friedrich Nietzsche(1844–1900) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)—as one ofthe “masters of suspicion”; that is, as an author whosework casts doubt on the transparency of our everyday understandings ofboth our own identity and the social world we inhabit (Ricouer 1970:32–33).

Given this enthusiastic reception, it can come as something of asurprise to turn to Marx’s writings and discover how little theycontain about ideology, and how inchoate and opaque those infrequentand passing observations on that topic are. There are, of course, somefamous quotations, not least fromThe German Ideologymanuscripts. The references there to ideology as involving an“inversion” of the relation between individuals and theircircumstances, perhaps analogous to the workings of a “cameraobscura”—an optical device which projected an image of itssurroundings, upside down but preserving perspective, onto a screeninside—have often mesmerised commentators but not alwaysgenerated much genuine illumination (MECW 5: 36). The pointshould not be exaggerated, but these striking images notwithstanding,there is no clear and sustained discussion of ideology in the Marxiancorpus.

Many commentators maintain that the search for a single model ofideology in his work has to be given up. Indeed, there is something ofan “arms race” in the literature, as commentators discovertwo, three, even five, competing models of ideology in Marx’swritings (Mepham 1979; Wood 1981 [2004]; Rosen 1996). Mostsurprisingly, it seems that some licence can be found in Marx’scorpus for three very different ways of thinking about what ideologyis. There is textual evidence of his variously utilising: a“descriptive” account of ideology involving a broadlyanthropological study of the beliefs and rituals characteristic ofcertain groups; a “positive” account of ideology as a“worldview” providing the members of a group with a senseof meaning and identity; and a “critical” account seekingto liberate individuals from certain false and misleading forms ofunderstanding (Geuss 1981: 4–26).

It is the last of these—the critical account rather than eitherof the two “non-critical” accounts—which is centralto his wider social and political theory, but this account is itselfsubject to some considerable interpretative disagreement. Marx’stheory of ideology is usually portrayed as an element in what might becalled Marx’s sociology, as distinct from his philosophicalanthropology say, or his theory of history (although complexly relatedto the latter).

6.2 Ideology and Stability

Marx does not view ideology as a feature of all societies, and, inparticular, suggests that it will not be a feature of a futurecommunist society. However, ideology is portrayed as a feature of allclass-divided societies, and not only of capitalistsociety—although many of Marx’s comments on ideology areconcerned with the latter. The theory of ideology appears to play arole in explaining a feature of class-divided societies which mightotherwise appear puzzling, namely what might be called their“stability”; that is, the absence of overt and seriousconflict between social classes. This stability is not permanent, butit can last for extended historical periods. This stability appearspuzzling to Marx because class-divided societies are flawed in wayswhich not only frustrate human flourishing, but also work to thematerial advantage of the ruling minority. Why do the subordinateclasses, who form a majority, tolerate these flaws, when resistanceand rebellion of various kinds might be in their objectiveinterests?

Marx’s account of the sources of social stability inclass-divided societies appeals to both repressive and non-repressivemechanisms. Such societies might often involve the direct repression(or the threat of it) of one group by another, but Marx does not thinkthat this is the whole story. There are also non-repressive sources ofsocial stability, and ideology is usually, and plausibly, consideredone of these. Very roughly, Marx’s account of ideology claimsthat the dominant social ideas in such societies are typically falseor misleading in a fashion that works to the advantage of theeconomically dominant class.

We should note that ideology would seem to be a part and not the wholeof Marx’s account of the non-repressive sources of stability inclass divided societies. Other factors might include: dull economicpressure, including the daily grind of having to earn a living;doubts—justified or otherwise—about the feasibility ofalternatives; sensitivity to the possible costs of radical socialchange; and collective action problems of various kinds which facethose who do want to rebel and resist. Marx does not think individualsare permanently trapped within ideological modes of thinking. Ideologymay have an initial hold, but it is not portrayed as impervious toreason and evidence, especially in circumstances in which theobjective conditions for social change obtain.

6.3 Characteristics

For Marx ideological beliefs are social in that they are widelyshared, indeed so widely-shared that for long periods they constitutethe “ruling” or “dominant” ideas in a givenclass-divided society (MECW 5: 59). And they are social inthat they directly concern, or indirectly impact upon, theaction-guiding understandings of self and society that individualshave. These action-guiding understandings include the dominant legal,political, religious, and philosophical views within particularclass-divided societies in periods of stability (MECW 29: 263).

Not all false or misleading beliefs count for Marx as ideological.Honest scientific error, for example can be non-ideological. Andideological belief can be misleading without being strictly false. Forexample, defenders of the capitalist economy portray what Marx callsthe “wage form”, with its exchange of equivalents, as thewhole (rather than a part) of the story about the relation betweencapital and labour, thereby ignoring the exploitation which occurs inthe sphere of production. Indeed, the notion of the“falsity” of ideology needs to be expanded beyond thecontent of the “ideas” in question, to include cases wheretheir origins are in some way contaminated (Geuss 1981: 19–22).Perhaps the only reason I believe something to be the case is that thebelief in question has a consoling effect on me. Arguably such abelief is held ideologically, even if it happens to be true.Nevertheless paradigmatic examples of ideology have a false content.For example, ideology often portrays institutions, policies, anddecisions which are in the interests of the economically dominantclass, as being in the interests of the society as a whole(MECW 5: 60); and ideology often portrays social andpolitical arrangements which are contingent, or historical, orartificial, as being necessary, or universal, or natural(MECW 35: 605).

In addition to false or misleading content, ideological beliefstypically have at least two additional characteristics, relating totheir social origin and their class function. By the “socialorigin” of ideology is meant that Marx thinks of these ideas asoften originating with, and being reinforced by, the complex structureof class-divided societies—a complex structure in which adeceptive surface appearance is governed by underlying essentialrelations (Geras 1986: 63–84). Capitalism is seen as especiallydeceptive in appearance; for example, Marx often contrasts therelative transparency of “exploitation” under feudalism,with the way in which the “wage form” obscures the ratioof necessary and surplus labour in capitalist societies. Ideologystems, in part, from this deceptive surface appearance which makes itdifficult to grasp the underlying social flaws that benefit theeconomically dominant class. Marx portrays the striving to uncoveressences concealed by misleading appearances as characteristic ofscientific endeavour (MECW 37, 804). And, in this context, hedistinguishes between classical political economy, whichstrove—albeit not always successfully—to uncover theessential relations often concealed behind misleading appearances, andwhat he calls vulgar economy, which happily restricts itself to themisleading appearances themselves (MECW 37, 804).

By the “class function” of ideology is meant that Marxholds that the pervasiveness of ideology is explained by the fact ithelps stabilise the economic structure of societies. All sorts ofideas might get generated for all sorts of reasons, but the ones thattend to “stick” (become widely accepted) in class-dividedsocieties do so, not because of their truth, but because they concealor misrepresent or justify flaws in that society in ways which redoundto the benefit of the economically dominant class (Rosen & Wolff1996: 235–236).

In response critics often see this as just another example of sloppyfunctional reasoning—purportedly widespread in the Marxisttradition—whereby a general pattern is asserted without theidentification of any of the mechanisms which might generate thatpattern. In the present case, it is said that Marx never properlyexplains why the ruling ideas should be those of the ruling class(Elster 1985: 473). Yet there are obvious possible mechanisms here. Togive two examples. First, there is the control of the ruling classover the means of mental production, and in particular the print andbroadcast media which in capitalist societies are typically owned andcontrolled by the very wealthy (MECW 5, 59). A secondpossible mechanism appeals to the psychological need of individualsfor invented narratives that legitimise or justify their socialposition; for instance, Marx identifies a widespread need, in flawedsocieties, for the consolatory effects of religion (MECW 3,175).

7. State and Politics

This broad heading—the state and politics—could cover verymany different issues. To make the present account manageable, onlytwo are addressed here: Marx’s account of the state incapitalist society; and Marx’s account of the fate of the statein communist society. (Consequently, many other important politicalissues—the nature of pre-capitalist states, relations betweenstates, the political transition to communism, and so on—are notdealt with.)

7.1 The State in Capitalist Society

Marx offers no unified theoretical account of the state in capitalistsociety. Instead his remarks on this topic are scattered across thecourse of his activist life, and deeply embedded in discussions ofcontemporary events, events which most modern readers will know verylittle about. Providing some initial order to that complexity, JonElster helpfully identifies three different models in Marx’swritings of the relationship, in capitalist society, between thepolitical state, on the one hand, and the economically dominant class,on the other. (The next three paragraphs draw heavily on Elster 1985:409–437.)

First, the “instrumental” model portrays the state assimply a tool, directly controlled by the economically dominant class,in its own interests, at the expense of the interests both of otherclasses and of the community as a whole. Marx is usually said toendorse the instrumental account in theCommunist Manifesto,where he and Engels insist that “the executive of the modernstate is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the wholebourgeoisie” (MECW 6: 486). On this account, the statemight also act against the short term, or the factional, interests ofparticular capitalists. The picture here is of the state as aninstrument directed—presumably by a subset of capitalists ortheir representatives—in ways which promote the long terminterests of the bourgeoisie as a whole. The precise mechanisms whichmight facilitate that result are not clear in Marx’swritings.

Second, the “class balance” model portrays the state ashaving interests of its own, with capitalist interests as merely oneof the strategic limits on its pursuit of these. This model gets itsname from the exceptional social circumstances said to explain theindependence of the state in this case. In situations where the socialpower of the two warring classes of contemporarysociety—capitalists and workers—are very nearly balanced,the political state (and especially the executive) can gainindependence from both, exploiting that conflict in order to promoteits own interests (the interests of the political caste). Somethinglike this picture appears in Marx’s discussions of the continuedexistence of certain absolutist states after the revolutions of 1848,and of the Bonapartist state established in France by the coup ofNapoleon III in December 1851. The state now competes with capitalistsand proletarians (and is not merely the tool of the former), and by“promising each of the major classes to protect it against theother, the government can rule autonomously” (Elster 1985: 425).On this account, the state has interests of its own, but presumablyonly gets to pursue them if those promises to others are plausible,finding some reflection in its policies and behaviour. Capitalistinterests accordingly remain a political constraint, but they are nowonly one of the factors constraining the state’s actions ratherthan constituting its primary goal.

Third, the “abdication” model presents the bourgeoisie asstaying away from the direct exercise of political power, but doingthis because it is in their economic interests to do so. As Elsternotes, strictly speaking, “abdication” here covers twoslightly different cases—first, where the bourgeoisieabdicate from the political power that they initiallycontrolled (relevant to France); and, second, where the bourgeoisieabstain from taking political power in the first place(relevant to Britain and Germany)—but they can be treatedtogether. In both cases, Marx identifies a situation where “inorder to save its purse, [the bourgeoisie] must forfeit thecrown” (MECW 11: 143). Where the instrumental pictureclaims that the state acts in the interests of the capitalist classbecause it is directly controlled by the latter, theabdication picture advances anexplanatory connection betweenthe promotion of bourgeois interests and the retreat from the directexercise of power. Circumstances obtain where “the politicalrule of the bourgeoisie” turns out to be“incompatible” with its continued economic flourishing,and the bourgeoisie seeks “to get rid of its own political rulein order to get rid of the troubles and dangers of ruling”(MECW 11: 173). There are several possible explanations ofwhy the bourgeoisie might remain outside of politics in order topromote their own interests. To give three examples: the bourgeoisiemight recognise that their own characteristic short-termism could befatal to their own interests if they exercised direct political aswell as economic power; the bourgeoisie might find political rulesufficiently time and effort consuming to withdraw from it,discovering that the economic benefits kept on coming regardless; orthe bourgeoisie might appreciate that abdication weakened their classopponents, forcing the proletariat to fight on two fronts (againstcapital and government) and thereby making it less able to win thosestruggles.

There are many questions one might have about these three models.

First, one might wonder which of these three models best embodiesMarx’s considered view? The instrumental account is the earliestaccount, which he largely abandons from the early 1850s, presumablynoticing how poorly it captured contemporary politicalrealities—in particular, the stable existence of states whichwere not directly run by the capitalist class, but which still in someway served their interests. That outcome is possible under either ofthe two other accounts. However, Marx seems to have thought of theclass balance model as a temporary solution in exceptionalcircumstances, and perhaps held that it failed to allow the stableexplanatory connection that he sought between the extant politicalarrangements and the promotion of dominant economic interests. Inshort, for better or worse, Marx’s considered view looks closerto the abdication account, reflecting his conviction that the centralfeatures of political life are explained by the existing economicstructure.

Second, one might wonder which model allows greatest“autonomy” to the political state? A weak definition ofstate autonomy might portray the state as autonomous when it isindependent of direct control by the economically dominant class. Onthis definition, both the class balance and abdicationmodels—but not the instrumental account—seem to providefor autonomy. A stronger definition of state autonomy might requirewhat Elster calls “explanatory autonomy”, which exists

when (and to the extent that) its structure and policies cannot beexplained by the interest of an economically dominant class. (Elster1985: 405)

Only the class balance view seems to allow significant explanatoryautonomy. In his preferred abdication account, Marx allows that thestate in capitalist society is independent of direct capitalistcontrol, but goes on to claim that its main structures (including thatvery independence) and policies are ultimately explained by theinterests of the capitalist class.

7.2. The Fate of the State in Communist Society

For reasons discussed below (seeSection 8), Marx declines to say much about the basic structure of a futurecommunist society. However, in the case of the fate of the state, thatreluctance is partially mitigated by his view that the institutionalarrangements of the Paris Commune prefigured the political dimensionsof communist society.

Marx’s views on the nature and fate of the state in communistsociety are to be distinguished from his infrequent, and subsequentlynotorious, use of the term “the dictatorship of theproletariat”. (On the infrequency, context, and content, ofthese uses see Draper 1986 and Hunt 1974.) The idea of“dictatorship” in this historical context has the(ancient) connotation of emergency rule rather than the (modern)connotation of totalitarianism. Marx’s use makes it clear thatany such temporary government should be democratic; for instance, inhaving majority support, and in preserving democratic rights (ofspeech, association, and so on). However, it is by definition“extra-legal” in that it seeks to establish a new regimeand not to preserve an old one. So understood, the dictatorship of theproletariat forms part of the political transition to communistsociety (a topic not covered here), rather than part of theinstitutional structure of communist society itself. The“dictatorial”—that is, the temporary andextra-legal—character of this regime ends with establishment ofa new and stable polity, and it is the latter which is discussed here(Hunt 1974: 297).

The character of the state in communist society consists, in part, ofits form (its institutional arrangements) and its function (the tasksthat it undertakes).

Some sense of theform of the state in communist society canbe gained from Marx’s engagement with the Paris Commune. Hispreferred future political arrangements involve a high degree ofparticipation, and the radical “de-professionalisation” ofcertain public offices. First, Marx is enthusiastic about regularelections, universal suffrage,mandat impératif,recall, open executive proceedings, decentralisation, and so on.Second, he objects to public offices (in the legislature, executive,and judiciary) being the spoils of a political caste, and sought tomake them working positions, remunerated at the average worker’swage, and regularly circulating (through election). This combinationof arrangements has been characterised as “democracy withoutprofessionals” (Hunt 1974: 365). Marx saw it as reflecting hisview that:

Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposedupon society into one completely subordinate to it. (MECW 24:94)

Some sense of thefunction of the state in communist societycan be gained from Marx’s distinction between“necessary” tasks that a state would need to undertake inall societies (at least, economically developed societies), and“unnecessary” tasks that a state would only need toundertake in class-divided societies. The difficulty here is less inallowing this distinction, than in deciding what might fall into eachcategory. On the necessary side, Marx appears to require that thestate in communist society provide both: democratic solutions tocoordination problems (deciding which side of the road traffic shoulddrive on, for instance); and the supply of public goods (health,welfare, education, and so on). On the unnecessary side, Marx seems tothink that a communist society might hugely reduce, or even eliminate,the element of organised coercion found in most states (in the form ofstanding armies, police forces, and so on). At least, this reductionmight be feasible once communist society had reached its higher stage(where distribution is based on “the needs principle”),and there is no longer a threat from non-communist societies.

Again, there are many reservations that one might have about thisaccount.

First, many will be sceptical about its feasibility, and perhapsespecially of the purported reduction, still less elimination, ofstate coercion. That scepticism might be motivated by the thought thatthis would only be possible if communist society were characterised bywidespread social and political consensus, and that such consensus is,both unlikely (at least, in modern societies), and undesirable(diversity and disagreement having a value). However, the reduction,or even elimination, of state coercion might be compatible withcertain forms of continuing disagreement about the ends and means ofcommunist society. Imagine that a democratic communist polityintroduces a new law prohibiting smoking in public places, and that arepresentative smoker (call her Anne) obeys that law despite beingamong the minority who wanted this practice permitted. Anne’smotivation for obedience, we can stipulate, is grounded, not in fearof the likely response of bodies of armed persons enforcing the law,but rather in respect for the democratic majority of the community ofwhich she is a part. In short, reasonably strong assumptions about thedemocratic commitments of individuals might allow the scaling down oforganised coercion without having to presume universal agreementamongst citizens on all issues.

Second, some might object to the reference, throughout this section,to the “state” in communist society. It might be said thata polity whose form and functions are so radicallytransformed—the form by democratic participation andde-professionalisation, the function by eliminating historicallyunnecessary tasks—is insufficiently “state-like” tobe called a state. That is certainly possible, but the terminologicalclaim would appear to assume that there is greater clarity andagreement about just what a state is, either than is presupposed hereor than exists in the world. Given that lack of consensus,“state” seems a suitably prudent choice. As well as beingconsistent with some of Marx’s usage, it avoids prejudging thisvery issue. However, anyone unmoved by those considerations can simplyreplace “state”, in this context, with their own preferredalternative.

8. Utopianism

8.1 Utopian Socialism

It is well-known that Marx never provided a detailed account of thebasic structure of the future communist society that he predicted.This was not simply an omission on his part, but rather reflects hisdeliberate commitment, as he colloquially has it, to refrain fromwriting “recipes” for the “restaurants” of thefuture (MECW 35: 17, translation amended).

The reasoning that underpins this commitment can be reconstructed fromMarx’s engagement with the radical political tradition that hecalled “utopian socialism”, and whose founding triumviratewere Charles Fourier (1772–1837), Henri Saint-Simon(1760–1825), and Robert Owen (1771–1858). Note that thedistinction between Marxian socialism and utopian socialism is not anexhaustive one. Marx happily allows that there are socialists who areneither Marxian nor Utopian; for example, the “feudalsocialists” discussed in theCommunist Manifesto.

What distinguishes utopian from other socialists is, in large part,their view that providing persuasiveconstructive plans andblueprints of future socialist arrangements is a legitimate andnecessary activity. (The expression “plans and blueprints”is used here to capture the necessarydetail of thesedescriptions, and not to suggest that these designs have to be thoughtof as “stipulative”, as having to be followed to theletter.) On the utopian account, the socialist future needs to bedesigned before it can be delivered; the plans and blueprints beingintended to guide and motivate socialists in their transformativeambitions. Of course, that Marx is notin this sense utopiandoes not rule out the possibility of additional (here unspecified)senses in which he might accurately be so described.

Marx’s account of utopian socialism might appear contradictory.It is certainly easy to find not only passages fiercely criticisingutopian authors and texts, but also passages generously praising them.However, that criticism and that praise turn out to attach to slightlydifferent targets, revealing an underlying and consistent structure tohis account.

That underlying structure rests on two main distinctions. The firstdistinction is achronological one running between thefounding triumvirate, on the one hand, and second and subsequentgenerations of utopian socialists, on the other. (These latergenerations including both loyal followers of the foundingtriumvirate, and independent later figures such as ÉtienneCabet (1788–1856)). The second distinction is asubstantive one running between the critical part of utopianwritings (the portrayal of faults within contemporary capitalistsociety), on the one hand, and the constructive part of utopianwritings (the detailed description of the ideal socialist future), onthe other.

Note that these distinctions underpin the asymmetry of Marx’sassessment of utopian socialism. Simply put: he is more enthusiasticand positive about the achievements of the first generation ofutopians, by comparison with those of second and subsequentgenerations; and he is more enthusiastic and positive about theutopians’ criticism of contemporary society, by comparison withthe utopians’ constructive endeavours.

8.2 Marx’s Utopophobia

The remainder of this section will focus on Marx’s disapprovalof the constructive endeavours of the utopians.

In trying to organise and understand Marx’s various criticismsof utopianism, it is helpful to distinguish between foundational andnon-foundational variants. (This distinction is intended to beexhaustive, in that all of his criticisms of utopianism will fall intoone of these two categories.)Non-foundational criticisms ofutopian socialism are those which, if sound, would provide us with areason to reject views which might be held by, or even becharacteristic of, utopian socialists, but which are not constitutiveof their utopianism. That is, they would give us a reason to abandonthe relevant beliefs, or to criticise those (including utopians) whoheld them, but they would not give us cause to reject utopianism assuch. In contrast,foundational criticisms of utopiansocialism are those which, if sound, would provide us with a reason toreject utopianism as such; that is, a reason to refrain from engagingin socialist design, a reason not to describe in relevant detail thesocialist society of the future. (Of course, that reason might not bedecisive, all things considered, but it would still count againstutopianism per se.)

Many of Marx’s best-known criticisms of utopian socialism arenon-foundational. For instance, in theCommunist Manifesto,he complains that utopian socialists hold a mistaken“ahistorical” view of social change. The utopianspurportedly fail to understand that the achievement of socialismdepends on conditions which can only emerge at a certain stage ofhistorical development. They might, for instance, recognise that thereare strategic preconditions for socialism (for instance, the rightblueprint and sufficient will to put it into practice), but(mistakenly on Marx’s account) imagine that those preconditionscould have appeared at any point in time. This complaint isnon-foundational in that one can accept that there are historicalconditions for establishing a socialist society, and that the utopiansocialists fail to understand this, without thereby having a reason toabandon utopianism as such. A commitment to the necessity anddesirability of socialist design does not require one to hold an“ahistorical” view of social change.

Assessing the soundness of non-foundational criticisms, and theirrelevance to the utopian socialist tradition, is a complicated task(see Leopold 2018). However, even if sound and relevant, thesecriticisms would provide no reason to abandon utopianismassuch. Consequently, they are pursued no further here. Instead,the focus is on the three main foundational arguments againstutopianism that can be located in Marx’s writings; namely, thatutopian plans and blueprints arenecessarily undemocratic,impossible, and redundant (see Leopold 2016).

Marx’s first argument involves anormative claim thatutopian plans and blueprints areundemocratic.(“Democracy” here connoting individual and collectiveself-determination, rather than political forms of governance.) Thebasic argument runs: that it is undemocratic to limit theself-determination of individuals; that providing a plan or blueprintfor a socialist society limits the self-determination of individuals;and that therefore the provision of plans and blueprints for asocialist society is undemocratic. If we add in the assumption thatundemocratic means are undesirable; then we can conclude that it isundesirable to provide plans or blueprints of a future socialistsociety. One central reason for resisting this argument is that it ishard to identify a plausible account of the conditions forself-determination, according to which it is necessarily true thatmerely providing a socialist plan or blueprint restrictsself-determination. Indeed, one might heretically think that detailedplans and blueprints often tend to promote self-determination, helpingindividuals think about where it is they want to go, and how they wantto get there.

Marx’s second argument rests on anepistemologicalclaim that that utopian plans and blueprints areimpossible,because they require accurate knowledge of the future of a kind whichcannot be had. The basic argument starts from the assumption that tobe of any use a blueprint must facilitate the construction of a futuresocialist society. Moreover, to facilitate the construction of afuture socialist society a blueprint must be completely accurate; andto be completely accurate a blueprint must predict all the relevantcircumstances of that future society. However, since it is notpossible—given the complexity of the social world and thelimitations of human nature—to predict all the relevantcircumstances of that future society, we can conclude that socialistblueprints are of no use. One central reason for resisting thisargument is that, whilst it is hard to deny that completely accurateplans are impossible (given the complexity of the world and thelimitations of human understanding), the claim that only completelyaccurate plans are useful seems doubtful. Plans are not simplypredictions, and providing less than wholly accurate plans forourselves often forms part of the process whereby we help determinethe future for ourselves (insofar as that is possible).

Marx’s third argument depends on anempirical claimthat utopian plans and blueprints areunnecessary, becausesatisfactory solutions to social problems emerge automatically fromthe unfolding of the historical process without themselves needing tobe designed. The basic argument runs as follows: that utopianblueprints describe the basic structure of the socialist society ofthe future; and that such blueprints are necessary if and only if thebasic structure of future socialist society needs to be designed.However, given that the basic structure of the future socialistsociety develops automatically (without design assistance) withincapitalist society; and that the role of human agency in thisunfolding historical process is to deliver (not design) that basicstructure, Marx concludes that utopian blueprints are redundant.Reasons for resisting this argument include scepticism about bothMarx’s reasoning and the empirical record. Marx is certain thathumankind does not need to design the basic structure of the futuresocialist society, but it is not really made clear who or what doesthat designing in its place. Moreover, the path of historicaldevelopment since Marx’s day does not obviously confirm thecomplex empirical claim that the basic structure of socialist societyis developing automatically within existing capitalism, needing onlyto be delivered (and not designed) by human agency.

This brief discussion suggests that there are cogent grounds fordoubting Marx’s claim that utopian plans and blueprints arenecessarily undemocratic, impossible, and redundant.

Finally, recall that Marx is less enthusiastic about the second andsubsequent generations of utopians, than he is about the originaltriumvirate. We might reasonably wonder about the rationale forgreater criticism of later utopians. It is important to recognise thatit is not that second and subsequent generations make more or grossererrors than the original triumvirate. (Indeed, Marx appears to thinkthat all these different generations largely held the same views, andmade the same mistakes). The relevant difference is rather that, bycomparison with their successors, this first generation were not toblame for those errors. In short, the rationale behind Marx’spreference for the first over the second and subsequent generations ofutopian socialists is based on an understanding of historicaldevelopment and an associated notion ofculpability.

Marx held that the intellectual formation of this first generationtook place in a historical context (the cusp of the eighteenth andnineteenth centuries) which was sufficiently developed to provokesocialist criticism, but not sufficiently developed for that socialistcriticism to escape serious misunderstandings (Cohen 2000: 51). Sinceneither the material conditions of modern society, nor the historicalagent capable of bringing socialism about, were sufficientlydeveloped, this first generation were bound to develop faulty accountsof the nature of, and transition to, socialism. However, thatdefence—the historical unavoidability of error—is notavailable to subsequent generations who, despite significantly changedcircumstances, hold fast to the original views of their intellectualforerunners. Marx maintains that more recent utopians, unlike theoriginal triumvirate, really ought to know better.

9. Marx’s Legacy

At this point, we might be expected briefly to survey Marx’slegacy.

That legacy is often elaborated in terms of movements and thinkers.However, so understood, the controversy and scale of that legacy makebrevity impossible, and this entry is already long enough. All we cando here is gesture at the history and mention some furtherreading.

The chronology here might provisionally be divided into threehistorical periods: from Marx’s death until the RussiaRevolution (1917); from the Russian Revolution to the fall of theBerlin Wall (1989); and since 1989. It seems hard to say much that iscertain about the last of these periods, but some generalisationsabout the first two might be hazarded.

That first period of “Classical Marxism” can be thought ofin two generational waves. The first smaller group of theorists wasassociated with the Second International, and includes Karl Kautsky(1854–1938) and Plekhanov. The succeeding more activistgeneration includes Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), V.I. Lenin(1870–1924) and Leon Trotsky (1879–1940).

The second period is perhaps dominated by “Soviet Marxism”and the critical reaction from other Marxists that it provoked. Therepressive bureaucratic regimes which solidified in the Soviet Unionand Eastern Europe repressed independent theoretical work, includingscholarly editorial work on the writings of Marx and Engels. However,they also provoked a critical reaction in the form of a body ofthought often called “Western Marxism”, usually said toinclude the work of Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), Theodor Adorno(1903–1969), and Althusser. The later parts of this period sawthe continuing development of “Critical Theory”, as wellas the birth of currents such as “Analytical Marxism”whose longer term impact is uncertain.

These first two periods are both partly covered by the Polishphilosopher and historian of ideas, Leszek Kołakowski, in thefinal two volumes of his encyclopaedic three volumeMain Currentsof Marxism (1976 [1978]). A succinct critical account of theemergence and distinctive character of Western Marxism is provided byPerry Anderson in hisConsiderations on Western Marxism(1976). And some of the more philosophically interesting authors inthis latter tradition are also covered elsewhere in this Encyclopaedia(see theRelated Entries section below). Finally, and edging a little into the third of thesehistorical periods, Christoph Henning offers an account of the (mis)readings of Marx—especially those replacing social theory withmoral philosophy—in German philosophy from Heidegger to Habermasand beyond, in hisPhilosophy After Marx (2014).

However, we might also think of Marx’s legacy, less in terms ofthinkers and movements, and more in terms of reasons for wanting tostudy Marx’s ideas. In that context, we would stress that thisis not simply a question of the truth of his various substantiveclaims. The work of philosophers is, of course, also valued for theoriginality, insight, potential, and so on, that it may also contain.And, so judged, Marx’s writings have much to offer.

The various strands of Marx’s thought surveyed here include hisphilosophical anthropology, his theory of history, his criticalengagement with the economic and political dimensions of capitalism,and a frustratingly vague outline of what might replace it. Whateverthe connections between these threads, it seems implausible to suggestthat Marx’s ideas form a system which has to be swallowed orrejected in its entirety. It might, for instance, be that Marx’sdiagnosis looks more persuasive than his remedies. Readers may havelittle confidence in his solutions, but that does not mean that theproblems he identifies are not acute.

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