John Locke (1632–1704) is among the most influential politicalphilosophers of the modern period. In theTwo Treatises ofGovernment, he defended the claim that men are by nature free andequal against claims that God had made all people naturally subject toa monarch. He argued that people have rights, such as the right tolife, liberty, and property, that have a foundation independent of thelaws of any particular society. Locke used the claim that men arenaturally free and equal as part of the justification forunderstanding legitimate political government as the result of asocial contract where people in the state of nature conditionallytransfer some of their rights to the government in order to betterensure the stable, comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty, andproperty. Since governments exist by the consent of the people inorder to protect the rights of the people and promote the public good,governments that fail to do so can be resisted and replaced with newgovernments. Locke is thus also important for his defense of the rightof revolution. Locke also defends the principle of majority rule andthe separation of legislative and executive powers. In theLetterConcerning Toleration, Locke denied that coercion should be usedto bring people to (what the ruler believes is) the true religion andalso denied that churches should have any coercive power over theirmembers. Locke elaborated on these themes in his later politicalwritings, such as theSecond Letter on Toleration andThird Letter on Toleration.

For a more general introduction to Locke’s history andbackground, the argument of theTwo Treatises, and theLetter Concerning Toleration, seeSection 1,Section 4, andSection 5, respectively, of the main entry onJohn Locke in this encyclopedia. The present entry focuses on eight centralconcepts in Locke’s political philosophy.

• 1. Natural Law and Natural Rights
• 2. State of Nature
• 3. Property
• 4. Consent, Political Obligation, and the Ends of Government
• 5. Locke and Punishment
• 6. Separation of Powers and the Dissolution of Government
• 7. Toleration
• 8. Education and Politics
• Bibliography
  • Select Primary Sources
  • Select Secondary Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Natural Law and Natural Rights

Perhaps the most central concept in Locke’s political philosophyis his theory of natural law and natural rights. The natural lawconcept existed long before Locke as a way of expressing the idea thatthere were certain moral truths that applied to all people, regardlessof the particular place where they lived or the agreements they hadmade. The most important early contrast was between laws that were bynature, and thus generally applicable, and those that wereconventional and operated only in those places where the particularconvention had been established. This distinction is sometimesformulated as the difference between natural law and positive law.

Natural law is also distinct from divine law in that the latter, inthe Christian tradition, normally referred to those laws that God haddirectly revealed through prophets and other inspired writers. Naturallaw can be discovered by reason alone and applies to all people, whiledivine law can be discovered only through God’s specialrevelation and applies only to those to whom it is revealed and whomGod specifically indicates are to be bound. Thus someseventeenth-century commentators, Locke included, held that not all ofthe 10 commandments, much less the rest of the Old Testament law, werebinding on all people. The 10 commandments begin “Hear OIsrael” and thus are only binding on the people to whom theywere addressed (Works 6:37). (Spelling and formatting aremodernized in quotations from Locke in this entry). As we will seebelow, even though Locke thought natural law could be known apart fromspecial revelation, he saw no contradiction in God playing a part inthe argument, so long as the relevant aspects of God’s charactercould be discovered by reason alone. In Locke’s theory, divinelaw and natural law are consistent and can overlap in content, butthey are not coextensive. Thus there is no problem for Locke if theBible commands a moral code that is stricter than the one that can bederived from natural law, but there is a real problem if the Bibleteaches what is contrary to natural law. In practice, Locke avoidedthis problem because consistency with natural law was one of thecriteria he used when deciding the proper interpretation of Biblicalpassages.

The language of natural rights also gained prominence through thewritings of thinkers in the generation before Locke, such as Grotiusand Hobbes, and of his contemporary Pufendorf. Whereas natural lawemphasized duties, natural rights normally emphasized privileges orclaims to which an individual was entitled. There is considerabledisagreement as to how these factors are to be understood in relationto each other in Locke’s theory. Leo Strauss (1953), and many ofhis followers, take rights to be paramount, going so far as to portrayLocke’s position as essentially similar to that of Hobbes. Theypoint out that Locke defended a hedonist theory of human motivation(Essay 2.20) and claim that he must agree with Hobbes aboutthe essentially self-interested nature of human beings. Locke, theyclaim, recognizes natural law obligations only in those situationswhere our own preservation is not in conflict, further emphasizingthat our right to preserve ourselves trumps any duties we mayhave.

On the other end of the spectrum, more scholars have adopted the viewof Dunn (1969), Tully (1980), and Ashcraft (1986) that it is naturallaw, not natural rights, that is primary. They hold that when Lockeemphasized the right to life, liberty, and property he was primarilymaking a point about the duties we have toward other people: dutiesnot to kill, enslave, or steal. Most scholars also argue that Lockerecognized a general duty to assist with the preservation of mankind,including a duty of charity to those who have no other way to procuretheir subsistence (Two Treatises 1.42). These scholars regardduties as primary in Locke because rights exist to ensure that we areable to fulfill our duties. Simmons (1992) takes a position similar tothe latter group, but claims that rights are not just the flip side ofduties in Locke, nor merely a means to performing our duties. Instead,rights and duties are equally fundamental because Locke believes in a“robust zone of indifference” in which rights protect ourability to make choices. While these choices cannot violate naturallaw, they are not a mere means to fulfilling natural law either. BrianTierney (2014) questions whether one needs to prioritize natural lawor natural right since both typically function as corollaries. Heargues that modern natural rights theories are a development frommedieval conceptions of natural law that included permissions to actor not act in certain ways.

There have been some attempts to find a compromise between thesepositions. Michael Zuckert’s (1994) version of the Straussianposition acknowledges more differences between Hobbes and Locke.Zuckert still questions the sincerity of Locke’s theism, butthinks that Locke does develop a position that grounds property rightsin the fact that human beings own themselves, something Hobbes denied.Adam Seagrave (2014) has gone a step further. He argues that thecontradiction between Locke’s claim that human beings are ownedby God and that human beings own themselves is only apparent. He basesthis argument on passages from Locke’s other writings(especially theEssay Concerning Human Understanding). In thepassages about divine ownership, Locke is speaking about humanity as awhole, while in the passages about self-ownership he is talking aboutindividual human beings with the capacity for property ownership. Godcreated human beings who are capable of having property rights withrespect to one another on the basis of owning their labor. Both ofthem emphasize differences between Locke’s use of natural rightsand the earlier tradition of natural law.

Another point of contestation has to do with the extent to which Lockethought natural law could, in fact, be known by reason. Both Strauss(1953) and Peter Laslett (Introduction to Locke’sTwoTreatises), though very different in their interpretations ofLocke generally, see Locke’s theory of natural law as filledwith contradictions. In theEssay Concerning HumanUnderstanding, Locke defends a theory of moral knowledge thatnegates the possibility of innate ideas (Essay Book 1) andclaims that morality is capable of demonstration in the same way thatMathematics is (Essay 3.11.16, 4.3.18–20). Yet nowherein any of his works does Locke make a full deduction of natural lawfrom first premises. More than that, Locke at times seems to appeal toinnate ideas in theSecond Treatise (2.11), and inTheReasonableness of Christianity (Works 7:139) he admitsthat no one has ever worked out all of natural law from reason alone.Strauss infers from this that the contradictions exist to show theattentive reader that Locke does not really believe in natural law atall. Laslett, more conservatively, simply says that Locke thephilosopher and Locke the political writer should be kept veryseparate.

Many scholars reject this position. Yolton (1958), Colman (1883),Ashcraft (1987), Grant (1987), Simmons (1992), Tuckness (1999),Israelson (2013), Rossiter (2016), Connolly (2019), and others allargue that there is nothing strictly inconsistent in Locke’sadmission inThe Reasonableness of Christianity. That no onehas deduced all of natural law from first principles does not meanthat none of it has been deduced. The supposedly contradictorypassages in theTwo Treatises are far from decisive. While itis true that Locke does not provide a deduction in theEssay,it is not clear that he was trying to. Section 4.10.1–19 of thatwork seems more concerned to show how reasoning with moral terms ispossible, not to actually provide a full account of natural law.Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Locke did not treat the topic ofnatural law as systematically as one might like. Attempts to work outhis theory in more detail with respect to its ground and its contentmust try to reconstruct it from scattered passages in many differenttexts.

To understand Locke’s position on the ground of natural law itmust be situated within a larger debate in natural law theory thatpredates Locke, the so-called“voluntarism-intellectualism,” or“voluntarist-rationalist” debate. At its simplest, thevoluntarist declares that right and wrong are determined byGod’s will and that we are obliged to obey the will of Godsimply because it is the will of God. Unless these positions aremaintained, the voluntarist argues, God becomes superfluous tomorality since both the content and the binding force of morality canbe explained without reference to God. The intellectualist repliesthat this understanding makes morality arbitrary and fails to explainwhy we have an obligation to obey God. Graedon Zorzi (2019) has arguedthat “person” is a relational term for Locke, indicatingthat we will be held accountable by God for whether we have followedthe law.

With respect to the grounds and content of natural law, Locke is notcompletely clear. On the one hand, there are many instances where hemakes statements that sound voluntarist to the effect that lawrequires a legislator with authority (Essay 1.3.6, 4.10.7).Locke also repeatedly insists in theEssays on the Law ofNature that created beings have an obligation to obey theircreator (Political Essays 116–120). On the other handthere are statements that seem to imply an external moral standard towhich God must conform (Two Treatises 2.195;Works7:6). Locke clearly wants to avoid the implication that the content ofnatural law is arbitrary. Several solutions have been proposed. Onesolution suggested by Herzog (1985) makes Locke an intellectualist bygrounding our obligation to obey God on a prior duty of gratitude thatexists independent of God. A second option, suggested by Simmons(1992), is simply to take Locke as a voluntarist since that is wherethe preponderance of his statements point. A third option, suggestedby Tuckness (1999) (and implied by Grant 1987 and affirmed byIsraelson 2013), is to treat the question of voluntarism as having twodifferent parts, grounds and content. On this view, Locke was indeed avoluntarist with respect to the question “why should we obey thelaw of nature?” Locke thought that reason, apart from the willof a superior, could only be advisory. With respect to content, divinereason and human reason must be sufficiently analogous that humanbeings can reason about what God likely wills. Locke takes it forgranted that since God created us with reason in order to followGod’s will, human reason and divine reason are sufficientlysimilar that natural law will not seem arbitrary to us.

Those interested in the contemporary relevance of Locke’spolitical theory must confront its theological aspects. Straussiansmake Locke’s theory relevant by claiming that the theologicaldimensions of his thought are primarily rhetorical; they were“cover” to keep him from being persecuted by the religiousauthorities of his day. Others, such as Dunn (1969) and Stanton(2018), take Locke to be of only limited relevance to contemporarypolitics precisely because so many of his arguments depend onreligious assumptions that are no longer widely shared. Some authors,such as Simmons (1992) and Vernon (1997), have tried to separate thefoundations of Locke’s argument from other aspects of it.Simmons, for example, argues that Locke’s thought isover-determined, containing both religious and secular arguments. Heclaims that for Locke the fundamental law of nature is that “asmuch as possible mankind is to be preserved” (TwoTreatises 2.135). At times, he claims, Locke presents thisprinciple in rule-consequentialist terms: it is the principle we useto determine the more specific rights and duties that all have. Atother times, Locke hints at a more Kantian justification thatemphasizes the impropriety of treating our equals as if they were meremeans to our ends. Waldron (2002) explores the opposite claim: thatLocke’s theology actually provides a more solid basis for hispremise of political equality than do contemporary secular approachesthat tend to simply assert equality.

With respect to the specific content of natural law, Locke neverprovides a comprehensive statement of what it requires. In theTwoTreatises, Locke frequently states that the fundamental law ofnature is that as much as possible mankind is to be preserved. Simmons(1992) argues that inTwo Treatises 2.6 Locke presents (1) aduty to preserve one’s self, (2) a duty to preserve others whenself-preservation does not conflict, (3) a duty not to take away thelife of another, and (4) a duty not to act in a way that “tendsto destroy” others. Libertarian interpreters of Locke tend todownplay duties of type 1 and 2. Locke presents a more extensive listin his earlier, and unpublished in his lifetime,Essays on the Lawof Nature. Interestingly, Locke here includes praise and honor ofthe deity as required by natural law as well as what we might callgood character qualities.

2. State of Nature

Locke’s concept of the state of nature has been interpreted bycommentators in a variety of ways. At first glance it seems quitesimple. Locke writes “want [lack] of a common judge, withauthority, puts all men in a state of nature” and again,“Men living together according to reason, without a commonsuperior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properlythe state of nature.” (Two Treatises 2.19) Manycommentators have taken this as Locke’s definition, concludingthat the state of nature exists wherever there is no legitimatepolitical authority able to judge disputes and where people liveaccording to the law of reason. On this account the state of nature isdistinct from political society, where a legitimate government exists,and from a state of war where men fail to abide by the law ofreason.

Simmons (1993) presents an important challenge to this view. Simmonspoints out that the above statement is worded as a sufficient ratherthan necessary condition. Two individuals might be able, in the stateof nature, to authorize a third to settle disputes between themwithout leaving the state of nature, since the third party would nothave, for example, the power to legislate for the public good. Simmonsalso claims that other interpretations often fail to account for thefact that there are some people who live in states with legitimategovernments who are nonetheless in the state of nature: visitingaliens (Two Treatises 2.9), children below the age ofmajority (2.15, 118), and those with a “defect” of reason(2.60). He claims that the state of nature is a relational conceptdescribing a particular set of moral relations that exist betweenparticular people, rather than a description of a particulargeographical territory where there is no government with effectivecontrol. The state of nature is just the way of describing the moralrights and responsibilities that exist between people who have notconsented to the adjudication of their disputes by the same legitimategovernment. The groups just mentioned either have not or cannot giveconsent, so they remain in the state of nature. Thus A may be in thestate of nature with respect to B, but not with C.

Simmons’ account stands in sharp contrast to that of Strauss(1953). According to Strauss, Locke presents the state of nature as afactual description of what the earliest society is like, an accountthat when read closely reveals Locke’s departure from Christianteachings. State of nature theories, he and his followers argue, arecontrary to the Biblical account in Genesis and evidence thatLocke’s teaching is similar to that of Hobbes. As noted above,on the Straussian account Locke’s apparently Christianstatements are only a façade designed to conceal hisessentially anti-Christian views. According to Simmons, since thestate of nature is a moral account, it is compatible with a widevariety of social accounts without contradiction. If we know only thata group of people are in a state of nature, we know only the rightsand responsibilities they have toward one another; we know nothingabout whether they are rich or poor, peaceful or warlike.

A complementary interpretation is made by John Dunn (1969) withrespect to the relationship between Locke’s state of nature andhis Christian beliefs. Dunn claimed that Locke’s state of natureis less an exercise in historical anthropology than a theologicalreflection on the condition of man. On Dunn’s interpretation,Locke’s state of nature thinking is an expression of histheological position, that man exists in a world created by God forGod’s purposes but that governments are created by men in orderto further those purposes.

Locke’s theory of the state of nature will thus be tied closelyto his theory of natural law, since the latter defines the rights ofpersons and their status as free and equal persons. The stronger thegrounds for accepting Locke’s characterization of people asfree, equal, and independent, the more helpful the state of naturebecomes as a device for representing people. Still, it is important toremember that none of these interpretations claims that Locke’sstate of nature isonly a thought experiment, in the way Kantand Rawls are normally thought to use the concept. Locke did notrespond to the argument “where have there ever been people insuch a state” by saying it did not matter since it was only athought experiment. Instead, he argued that there are and have beenpeople in the state of nature (Two Treatises 2.14). It seemsimportant to him that at least some governments have actually beenformed in the way he suggests. How much it matters whether they havebeen or not will be discussed below under the topic of consent, sincethe central question is whether a good government can be legitimateeven if it does not have the actual consent of the people who liveunder it; hypothetical contract and actual contract theories will tendto answer this question differently.

3. Property

Locke’s treatment of property is generally thought to be amonghis most important contributions in political thought, but it is alsoone of the aspects of his thought that has been most heavilycriticized. There are important debates over what exactly Locke wastrying to accomplish with his theory. One interpretation, advanced byC.B. Macpherson (1962), sees Locke as a defender of unrestrictedcapitalist accumulation. On Macpherson’s interpretation, Lockeis thought to have set three restrictions on the accumulation ofproperty in the state of nature: (1) one may only appropriate as muchas one can use before it spoils (Two Treatises 2.31), (2) onemust leave “enough and as good” for others (thesufficiency restriction) (2.27), and (3) one may (supposedly) onlyappropriate property through one’s own labor (2.27). Macphersonclaims that as the argument progresses, each of these restrictions istranscended. The spoilage restriction ceases to be a meaningfulrestriction with the invention of money because value can be stored ina medium that does not decay (2.46–47). The sufficiencyrestriction is transcended because the creation of private property soincreases productivity that even those who no longer have theopportunity to acquire land will have more opportunity to acquire whatis necessary for life (2.37). According to Macpherson’s view,the “enough and as good” requirement is itself merely aderivative of a prior principle guaranteeing the opportunity toacquire, through labor, the necessities of life. The thirdrestriction, Macpherson argues, was not one Locke actually held atall. Though Locke appears to suggest that one can only have propertyin what one has personally labored on when he makes labor the sourceof property rights, Locke clearly recognized that even in the state ofnature, “the Turfs my Servant has cut” (2.28) can becomemy property. Locke, according to Macpherson, thus clearly recognizedthat labor can be alienated. As one would guess, Macpherson iscritical of the “possessive individualism” thatLocke’s theory of property represents. He argues that itscoherence depends upon the assumption of differential rationalitybetween capitalists and wage-laborers and on the division of societyinto distinct classes. Because Locke was bound by these constraints,we are to understand him as including only property owners as votingmembers of society.

Macpherson’s understanding of Locke has been criticized fromseveral different directions. Alan Ryan (1965) argued that sinceproperty for Locke includes life and liberty as well as estate(Two Treatises 2.87), even those without land could still bemembers of political society. The dispute between the two would thenturn on whether Locke was using “property” in the moreexpansive sense in some of the crucial passages. James Tully (1980)attacked Macpherson’s interpretation by pointing out that theFirst Treatise specifically includes a duty of charity towardthose who have no other means of subsistence (1.42). While this dutyis consistent with requiring the poor to work for low wages, it doesundermine the claim that those who have wealth haveno socialduties to others.

Tully also argued for a fundamental reinterpretation of Locke’stheory. Previous accounts had focused on the claim that since personsown their own labor, when they mix their labor with that which isunowned it becomes their property. Robert Nozick (1974) criticizedthis argument with his famous example of mixing tomato juice onerightfully owns with the sea. When we mix what we own with what we donot, why should we think we gain property instead of losing it? OnTully’s account, focus on the mixing metaphor missesLocke’s emphasis on what he calls the “workmanshipmodel.” Locke believed that makers have property rights withrespect to what they make just as God has property rights with respectto human beings because he is their maker. Human beings are created inthe image of God and share with God, though to a much lesser extent,the ability to shape and mold the physical environment in accordancewith a rational pattern or plan. Waldron (1988) has criticized thisinterpretation on the grounds that it would make the rights of humanmakers absolute in the same way that God’s right over hiscreation is absolute. Sreenivasan (1995) has defended Tully’sargument against Waldron’s response by claiming a distinctionbetween creating and making. Only creating generates an absoluteproperty right, and only God can create, but making is analogous tocreating and creates an analogous, though weaker, right.

Another controversial aspect of Tully’s interpretation of Lockeis his interpretation of the sufficiency condition and itsimplications. On his analysis, the sufficiency argument is crucial forLocke’s argument to be plausible. Since Locke begins with theassumption that the world is owned by all, individual property is onlyjustified if it can be shown that no one is made worse off by theappropriation. In conditions where the good taken is not scarce, wherethere is much water or land available, an individual’s takingsome portion of it does no harm to others. Where this condition is notmet, those who are denied access to the good do have a legitimateobjection to appropriation. According to Tully, Locke realized that assoon as land became scarce, previous rights acquired by labor nolonger held since “enough and as good” was no longeravailable for others. Once land became scarce, property could only belegitimated by the creation of political society.

Waldron (1988) claims that, contrary to Macpherson (1962), Tully(1980), and others, Locke did not recognize a sufficiency condition atall. He notes that, strictly speaking, Locke makes sufficiency asufficient rather than necessary condition when he says that laborgenerates a title to property “at least where there is enough,and as good left in common for others” (Two Treatises2.27). Waldron takes Locke to be making a descriptive statement, not anormative one, about the conditions that initially existed. Waldronalso argues that in the text “enough and as good” is notpresented as a restriction and is not grouped with other restrictions.Waldron thinks that the condition would lead Locke to the absurdconclusion that in circumstances of scarcity everyone must starve todeath since no one would be able to obtain universal consent and anyappropriation would make others worse off.

One of the strongest defenses of Tully’s position is presentedby Sreenivasan (1995). He argues that Locke’s repetitious use of“enough and as good” indicates that the phrase is doingsome real work in the argument. In particular, it is the only wayLocke can be thought to have provided some solution to the fact thatthe consent of all is needed to justify appropriation in the state ofnature. If others are not harmed, they have no grounds to object andcan be thought to consent, whereas if they are harmed, it isimplausible to think of them as consenting. Sreenivasan does departfrom Tully in some important respects. He takes “enough and asgood” to mean “enough and as good opportunity for securingone’s preservation,” not “enough and as good of thesame commodity (such as land).” This has the advantage of makingLocke’s account of property less radical since it does not claimthat Locke thought the point of his theory was to show that alloriginal property rights were invalid at the point where politicalcommunities were created. The disadvantage of this interpretation, asSreenivasan admits, is that it saddles Locke with a flawed argument.Those who merely have the opportunity to labor for others atsubsistence wages no longer have the liberty that individuals hadbefore scarcity to benefit from the full surplus of value they create.Moreover, poor laborers no longer enjoy equality of access to thematerials from which products can be made. Sreenivasan thinks thatLocke’s theory is thus unable to solve the problem of howindividuals can obtain individual property rights in what is initiallyowned by all people without consent.

Simmons (1992) presents a still different synthesis. He sides withWaldron (1988) and against Tully (1980) and Sreenivasan (1995) inrejecting the workmanship model. He claims that the references to“making” in chapter five of theTwo Treatises arenot making in the right sense of the word for the workmanship model tobe correct. Locke thinks we have property in our own persons eventhough we do not make or create ourselves. Simmons claims that whileLocke did believe that God had rights as creator, human beings have adifferent limited right astrustees, not as makers. Simmonsbases this in part on his reading of two distinct arguments he takesLocke to make: the first justifies property based on God’s willand basic human needs, the second based on “mixing” labor.According to the former argument, at least some property rights can bejustified by showing that a scheme allowing appropriation of propertywithout consent has beneficial consequences for the preservation ofmankind. This argument is overdetermined, according to Simmons, inthat it can be interpreted either theologically or as a simplerule-consequentialist argument. With respect to the latter argument,Simmons takes labor not to be a substance that is literally“mixed” but rather as a purposive activity aimed atsatisfying needs and conveniences of life. Like Sreenivasan, Simmonssees this as flowing from a prior right of people to secure theirsubsistence, but Simmons also adds a prior right to self-government.Labor can generate claims to private property because private propertymakes individuals more independent and able to direct their ownactions. Simmons thinks Locke’s argument is ultimately flawedbecause he underestimated the extent to which wage labor would makethe poor dependent on the rich, undermining self-government. He alsojoins the chorus of those who find Locke’s appeal to consent tothe introduction of money inadequate to justify the very unequalproperty holdings that now exist.

Some authors have suggested that Locke may have had an additionalconcern in mind in writing the chapter on property. Tully (1993) andBarbara Arneil (1996) point out that Locke was interested in andinvolved in the affairs of the American colonies and thatLocke’s theory of labor led to the convenient conclusion thatthe labor of Native Americans generated property rights only over theanimals they caught, not the land on which they hunted which Lockeregarded as vacant and available for the taking. David Armitage (2004)even argues that there is evidence that Locke was actively involved inrevising the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina at thesame time he was drafting the chapter on property for theSecondTreatise. Mark Goldie (1983), however, cautions that we shouldnot miss the fact that political events in England were stillLocke’s primary focus in writing theSecondTreatise.

A final question concerns the status of those property rights acquiredin the state of nature after civil society has come into being. Itseems clear that at the very least Locke allows taxation to take placeby the consent of the majority rather than requiring unanimous consent(2.140). Nozick (1974) takes Locke to be a libertarian, with thegovernment having no right to take property to use for the common goodwithout the consent of the property owner. On his interpretation, themajority may only tax at the rate needed to allow the government tosuccessfully protect property rights. At the other extreme, Tully(1980) thinks that, by the time government is formed, land is alreadyscarce and so the initial holdings of the state of nature are nolonger valid and thus are no constraint on governmental action.Waldron’s (1988) view is in between these, acknowledging thatproperty rights are among the rights from the state of nature thatcontinue to constrain the government, but seeing the legislature ashaving the power to interpret what natural law requires in this matterin a fairly substantial way.

4. Consent, Political Obligation, and the Ends of Government

The most direct reading of Locke’s political philosophy findsthe concept of consent playing a central role. His analysis beginswith individuals in a state of nature where they are not subject to acommon legitimate authority with the power to legislate or adjudicatedisputes. From this natural state of freedom and independence, Lockestresses individual consent as the mechanism by which politicalsocieties are created and individuals join those societies. Whilethere are of course some general obligations and rights that allpeople have from the law of nature, special obligations come aboutonly when we voluntarily undertake them. Locke clearly states that onecan only become a full member of society by an act of express consent(Two Treatises 2.122). The literature on Locke’s theoryof consent tends to focus on how Locke does or does not successfullyanswer the following objection: few people have actually consented totheir governments so no, or almost no, governments are actuallylegitimate. This conclusion is problematic since it is clearlycontrary to Locke’s intention.

Locke’s most obvious solution to this problem is his doctrine oftacit consent. Simply by walking along the highways of a country aperson gives tacit consent to the government and agrees to obey itwhile living in its territory. This, Locke thinks, explains whyresident aliens have an obligation to obey the laws of the state wherethey reside, though only while they live there. Inheriting propertycreates an even stronger bond, since the original owner of theproperty permanently put the property under the jurisdiction of thecommonwealth. Children, when they accept the property of theirparents, consent to the jurisdiction of the commonwealth over thatproperty (Two Treatises 2.120). There is debate over whetherthe inheritance of property should be regarded as tacit or expressconsent. On one interpretation, by accepting the property, Lockethinks a person becomes a full member of society, which implies thathe must regard this as an act of express consent. Grant (1987)suggests that Locke’s ideal would have been an explicitmechanism of society whereupon adults would give express consent andthis would be a precondition of inheriting property. On the otherinterpretation, Locke recognized that people inheriting property didnot in the process of doing so make any explicit declaration abouttheir political obligation.

However this debate is resolved, there will be in any current orpreviously existing society many people who have never given expressconsent, and thus some version of tacit consent seems needed toexplain how governments could still be legitimate. Simmons finds itdifficult to see how merely walking on a street or inheriting land canbe thought of as an example of a “deliberate, voluntaryalienating of rights” (Simmons 1993, 69). It is one thing, heargues, for a person to consent by actions rather than words; it isquite another to claim a person has consented without being aware thatthey have done so. To require a person to leave behind all of theirproperty and emigrate in order to avoid giving tacit consent is tocreate a situation where continued residence is not a free andvoluntary choice. Simmons’ approach is to agree with Locke thatreal consent is necessary for political obligation but disagree aboutwhether most people in fact have given that kind of consent. Simmonsclaims that Locke’s arguments push toward “philosophicalanarchism,” the position that most people do not have a moralobligation to obey the government, even though Locke himself would nothave made this claim.

Hannah Pitkin (1965) takes a very different approach. She claims thatthe logic of Locke’s argument makes consent far less importantin practice than it might appear. Tacit consent is indeed a wateringdown of the concept of consent, but Locke can do this because thebasic content of what governments are to be like is set by natural lawand not by consent. If consent were truly foundational inLocke’s scheme, we would discover the legitimate powers of anygiven government by finding out what contract the original founderssigned. Pitkin, however, thinks that for Locke the form and powers ofgovernment are determined by natural law. What really matters,therefore, is not previous acts of consent but the quality of thepresent government, whether it corresponds to what natural lawrequires. Locke does not think, for example, that walking the streetsor inheriting property in a tyrannical regime means we have consentedto that regime. It is thus the quality of the government, not acts ofactual consent, that determine whether a government is legitimate.Simmons objects to this interpretation, saying that it fails toaccount for the many places where Locke does indeed say a personacquires political obligations only by his own consent.

John Dunn (1967) takes a still different approach. He claims that itis anachronistic to read into Locke a modern conception of what countsas “consent.” While modern theories do insist that consentis truly consent only if it is deliberate and voluntary, Locke’sconcept of consent was far broader. For Locke, it was enough thatpeople be “not unwilling.” Voluntary acquiescence, onDunn’s interpretation, is all that is needed. As evidence Dunncan point to the fact that many of the instances of consent Lockeuses, such as “consenting” to the use of money, make moresense on this broad interpretation. Simmons objects that this ignoresthe instances where Locke does talk about consent as a deliberatechoice and that, in any case, it would only make Locke consistent atthe price of making him unconvincing.

Recent scholarship has continued to probe these issues. Davis (2014)closely examines Locke’s terminology and argues that we mustdistinguish between political society and legitimate government. Onlythose who have expressly consented are members of political society,while the government exercises legitimate authority over various typesof people who have not so consented. The government is supreme in somerespects, but there is no sovereign. He also argues (2017) that onecould give actual consent in Locke’s day by declaringone’s intent to cast a vote, rather than by voting for aparticular candidate. The former is more plausibly interpreted as anact of affirmative consent to be a member of a political society.Registering to vote, as opposed to actually voting, would be acontemporary analogue. Van der Vossen (2015) makes a related argument,claiming that the initial consent of property owners is not themechanism by which governments come to rule over a particularterritory. Rather, Locke thinks that people (probably fathersinitially) simply begin exercising political authority and peopletacitly consent. This tacit consent is sufficient to justify arudimentary state that rules over the consenters. Treaties betweenthese governments would then fix the territorial borders. Hoff (2015)goes still further, arguing that we need not even think of specificacts of tacit consent (such as deciding not to emigrate) as necessaryfor generating political obligation. Instead, consent is implied ifthe government itself functions in ways that show it is answerable tothe people.

A related question has to do with the extent of our obligation onceconsent has been given. The interpretive school influenced by Straussemphasizes the primacy of preservation. Since the duties of naturallaw apply only when our preservation is not threatened (TwoTreatises 2.6), then our obligations cease in cases where ourpreservation is directly threatened. This has important implicationsif we consider a soldier who is being sent on a mission where death isextremely likely. Grant (1987) points out that Locke believes asoldier who deserts from such a mission (2.139) is justly sentenced todeath. Grant takes Locke to be claiming not only that desertion lawsare legitimate in the sense that they can be blamelessly enforced(something Hobbes would grant) but that they also imply a moralobligation on the part of the soldier to give up his life for thecommon good (something Hobbes would deny). According to Grant, Lockethinks that our acts of consent can, in fact, extend to cases whereliving up to our commitments will risk our lives. The decision toenter political society is a permanent one for precisely this reason:the society will have to be defended and if people can revoke theirconsent to help protect it when attacked, the act of consent made whenentering political society would be pointless since the politicalcommunity would fail at the very point where it is most needed. Peoplemake a calculated decision when they enter society, and the risk ofdying in combat is part of that calculation. Grant also thinks Lockerecognizes a duty based on reciprocity since others risk their livesas well.

Most of these approaches focus on Locke’s doctrine of consent asa solution to the problem of political obligation. A differentapproach asks what role consent plays in determining, here and now,the legitimate ends that governments can pursue. One part of thisdebate is captured by the debate between Seliger (1968) and Kendall(1959), the former viewing Locke as a constitutionalist and the latterviewing him as giving almost unlimited power to majorities. On theformer interpretation, a constitution is created by the consent of thepeople as part of the creation of the commonwealth. On the latterinterpretation, the people create a legislature which rules bymajority vote. A third view, advanced by Tuckness (2002a), holds thatLocke was flexible at this point and gave people considerableflexibility in constitutional drafting.

A second part of the debate focuses on ends rather than institutions.Locke states in theTwo Treatises that the power of theGovernment is limited to the public good. It is a power “thathath no other end but preservation” and therefore cannot justifykilling, enslaving, or plundering the citizens (2.135). Libertarianslike Nozick (1974) read this as stating that governments exist only toprotect people from infringements on their rights. An alternateinterpretation, advanced by Tuckness (2002b, 2008a), draws attentionto the fact that in the following sentences the formulation of naturallaw that Locke focuses on is a positive one, that “as much aspossible” mankind is to be preserved. On this second reading,government is limited to fulfilling the purposes of natural law, butthese include positive goals as well as negative rights. On this view,the power to promote the common good extends to actions designed toincrease population, improve the military, strengthen the economy andinfrastructure, and so on, provided these steps are indirectly usefulto the goal of preserving the society. This would explain why Locke,in theLetter, describes government promotion of “arms,riches, and multitude of citizens” as the proper remedy for thedanger of foreign attack (Works 6: 42).

5. Locke and Punishment

John Locke defined political power as “a right of making lawswith penalties of death, and consequently all less Penalties”(Two Treatises 2.3). Locke’s theory of punishment isthus central to his view of politics and part of what he consideredinnovative about his political philosophy. But he also referred to hisaccount of punishment as a “very strange doctrine” (2.9),presumably because it ran against the assumption that only politicalsovereigns could punish. Locke believed that punishment requires thatthere be a law, and since the state of nature has the law of nature togovern it, it is permissible to describe one individual as“punishing” another in that state. Locke’s rationaleis that since the fundamental law of nature is that mankind bepreserved and since that law would “be in vain” with nohuman power to enforce it (Two Treatises 2.7), it must,therefore, be legitimate for individuals to punish each other evenbefore government exists. In arguing this, Locke was disagreeing withSamuel Pufendorf (1934). Samuel Pufendorf had argued strongly that theconcept of punishment made no sense apart from an established positivelegal structure.

Locke realized that the crucial objection to allowing people to act asjudges with power to punish in the state of nature was that suchpeople would end up being judges in their own cases. Locke readilyadmitted that this was a serious inconvenience and a primary reasonfor leaving the state of nature (Two Treatises 2.13). Lockeinsisted on this point because it helped explain the transition intocivil society. Locke thought that in the state of nature men had aliberty to engage in “innocent delights” (actions that arenot a violation of any applicable laws), to seek their ownpreservation within the limits of natural law, and to punishviolations of natural law. The power to seek one’s preservationis limited in civil society by the law, and the power to punish istransferred to the government (Two Treatises2.128–130). The power to punish in the state of nature is thusthe foundation for the right of governments to use coercive force.

The situation becomes more complex, however, if we look at theprinciples which are to guide punishment. Rationales for punishmentare often divided into those that are forward-looking andbackward-looking. Forward-looking rationales include deterring crime,protecting society from dangerous persons, and rehabilitation ofcriminals. Backward-looking rationales normally focus on retribution,inflicting on the criminal harm comparable to the crime. Locke mayseem to conflate these two rationales in passages like thefollowing:

And thus in the state of nature, one Man comes by a power overanother, but yet no absolute or arbitrary Power, to use a criminalwhen he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats,or boundless extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute tohim, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what isproportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve forreparation and restraint. For these two are the only reasons, why oneman may lawfully do harm to another, which is that [which] we callpunishment. (Two Treatises 2.8)

Locke talks both of retribution and of punishing only for reparationand restraint. Simmons argues that this is evidence that Locke iscombining both rationales for punishment in his theory. A survey ofother seventeenth-century natural rights justifications forpunishment, however, indicates that it was common to use words like“retribute” in theories that reject what we would todaycall retributive punishment (Tuckness 2010a). In the passage quotedabove, Locke is saying that the proper amount of punishment is theamount that will provide restitution to injured parties, protect thepublic, and deter future crime. Locke’s attitude towardpunishment in his other writings on toleration, education, andreligion consistently follows this path toward justifying punishmenton grounds other than retribution. Tuckness claims that Locke’semphasis on restitution is interesting because restitution is backwardlooking in a sense (it seeks to restore an earlier state of affairs)but also forward looking in that it provides tangible benefits tothose who receive the restitution. There is a link here betweenLocke’s understanding of natural punishment and hisunderstanding of legitimate state punishment. Even in the state ofnature, a primary justification for punishment is that it helpsfurther the positive goal of preserving human life and human property.The emphasis on deterrence, public safety, and restitution inpunishments administered by the government mirrors this emphasis.

A second puzzle regarding punishment is the permissibility ofpunishing internationally. Locke describes international relations asa state of nature, and so in principle, states should have the samepower to punish breaches of the natural law in the internationalcommunity that individuals have in the state of nature. This wouldlegitimize, for example, punishment of individuals for war crimes orcrimes against humanity even in cases where neither the laws of theparticular state nor international law authorize punishment. Thus inWorld War II, even if “crimes of aggression” was not atthe time recognized as a crime for which individual punishment wasjustified, if the actions violated the natural law principle that oneshould not deprive another of life, liberty, or property, the guiltyparties could still be liable to criminal punishment. The most commoninterpretation has thus been that the power to punish internationallyis symmetrical with the power to punish in the state of nature.

Tuckness (2008a), however, has argued that there is an asymmetrybetween the two cases because Locke also talks about states beinglimited in the goals that they can pursue. Locke often says that thepower of the government is to be used for the protection of the rightsof its own citizens, not for the rights of all people everywhere(Two Treatises 1.92, 2.88, 2.95, 2.131, 2.147). Locke arguesthat in the state of nature a person is to use the power to punish topreserve his society, which is mankind as a whole. After states areformed, however, the power to punish is to be used for the benefit ofhis own particular society. In the state of nature, a person is notrequired to risk his life for another (Two Treatises 2.6),and this presumably would also mean a person is not required to punishin the state of nature when attempting to punish would risk the lifeof the punisher. Locke may therefore be objecting to the idea thatsoldiers can be compelled to risk their lives for altruistic reasons.In the state of nature, a person could refuse to attempt to punishothers if doing so would risk his life and so Locke reasons thatindividuals may not have consented to allow the state to risk theirlives for altruistic punishment of international crimes.

6. Separation of Powers and the Dissolution of Government

Locke claims that legitimate government is based on the idea ofseparation of powers. First and foremost of these is the legislativepower. Locke describes the legislative power as supreme (TwoTreatises 2.149) in having ultimate authority over “how theforce for the commonwealth shall be employed” (2.143). Thelegislature is still bound by the law of nature and much of what itdoes is set down laws that further the goals of natural law andspecify appropriate punishments for them (2.135). The executive poweris then charged with enforcing the law as it is applied in specificcases. Interestingly, Locke’s third power is called the“federative power” and it consists of the right to actinternationally according to the law of nature. Since countries arestill in the state of nature with respect to each other, they mustfollow the dictates of natural law and can punish one another forviolations of that law in order to protect the rights of theircitizens.

The fact that Locke does not mention the judicial power as a separatepower becomes clearer if we distinguish powers from institutions.Powers relate to functions. To have a power means that there is afunction (such as making the laws or enforcing the laws) that one maylegitimately perform. When Locke says that the legislative is supremeover the executive, he is not saying that parliament is supreme overthe king. Locke is simply affirming that “what can give laws toanother, must needs be superior to him” (Two Treatises2.150). Moreover, Locke thinks that it is possible for multipleinstitutions to share the same power; for example, the legislativepower in his day was shared by the House of Commons, the House ofLords, and the King. Since all three needed to agree for something tobecome law, all three are part of the legislative power (1.151). Healso thinks that the federative power and the executive power arenormally placed in the hands of the executive, so it is possible forthe same person to exercise more than one power (or function). Thereis, therefore, no one-to-one correspondence between powers andinstitutions (Tuckness 2002a).

Locke is not opposed to having distinct institutions called courts,but he does not see interpretation as a distinct function or power.For Locke, legislation is primarily about announcing a general rulestipulating what types of actions should receive what types ofpunishments. The executive power is the power to make the judgmentsnecessary to apply those rules to specific cases and administer forceas directed by the rule (Two Treatises 2.88–89). Bothof these actions involve interpretation. Locke states that positivelaws “are only so far right, as they are founded on the law ofnature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted”(2.12). In other words, the executive must interpret the laws in lightof its understanding of natural law. Similarly, legislation involvesmaking the laws of nature more specific and determining how to applythem to particular circumstances (2.135) which also calls forinterpreting natural law. Locke did not think of interpreting law as adistinct function because he thought it was a part of both thelegislative and executive functions (Tuckness 2002a).

If we compare Locke’s formulation of separation of powers to thelater ideas of Montesquieu (1989), we see that they are not sodifferent as they may initially appear. Although Montesquieu gives themore well known division of legislative, executive, and judicial, ashe explains what he means by these terms he reaffirms the superiorityof the legislative power and describes the executive power as havingto do with international affairs (Locke’s federative power) andthe judicial power as concerned with the domestic execution of thelaws (Locke’s executive power). It is more the terminology thanthe concepts that have changed. Locke considered arresting a person,trying a person, and punishing a person as all part of the function ofexecuting the law rather than as a distinct function (Tuckness2002a).

Locke believed that it was important that the legislative powercontain an assembly of elected representatives, but as we have seenthe legislative power could contain monarchical and aristocraticelements as well. Locke believed the people had the freedom to create“mixed” constitutions that utilize all of these. For thatreason, Locke’s theory of separation of powers does not dictateone particular type of constitution and does not preclude unelectedofficials from having part of the legislative power. Locke was moreconcerned that the people have representatives with sufficient powerto block attacks on their liberty and attempts to tax them withoutjustification. This is important because Locke also affirms that thecommunity remains the real supreme power throughout. The people retainthe right to “remove or alter” the legislative power(Two Treatises 2.149). This can happen for a variety ofreasons. The entire society can be dissolved by a successful foreigninvasion (2.211), but Locke is more interested in describing theoccasions when the people take power back from the government to whichthey have entrusted it. If the rule of law is ignored, if therepresentatives of the people are prevented from assembling, if themechanisms of election are altered without popular consent, or if thepeople are handed over to a foreign power, then they can take backtheir original authority and overthrow the government(2.212–17). They can also rebel if the government attempts totake away their rights (2.222). Locke thinks this is justifiable sinceoppressed people will likely rebel anyway, and those who are notoppressed will be unlikely to rebel. Moreover, the threat of possiblerebellion makes tyranny less likely to start with (2.224–6). Forall these reasons, while there are a variety of legitimateconstitutional forms, the delegation of power under any constitutionis understood to be conditional.

Locke’s understanding of separation of powers is complicated bythe doctrine of prerogative. Prerogative is the right of the executiveto act without explicit authorization for a law, or even contrary tothe law, in order to better fulfill the laws that seek thepreservation of human life. A king might, for example, order that ahouse be torn down in order to stop a fire from spreading throughout acity (Two Treatises 2.159). Locke defines it more broadly as“the power of doing public good without a rule” (2.166).This poses a challenge to Locke’s doctrine of legislativesupremacy. Locke handles this by explaining that the rationale forthis power is that general rules cannot cover all possible cases andthat inflexible adherence to the rules would be detrimental to thepublic good and that the legislature is not always in session torender a judgment (2.160). The relationship between the executive andthe legislature depends on the specific constitution. If the chiefexecutive has no part in the supreme legislative power, then thelegislature could overrule the executive’s decisions based onprerogative when it reconvenes. If, however, the chief executive has aveto, the result would be a stalemate between them. Locke describes asimilar stalemate in the case where the chief executive has the powerto call parliament and can thus prevent it from meeting by refusing tocall it into session. In such a case, Locke says, there is no judge onearth between them as to whether the executive has misused prerogativeand both sides have the right to “appeal to heaven” in thesame way that the people can appeal to heaven against a tyrannicalgovernment (2.168).

The concept of an “appeal to heaven” is an importantconcept in Locke’s thought. Locke assumes that people, when theyleave the state of nature, create a government with some sort ofconstitution that specifies which entities are entitled to exercisewhich powers. Locke also assumes that these powers will be used toprotect the rights of the people and to promote the public good. Incases where there is a dispute between the people and the governmentabout whether the government is fulfilling its obligations, there isno higher human authority to which one can appeal. The only appealleft, for Locke, is the appeal to God. The “appeal toheaven,” therefore, involves taking up arms against youropponent and letting God judge who is in the right.

7. Toleration

In Locke’sLetter Concerning Toleration, he developsseveral lines of argument that are intended to establish the properspheres for religion and politics. His central claims are thatgovernment should not use force to try to bring people to the truereligion and that religious societies are voluntary organizations thathave no right to use coercive power over their own members or thoseoutside their group. One recurring line of argument that Locke uses isexplicitly religious. Locke argues that neither the example of Jesusnor the teaching of the New Testament gives any indication that forceis a proper way to bring people to salvation. He also frequentlypoints out what he takes to be clear evidence of hypocrisy, namelythat those who are so quick to persecute others for small differencesin worship or doctrine are relatively unconcerned with much moreobvious moral sins that pose an even greater threat to their eternalstate.

In addition to these and similar religious arguments, Locke givesthree reasons that are more philosophical in nature for barringgovernments from using force to encourage people to adopt religiousbeliefs (Works 6:10–12). First, he argues that the careof men’s souls has not been committed to the magistrate byeither God or the consent of men. This argument resonates with thestructure of argument used so often in theTwo Treatises toestablish the natural freedom and equality of mankind. There is nocommand in the Bible telling magistrates to bring people to the truefaith, and people could not consent to such a goal for governmentbecause it is not possible for people, at will, to believe what themagistrate tells them to believe. Their beliefs are a function of whatthey think is true, not what they will. Locke’s second argumentis that since the power of the government is only force, while truereligion consists of genuine inward persuasion of the mind, force isincapable of bringing people to the true religion. Locke’s thirdargument is that even if the magistrate could change people’sminds, a situation where everyone accepted the magistrate’sreligion would not bring more people to the true religion. Many of themagistrates of the world believe religions that are false.

Locke’s contemporary, Jonas Proast (1999a), responded by sayingthat Locke’s three arguments really amount to just two, thattrue faith cannot be forced and that we have no more reason to thinkthat we are right than anyone else has. Proast argued that force canbe helpful in bringing people to the truth “indirectly, and at adistance.” His idea was that although force cannot directlybring about a change of mind or heart, it can cause people to considerarguments that they would otherwise ignore or prevent them fromhearing or reading things that would lead them astray. If force isindirectly useful in bringing people to the true faith, then Locke hasnot provided a persuasive argument. As for Locke’s argumentabout the harm of a magistrate whose religion is false using force topromote it, Proast claimed that this was irrelevant since there is amorally relevant difference between affirming that the magistrate maypromote the religion he thinks true and affirming that he may promotethe religion that actually is true. Proast thought that unless one wasa complete skeptic, one must believe that the reasons for one’sown position are objectively better than those for otherpositions.

Jeremy Waldron (1993) restated the substance of Proast’sobjection for a contemporary audience. He argued that, leaving asideLocke’s Christian arguments, his main position was that it wasinstrumentally irrational, from the perspective of the persecutor, touse force in matters of religion because force acts only on the will,and belief is not something that we change at will. Waldron pointedout that this argument blocks only one particular reason forpersecution, not all reasons. Thus it would not stop someone who usedreligious persecution for some end other than religious conversion,such as preserving the peace. Even in cases where persecution doeshave a religious goal, Waldron agrees with Proast that force may beindirectly effective in changing people’s beliefs. Some of thecurrent discussion about Locke’s contribution to contemporarypolitical philosophy in the area of toleration centers on whetherLocke has a good reply to these objections from Proast and Waldron.Tuckness (2008b) and Tate (2016) argue that Locke deemphasized therationality argument in his later writings.

Some contemporary commentators try to rescue Locke’s argument byredefining the religious goal that the magistrate is presumed to seek.Susan Mendus (1989), for example, notes that successful brainwashingmight cause a person to sincerely utter a set of beliefs, but thatthose beliefs might still not count as genuine. Beliefs induced bycoercion might be similarly problematic. Paul Bou Habib (2003) arguesthat what Locke is really after is sincere inquiry and that Lockethinks inquiry undertaken only because of duress is necessarilyinsincere. These approaches thus try to save Locke’s argument byshowing that force really is incapable of bringing about the desiredreligious goal.

Other commentators focus on Locke’s first argument about properauthority, and particularly on the idea that authorization must be byconsent. David Wootton (1993) argues that even if force occasionallyworks at changing a person’s belief, it does not work oftenenough to make it rational for persons to consent to the governmentexercising that power. A person who has good reason to think he willnot change his beliefs even when persecuted has good reason to preventthe persecution scenario from ever happening. Richard Vernon (1997)argues that we want not only to hold right beliefs, but also to holdthem for the right reasons. Since the balance of reasons rather thanthe balance of force should determine our beliefs, we would notconsent to a system in which irrelevant reasons for belief mightinfluence us. Richard Tate (2016) argues that the strongest argumentof Locke for toleration is rooted in the fact that we do not consentto giving government authority in this area, only the promotion of oursecular interests, interests that Locke thought a policy of tolerationwould further.

Still other commentators focus on the third argument, that themagistrate might be wrong. Here the question is whether Locke’sargument is question-begging or not. The two most promising lines ofargument are the following. Wootton (1993) argues that there are verygood reasons, from the standpoint of a given individual, for thinkingthat governments will be wrong about which religion is true.Governments are motivated by the quest for power, not truth, and areunlikely to be good guides in religious matters. Since there are somany different religions held by rulers, if only one is true thenlikely my own ruler’s views are not true. Wootton thus takesLocke to be showing that it is irrational, from the perspective of theindividual, to consent to government promotion of religion. Adifferent interpretation of the third argument is presented byTuckness. He argues that the likelihood that the magistrate may bewrong generates a principle of toleration based on what is rationalfrom the perspective of a legislator, not the perspective of anindividual citizen or ruler. Drawing on Locke’s later writingson toleration, he argues that Locke’s theory of natural lawassumes that God, as author of natural law, takes into account thefallibility of those magistrates who will carry out the commands ofnatural law. If “use force to promote the true religion”were a command of natural law addressed to all magistrates, it wouldnot promote the true religion in practice because so many magistrateswrongly believe that their religion is the true one. Tuckness claimsthat in Locke’s later writings on toleration he moved away fromarguments based on what it is instrumentally rational for anindividual to consent to. Instead, he emphasized human fallibility andthe need for universal principles.

8. Education and Politics

Locke’s epistemological positions in theEssay ConcerningHuman Understanding lead him to take education to be extremelyimportant for his political philosophy. His attack on innate ideasincreases the importance of giving children the right sort ofeducation to help them get the right sorts of ideas. He also notes intheEssay that human beings govern themselves by a variety ofdifferent laws, the most practically efficacious of which is the“Law of Opinion or Reputation.” (Essay2.28.10) Since people are often highly motivated to be well thought ofby others, the moral standards that are operative within a society forallocating praise and blame are powerful and important. Ideally, thesesocial norms will reinforce natural law and thus help stabilizepolitical society. Locke’s educational writings suggest howchildren might be raised in such a way that they will be the sorts ofcitizens who function well in a liberal society (Tarcov 1984). Somethink that Locke’s approach to education, which centerseducation within the family, gives the state too little influence overthe formation of future citizens (Gutmann 1999), while others thinkLocke actually gives the state considerable power to regulateeducation (Tuckness 2010b).

Locke’s main educational writing isSome Thoughts ConcerningEducation, and it is based on letters of advice that Locke wroteto his friend Edward Clarke. This context means that the book assumesa person of relative wealth who will be overseeing the education ofhis son. The book was extremely popular and went through numerouseditions in the century after its publication. One of the strikingfeatures of the book is the way parents are encouraged to develop andaugment the child’s love for praise and esteem (SomeThoughts, 56–62). Cultivating this desire helps the childlearn to hold in check other harmful desires, such as the desire fordominion, and to learn to control impulses by not acting on them untilafter reflecting on them.

Some contemporary critics of Locke, inspired by Foucault, argue thatLocke’s education is not a recipe for liberty but for formingchildren who will be compliant subjects of liberal regimes (Baltes2016, Carrig 2001, Metha 1992). Locke encourages parents to tightlyregulate the social environments of children to avoid children beingcorrupted by the wrong ideas and influences. Locke hopes for childrenwho have internalized strong powers of self-denial and a work ethicthat will make them compliant in an emerging modern economy. Ifparents are tightly controlling the child’s educationalenvironment with the goal of producing a particular sort of child, andif in reality people are primarily guided by the repetitional normsthat govern praise and blame, critics claim that this reveals theautonomous liberal subject to be, in reality, a guise for imposedconformity.

Defenders of Locke argue that this critique underestimates theorientation of Locke’s education toward meaningful freedom.There are reasons for thinking that, under normal circumstances, thelaw of nature and the law of reputation will coincide with each other,minimizing the potential harms that come from people following the lawof reputation (Stuart-Buttle 2017). Locke’s education isdesigned to increase compliance with natural law (Brady 2013). Muchdepends on whether one thinks conformity with natural law decreases orincreases freedom. While it is true that Locke recognizes the socialnature of the Lockean subject, Locke does not think habituation andautonomy are necessarily opposed (Koganzon 2016, Nazar 2017). Becausehuman beings naturally conform to the prevailing norms in theirsociety, in the absence of a Lockean education people would not bemore free because they would simply conform to those norms.Locke’s education is designed to give children the ability, whenthey are older, to evaluate critically, and possibly reject,prevailing norms. Locke also assumes that the isolation of earlychildhood will end and that adolescent children will normally thinkdifferently from their parents (Koganzon 2016). In fact, Locke mayeven use custom to help people rationally evaluate their customaryprejudices (Grant 2012).

Bibliography

Select Primary Sources

• Filmer, Robert, 1991,Sir Robert Filmer: Patriarcha and OtherWritings, Johann P. Sommerville (ed.), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511812644
• Hooker, Richard, 1975,Of the Laws of EcclesiasticalPolity, A. S. McGrade (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• Locke, John,Works, 10 volumes, London, 1823; reprinted,Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963. Citations are toWorks then thevolume and page number.
• –––,Essay,An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, four books, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975. Citations are toEssay then book,chapter, and section.
• –––,Letter,Letter ConcerningToleration, James Tully (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: HackettPublishing Company, 1983.
• –––,Two Treatises,Two Treatisesof Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1988. Citations are toTwo Treatises thentreatise and section.
• –––,Some Thoughts,Some ThoughtsConcerning Education; and On the Conduct of the Understanding,Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996.Citations are toSome Thoughts by section.
• –––,Political Essays, Mark Goldie(ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
• –––,An Essay Concerning Toleration andOther Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683, J.R. Miltonand Phillip Milton (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
• Montesquieu, 1989,The Spirit of the Laws, Anne Cohler,Basia Miller, and Harold Stone (trans. and eds.), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• Proast, Jonas, 1999a,The Argument of the Letter ConcerningToleration Briefly Consider’d and Answered, inTheReception of Locke’s Politics, vol. 5, Mark Goldie (ed.),London: Pickering & Chatto.
• –––, 1999b,A Third Letter to the Authorof …, inThe Reception of Locke’s Politics,vol. 5, Mark Goldie (ed.), London: Pickering & Chatto.
• Pufendorf, Samuel, 1934,De Jure Naturae et Gentium(Volume 2), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Select Secondary Sources

• Aaron, Richard I., 1937,John Locke, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, second edition 1955.
• Armitage, David, 2004, “John Locke, Carolina, and the TwoTreatises of Government”,Political Theory, 32(5):602–627. doi:10.1177/0090591704267122
• Arneil, Barbara, 1996,John Locke and America: The Defence ofEnglish Colonialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198279679.001.0001
• Ashcraft, Richard, 1986,Revolutionary Politics andLocke’s Two Treatises of Government, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1987,Locke’s Two Treatises ofGovernment, London: Allen & Unwin.
• Baltes, John, 2016,The Empire of Habit: John Locke,Discipline, and the Origins of Liberalism, Rochester: Universityof Rochester Press.
• Butler, Melissa A., 1978, “Early Liberal Roots of Feminism:John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy”,American PoliticalScience Review, 72(1): 135–150. doi:10.2307/1953604
• Bou-Habib, Paul, 2003, “Locke, Sincerity and the Rationalityof Persecution”,Political Studies, 51(4): 611–626.doi:10.1111j.0032-3217.2003.00449.x
• Brady, Michelle, 2013, “Locke’s Thoughts onReputation”,The Review of Politics, 75(3):335–356. doi:10.1017/S0034670513000302
• Carrig, Joseph, 2001, “Liberal Impediments to LiberalEducation: The Assent to Locke”,The Review ofPolitics, 63(1): 41–76. doi:10.1017/S0034670500030515
• Casson, Douglas, 2011,Liberating Judgment: Fanatics,Skeptics, and John Locke’s Politics of Probability,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Chappell, Vere (ed.), 1994,The Cambridge Companion toLocke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CCOL0521383714
• Colman, John, 1983,John Locke’s Moral Philosophy,Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Connolly, Patrick, 2019, “Locke’s Theory ofDemonstration and Demonstrative Morality”,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 98(2): 435–451.doi:10.1111/phpr.12512
• Cranston, Maurice, 1957,John Locke, a Biography, London:Longmans, Green.
• Creppell, Ingrid, 1996, “Locke on Toleration: TheTransformation of Constraint”,Political Theory, 24(2):200–240. doi:10.1177/0090591796024002003
• Davis, Michael, 2014, “Locke’s Political Society: SomeProblems of Terminology in Two Treatises of Government”,Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11(2): 209–231.doi:10.1163/17455243-4681005
• –––, 2017, “Locke, Simmons, and Consent: ALawyerly Approach”,Social Theory and Practice, 43(4):667–690. doi:10.5840soctheorpract2017103018
• Dunn, John, 1967 [1980], “Consent in the Political Theory ofJohn Locke”,The Historical Journal, 10(2):153–182. Reprinted in hisPolitical Obligation in itsHistorical Context: Essays in Political Theory, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1980, 29–52.
• –––, 1969,The Political Thought of JohnLocke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the “TwoTreatises of Government”, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511558436
• –––, 1990, “What Is Living and What IsDead in the Political Theory of John Locke?”, in hisInterpreting Political Responsibility, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 9–26.
• –––, 1991, “The Claim to Freedom ofConscience: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, Freedom ofWorship?”, inFrom Persecution to Toleration: the GloriousRevolution and Religion in England, Ole Peter Grell, JonathanIsrael, and Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press,171–193.
• Farr, James, 2008, “Locke, Natural Law, and New WorldSlavery”,Political Theory, 36(4): 495–522.doi:10.1177/0090591708317899
• Forde, Steven, 2001, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality inLocke”,American Journal of Political Science, 45(2):396–409. doi:10.2307/2669348
• –––, 2011, “‘Mixed Modes’ inJohn Locke’s Moral and Political Philosophy”,TheReview of Politics, 73(4): 581–608.doi:10.1017/S0034670511003652
• Forster, Greg, 2005,John Locke’s Politics of MoralConsensus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511498114
• Franklin, Julian, 1978,John Locke and the Theory ofSovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in thePolitical Thought of the English Revolution, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• Goldie, Mark, 1983, “John Locke and AnglicanRoyalism”,Political Studies, 31(1): 61–85.doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01335.x
• –––, 2015, “Locke and America”, inA Companion to Locke, Matthew Stuart (ed.), London: WileyBlackwell, 546–563. doi:10.1002/9781118328705.ch28
• Grant, Ruth W., 1987,John Locke’s Liberalism,Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• –––, 2012, “John Locke on Custom’sPower and Reason’s Authority”,The Review ofPolitics, 74(4): 607–629.doi:10.1017/S0034670512000770
• Gutmann, Amy, 1999,Democratic Education (revisededition), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Hoff, Shannon, 2015, “Locke and the Nature of PoliticalAuthority”,The Review of Politics, 77(1): 1–22.doi:10.1017/S0034670514000813
• Harris, Ian, 1994,The Mind of John Locke: A Study ofPolitical Theory in its Intellectual Setting, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Herzog, Don, 1985,Without Foundations: Justification inPolitical Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Hirschmann, Nancy J. and Kirstie Morna McClure (eds.), 2007,Feminist Interpretations of John Locke, University Park, PA:Penn State University Press.
• Horton, John P. and Susan Mendus (eds.), 1991,JohnLocke’s Letter on Toleration in Focus, New York:Routledge.
• Israelson, Andrew, 2013, “God, Mixed Modes, and Natural Law:An Intellectualist Interpretation of Locke’s MoralPhilosophy”,British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 21(6): 1111–1132.doi:10.1080/09608788.2013.858236
• Koganzon, Rita, 2016, “‘Contesting the Empire ofHabit’: Habituation and Liberty in LockeanEducation”,American Political Science Review, 110(3):547–558. doi:10.1017/S0003055416000344
• Lolordo, Antonia, 2012,Locke’s Moral Man, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Macpherson, C.B., 1962,The Political Theory of PossessiveIndividualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Marshall, John, 1994,John Locke: Resistance, Religion andResponsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511598531
• –––, 2006,John Locke, Toleration, and EarlyEnlightenment Culture: Religious Intolerance and Arguments forReligious Toleration in Early Modern and “EarlyEnlightenment” Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• Metha, Uday, 1992,The Anxiety of Freedom, Ithica, NY:Cornell University Press.
• Nazar, Hina, 2017, “Locke, Education, and‘Disciplinary Liberalism’”,The Review ofPolitics, 79(2): 215–238. doi:10.1017S0034670516001042
• Numao, J.K., 2013, “Locke on Atheism”,History ofPolitical Thought, 34(2): 252–272.
• Nuovo, Victor, 2017,John Locke: The Philosopher as ChristianVirtuoso. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Kendall, Willmoore, 1959,John Locke and the Doctrine ofMajority-Rule, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
• Nozick, Robert, 1974,Anarchy, State, and Utopia, NewYork: Basic Books.
• Pangle, Thomas, 1988,The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: TheMoral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy ofLocke, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Parker, Kim Ian, 2004,The Biblical Politics of JohnLocke, Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
• Pasquino, Pasquale, 1998, “Locke on King’sPrerogative”,Political Theory, 26(2): 198–208.doi:10.1177/0090591798026002003
• Pitkin, Hanna, 1965, “Obligation and Consent—I”,American Political Science Review, 59(4): 990–999.doi:10.2307/1953218
• de Roover, Jakob and S.N. Balagangadhara, 2008, “John Locke,Christian Liberty, and the Predicament of Liberal Toleration”,Political Theory, 36(4): 523–549.doi:10.1177/0090591708317969
• Rossiter, Eliot, 2016, “Hedonism and Natural Law inLocke’s Moral Philosophy”,Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 52(2): 203–225. doi:10.1353/hph.2016.0044
• Ryan, Alan, 1965, “Locke and the Dictatorship of theBourgeoisie”,Political Studies, 13(2): 219–230.doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1965.tb00366.x
• Seagrave, S. Adam, 2014,The Foundations of Natural Morality:On the Compatibility of Natural Law and Natural Right, Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Seliger, Martin, 1968,The Liberal Politics of JohnLocke, London: Allen & Unwin.
• Shanks, Torrey. 2019, “The Rhetoric ofSelf-Ownership”,Political Theory, 47(3): 311–337.doi:10.1177/0090591718786471
• Simmons, A. John, 1992,The Lockean Theory of Rights,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1993,On The Edge of Anarchy: Locke,Consent, and the Limits of Society, Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.
• Sreenivasan, Gopal, 1995,The Limits of Lockean Rights inProperty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Stanton, Timothy, 2011, “Authority and Freedom in theInterpretation of Locke’s Political Theory”,PoliticalTheory, 39(1): 6–30. doi:10.1177/0090591710386571
• –––, 2018, “John Locke and the Fable ofLiberalism”,The Historical Journal, 61(3):597–622. doi:10.1017S0018246X17000450
• Strauss, Leo, 1953,Natural Right and History, Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Stuart-Buttle, Tim, 2016, “‘A burden too heavy forhuman sufferance’: Locke on Reputation”,History ofPolitical Thought, 38(4): 644–680. doi:10.17863/CAM.656
• Tarcov, Nathan, 1984,Locke’s Education forLiberty, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Tate, John William, 2013a, “‘We Cannot Give OneMillimetre’? Liberalism, Enlightenment and Diversity”,Political Studies, 61(4): 816–833.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12000
• –––, 2013b, “Dividing Locke from God: TheLimits of Theology in Locke’s Political Philosophy”,Philosophy and Social Criticism, 39(2): 133–164.doi:10.1177/0191453712470358
• –––, 2016,Liberty, Toleration, andEquality: John Locke, Jonas Proast, and the Letters ConcerningToleration, New York: Routledge.
• Tierney, Brian, 2014,Liberty and Law: Studies on the Idea ofPermissive Natural Law, 1100–1800, Washington, DC: CatholicUniversity of America Press.
• Tuckness, Alex, 1999, “The Coherence of a Mind: John Lockeand the Law of Nature”,Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 37(1): 73–90. doi:10.1353/hph.2008.0833
• –––, 2002a,Locke and the Legislative Pointof View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and Law, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2002b, “Rethinking the IntolerantLocke”,American Journal of Political Science, 46(2):288–298. doi:10.2307/3088377
• –––, 2008a, “Punishment, Property, and theLimits of Altruism: Locke’s International Asymmetry”,American Political Science Review, 102(4): 467–479.doi:10.1017/S0003055408080349
• –––, 2008b,“Locke’s Main Argumentfor Toleration”,NOMOS, 48: 114–138.
• –––, 2010a, “Retribution and Restitutionin Locke’s Theory of Punishment”,The Journal ofPolitics, 72(3): 720–732.doi:10.1017/S0022381610000125
• –––, 2010b,“Locke on Education and theRights of Parents”,Oxford Review of Education, 36(5):627–638. doi:10.1080/03054985.2010.514439
• Tully, James, 1980,A Discourse on Property: John Locke andHis Adversaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511558641
• –––, 1993,An Approach to PoliticalPhilosophy: Locke in Contexts, (Ideas in Context), Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607882
• Tunick, Mark, 2014, “John Locke and the Right to BearArms”,History of Political Thought, 35(1):50–69.
• Udi, Juliana, 2015, “Locke and the Fundamental Right toPreservation: On the Convergence of Charity and PropertyRights”,The Review of Politics, 77(2): 191–215.doi:10.1017/S0034670515000030
• Van der Vossen, Bas, 2015, “Locke on TerritorialRights”,Political Studies, 63(3): 713–728.doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12106
• Vernon, Richard, 1997,The Career of Toleration: John Locke,Jonas Proast, and After, Montréal and Kingston:McGill-Queens University Press.
• –––, 2013, “Lockean Toleration: DialogicalNot Theological?”,Political Studies, 61(1):215–230. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00958.x
• Waldron, Jeremy, 1988,The Right to Private Property,Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239376.001.0001
• –––, 1993, “Locke, Toleration, and theRationality of Persecution”, in hisLiberal Rights:Collected Papers 1981–1991, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, pp. 88–114.
• –––, 2002,God, Locke, and Equality:Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511613920
• Ward, Lee, 2010,John Locke and Modern Life, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2017, “Thomas Hobbes and John Lockeon a Liberal Right of Secession”,Political ResearchQuarterly, 70(4): 876–888.doi:10.1177/1065912917717818
• Wolfson, Adam, 2010,Persecution or Toleration: An Explicationof the Locke-Proast Quarrel, 1689–1704, Lanham, MD:Lexington Books.
• Wood, Neal, 1983,The Politics of Locke’sPhilosophy, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• –––, 1984,John Locke and AgrarianCapitalism, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Woolhouse, Roger S., 2007,Locke: A Biography, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Wootton, David, 1993, “Introduction”, toJohnLocke: Political Writings, London: Penguin Books.
• Yolton, John W., 1958, “Locke on the Law of Nature”,The Philosophical Review, 67(4): 477–498.doi:10.2307/2182945
• –––, 1969,John Locke: Problems andPerspectives; a Collection of New Essays, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• Zorzi, Graedon, 2019, “Liberalism and Locke’sPhilosophical Anthropology”,The Review of Politics,81(2): 183–205.
• Zuckert, Michael P., 1994,Natural Rights and the NewRepublicanism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• The Works of John Locke, 1824 edition; several volumes, including the Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding, Two Treatises of Government, all four Letters onToleration, and his writings on money.
• John Locke’s Political Philosophy, entry by Alexander Moseley, in theInternet Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy
• John Locke Bibliography, maintained by John Attig (Pennsylvania State University).
• Images of Locke, at the National Portrait Gallery, Great Britain.

Related Entries

contractarianism |Grotius, Hugo |Hobbes, Thomas |legitimacy, political |Locke, John |paternalism |political obligation |property and ownership |Pufendorf, Samuel Freiherr von: moral and political philosophy |rights |social contract: contemporary approaches to

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Sally Ferguson for pointing out anumber of typographical and other infelicitous errors in this entry.