In political theory and philosophy, the term‘republicanism’ is generally used in two different, butclosely related, senses. In the first sense, republicanism refers to aloose tradition or family of writers in the history of westernpolitical thought, including especially: Machiavelli and hisfifteenth-century Italian predecessors; the English republicansMilton, Harrington, Sidney, and others; Montesquieu and Blackstone;the eighteenth-century English commonwealthmen; and many Americans ofthe founding era such as Jefferson, Madison, and Adams. The writers inthis tradition emphasize many common ideas and concerns, such as theimportance of civic virtue and political participation, the dangers ofcorruption, the benefits of a mixed constitution and the rule of law,etc.; and it is characteristic of their rhetorical style to drawheavily on classical examples—from Cicero and the Latinhistorians especially—in presenting their arguments. In light ofthe last point, this is sometimes referred to as the ‘classicalrepublican’ or ‘neo-roman’ tradition in politicalthought.

Beyond this brief sketch, there exists considerable historiographicalcontroversy—with respect to who the tradition’s membersare, and their relative significance; with respect to how we shouldinterpret its underlying philosophical commitments; and with respectto its role (especially vis-à-vis liberalism) in the historicaldevelopment of modern political thought. This brings us to the secondsense of the term ‘republicanism’. In contemporarypolitical theory and philosophy, it most often refers to a specific(and still contested) interpretation of the classical republicantradition, associated especially with the work of Quentin Skinner;together with a research program dedicated to developing insights fromthis tradition into an attractive contemporary political doctrine,associated especially with the work of Philip Pettit. According torepublicans in this second sense (sometimes called ‘civicrepublicans’ or ‘neo-republicans’), the paramountrepublican value is political liberty, understood as non-domination orindependence from arbitrary power. This entry will primarily discussrepublicanism in this second sense.

In their interpretation of the classical republicanism tradition,civic republicans are often in debate with civic humanists, with whomthey are often confused (see the entry oncivic humanism). Developed as a contemporary political doctrine, civic republicanismis broadly speaking progressive and liberal, but not without importantdistinctive features. Some of its policy implications diverge frommainstream liberalism in particular ways, and for this reason civicrepublicans are sometimes also confused with communitarians (see theentry oncommunitarianism). For the strengths or weakness of civic republicanism to be fairlyassessed, both confusions should be assiduously avoided.

• 1. Political Liberty as Non-Domination
  • 1.1 Political Liberty, Positive and Negative
  • 1.2 Liberty as Non-Domination
  • 1.3 Republican versus Negative Liberty
• 2. Republican Liberty: Problems and Debates
  • 2.1 What about non-interference?
  • 2.2 What Counts as ‘Arbitrary’ Power?
  • 2.3 Republican Freedom and the Human Good
• 3. The Classical Republican Tradition
  • 3.1 The Instrumental Turn
  • 3.2 Republicanism and Liberalism
• 4. The Contemporary Republican Program
  • 4.1 Republican Public Policy
  • 4.2 Republican Political Institutions
  • 4.3 Civic virtue and corruption
  • 4.4 Republicanism Across Borders
• 5. Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Political Liberty as Non-Domination

Absolutely central to the contemporary civic republican program is theconception of political liberty as non-domination or independence fromarbitrary power, and so it makes good sense to begin with anexplication of this idea.

1.1 Political Liberty, Positive and Negative

It is notorious that there are several competing conceptions ofpolitical liberty. The now standard account was laid down mostinfluentially by Isaiah Berlin in his famous lecture on “TwoConcepts of Liberty” (Berlin 1969). According to the first,‘negative’ conception of liberty, people are free simplyto the extent that their choices are not interfered with. There aremany variations on this conception, depending on how exactly one wantsto define ‘interference’, but they all have in common thebasic intuition that to be free is, more or less, to be left alone todo whatever one chooses. This idea of negative liberty Berlinassociates especially with the classic English political philosophersHobbes, Bentham, and J. S. Mill, and it is today probably the dominantconception of liberty, particularly among contemporary Anglo-Americanphilosophers. In Mill’s well-known words, “the onlyfreedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good inour own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others oftheirs” (1859, 17).

The second, ‘positive’ conception of liberty is not quiteso easy to define. Roughly speaking, a person or group is free in thepositive sense to the extent that they exercise self-control orself-mastery. It is not agreed, however, what exactly constitutes thisself-mastery in the relevant sense. According to one influentialaccount, to be free in the positive sense is to be able to act onone’s second-order desires (Frankfurt 1982). For example, theaddicted gambler may be free in the negative sense not togamble—since no one actually forces him to do so—, but heis not free in the positive sense unless he actually succeeds inacting on his presumed second-order desire not to desire gambling.Berlin associates this second conception especially with suchcontinental philosophers as Spinoza, Rousseau, and Hegel. Although itfound some support among English Hegelians like T. H. Green, those whoadvocate the positive conception of liberty have generally been in theminority, particularly among contemporary Anglo-Americanphilosophers.

The troubling implications of the positive conception of liberty arewell-known, and need not be rehearsed at length here. For the mostpart, these stem from the problem that freedom in the positive sensewould seem to license fairly extensive coercion on behalf ofindividuals’ allegedly ‘real’ interests—forexample, coercively forcing the gambler to quit on the presumptionthat this is, in fact, what he really wants to do even if hedoesn’t say so. Regarding this danger, Berlin writes:

It is one thing to say that I may be coerced for my own good which Iam too blind to see: this may, on occasion, be for my benefit…. [But] it is another to say that if it is my good, then I amnot being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not,and am free (or ‘truly’ free) even when my poor earthlybody and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against thosewho seek however benevolently to impose it …. (1969, 134)

Liberals like Berlin have thus understandably rejected thepositive and embraced the negative conception of liberty. Thequestion remains, however, whether the received view of negativeliberty as non-interference in particular adequately captures thepolitical ideal we should be most interested in. Contemporary civicrepublicans argue that it does not.

1.2 Liberty as Non-Domination

By way of illustration, consider the following scenarios (both arestandard examples in the republican tradition). In the first, imaginea group of slaves with a generally well-meaning master. While thelatter has an institutionally-protected right to treat his slaves moreor less as he pleases (he might start whipping them just for the heckof it, say), let us suppose that this master in particular leaves hisslaves for the most part alone. Now to the extent that he does not infact interfere with his slaves on a day-to-day basis, we are committedto saying—on the non-interference view of liberty—thatthey enjoy some measure of freedom. Some find this conclusion deeplycounterintuitive: if there is anything to the idea of politicalliberty, one might think, surely it cannot be found in the conditionof slavery!

Even if we are willing to accept this conclusion, the non-interferenceview of liberty commits us to others that are perhaps even moreparadoxical. For one thing, notice that we are committed to sayingthat the slaves of our well-meaning master enjoygreaterfreedom than the slaves of an abusive master down the road. Of course,the former slaves are better off in some respect than the latter, butdo we really want to say that they aremore free? Foranother, consider the slave who, over time, comes to understand hismaster’s psychological dispositions better and better. Takingadvantage of this improved insight, he manages to keep on hismaster’s good side, and is consequently interfered with less andless. Thus, on the non-interference view of liberty, we are committedto saying that his freedom is increasing over time. Again, while it isclear that the slave’s greater psychological insight improveshis well-being in some respect, do we really want to say that itincreases hisfreedom specifically?

Now consider a second scenario. Imagine the colony of a great imperialpower. Suppose that the colonial subjects have no political rights,and thus that the imperial power governs them unilaterally. Butfurther suppose that the imperial power, for one reason or another,chooses not to exercise the full measure of its authority—thatits policy towards the colony is one of more or less benign neglect.From the point of view of liberty as non-interference, we mustconclude that the colonial subjects enjoy considerable freedom withrespect to their government for, on a day-to-day basis, theirgovernment hardly ever interferes with them. Next suppose that thecolonial subjects revolt with success, and achieve politicalindependence. The former colony is now self-governing. We may imagine,however, that the new government is somewhat more active than itsimperial predecessor, passing laws and instituting policies thatinterfere with people’s lives to a greater extent than formerlywas the case. On the view of liberty as non-interference, we musttherefore say that there has been adecline in freedom withindependence. As in the first scenario, many find thiscounterintuitive. Surely, a nation that has secured its independencefrom colonial rule must haveincreased its politicalliberty.

What these examples are driving at is that political liberty mightbest be understood as a sort of structural relationship that existsbetween persons or groups, rather than as a contingent pattern onoutcomes. Whether a master chooses to whip his slave on any given day,we might say, is a contingent outcome: it all depends on themaster’s mood, the slave’s behavior, and so forth. What isnot contingent (or at least not in the same way) is the broaderconfiguration of laws, institutions, and norms that effectively permitmasters to treat their slaves however they please. As the ex-slaveFrederick Douglass said of his former condition, “it wasslavery—not its mere incidents—that I hated” (1855,161).

The republican conception of political liberty aims to capture thisinsight as directly as possible. It defines freedom as a sort ofstructural independence—as the condition of not being subject tothe arbitrary or uncontrolled power of a master. Pettit, who has donemore than anyone else to develop this republican conception of freedomphilosophically, puts it thus: a person or group enjoys freedom to theextent that no other person or group has “the capacity tointerfere in their affairs on an arbitrary basis” (1999, 165;cf. Pettit 1997, 2001, 2012, 2014). On a plausible rendering ofthe term ‘domination’ as, roughly speaking, arbitrary oruncontrolled power (see Wartenberg 1990; Pettit 1997, 2012;Lovett 2010, 2018), we might equivalently say that freedom in therepublican sense consists in the secure enjoyment of non-domination.This view has since been widely embraced by republican-minded authorssuch as Skinner (1998, 2002, 2008), Viroli (2002), Maynor (2003,2015), Laborde (2008, 2010), Costa (2009, 2013, 2016), Honohan (2013,2014), Taylor (2017), and O’Shea (2019).

1.3 Republican versus Negative Liberty

Notice that the republican view of freedom is, at least in the broadsense, a negative conception of political liberty. One need not do orbecome anything in particular to enjoy political liberty in therepublican sense; one need not exercise self-mastery, on any view ofwhat that entails, nor succeed in acting on one’s second-orderdesires (Skinner 1984, 1991, 2002; Spitz 1993). Republican freedommerely requires the absence of something, namely, the absence of anystructural dependence on arbitrary power or domination. (Also likenon-interference, non-domination comes in degrees: on the civicrepublican view, one is not either free or unfree, but rather more orless free depending on the extent of non-domination one securelyenjoys.)

Despite these similarities, however, republican freedom is notequivalent to the received view of negative liberty asnon-interference. In contrast to the non-interference view, it easilyaccounts for our intuitions in the two scenarios described above. Theslave lacks freedom because he is vulnerable to the arbitrary power ofhis master; whether his master happens to exercise that power isneither here nor there. Likewise, what matters with respect topolitical freedom on the republican view is nothow much theimperial power chooses to govern its colony, but the fact that theformer may choose to govern the latter as much and however it likes.Thus Joseph Priestley described the lightly-governed American coloniesas nevertheless in a condition of servitude because “by the samepower, by which the people of England can compel them to pay onepenny, they may compel them to pay the last penny they have”(1769, 140).

Moreover, the republican conception captures in a more intuitivelysatisfying way whatwould improve either situation withrespect to political liberty. Most people are not inclined to say thatslaves enjoy increasing freedom just because, with experience, theyimprove their insight into their master’s psychologicaldispositions. But manywould be inclined to say that theirfreedom is enhanced, other things being equal, if some effectivereform in the laws, institutions, or norms sharply reduced theirmaster’s authority over them. (This is not necessarily to saythat the slaves will enjoy greater well-being, all thingsconsidered—only that because their domination is lessened, theyenjoy greater freedom to that extent.) And of course, no matter howbenevolent their particular master happens to be, no slave can becompletely free until the institution of slavery itself isabolished.

Political freedom, in other words, is constituted by rightly-orderedlaws, institutions, and norms: “to enjoy such non-domination,after all, is just to be in a position where no one can interferearbitrarily in your affairs,” writes Pettit, “and you arein that position from the moment that the institutions are inplace” inhibiting possible arbitrary interference (1997, 107).Political freedom is most fully realized, on this view, in awell-ordered self-governing republic of equal citizens under the ruleof law, where no one citizen is the master of any other (Pettit 1989,1997, 2012, 2014; Skinner 1991, 1998; Spitz 1993, 1995; Viroli 2002;Maynor 2003; Lovett 2022). In the classic expression of JamesHarrington, such a community would be an “empire of laws and notof men” (1656, 8).

2. Republican Liberty: Problems and Debates

The appeal of the republican conception of political liberty asindependence from the arbitrary power of a master is perhapsunderstandable. This is not to say, however, that this conception isuncontroversial. Before discussing its role in developing contemporarycivic republican arguments, we should consider various problems anddebates surrounding the republican idea of freedom.

2.1 What about non-interference?

A common objection to the republican idea of freedom is that it failsto pick out an distinct conception at all. The suggestion here, firstnoted perhaps by Paley (1785), is that talking about non-domination isreally just another (more obscure) way of talking about security ofnon-interference (Goodin 2003; Carter 2008; Kramer 2008). Contemporarycivic republicans must reject this view. Pettit (1997, 73–4)observes that one might secure a low expected level ofnon-interference in more than one way, and the republican idea offreedom is by no means indifferent as to the method adopted. Forexample, to have a master with an exceptionally benevolent dispositionis to be reasonably secure in one’s expectation that one willnot often be adversely interfered with—but it is to have amaster nonetheless. The republican idea of freedom specificallyinstructs us not to make our master a better person (the goal of theold ‘mirror for princes’ literature), but to render himless of a master (Lovett 2012b). This can only be done by curbingeither his arbitrary power or his subjects’ dependency onhim.

Supposing then that non-domination and non-interference are indeeddistinct ideas, one might wonder where this leaves the latter, on thecivic republican view of things. Is obtaining freedom from arbitrarypower theonly thing we should care about? Roughly speaking,there are three possible answers civic republicans might give to thisquestion.

The first is simply to answeryes. It was a mistake, onemight argue, to ever think non-interference important or desirable initself. Of course, as a contingent empirical fact, extensive arbitrarypower often brings extensive interferences in train (slave masters andabsolute monarchs just can’t help meddling in theirsubjects’ affairs, we might suppose), so it is understandablethat our distaste for the former should influence our assessment ofthe latter. There are good reasons for rejecting this first answer,however. Imagine living in a community where our lives are regulateddown to the tiniest detail, but always in strict accordance withcommonly-known, non-arbitrary rules and procedures. Although we enjoyextensive freedom from arbitrary power, we have hardly any freedom ofindividual choice. Most would not want to live in such a community,and this suggests that we do indeed place some independent value onnon-interference (Larmore 2001; Wall 2001).

This leaves two other possible answers. On the one hand, we might tryto incorporate some measure of non-interference into our idea offreedom as non-domination. Something like this approach was initiallytaken by Pettit (1997, 74–7): there he distinguished betweenfactors that “compromise” liberty, and factors that“condition” it. Perhaps my republican freedom iscompromised when someone gains arbitrary power over me, but it ismerely conditioned when I lack the means or opportunities to make fulluse of it, and interferences might be one such conditioning factor. Onthe other hand, we might allow that republican freedom andnon-interference are distinct goods, but hold that both are valuablein some degree. We might either regard them as having roughly equalvalue (Skinner 1998), or we might regard republican liberty as havinggreater importance than non-interference, other things equal (Viroli2002, Pettit 2012). Each of these options has its advantages anddisadvantages, and there is no settled view in the contemporary civicrepublican literature on this point (see Lovett 2018). 

2.2 What Counts as ‘Arbitrary’ Power?

A second major difficulty in developing the republican idea of freedomlies in giving precise meaning to the notion of arbitrariness.According to what criteria are we to consider power‘arbitrary’? Not simply when its exercise is random orunpredictable. This view would undermine the whole point of therepublican conception of political liberty. As discussed above, withlong experience a slave is better able to predict his master’sbehavior, and so it appears less random to him, but (the civicrepublican wants to argue) the slave does not enjoy greater freedom bythat fact alone. Just because one is better able to cope witharbitrary power, it does not follow that one’s domination is anyless.

‘Discretionary’ is much closer to the relevant meaning ofarbitrary, but it is not quite right either. Discretionary power mightbe delegated to a public agency with a view to advancing certainpolicy goals or ends—as for example Congress has delegateddiscretionary authority to the Federal Reserve—but we would notwant to say that this reduces our freedom (or, at any rate, not solong as that discretionary authority is appropriately answerable to acommon knowledge understanding of the goals or ends it is meant toserve and the means it is permitted to employ). For reasons explainedin the fourth section of this entry, contemporary civic republicansmust be able to offer an account of non-arbitrary, yet discretionaryauthority.

How then should we characterize arbitrary power? Broadly speaking, twoanswers have been proposed. The first defines non-arbitrarinessprocedurally. Power is not arbitrary, on this view, to the extent thatit is reliably controlled by effective rules, procedures, or goalsthat are common knowledge to all persons or groups concerned(Lovett 2010, 2022). To be reliable and effective, on this view,constraints must be resilient over a wide range of possible changes ormodifications in the relevant circumstances. Roughly speaking, theprocedural view equates republican freedom with the traditional ideaof the rule of law, provided we are willing to extend the latter ideaconsiderably (List 2006; Lovett 2016a).

Alternatively, we might define non-arbitrariness democratically. Poweris not arbitrary, on this second view, to the extent that it isdirectly or indirectly controlled by the concerned persons or groupsthemselves. In an example offered by Pettit (2012, 57–58),suppose Andrea has given Bob the keys to her alcohol cupboard, withstrict instructions that no matter how much she pleads, he is not toreturn them except on twenty-four hours notice. Since Bob must answerto Andrea for his conduct in this regard, his power over her is notarbitrary. In roughly the same way, the power of the state over itscitizens will not be arbitrary provided the people have an equal sharein controlling how their state exercises its power. Many authorssubscribe to some version of this democratic view (see for exampleBohman 2008; Laborde 2008; Forst 2013; McCammon 2015).

Either way, two caveats are worth noting. The first is that, on eitherview, arbitrariness simply means uncontrolled and vice versa.Pettit’s recent preference for the latter term over the former(e.g., Pettit 2012, 2014) is simply due to its superior clarity, andrepresents neither a real change in view nor the addition of a newcondition alongside the old. The second caveat is that, again oneither view, arbitrary or uncontrolled power should not be definedalong substantive lines as power that is unjust or illegitimate. Thiswas never Pettit’s view, though in earlier work (e.g., Pettit1997) some passages may have inadvertently suggested otherwise. Thewell-known problem with a moralized definition of arbitrariness isthat it would collapse our conception of republican freedom into ageneral account of the human good (Larmore 2001; Costa 2007; Carter2008).

2.3 Republican Freedom and the Human Good

So far we have assumed that, however ultimately defined, republicanfreedom is always a good thing. Some have wondered whether this is thecase, however. This objection is most often expressed via the exampleof benevolent care-giving relationships. On the republican view thatone enjoys freedom only to the extent that one is independent fromarbitrary power, it would seem that children do not enjoy republicanfreedom with respect to their parents. But surely, one might suppose,the parent-child relationship is (in most cases) an extremely valuableone, and so we would not want greater republican freedom in such acontext. Republican freedom is, perhaps, not always a good thing(Ferejohn 2001).

As stated, this objection rests on a conceptual error, though (as weshall see) it points to an important set of issues as yetunder-developed in the contemporary civic republican literature. Theerror in the above example stems from our confusing the overallevaluation of a whole with an evaluation of its parts consideredseparately. It is undeniable that, at least in the ordinary course ofthings, parent-child relationships are extremely valuable, consideredas a whole; it does not follow from this, however, that therelationship is necessarily valuable in each and every part. For theobjection to hold, it must be the case—not only that theparent-child relationship is valuable overall—but further, thatthat it would actually be worse if, holding all its other featuresconstant, it involved less arbitrary power. But this is highlydoubtful. Clearly, the introduction of children’s rights intowestern law was a boon, precisely because it reduced the degree ofarbitrary power to which children are inevitably subject (which is tosay, because it increased their republican freedom). That theirrepublican freedom cannot be increased still further, perhaps, withoutdestroying family life altogether, and thus losing its many otherbenefits, is neither here nor there.

What consideration of this faulty objection does reveal, however, isthat republican freedom is simply one good among others, with which itmight come into conflict (Markell 2008). The challenge forcontemporary civic republicans, therefore, is less to show whynon-domination is an important human good (for which there are plentyof good arguments in the literature: see Pettit 1997; Maynor 2003;Laborde 2008; Gädeke 2020), but rather to show how it fits into abroader moral framework, and specifically, the comparative weight weshould assign to republican freedom vis-à-vis other importantgoods in the achievement of human flourishing (or, if non-dominationis regarded as a deontological side-constraint, as suggested by Forst2013, its relative priority vis-à-vis other side-constraints).Pettit (2005, 2014) sketches a case for the relative priority ofrepublican liberty on more or less pragmatic grounds: roughlyspeaking, he argues that political doctrines will be most effectivewhen they concentrate on as few core values as possible, andaccordingly that the best values to concentrate on are those whosepromotion will service as wide a range of needs as possible.Republican freedom is just such a good, he claims, insofar as ourefforts to promote it will necessarily have far-reaching beneficialconsequences. It will be more clear why this might be so in light ofthe discussion in part four below, but regardless there remainsconsiderable work to be done developing the foundations of republicantheory.

3. The Classical Republican Tradition

After long-standing neglect among historians of political thought,there has been a dramatic revival of interest in the classicalrepublican tradition in the past fifty years or so. For the first fewdecades of this revival, a particular interpretation of that traditionprevailed. According to this view, the classical republicans held whatwould now be described as a perfectionist politicalphilosophy—that is, a political philosophy centered on the ideaof promoting a specific conception of the good life as consisting inactive citizenship and healthy civic virtue on the one hand, whilecombating any sort of corruption that would undermine these values onthe other. This distinctive vision of the good life is supposed to berooted in the experience of the ancient Greek polis, especially asexpressed in the writings of Aristotle. The goods of active politicalparticipation, civic virtue, and so on, are to be understood asintrinsically valuable components of human flourishing.

It is now standard to refer to this as the ‘civichumanist’ interpretation of the classical republican tradition,and it is most commonly associated with the writings of Arendt (1958,1963), Pocock (1975, 1981), and Rahe (1992). These and other civichumanist writings have left such an impression on the field that eventoday many fail to distinguish their views from those of the civicrepublicans. As we shall see, however, the two are importantlydistinct.

3.1 The Instrumental Turn

Beginning with Skinner (1984), Sunstein (1988), and Pettit (1989), analternative interpretation of the tradition began to emerge.Undoubtedly, the classical republicans were committed to theimportance of active political participation, civic virtue, combatingcorruption, and so forth. But rather than viewing these asintrinsically valuable components of a particular vision of the goodlife, these authors argued, they should instead be viewed asinstrumentally useful tools for securing and preservingpolitical liberty, understood as independence from arbitrary rule.Republicanism, on this view, has its roots not in an Aristotelianvision of the ancient Greek polis, but rather in Roman jurisprudencewith its fundamental and categorical distinction between free men andcitizens on the one hand, and dependent slaves on the other. Thisinstrumental or ‘neo-Roman’ interpretation of thetradition was cemented in major contributions by Spitz (1995), Pettit(1997), Dagger (1997), and Skinner (1998).

There now exists a considerable historiographical literature advancingthis new interpretation, including studies of Machiavelli (Skinner1983, 1984; Viroli 1998), the seventeenth-century English republicans(Dzelzainis 1995; Skinner 1998, 2000; Lovett 2005, 2012a, 2020);Rousseau (Viroli 1998); many Americans of the founding era (Sellers1994); Wollstonecraft (Coffee 2012; Halldenius 2015); some of theFrench revolutionaries (Hammersley (2010); and thenineteenth-century American labor republicans (Gourevitch 2015). Theseand other contemporary civic republicans argue that a careful readingof the classical republican texts firmly rejects the perfectionistinterpretation favored by civic humanists.

Moreover, the instrumental turn was vital to establishing interest inrepublicanism as a viable contemporary political doctrine. Thedifficulty with civic humanism, as many critics have pointed out, isthat a perfectionist vision of human flourishing through activepolitical virtue is out of step with modern political and socialconditions. There is simply no hope for recreating the experienceof the Greek polis in economically complex mass democraciescharacterized by reasonable pluralism (Herzog 1986; Goodin 2003;Brennan and Lomasky 2006). This objection is removed, however, if weregard civic virtue instrumentally, as merely one tool among othersfor securing political liberty. Insofar as republicans are willing touse that tool, and thus willing to support public policies designed todeliberately cultivate civic virtue, they must perhaps reject strongerdoctrines of liberal neutrality; but they will nevertheless be happyto endorse broad principles of toleration (Honohan 2013; Lovett andWhitfield 2016). Thus properly understood, republicanism is fully“compatible with modern pluralistic forms of society”(Pettit 1997, 8).

3.2 Republicanism and Liberalism

The contemporary civic republican interpretation carries with it whatcould be seen as a significant drawback, namely, that it reduces thedistance between classical republicanism and the mainstream liberaltradition. At one level, this should surprise no one. After all,classical republicans and classical liberals shared many politicalcommitments (constitutionalism and the rule of law, for example), andmany figures are regarded as central to both traditions (Montesquieu,for example). The difficulty arises, however, from the suggestion thaton the new instrumental interpretation, republicanism for all intentsand purposes collapses into liberalism (Patten 1996; Larmore 2001).Indeed, at one point in hisPolitical Liberalism, Rawlsexplicitly states that his theory has “no fundamentalopposition” with a non-perfectionist, instrumentalinterpretation of republicanism (1993, 205). What then is theadvantage of civic republicanism over mainstream liberalism (Herzog1986; Goodin 2003; Brennan and Lomasky 2006)?

The standard reply among contemporary civic republicans is to arguethat there is indeed a connection between republicanism andliberalism, but that liberalism is “an impoverished orincoherent republicanism” (Viroli 2002, 61)—a bastardoffshoot, so to speak, of what was originally a considerably moreappealing political philosophy. The republican critique of liberalismis thus best understood as a critique of various problematictendencies that developed within the liberal tradition as itincreasingly diverged from its republican roots.

The most important of these is the tendency in the liberal tradition,especially beginning with Bentham, Paley, and Constant, to displacethe robust conception of liberty as independence from arbitrary oruncontrolled power with a weaker conception of liberty asnon-interference. The significance of this substitution will be easierto assess after the discussion below, but in the main it comes down tothis: because republican liberty is inherently incompatible with anyform of dependency or mastery, its social implications areconsiderably more radical than those of mere negative liberty. This isprecisely why many liberal authors took pains to distance themselvesfrom republicanism in the first place, as they openly admitted:“those definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which, bymaking that essential to civil freedom which is unattainable inexperience, inflame expectations that can never be gratified,”observed Paley (1785, 315; cf. Pettit 1997).

What is more, on the view of liberty as non-interference, any sort ofpublic law or policy intervention will count as an interference and,ergo, as a reduction in freedom. Liberals committed to the receivedview of negative liberty will thus tend to be overly hostile togovernment action (Pettit 1997, 2009). On the republican view, bycontrast, public laws or policy interventions need not always count asreductions in freedom. Provided the law or policy is adopted andimplemented in an appropriately non-arbitrary manner, thecitizens’ freedom remains untouched. Indeed, if the law orpolicy ameliorates dependency, or curtails the arbitrary powers somein the community exercise over others, freedom may be enhanced. In theclassical tradition, this idea was often expressed as the claim that,in the words of Blackstone, “laws, when prudently framed, are byno means subversive but rather introductive of liberty” and thus“where there is no law, there is no freedom” (1765, 122).The grounds for this claim will be explained further below.

4. The Contemporary Republican Program

However interesting the debates discussed in the previous section, onemay still wonder whether republicanism has anything valuable tocontribute to contemporary normative political theory and philosophy.One reason many people remain skeptical has to do with the fact thatthe classical republican writings often express views that aredecidedly elitist, patriarchal, and militaristic. How could the basisfor an appealing contemporary political program be found in suchwritings (Goldsmith 2000; Maddox 2002; Goodin 2003; McCormick2003)?

That the classical republicans often expressed these very unappealingviews is not disputed. But what are we to make of this fact? There aretwo possibilities. On the one hand, the parochialism of the classicalrepublicans might reflect logical consequences of their core valuecommitments, in which case we cannot adopt the latter without takingon board the former. On the other hand, it might merely reflect theaccidental prejudices of their day, in which case it can easily bedispensed with as we modernize the republican program. Now accordingto the civic humanist reading of the tradition, the classicalrepublicans were committed to a perfectionist conception of the humangood as active citizenship and civic virtue. On this view, it is clearthat some individuals will be more successful than others in attainingthe good so understood—some are more adept at politics thanothers, some are more capable of heroic displays of virtue thanothers, and so on. Indeed, political power and public honor are, tosome extent, positional goods, meaning that their distribution amongthe members of a community will necessarily be unequal. It followsthat, on the civic humanist reading of the tradition, the elitist bentof the classical republican writings is a consequence of their corevalues. As Arendt writes, it is “the sign of a well-orderedrepublic” that only the politically virtuous elite “wouldhave the right to be heard in the conduct of the business of therepublic” (1963, 279).

The civic republicans, naturally, reject this view. There is nothinginherently elitist about the ideal of freedom when this is understoodnegatively as independence from arbitrary or uncontrolled power. Theclassical republicans, to be sure, typically confined the extension ofthis ideal to a narrow range of propertied, native-born male citizens.But on the civic republican reading of the tradition, this merelyreflects an unnecessary prejudice we can easily dispense with. Theelitism of the tradition long concealed the potentially radicalimplications of freedom as non-domination; suitably universalized nowat last, republicanism is revealed to be a strikingly progressivepolitical doctrine (Pettit 1997, 2014; Maynor 2003; Gourevitch2015).

The remainder of this section will sketch some of the wide-rangingapplications of a universalized republicanism, dedicated to thepromotion of freedom as non-domination. Much of the contemporaryrepublican program, as one would expect, bears some familialrelationship with the political commitments of the classicalrepublicans. There are also divergences, however. Contemporary civicrepublicans draw inspiration from the classical tradition, but they donot aim to anachronistically implement the republicanism of yore forits own sake.

4.1 Republican Public Policy

Contemporary civic republicans aim to promote freedom, understood asindependence from arbitrary power. Roughly speaking, there are twodirections from which republican freedom might be threatened. First,there is the obvious danger of an autocratic or despotic governmentassuming arbitrary powers over its subjects; this concern, andrepublican remedies for it, will be discussed below. But there is asecond danger to republican freedom as well—one that concernscontemporary civic republicans just as much as the first. This is thedanger that some individuals or groups within civil society willsucceed in assuming arbitrary or uncontrolled powers over others.Absent this second concern, republican policy would indeed often seem“indeterminate,” as observed by McMahon (2005) andCosta (2007). A few examples will help clarify this seconddanger.

Imagine for a moment there were no system of domestic criminal andcivil law. In this case, citizens would not know where they stood withone another; their interrelations would be governed simply byforce—which is to say, by the arbitrary whim of the momentarilystronger party. In order to enjoy some degree of republican freedom,therefore, it is absolutely essential to introduce a domestic legalsystem so as to govern the citizens’ mutual relations (Lovett2016a). Notice that, on the republican view of freedom, the laws donot merely protect some freedoms at the expense of others (as on thenon-interference view), but rather themselves actually introduce orenable that freedom. On this view, only when their interrelations aremutually governed by a system of public and stable rules is itpossible for fellow citizens to enjoy some measure of independencefrom arbitrary rule (Pettit 1989, 1997, 2012; Spitz 1995; Viroli 2002;Dagger 2009).

This connection between the rule of law and freedom is a common themein the classical republican literature. Contemporary civic republicansobserve, however, that even when the rule of law is firmlyestablished, there remain many other potential dangers of which theclassical republicans were less well aware. For example, while marketsas such need not involve domination (Pettit 2006), and indeed whenwell-ordered might reduce it (Taylor 2017), republicans’enthusiasm for markets will have definite limits. Specifically, thereis the danger of basic needs deprivation, which can place the leastadvantaged members of society in a position of economic vulnerability(Spitz 1993; Pettit 1997; Viroli 2002). In order to satisfy theirbasic needs, individuals may well submit themselves to the arbitrarypower of exploitative employers or become dependent on the whims ofvoluntary charity (Dagger 2006; Gourevitch 2015; O’Shea 2019).Ensuring the enjoyment of republican freedom will therefore requiresome public provision for otherwise unmet basic needs.

Yet another danger to republican freedom arises in the context offamily life and gender relations. Traditional family law subjectedboth wives and children to considerable arbitrary power: circumstancesin the case of the latter, circumscribed opportunities in the case ofthe former, ensured the nearly complete dependency of both on thefamily they happened to be in. The contemporary civic republicanprogram is thus congenial to both an expansion of children’srights, and the elimination of sex domination (Pettit 1997; Phillips2000; Costa 2013; Halldenius 2015).

It is always important from a civic republican point of view to be onguard against the introduction of new forms of dependency andarbitrary power through those very laws and policies designed toenhance individual freedom, however. In the area of criminal and civillaw, for example, freedom might be threatened by legal uncertainty orprosecutorial discretion; and, of course, there are grave republicanconcerns with respect to the existing system of punishment in manywestern nations (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990). These dangers mightsuggest the need for a more democratized system of criminal justice(Martí 2009). Similarly, in the public provision of basicneeds, there are republican concerns with respect to dependence ongovernment aid and arbitrariness in the distribution of benefits thatmight point to the introduction of an unconditional basic income(Raventos 2007; Lovett 2010; for a contrary view, see Taylor 2017). Inmany of these areas, however, there remains considerable work forcontemporary civic republicans in determining the appropriate publicpolicy implications of a universalized concern for republicanfreedom.

4.2 Republican Political Institutions

Turning from questions of public policy to the form of government, wereturn to issues more familiar to the writers in the classicaltradition. Protecting citizens from the arbitrary or uncontrolledpower of their government through good institutional design representsperhaps the signature classical republican concern. Many of thestandard devices for achieving this aim—the rule of law, theseparation of powers, federalism, constitutionally entrenched basicrights, and so on—have been adopted by liberals and others.Contemporary civic republicans, naturally, remain committed to theseinstitutional devices in some measure (Pettit 1997, 2012, 2014; Maynor2003).

However, contemporary civic republicans also recognize that thesesorts of devices can only go so far. The basic reason for this isthat, no matter how carefully designed, the operation and functioningof government necessarily entails considerable discretion on the partof public authorities (Pettit 1997; Richardson 2002). There are twoespecially prominent instances of this. First, it is clear that nomatter how detailed and carefully-crafted it is, no system of explicitrules and regulations can possibly cover all contingencies andcircumstances. It follows that discretionary authority must inevitablybe left in the hands of courts, public agencies, and administrativebureaucracies. Second, even apart from this, there remains extensivediscretion in the hands of legislatures to set public law and policyin the first place. A daily-changing system of rules is no better thanhaving no rules at all.  

The standard republican remedy for this problem is enhanced democracy.It must, however, be democracy of the right sort. Most contemporarycivic republicans reject the populist model of democracy according towhich all public laws and policies must express the collective will ofthe people in order to be considered legitimate. Instead, theygenerally endorse some form of “qualified populism”(Richardson 2002) or “contestatory democracy” (Pettit1997, 1999, 2001; Maynor 2003). Roughly speaking, the idea is thatproperly-designed democratic institutions should give citizens theeffective opportunity to contest the decisions of theirrepresentatives. This possibility of contestation will make governmentagents wielding discretionary authority answerable to a publicunderstanding of the goals or ends they are meant to serve and themeans they are permitted to employ. In this way, discretionary powercan be subject to popular control in the sense required for a secureenjoyment of republican liberty (Pettit 2012, 2014; Ingham 2019).

Next, of course, we will want to know how popular control mightactually be put into practice. The main challenges are commonlyaddressed under three headings, outlined by Pettit (1997,186–7). The first and most thoroughly discussed is therequirement that discretionary authority be guided by the norm ofdeliberative public reasoning. This means that the relevantdecision-makers (legislatures, courts, bureaucrats, etc.) must berequired to present reasons for their decisions, and those reasonsmust be subject to open public debate (see Sunstein 1988, 1993; Pettit1997; Richardson 2002). So, for example, legislative processes shouldbe designed so as to discourage back-room bargaining on the basis ofsectional interests, and instead to encourage open publicdeliberation. Similarly, bureaucratic agencies should not be allowedto merely issue determinations on the basis of technocratic expertisewithout offering reasons for their decisions that are open to publicexamination.

The other two requirements have not received as much attention as thefirst, perhaps because both are relatively obvious. The second is thatof inclusiveness. Opportunities for democratic contestation must beequally open to all persons and groups in the society. Thisrequirement follows naturally from a universalized concern forrepublican liberty, and it has implications for the design ofrepresentative institutions, campaign financing, and so on (Pettit1997, 2012; Bellamy 2007). And the third requirement is that thereexist institutionalized forums for contestation—impartial‘courts of appeal,’ so to speak, where citizens can raiseobjections to public laws and policies (Pettit 1997, 1999, 2012).Whether these forums should include constitutional courts with strongpowers of judicial review remains a subject of debate in therepublican literature, however (Bellamy 2007; Honohan 2009; Hickey2019).

4.3 Civic virtue and corruption

Among the more salient themes in the classical republican traditionare the importance of civic virtue and the dangers of corruption. Wemay understand the term ‘corruption’ simply to mean theadvancement of personal or sectional interest at the expense of thepublic good, and ‘civic virtue’ as its opposite—thatis, a willingness to do one’s part in supporting the publicgood. Critics of republicanism often fear that this implies extensiveself-sacrifice and frugality, a renunciation of individuality andself-identification with the community (Herzog 1986; Goodin 2003;Brennan and Lomasky 2006). These fears are no doubt encouraged by thecivic humanist reading of the classical tradition along perfectionistlines. Civic republicans accordingly have been at pains to show thecontrary—that civic virtue should be understood as a strictlyinstrumental good, useful in establishing and maintaining republicanliberty. Far from calling for the subjection of individual tocollective aims, they argue, republican liberty is desirable in partbecause it enables citizens to pursue their private aims withassurances of security (Skinner 1984, 1991; Spitz 1993; Dagger 1997;Viroli 2002; Maynor 2003).

Broadly speaking, there are two topics to consider under the headingof civic virtue. On the one hand, there is the civic virtue and dangerof its corruption on the part of public officials; on the other, thereis the civic virtue and danger of its corruption on the part ofcitizens in general. With respect to the former, republicans typicallyreject the view (common in the liberal tradition) that publicofficials are by nature corrupt, and instead regard individuals aspotentially corruptible, but not necessarily corrupt (Pettit 1997).Working from this assumption, it is strictly a pragmatic and empiricalquestion which configurations of public laws, institutions, and normsare most likely to minimize the danger of corruption, and enhance thecivic virtue of public officials. Options here include screeningprocedures on the selection of officials, rules and norms keeping somepolicy options out of bounds, and both positive and negativesanctions. In designing such institutions, it is important not toassume the worst of people, for otherwise we might inadvertentlyencourage (through an evident lack of trust) the very corrupt behaviorone aims to guard against.

Promoting civic virtue on the part of the citizens in general,however, is just as important from a republican point of view. Thereare a variety of possible reasons for this. For the most part, theystem from the observation that the widespread enjoyment of republicanliberty is most likely to be maximized in a community where thecitizens are committed to that ideal, and each is willing to do his orher part in realizing it. For example, through collective politicalaction, citizens can bring instances of domination to publicattention; they can support laws and policies that would expandrepublican freedom; and they can do their part in defending republicaninstitutions when called upon to do so. Promoting this sort ofcommitment to republican ideals will require a fairly robust programof civics education, together with a culture that rewards virtue withpublic esteem (Dagger 1997; Pettit 1997; Brennan and Pettit 2003;Maynor 2003; Costa 2009; Lovett 2020). Again, it should be emphasizedhere that citizens do not enjoy republican freedom, on the civicrepublican view, inbeing virtuous. Indeed, this could not bethe case since, as argued earlier, the degree of republican freedomenjoyed is rather a question of how the laws, institutions, and normsof the community are ordered. Civic virtue is, however,instrumentally useful both in bringing about the right sortsof laws, institutions, and norms, and in ensuring their durability andreliability.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the connection between civic virtue(both on the part of public officials and citizens in general) and therule of law. The significance of the rule of law for republicanliberty was discussed above; in the classical republican tradition,this was expressed as the “empire of law” ideal—thenotion that in a free republic laws, not men, rule. Of course thiscannot ever be literally true, but it can be approximated in a sort ofartificial way, so that life can be experiencedas if it weretrue within a given community. This requires, however, that the law bewidely regarded as clear, predictable, and legitimate, and this inturn is possible only when there is a generally high level ofcompliance and when legal rules are embedded in a shared network ofinformal social norms (Pettit 1997; Lovett 2016a).

4.4 Republicanism Across Borders

The classical republicans were fond of extolling the martial valor ofRome and other ancient republics, and they often followed Machiavelliin advocating policies and institutions that would enhance theexpansionist capacities of republics. For this they have often beenaccused of militaristic and imperialistic tendencies (see for exampleGoodin 2003), but this is not entirely fair. One has to be mindful ofthe dangerous security environments republics have often faced. Theclassical republicans rarely advocated conquest for its own sake:“swords were given to men,” writes Sidney, “thatnone might be slaves,” not that they might enslave others (1698,343). In a hostile world populated by autocratic rivals, Machiavellimay have been right to believe that a republic’s best defence isa good offense.

Even so, the classical republicans were sensitive to the particulardangers of territorial expansion. They especially worried that byupsetting the domestic balance of wealth and power, imperial conquestwould undermine freedom at home, and accordingly they sought remediesthrough various cooperative and federal arrangements (Deudney 2007;Bohman 2008). Whether optimally securing republican freedom undermodern conditions will ultimately require some sort of globalrepublic, however, remains a topic of debate (see Pettit 2010;Martí 2010; Maynor 2015).

Beyond narrow security concerns, however, contemporary civicrepublicans have recently begun to explore the implications ofrepublican freedom for global economic justice. Supposing the ideal issuitably universalized, and thus every human being’snon-domination counts the same, are republicans committed tocosmopolitan policies of global redistribution? Here a wide range ofviews can be found in the literature. Pettit (2010, 2014) argues no,on the grounds that economic justice is mainly important indirectlyfor preserving domestic republican institutions, whereas Lovett(2016b) argues yes, on the grounds that poverty and severe inequalitydirectly expose individuals to domination. In between these positions,Laborde (2010), and Laborde and Ronzoni (2016) maintain that ourglobal obligations to promote non-domination are similar butultimately weaker than our domestic ones. Finally, Bachvarova (2013)suggests that republicanism is best suited to address relationalrather than distributive global justice.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to contemporary civic republicantheory, however, is the problem of state borders and global migration.Republicans are in a strong position to advocate for statelesspersons, refugees, and resident non-citizens who, in various ways, areclearly vulnerable to avoidable domination (Bohman 2009; Benton 2010).Much less obvious, however, is how to address the issue ofinternational freedom of movement. Traditionally committed to a strongconception of citizenship, the republican ideal of political libertyhas often seemed inseparable from the existence of bounded communitiesof fellow free citizens. Pettit (2012, 161–2) claims that sincestates have no choice but to maintain borders, the existence ofmigration controls as such cannot count as dominating, while Costa(2016) disagrees. Honohan (2014) insists that any migration controls agiven state does implement should be non-arbitrary, but as Fine (2014)observes, this does not settle the ultimate question of whetherfreedom of movement can be reconciled with the need to maintain civiccommunity.

5. Conclusion

In many respects, civic republicanism remains a still underdevelopedpolitical doctrine. Further work is required in all the areasdiscussed above, and there are many issues central to the concerns ofcontemporary political theorists and philosophers that contemporarycivic republicans have only recently begun to examine. Among thelatter, there are now at least initial treatments of multiculturalism(Laborde 2008; Lovett 2010; Honohan 2013; Bachvarova 2014), educationpolicy (Peterson 2011; Hinchliffe 2014; Macleod 2015), andintergenerational justice (Beckman 2016; Katz 2017; Pinto 2019),although substantial work certainly remains to be done. Nevertheless,civic republicanism is a dynamic and growing field, which stands tomake continuing positive contributions to debate in contemporarysocial and political theory.

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Other Internet Resources

• Lovett, Frank. “Republicanism,”Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science (2015), L. SandyMaisel (ed.).
• Pettit, Philip. “Republicanism,”The StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy (2003), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/republicanism/>. [This was the previous entry on republicanism in theStanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy — see theversion history.]

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