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1. In RG, Ross says what we are obliged to do is a certain act; that is,we are obliged to bring about a certain state of affairs, e.g., that afriend receives a book one promised to send her (RG 42–46).However, he changed his mind about this in FE, where he argues(following Prichard 1932) that what we obliged to do is to setourselves to do something rather than bring about a state of affairs(FE 108, 153–154, 160–161).

2. Ross says pleasure is onlyprima facie good because in somecases pleasure is bad, e.g., when it is taken in lust or in cruelty(RG 136–137). For criticism of Ross’s claim that pleasure isprima facie good, see Stratton-Lake 2002b: 125-128.

3. In FE, he describes justice as a situational good: it does notinvolve ‘activities or enjoyments resident in individuals, butwould involve relations between individuals’ (FE 286).

4. Ross says as a mere condition of the intellect knowledge is notbetter than pleasure. An instance of knowledge is better than aninstance of pleasure only when it is ‘to some extent theactualization of a desire for knowledge’ (RG 151). This desireis virtuous and so makes the knowledge better than the pleasure (RG152). Indeed, the value of knowledge of this kind‘completely’ transcends that of (at least) sensuouspleasure (RG 152).

5. In the case of pleasure, there are other reasons for thinking it isnot worthy of admiration, namely, that pleasant experiences are notadmirable like virtue and intellectual activity and that one is notconsidered admirable in respect of feeling pleasure, though one is inrespect of behaving virtuously and in respect of intellectual activity(FE 271).

6. Initially, Ross thought all innocent pleasures were good, including one’s own, and that we ought to promote them (RG 24–26; though cf. 151). In FE, denies that we have reason to promote our own pleasure.

7. Stratton-Lake (2002a: xlii, n.51) argues that it is‘unclear’ how Ross can ‘believe that pleasure isgood in any sense and avoid the conclusion that we have aprimafacie duty to promote our own pleasure.’ But given thedistinction between goods Ross draws in FE it is clear: my ownpleasure is not from my point of view an object worthy of satisfactiontherefore I have no duty or responsibility to promote it.

8. In his discussion of the idea it is right to take satisfaction in apromise being kept he is careful not to say that promise keeping isgood: indeed, he thinks it is right to take satisfaction in thisbecause it is an instance in which a duty is discharged, not a goodpromoted (FE 289).

9. This seems to be the view he held in OJ; see 119, 123. He does, note,appear to rely on a different view of justice (OJ 123).